Korean religions – pre-colonial and colonial period.

Korea’s Pre-colonial Christianity

- Roman Catholic missionaries did not arrive in Korea until 1794, a decade after the return of the first baptized Korean from a visit to Beijing (1784). However, the writings of the Jesuit missionary, Matteo Ricci, who was resident at the imperial court in Beijing, had been brought to Korea from China in the seventeenth century. It appears that scholars of the Sirhak, or practical learning, school were interested in these writings. Largely because converts refused to perform Confucian ancestor rites (yangban Yun Ch’I-ch’ung – 1791, refusal to mourn his mother using the traditional tablet, execution), the government prohibited the proselytization of Christianity. Protest – Hwang Sa-yŏng and call for the French fleet (1801). Already around 1800 many of the Catholics – middle-class technicians, artisans and women. The challenges to the established order – the idea that religion is private matter and to be free from the state interference (private moral community – challenge to the Confucian idea of the state as one huge moral community, and step to modern civil society), and the idea of equality (of classes and sexes, however uncomplete). Still, most Catholics remained supportive of those Confucian moral norms that were compatible with their beliefs. The attitude of “serving the senior state” survived, but the “seniority” shifted from Peking to Rome (France). Some Catholics were executed during the early nineteenth century (French martyrs, first Korean priest-martyr – Andrew Kim Tae-gŏn – 1846), but the anti-Christian law was not strictly enforced (successful hiding in the provinces). By the 1860s, there were some 17,500 Roman Catholics in the country (and almost 70,000 in 1910 – “miraculous” growth). There followed a more rigorous persecution, in which thousands of Christians died, that continued until 1884. Religious freedom – won with the treaty between Korean and France in 1886. Consequence of the persecution – strong sect mentality, thorough rejection of non-Christian cults (Buddhism, shamanism). First native priests instead the martyred – in 1896 only (long French domination of church leadership. French bishops – until almost the end of Japanese period. First Korean bishop - 1942). Up to the end of colonial period – more foreign than Korean priests. Jansenist orientation of foreign leadership – less medical and educational service, more other-wordliness. Catholic church – already was not in the vanguard of the “modernity” even in the France, and definitely not in Korea. Less contacts with the modernizing elite (thus driven to Protestantism). The only prominent nationalist leader among the Korean Catholics – An Chung-gŭn (assassin of Ito Hirobumi in 1909) – denounced by the French leadership. Other – less prominent – Catholic assassin – Chŏn Myŏng-un (killed D.Stevens in 1908). Almost no anti-Japanese involvement afterwards (no Catholics among the organizers of the demos in 1919) – one of the reasons Protestant churches (more involved in the nationalist movements) grew comparatively quicker. Willingness to participate in Shinto rites (Vatican’s political considerations). Overall – “limited modernity” of the Korean Catholicism before 1945 – religious freedom and relative in-group equality, but hardly more. “Dependent modernity” – foreign “tutelage”.

“The mountain where the heads were cut” – 切頭山 – Catholic sanctuary in Seoul

- First Protestant missionary to make Korean contacts – John Ross (1842-1915) in Manchuria (1870^th ): mostly with itinerant merchants. From the first beginning – orientation on non-yangban “masses” (basically, middle classes, especially commercial), “scholarly approach” (Korean textbook, translation of Bible), strategy of “indigenisation”. All this wonderfully matched the incipient Korean nationalism – the idea of class equality, importance of Korean language (as opposed to Chinese), and ideals of independent Korean church.

“The Korean Primer” – 1877 (at that time, textbooks in vernacular were non-existent even in Korea itself).

