Post-Colonial nationalism in divided Korea: 1945 – today

General: Korea – a rare case where political and racial (ethnic) nationalism overlapped each other from the very beginning. Pre-colonial times: loyalty to the state and nation were thought to be more or less one and the same concept (aegukaejok – “love of the state, love of the nation”). Foremost nationalists like Sin Ch’aeho – preached “kukkajuŭi” – doctrine of “statism” (much emulated from Japanese kokkashugi).

Colonial times: as Korean state was gone, anti-Japanese, pro-independence nationalists focused on Koreans’ “racial unity”, in a bid to keep Koreans intact, and defend them from the thread of assimilation. Emphasis – on the ethnogeny myth (Tan’gun) and “glorious national/racial history”. In a word – “ethnic unity” substitutes for the absent state. Post-Colonial times/division: nationalism became a pre-eminent legitimating ideology for both South and North Korean state powers, due to its anti-colonial credentials. South Korea – promoted nationalism openly, while North Korea preferred to call its version “socialist patriotism”. But – the dilemma: main patterns of Korean nationalism were already formed in pre-colonial and colonial times, and “ethnic unity of all Koreans – Tan’gun descendants” – was already emphasized there. This emphasis on “all-encompassing racial unity” contravened political reality of the divided peninsula – the worst enemy of nationalist South Korea was the North, and vice versa. How was it possible to explain the situation when co-descendants of Tan’gun became simultaneously “enemies”, from nationalistic positions? Both Koreas chose the way of “political exclusion from the national body”: in the North, Southern elite was described as “bunch of national traitors”, who were to be eliminated so that “state” and “ethnic” unity would be “recovered”. In the South, similar view on the North prevailed: political/military victory was urged for the sake of “recovery of national unity”. This brand of “exclusive”, politicized, system-serving nationalism became inseparably linked to the Cold War ideology. Now, in the South at least, it is largely defunct: North Korea’s “ratings of approval” are higher that that of the USA, and Kim Daejung mentioned in his inaugural speech, that “no allies can be closer than compatriots” (implication: North Korea and peaceful unification may be prioritized over the relations with the USA). North Korea – also stopped publicly reviling South Korea (but not the USA). Grounds for such ideological changes in the South – anti-systemic, left-wing nationalism of the 1970s-1980s: idea of Korea as a “sufferer”, whose primordial “ethnic unity” was violated by the rival world-systems in the Cold War. The same task of “recovering the unified state/nation” as in the official versions of nationalism, but by peaceful, conciliatory means, and struggle against “pro-imperialist” anti-Communist ideology in the South. Ham Sŏkhŏn and his contribution to the “progressive nationalist” philosophy with strong pacifist, religious treats (philosophic basis for Kim Daejung’s politics).

Main common features of all versions of Korean nationalism (Southern official, Northern official, Southern progressive in various interpretations, etc.): identification of “nation” with “state” and “family” (based on the “homogenous nation” theory, advanced also by Japanese nationalists of Meiji period), strong patriarchal (sexist – “family” is father-centered here) and “statist” treats, visible Social Darwinist features (emphasis on the “competition” in the world of nation-states). Today – criticism of nationalism as a whole is a palpable trend among younger, progressively oriented South Koreans.

South Korea: Yi Sŭngman (Syngman Rhee) time (1948-1960) – liberal/social democratic variants of nationalism – cruelly suppressed. Possibility of non-totalitarian, progressive nationalism in the 1940s in Korea – Yŏ Unhyŏng. Bruce Cumings on him:

“Yo Un-hyong had a remarkable career as an Asian revolutionary. He was born in 1885 in Yangp’yong-gun, Kyonggi Province, into a family of poor yangban status. Ancestors had been part of the Soron faction in Yi Dynasty politics, and an uncle had been a Tonghok leader. When he was fourteen years old, he entered the famous Paejae School. a missionary-run institution that helped introduce Western learning in Korea. Yo traveled to China in 1914, and then played an important role in attempts to gain Korean independence in 1919 and in the founding of the Korean Provisional Government in Shanghai. In 1921 he, Kim Kyu-sik, and some thirty other Koreans attended the Congress of the Toilers of the Far East in Moscow, where Yo met Lenin and Trotsky. After his return to China, he served as a propagandist during the Northern Expedition, and claimed to have met Sun Yat-sen and Mao Tse-tung. He is said to have avoided Chiang Kai-shek’s terror in Shanghai in 1927 by posing as a Westerner.
In 1929 Japanese agents captured Yo in Shanghai and returned him to Korea, where he served a three-year prison term in Taejon. Upon his release he assumed the editorship of the Chung’ang ilbo (Central Daily) in Seoul. Like other prominent Koreans Yo was pressured from 1938 on to collaborate with the Japanese in their war effort. He resisted, telling the Japanese at one point that he had fought them to the death and there was nothing left but to kill him. Yo’s younger brother, Yo Un-hong, succumbed to the Japanese; there is no evidence that the elder Yo ever gave in.
Y0's views were a mixture of socialism, Christianity, and Wilsonian democracy. Although he always was willing to work with communists and embraced Marxism as a “good idea.” he never joined the Korean Communist Party and stated that he never could believe wholeheartedly in the materialist view of history. If anything, he was an Asian populist; he often contrasted the simple generosity and unrewarded toil of Korea’s peasants with “the so-called intelligentsia, the intellectual stratum that knows ideographs, which for 500 years has paralyzed the spirit of our people.”
He was a great orator with a charismatic presence; his robust good looks and easy charm later drew many Americans to him. An Occupation historian, Albert Keep, once said of Yo, “What an amazing Korean he was…grey fedora, grey tweed overcoat, grey flannel trousers, well-tailored tweed coat, blue shirt with clean collar and neatly tied foreinhand looking for all the world as tho’ he were off for a date at the Greenwich Country Club.” (The Origin of The Korean War (Princeton University Press, 1981) P 474-475).

