Security, peace, Afghanistan, Dr. Farooq Azam, history, pukhtun, Pushtun, Pashtun

Security Situation in Afghanistan by
Dr. Faruq Azam



AFGHANISTAN STUDIES FORUM (A worldwide think-bank of Afghan intellectuals based in London) 132 Caledonian Road, London N1 9RE, UK Tel. + 44 (o)79 4457 3690; Fax: + 44 (0)20 7689 4216; Email: farouqazam@hotmail.com Ref. ЕЕЕЕ. Date. ЕЕЕ.. SECURITY SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN by Dr. Farouq Azam For the Bonn Conference on the PROMOTING SECURITY IN AFGHANISTAN AND THE REGION Bonn, Germany, May 23-26, 2003 Background After Sept. 11, the US needed allies in Afghanistan that knew the terrains of the country and were willing to fight the Taliban and al Qaeda. Warlords like Abdul Rashid Dostum, Gul Agha Shirzai, Qaseem Fahim, Toran Ismail, Ustad Atta, Haji Qadeer, Badshah Khan Zadran, etc., who were driven by the Taliban were approached by the US. So far, as President Karzai put it, they were living in Pakistan, Iran, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan with few sympathizers inside Afghanistan in remote mountains. The US different sources, mainly the CIA, gave these individuals millions of dollars, military hardware, ammunition and moral support to work as the US ground force in fighting the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. In exchange for their service, these warlords were allotted shares of the Afghan kingdom. Though Washington knew these warlords were bitter rival to each other in the past but hoped to manage them and prevent their hostility from interfering with operations while it conducted its war against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. Washington further assumed these warlords would abandon their old habits and come on board with the US program once the Taliban were ousted and the situation turned to normal. Thus, the priority was given at the time to the military operation and the socio-political aspect of the problem was left to the UN to handle. The UN needed a new administration for Afghanistan to take control of the country, assume its international obligations and make Afghanistan safe for her near and far reaching neighbors. The Afghans wanted a strong and to somehow a representative central government to bring security to the war torn country; reconstruct their country's soci-economic infrastructure and become in the position to coordinate their interests with the interests of their neighbors and the international community on the basis of mutual respect. Among these three major players, of course, the Americans were in strong position and dominated the other two. The UN, in its part, wanted to please the Americans and the neighbors of Afghanistan as the Afghans did not have voice in the United Nations. The Bonn Accord was concluded in such an atmosphere described above and the today chaos arose from the very point that the international community paid little attention to the Afghan side of the problem. From the UN point of view, the Bonn Conference was a success as it accommodated the interests of the neighbors of Afghanistan and the big powers. On the ground, the new Kabul administration was a concession to warlords who served as the US ground force and thus the US was also happy, able to continue its military campaign without major obstacles. From the Afghan point of view, it was a narrow based non-representative administration and actually a bunch of warlords joined by few powerless technocrats from the West. However, in spite of these reservations, many Afghans attached hopes to the Bonn Conference as a first step as they believed every political process has to start from somewhere. The Afghans expected the international community to bring security to Afghanistan, gave opportunity to the formation of a representative and professional government and help the reconstruction of the country. The UN asked for time till Loya Jirga of June 2002. Please keep patience; conditions will change significantly, Karzai and Ibrahim were telling the people. But, we all saw Loya Jirga, which was a rubber stamp on the Bonn Accord. No desired change in the government took place but, instead, the warlords emerged stronger. Thus, security further deteriorated. With no security, no reconstruction of the country can take place as donors don't want to fatten the warlords. They must not be considered milking cows. The Afghans desperately need security in their country to resume their normal lives. Moreover, many of them were forced to leave their homes and are dispersed all over the world. They need conditions in the country to be conducive for their return and to live without fear of another war. They need the warlords to be disarmed and wish to see Law rules the country. A government neither can function effectively nor can bring socio-economic reforms if there is no security. Security would encourage investments and give opportunity to reconstruct the country. Otherwise, accords, legislations and constitutions would be instruments at the hands of warlords to justify their selfish rule and dictatorship. After this short background, I want to focus here only on security issue. The US Defence Secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, said few weeks ago in Kabul "war in Afghanistan is over". While, Mr. Ibrahimi, the UN Special Envoy for Afghanistan and the engineer of the Bonn Accord, told to the UNSC just few days later "security, law and order in Afghanistan is getting out of control and has posed a serious threat to the peace process". These two remarks seem apparently contradiction to each other, but