Protestant missionaries entered Korea during the 1880s and, along with Catholic priests, converted a remarkable number of Koreans. Methodist and Presbyterian missionaries were especially successful. They established schools, universities, hospitals, and orphanages and played a significant role in the modernization of the country: Paejae Boys’ School (1886), Ewha Girls’ School (1886). Lack of students in the first days: schools resembled orphanages. First elite baptism – Yun Ch’iho, 1887, Shanghai. Emory Un-ty: struggle to reconcile Social Darwinism and Christian faith. Solution: the fittest is usually relatively more moral and has God’s connivance for what it does. Fitness as God’s gift, invasion as a fault of the unvaded, moral fault. Overall rejection of the Confucianism (even filial piety as contradicting to the “public spirit). Yun’s “Independence Club”: 1896-1899: God, industry, education, complete Westernisation, and fight for civil rights as main topics. “Christian capitalism” as moral good (“America supplies the world with the food”). Number of Protestant adherents at 1910: about 200,000, including large number of new urban middle-class and elite people. Education totally under Protestants – more than 800 schools. Northwest (P’yongyang) – largely ran by the Protestants (1/6 of the city was converted – “Korean Jerusalem”). “Great Revival” movement – started in P’yongyang in 1907, and the same year Korean Presbyterian Church became fully self-governed. Position towards national struggle – ambivalent: Church was to withdraw from day-to-day political struggle, but sponsor the “gradual” national building through “spiritual and economical revival”. Still, very strong anti-Japanese element (although generally non-militant). Along with “material modernization” (schools, people’s assemblies, hospitals, self-governing churches, etc.), Protestantism brought strong “spiritual modernization” – idea of “ethical nature of commerce” as contribution to “nation-building”, “inner dialogue with God”, “class equality”, “personal repentance”, and “spiritual independence from the rulers” (although not necessary against the rulers). By 1910, Protestantism was largely Koreanized, much unlike Catholicism.

During the Japanese colonial occupation, Christians were in the front ranks of the struggle for independence. The Conspiracy Case (the Case of 105): 1911-1913 – Yun Ch’iho imprisoned. Contradictory policy of 1910-1919 – wish to eliminate all “heterogeneous elements” and fear to provoke hostile foreign reaction. Thus, the prohibition of religious instruction in schools in 1915 (all instruction also was to be switched into Japanese, Western missionaries unable to speak Japanese being threatened with dismissal) and 10-years “grace period”. For many Protestants, church became the substitute for the absent Korean state – National symbol and the only hope for “National Revival” (understood as “growth of Christian democracy and Christian commerce”). Progress of the Church as “national progress”. Korea as “holy race” and “second Israel”, “sacrificed for the divine sake”. Beginning of conflicts between increasingly nation-conscious Korean pastors and activist lay folk, and missionaries wishing to retain their control over the churches for some time: 1918: Rev. Kim Sangho (Hwanghae Province) separated himself from mainstream missionary Presbyterian Church and founded “Korean Christian Church”, without any help from the missionaries and on the base of liberal theology. Non-church movement in Korea – influenced by Japanese Christian thinker Uchimura Kanzō (1861-1930). Kim Kyosin (1901-1945) – begins this movement in Korea in 1927, publishes <Biblical Korea> - religious journal with strong nationalist elements (“you should go to those who possess the spirit of Korea rather than to those who call themselves Christian”). Kim – arrested by the Japanese, dies in captivity. Christian publications – greatly accelerate the spread of vernacular writing (hangŭl). Principal “language nationalists”, scholars of Korean language – graduates or teachers in Protestant schools. Summer Bible schools for children – greatly contributing in spreading literacy in the villages (more than 30 thousands students).

March 1, 1919 – largely Protestant movement (22% of all arrested Koreans were Protestants, although the total number of Protestant Koreans did not exceed 250 thousands). Then - growth of “diplomatic gradualism” (Methodist Syngman Rhee), “economical gradualism” (An Ch’angho), and “military struggle” (Lee Tonghwi) – the latter drifting eventually to Communism. Mainstream – “culturalist” self-improvement and “national repentance”. Tragedy of collaboration in 1930^th – middle-class commercial background of most prominent Protestants did not allow anything else.