Still, after Yŏ’s assassination in July 1947 – moderate “Nehru-like” populist, neutralist, social democratic nationalism became practically excluded from South Korean political discourse.

Syngman Rhee’s political ideologue – An Hosang’s “Ilminjuŭi” – “One People ideology”. Fascism-influenced doctrine about the necessity of grouping around the leader, so that a nation can fulfill its world-historical duties. Rhee’s motto: “we can survive only if we stand together: once we get scattered, the nation is gone” – emphasis on national/political “together-ness”.

Pak Chong-Hee (Chŏnghŭi)’s time (1961-1979) – Meiji official nationalist formulae are re-introduced into the South Korean nationalist discourse. Army and bureaucracy – should “lead the nation to modernization”, and also “nurture and enlighten the nation” – nation as the main subject (chuch’e) of history, and Pak Chong-Hee-led military as the main subject of “nation-making”. Similarity with the North Korean discourse – there, the “Party” comes instead of military, but the underlying structure is similar. New emphasis on “glorious national history” – Opening of the “Academy of Korean Studies” (literally – “Institute of Korean Spiritual Culture”), making of historical cities into museums, etc. Monuments to the famous generals of the past in Seoul. Nationalist-historical brainwashing in schools – “The Charter for National education” (1968) – “we are born with the historical mission of restoring our nation” – was to be memorialized by all students. “National history” – made into an obligatory subject in all universities.

Voices of protest: Ham Sŏkhŏn – populist, pacifist, and inclusive version of nationalism:

Prof. Pak Jaesun: “To Ham, the Korean people suffering from the national division and the Korea War is like being nailed on the cross. Ham actively tries to revitalize the good and peace-loving nature of the Korean people by applying the principle of faith in the cross to the history of Korea and calling for the responsibility of the Korean people for world peace. As Jesus led the entire humanity to redemption by being crucified and dying on the cross, the Korean people could lead the world to peace by bearing the burden of suffering in world history.

The world powers, which are the victimizers, cannot overcome injustice and evil in the world or bring about a peaceful world where the wrongdoings can be forgiven and reconciled. It is the people of the Third World, the victims and the mental debtors, that can atone for the injustice and evil of the world, pay the debt and realize peace and reconciliation. In order to settle this, the injustice and sins of the world must be directed to God and only through this process can we be set free from the relationship between the victimizers and the victims. In order to direct that burden to God, we must "go deep into ourselves and dig a path that directly leads us to God." If the victims in the world, such as Koreans, Indians, Jews, and blacks, "overcome the suffering from injustice and find their rightful place, the entire humanity will be redeemed." If the Koran people overcome their unjust suffering and lead the world to the road of peace, it will confirm the truth of the Christian faith in the Cross. (…).

Ham confirms in the 5,000-year history of Korea that the life of the "foolish and humble" people reveals the national spirit while being directly related to God. "Although they have been exploited and trampled under severe domination for 5,000 years, they have lived on as though impervious to feeling. Despite their hard toils and sufferings, they have not received their rightful dues. Their only hope is, as they were born and will be buried on this land, to become a seed to serve the nation and God, to serve by labor and belief in life, and to serve with their flesh and bones in death, by making their land fertile. (…) Ham argues that to lead a true life must go to the ssial (plain people) occupying the lowest status in history. As a seed sings the song of life and dances the dance of life by falling on a patch of soft land, man relishes the joy and blessing of life and peace of the soul by reaching out to people at the bottom of history. One can reach God and lead a true life only through the people. Thus, what one does for the people is what one does for God. "If one mistreats people thinking they are lowly, one is despising and upsetting God." Service to the people is service to the Kingdom of Heaven and a song for the people is a song of praise to God."(“Ham Seok-heon's National Spirit and Christian Thought “ by Park Jae Soon, Korea Journal, Vol. 40 No. 2 Summer 2000).

Kind of Third World-oriented progressive populist pacifist theology, also based on nationalistic beliefs.

Other dissident nationalist – Chang Junha (1918-1975), editor of influential monthly Sasanggye (“The World of Ideas”) – also in favor of peaceful, conciliatory unification. Charged Pak Chong-Hee with “selling the blood of our youth to America” (as S.Korea sent troops to Vietnam). Suspicious death - “fallen from a mountain”.