in reality on the ground, both are correct. Yes, Mr. Rumsfeld is right; war is over; Al-Qaeda is dismantled in Afghanistan and the Taliban are no more a threat to the Kabul Government. Yes, Mr. Ibrahimi is right as the real threat is now from the warlords. There are several major reasons for insecurity in Afghanistan: 1. Pashtun factor. The Pashtuns, majority in Afghanistan and the backbone of every socio-political setup in the country, were not given a due say in Bonn Conference. Qanuni, Sirat, Jarir and Gailani, none of them a Pashtun, headed the four groups constituted the Bonn Conference. The former King's group, considered Pashtun, was invited by the UN to balance the meeting from ethnical point of view. But, the king, for some reasons, included many pro-Northern Alliance non-Pashtuns in his group, which upset the balance further more. Nineteen out of 28 ministries, including defense, interior, intelligence, foreign, press & Culture, education, reconstruction, were given to non-Pashtuns. Though, the UN and the international community recognized the role of the Pashtuns and had firm believe that there would be no peace in the country if this group is sidelined and for this very reason, the UN appointed Hamid Karzai, a Pashtun, as head of the new administration. However, in practice, the UN did not seem committed to this recognition. Karzai with no power was put among the ruthless powerful warlords. He was put in the administration as an individual, guarded by the Americans, while; his ministers each is either a warlord or representing a warlord. Most of the Pashtun members of the cabinet are the subjects of the Northern Alliance, introduced to the government to show it is a broad based administration. They are individuals, which does not have power base of their own. In addition, each warlord has at least two ministers under instruction in the cabinet. Thus, the warlords control the government from their provinces. Actually, it is a remote controlled government. The warlords, taking wrong advantage from the US and UN support, abused human rights and brought a shame for the international community. They massacred hundreds of the Taliban prisoners in the presence of the Americans, thousands more in their absence but with their knowledge and uprooted tens of thousands of Pashtun families from their homes as part of ethnic cleansing. The massive graves in Dasht-i-Laili, Shabeghan and Mazar-i-Sherif are name and shame. The US and UN turned their blind eye towards the raping of Pashtun women, looting their properties and honor. Not only the UN and the US have not even asked these warlords to allow these displaced Pashtuns to return home, but their uprooting is still continuing with the knowledge of the UN Special Envoy to Afghanistan. Moreover, the warlords are fighting among each other for the revenues, coming from tax, custom and drug and for the control of territory, mainly the Pashtun areas in the north, which are left to these warlords tied hands. In the north of the country, Pashtuns are the minority that constitutes 40% of the total population, but bigger than any single group there. Traditionally, the Pashtuns have kept a balance and harmony in the north between different ethnic groups, but this balance is now upset. Pashtuns were given little say in Loya Jirga. They collected majority vote for the former king. Hundreds of non-Pashtun delegates supported the nomination. But the Zahir Shah was forced by the US to retreat after the Defense Minister, Fahim, threatened to withdraw his supporters from the Loya Jirga and put his forces on alert. The nation as a whole and pashtuns in particular were again denied their democratic rights to choose their leader. The Government emerged from the Loya Jirga was to much extent the continuation of the Bonn Conference in which the Pashtuns were sidelined. The US military operation is confined only to Pashtun areas. In order to avoid American casualties, the US uses air force extensively in every military operation. Such action (bombardment) not only destroys the house of the suspect but the neighboring houses as well and killing innocent people. All villagers get panic but children and women are more affected psychologically. This anger multiplies when the strike is proved to be a mistake due to the false report of the rival faction. Several time the Americans bombarded a village or a group of people by mistake, e.g., wedding, funeral, festival, etc. Such action increases the opposition of the Pashtuns towards the Americans as the former already consider themselves deprived from their legitimate rights in their own country. Thus, the Pashtuns are sidelined in the politics of their country; suppressed in the north and are persecuted in the east, south and west. They are under pressure from every quarter. If the US does not change its policy towards the Pashtuns security will never return to the country. The role of Pashtuns has become more important in the politics of the region in the post-Saddam era as Iran will appease the Americans in Afghanistan. Rumsfeld and Ibrahimi's indications seem signs of a change. 