General factors of church growth in the Christian world: advantages of “strong” churches that demand absolute faith, strong commitment, rigorous training (Dean Kelly, <Why Conservative Churches Are Growing?>), deprivation-compensation factor, status group theory. Korean colonial context – Korean churches may be generally classified as “strong” (rigorous and demanding), participation in church life could psychologically compensate the absence of real national or free social life, and belonging to a church accorded “modern” status of an “enlightened”, “Westernised” person, many opportunities for network-building.

Contextual factors contributing to the growth of Protestantism also included:

· the deep crisis of Korean Buddhism,

· the efforts made by educated Christians to reconcile Christian and Confucian values (the latter being viewed as purely a social ethic rather than a religion).

· the encouragement of self-support and self-government among members of the Korean church, and the identification of Christianity with Korean nationalism.

Korea’s Post-colonial Christianity

- Loss of the North – the most Christianised area. Experience of Christian Social Democratic Party of Cho Mansik. Sunday general elections – November 1946, and the subsequent great flight to the South. Result – the formation of conservative anti-communist Christian milieu in the South and pro-governmental official pseudo-church (“Christian Federation”) in the North (with Kang Yang-uk, Kim Il-song’s mother’s cousin, and former pastor, as the head). The Korean War and finalization of the cleavage: American-built churches in the North are bombed and destroyed by the Americans (to the utmost dismay of pro-Governmental former Christians), and the “flied Christians” of Northern extraction consider the anti-Communist war “sacred” (the concept of “sacred war” – introduced by the Japanese during the Pacific War). Army chaplainries in the Southern Army – main tool of the proselytising (no Buddhist competition until 1970th). Anti-Communism as the main link between the churches and the state, main rationale for the dictatorship for Western-educated Christians. Until the 1970th – “mutual non-interference”: by the churches to the affaires of the dictatorship, and by the dictators – into the church affairs. Some of the Christian leaders of Northern provenance, personally embittered by the loss of their properties (Rev. Han Kyŏngjik, etc.) – specially close to almost all dictatorial governments (prayer sessions in the presidential mansions, etc.).

- Liberal and anti-governmental Christians in the South. “Kijang” – liberal Presbyterian denomination with Canadian/Manchurian/Northeast Korean roots. The idea of “non-missionary seminary by Koreans and for Koreans” – already in the colonial days. 1960th and 1970th – beginning of the human rights struggle, and systematisation of the Korean and mass-oriented “minjung” theology (Korean counterpart to the “liberation theology”, but without Marxist references, impossible in Korean case). Idea of national and personal suffering and sorrow as re-presentation of the Old Testament Jewish and Jesus’ personal suffering experience. Koreans – individually and nationally – are to embody Jesus and his pain. New understanding of the political struggle – as product of righteous suffering and suffering itself. Self-sacrifice in the human rights struggle – is taken as culmination of purifying Christian experience. Struggle – as the march from sorrow to the Joy of Resurrection (and national/class revival: “minjung” has both national and class meanings). New understanding of shamanism – as Korean “minjung” spiritual experience, which facilitated the acceptance of Christianity. Shamanist exorcism – re-evaluated as “purification from evil”, “overcoming of the grief” (caused by class exploitation and national humiliation), indeed parallel to “minjung” theological “march to joy”. “Minjung” theology – predominantly liberal Protestant. “Minjung” Protestant pastors and unification issue – the case of Mun Ik-hwan.

Catholic Church – rapid Koreanization and prodigious growth (annual rates from 10 to 25%). More Catholic universities (including high-ranking Sŏgang University established by American Jesuits) and much better educated believers. Growth of Catholic medical facilities (4 mln. patients a year in early 1980th). Cardinal Stephan Kim Su-hwan – headed the Church from 1968 and started to support workers’ strikes and student movement. Material support of anti-dictatorial student movement – reason for unprecedented arrest of Catholic bishop Chi Hak-sun (1974). Newly-founded Korean Priests’ Association for the Realization of Justice and its human right struggle. March 1976 – joint Catholic-Protestant Declaration for National Salvation signed in the Catholic cathedral (by Catholic Kim Dae-jung, among others). The struggles of the Catholic farmers and workers (grass-root character of Korean Catholicism played positive role). The observing of “human rights’ Sunday” – from 1982. The Pope’s visit to Kwangju in 1984 and its significance. Cathedrals as staging grounds for political demonstrations – even now. New approach to the Unification issue – several unauthorized visits of Southern Catholic priests there. Most lay Catholics (70-80%) are highly supportive of the new social and political role of their Church.

New socio-political movements(in fact, minority in Protestantism) inside the Korean Christianity - reasons:

- consequence of the “indigenisation” of the Church – more attention to native, grass-roots practical concerns.

- speaking on behalf of the underprivileged majority as an instrument of church growth, “out-reach”

- Church as largely “off-limits” space for the dictatorships (protected by international connections) could allow itself “speaking on behalf” of the forcibly silenced groups

connection with the worldwide trends to “social gospel” and “involvement” (2nd Vatican

Council, Vietnam War and the radicalisation of the part of Christian spectrum)

- “Shamanist” elements as an instrument of church growth: collective and very emotional singing, full-voice praying with clapping hands, collective (and very charged) prayer for the nation and the victory over world Communism (in conservative churches). Collective prayer – loud, fervent, with bouncing, weeping, and crying, usually for worldly success (debt repayment, university entrance, etc.). “Healing” by putting the pastor’s hand on the patient. “Dionysian” church culture in Korea – festive and highly emotional.

- Church and “relationship” network – provider of social networking for uprooted first-generation urbanites. “Gospel of success” – “channelling” of lower-class aspirations towards the better position inside the existing system. Church positions – given in accordance with the degree of worldly success. “Prestige” and “non-prestige” churches - the same hierarchy as within university community. Church as social security network (almost non-existent in the normal form) – help in difficult times. Church as a “bigger family” – quasi-Confucian ideology of “church familism”. Competition between churches – “cross every ten meters”. Internal priority placed on church growth – most Korean churches followed “Fuller Seminary doctrine” which prioritises “evangelisation” – growth of church-going population. “Fuller Seminary doctrine” - Donald McGavran (1897-1990), who wrote in 1955 <The Bridges of God>, and founded School of World Mission at Fuller Seminary in 1965 – “we must evangelise up to our fringes”. This doctrine – entered Korea in the 1970s. Now – number of Protestant believers is estimated at 8 millions 700 thousands (Catholic – around 3 millions). Average growth rates for Protestants – 35% (Catholics – 58%). Decline in church membership growth rates in the later 1990s – due to general betterment of socio-economic situation (there are not so many deprivations now to compensate for by church-going), growth of leisure industry (more opportunities for alternative disposal of the free time), somewhat more negative image of church in recent years due to property scandals, “capitalist” manner in which many churches are run (focus on donations), general feeling that the church lost its meaning.

Overall – enormous Christian contribution to the building of modern Korea – nationalism, national language, democracy movement support, etc. Still, in mature modern society today Korean churches find themselves in a “growth crisis” of sorts – Christianity is no longer seen as the only – or the most preferable - route to modernity, churches are perceived largely as a part of conservative establishment (young progressive activists – mostly atheists or non-church believers).

Modernising Korean Buddhism:

Radical reformists of the later 19^th C. (Kim Okkyun and others) – very fond of Buddhism, see it as a possible substitute for the “fossilized” Neo-Confucianism (Buddhism seen as more egalitarian and open; also the example of the modernising Meiji Buddhism works).

1878 – Beginning of Japanese Buddhist missionary work in Korea: Pusan (earlier than Western Protestant missions. A motive – to forestall possible “Christianisation” of Korea – Pan-Asianist motives).

1889 – Beginning of Japanese Buddhist missionary work in Seoul – before this, Korean Buddhist monks were discriminated to the extent of not being allowed to enter Seoul at all.