2. The warlords. Dostum's clashes with Ustad Atta, Atta clashes with Hizb Wahdat in the north have become a routine news item. Toran Ismail and Amanullah are fighting in Herat; Badsha Kahan is fighting with Karzai's appointed governors in Paktya, Paktika and Khost. Situation in other parts of Afghanistan is not much better than these. Warlords have posed a serious threat to the central government, to the normal life of the ordinary people. Taking wrong advantage from the US alignment, the warlords tried to pressurize the central government for more concessions. These warlords know well that the US supports Karzai but they also know the US has to maintain good relations with them since she still needs them against the remnants of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. They have skillfully designed the situation such to make the Americans think they are in need of these warlords for ever. Rockets shelling on Kabul and terrorizing the NGO personnel can be a part of such designs. The question now is, if the war against Taliban and Al-Qaeda is over and warlords are currently a serious threat to the security of the country, then, why some thing can not be done about? It seems the situation is made such that the Americans have to bleed in Afghanistan, not by enemies but by apparently war allies. These warlords are encouraging the Americans to strengthen their muscles more by imposing a federal system on Afghanistan, though unrealistic and against the interest of all except them. Under the federal system, the warlords believe, they will continue their absolute power for ever. If they understand, it is not the case, they would never want it. There will be no security if the warlords are not disarmed thoroughly. It can not be done under the present administration. The Ministry of Defense that is in charge of disarming the warlords is not trusted by all. More or less it is the military department of the Northern Alliance rather to call it the Ministry of Defense of Afghanistan as almost all top officials of the ministry belong to NA. Though some changes took place recently but they are so minor. Moreover, sixty five percent of the top generals of the Ministry of Defense are from the Panjsher district. This is not acceptable even by all components of the Northern Alliance, e.g. Ismail Khan and Dostum. This is why no warlord is ready to hand over his arms to the Ministry of Defense. Fahim will also not hand over his weapon if he is not Minister of Defense any more. Thus, the program of disarmament does not go any where. It is only a good excuse for big warlords to eat the smaller fishes. In Heart, Ismail Khan took advantage of the program and attacked the Pashtun commanders in Shindand, Gulran, Ghorian and Obeh. 3. ISAF. The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) is only in Kabul and has not gone further to the provinces as envisaged in Bonn Conference. Though ISAF is welcomed by Afghans and proved to be psychologically important but could not expand beyond Kabul. Practically, it failed to enforce proper security even in Kabul. The Minister of Civil Aviation, Dr. Abdul Rahman, was assassinated at the front of the ISAF in 2002. It did not take any action and thus rewarded those who wanted to destabilize the government and jeopardize the security of the capital. Haji Qadeer, Vice President, was assassinated soon after the Loya Jirga at the front of his office in the heart of the Kabul city where ISAF had full presence. No action was taken and thus it was another reward to war allies. In spite of serious setback to his credibility among Afghans, Karzai asked for American bodyguards to save him from his colleagues. It is recognition of the fact; ISAF could not provide security to the people of the city, to the ministers and to the president of the country. However, ISAF still has a good psychological effect that must be appreciated and boosted. The Afghanistan Studies Forum has already submitted a thorough analysis of the role of ISAF in Afghanistan and proposed how it could be spread all over Afghanistan effectively without increasing its number. 4. No shared ideology, tactics and concerted efforts in the part of the government. An effective government is a group of people having a common ideology with agreed agenda for work to run the administration. The Kabul Government's ministers have completely different ideologies and agendas. Some are Islamic fundamentalists and some are against; some believe in federalism but others consider the idea treason. Some wants democracy but some are against it, some are famous drug traffickers and some are their critics and so on. Thus, they are ideologically against each other, no shared and specific agenda and have no intention to work together as a team. Even there is a sharp rift between those who wear western dress and ties and those who use Pakol. Thus, this government is made of opponents if not foes. Such a government will never survive for long. Its survival is dependent on the US blessing. In such disarray in the part of the government machinery, warlords and wreck bureaucrats are happy; injustice prevails that is the root of discontent and insecurity. Tension between Karzai and Fahim; between Younus Qanuni and Minister of Interior are so surfaced that world media has mention several times. Even, President Bush's Special Envoy to Afghanistan, Khalilzad, mediated between Karzai and Fahim in August 2002. How security can be restored? If war in Afghanistan is over as Mr. Rumsfeld claimed; if warlords are the real threat to security and peace process as Mr. Ibrahimi put it, then, both the US and the UN must act decisively and quickly. The present government has been setup by emergency conditions. Emergency can not continue for ever. Nothing will come out of the present crippled setup. The new constitution, drafted by the government and the coming Loya Jirga, another rubber stamp, will not simply work. A new government, new people with new agenda are in urgent demand. Regards, _______________ Dr. Farouq Azam Chairman, AFGHANISTAN STUDIES FORUM