1895 – On the request by Japanese Buddhist missionaries, Korean monks are officially allowed to enter Seoul at will – rapid increase of the pro-Japanese sympathies of the Korean monks.

1902 – Korean state attempts to administrate Buddhist temples directly through a special department, issues temple regulations and designates 16 “head temples”, using Japanese Meiji system – beginning of administrative centralization inside Buddhism.

1906 – First modern-type Buddhist school established, along Japanese lines – modernization of Korean Buddhism follows Japanese model.

The 1900s: Japanese practice of marriage for monks gradually spreads in Korea.

1911 – “Temple Ordinance” by the Japanese Government-General – colonial administration controls now all temples through the “head temple” system. Abbots – given rights to buy and sell temple land at will and made into “quasi-capitalists”. Most abbots – rich and staunchly pro-Japanese. Number of temples and monks – gradually increases (but much slower than the number of Protestant churches and believers).

1919 March 1 Movement – relatively small Buddhist participation (2 prominent Buddhist leaders are among the initiators).

1921 – Sŏn (Meditation) school is founded in Seoul – continuation of pre-modern traditions in the new circumstances.

From 1924 – up to 500 monks are sent to Japan to study. Study in Japan – becomes a requirement for a scholarly monk.

1926 – Government-General officially allows Korean monks to marry.

1931 – “Association of Young Korean Buddhists” – proclaims “progressive, rational, mass Buddhism” as its aim.

From 1935 – fascist influences in Buddhism; active participation in the official campaigns for the “development of spiritual fields” (loyalty to the Emperor).

From 1937 – Buddhist temple collect donations for building of military airplanes for the Japanese army, participate in the official Shinto rituals (prayers for victory, etc.).

1943 – “Prayers of the gratefulness” in the temples for applying Japanese conscription laws to the Koreans in full – Militarization of Buddhism.

1945-50 – right-left rift among the monks. 3 monks – enter South Korean parliament in 1950.

1950-53: Korean War, destruction of many temples (aerial bombing, suppression of guerrillas – blow to the temples). Land reform in South Korea - lots of temple lose their lands, and the governmental compensation was often embezzled by the corrupt abbots. General crisis of Buddhism.

1954 May – Syngman Rhee starts the campaign against “Japanized Buddhists” (an aim – to weaken Buddhism generally and strengthen Christianity). Deep rift among monks along “married”-“celibate” line, beginning of the “temple battles” (fistfights over the control over temples). Celibate monks – ordinate former gangsters and hooligans, to use them against “Japanized” rivals. Total weakening of Buddhism.

1961-62 – Park Chong Hee tries to settle the dispute and build a unified pan-national Buddhist organization, but fails. State – mainly supports the celibate Buddhists, and they reciprocate with full support to Park’s policies.

1967 – Buddhist monks sent to Vietnam together with Korean troops: build Korean temples there.

1960-70 – state sponsors Korean translation of Buddhist scriptures (from classic Chinese), systemizes Buddhist cultural assets and proclaims them “national treasures”, restores some bigger temples into tourist attractions. Result – loyalty of the mainstream Buddhism to the dictatorial state, commercialisation in the larger temples. Beginning of active export of Korean Buddhism to the USA and – to lesser extent – Europe.

1977 – Beginning of “minjung” anti-establishmentarian Buddhist movement – left-wing Buddhism.

1980 – Chŏn Duhwan, willing to put Buddhism under strict control, announces that the temples became “dens of corruption and banditry”, and sends troops to appr. 3 thousand temples. Hundreds of monks – arrested and tortured, one abbot dies. After this – mainstream Buddhism fears to get involved into politics at all, but “minjung” movement inside Buddhism continues to gain popularity.

1987 – young Buddhist activists, Buddhist students actively participate in the pro-democratisation demonstrations.

1990s – growth of lay Buddhist NGOs – human rights, ecology, etc. At the same time – loss of moral authority by the mainstream monk leaders, beset with corruption and embezzlement allegations.