Chŏn Duhwan’s time (1980-1987): official encouragement of the so-called “amateur historians’ movement” (chaeya sahak) – ultra-nationalist historians that claimed that mythical progenitor Tan’gun really existed, and ancient Korean kingdoms controlled all Chinese territory. Claim that Tan’gun was a historic figure – soon made by Kim Ilsung in the North too (“discovery” of his “relics” in the 1990s: An Hosang went to the North to worship them).

Protest: Growth of leftist nationalist (minjung) historiography and philosophy/theology: “external forces” (wese), namely “American imperialism” and former pro-Japanese collaborators that turned to pro-American anti-communism, are blamed now for the “tragedy of our nation” – division, war, and dictatorship. New picture of “national history”: minjung (masses) as “real nation” against all the foreign-related anti-national forces.

Common feature of establishment and anti-establishment nationalisms: extreme “statism” (emphasis on state as the expression of ethnic nation). Sin Ch’aeho’s “kukkajuŭi” – internalized by both camps.

North Korea: Chuch’e ideology and the inherent nationalist features in it:

“Chuch'e ideology is the basic cornerstone of party construction, party works, and government operations. Chuch'e is sanctified as the essence of what has been officially called Kim Il Sung Chuui (Kim Il Sung-ism) since April 1974. Chuch'e is also claimed as "the present-day MarxismLeninism ." North Korean leaders advocate chuch'e ideology as the only correct guiding ideology in their ongoing revolutionary movement.

Chuch'e also is referred to as "the unitary ideology" or as "the monolithic ideology of the Party." It is inseparable from and, for all intents and purposes, synonymous with Kim Il Sung's leadership and was said to have been "created" or "fathered" by the great leader as an original "encyclopedic thought which provides a complete answer to any question that arises in the struggle for national liberation and class emancipation, in the building of socialism and communism." Chuch'e is viewed as the embodiment of revealed truth attesting to the wisdom of Kim's leadership as exemplified in countless speeches and "on-the-spot guidance."

Chuch'e was proclaimed in December 1955, when Kim underlined the critical need for a Korea-centered revolution rather than one designed to benefit, in his words, "another country." Chuch'e is designed to inspire national pride and identity and mold national consciousness into a potentially powerful focus for internal solidarity centered on Kim and the KWP.

According to Kim, chuch'e means "the independent stance of rejecting dependence on others and of using one's own powers, believing in one's own strength and displaying the revolutionary spirit of self-reliance." Chuch'e is an ideology geared to address North Korea's contemporary goals--an independent foreign policy, a self-sufficient economy, and a self-reliant defense posture. Kim Il Sung's enunciation of chuch'e in 1955 was aimed at developing a monolithic and effective system of authority under his exclusive leadership. The invocation of chuch'e was a psychological tool with which to stigmatize the foreign-oriented dissenters and remove them from the center of power. Targeted for elimination were groups of pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese anti-Kim dissenters.

Chuch'e did not become a prominent ideology overnight. During the first ten years of North Korea's existence, MarxismLeninism was accepted unquestioningly as the only source of doctrinal authority. Nationalism was toned down in deference to the country's connections to the Soviet Union and China. In the mid-1950s, however, chuch'e was presented as a "creative" application of Marxism-Leninism. In his attempt to establish an interrelationship between Marxism-Leninism and chuch'e, Kim contended that although Marxism-Leninism was valid as the fundamental law of revolution, it needed an authoritative interpreter to define a new set of practical ideological guidelines appropriate to the revolutionary environment in North Korea.

Kim's practical ideology was given a test of relevancy throughout the mid-1960s. In the late 1950s, Kim was able to mobilize internal support when he purged pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese dissenters from party ranks. During the first half of the 1960s, Kim faced an even more formidable challenge when he had to weather a series of tense situations that had potentially adverse implications for North Korea's economic development and national security. Among these were a sharp decrease in aid from the Soviet Union and China; discord between the Soviet Union and China and its disquieting implications for North Korea's confrontation with the United States and South Korea; P'yongyang's disagreements with Moscow and apprehensions about the reliability of the Soviet Union as an ally; and the rise of an authoritarian regime in Seoul under former General Park Chung Hee (1961-79).

These developments emphasized the need for self-reliance--the need to rely on domestic resources, heighten vigilance against possible external challenges, and strengthen domestic political solidarity. Sacrifice, austerity, unity, and patriotism became dominant themes in the party's efforts to instill in the people the importance of chuch'e and collective discipline. By the mid-1960s, however, North Korea could afford to relax somewhat; its strained relations with the Soviet Union had eased, as reflected in part by Moscow's decision to rush economic and military assistance to P'yongyang.

Beginning in mid-1965, chuch'e was presented as the essence of Kim Il Sung's leadership and of party lines and policies for every conceivable revolutionary situation. Kim's past leadership record was put forward as the "guide and compass" for the present and future and as a source of strength sufficient to propel the faithful through any adversity.

Since 1974 it has become increasingly evident that the emphasis is on the glorification of chuch'e as "the only scientific revolutionary thought representing our era of Juche and communist future and the most effective revolutionary theoretical structure that leads to the future of communist society along the surest shortcut." This new emphasis was based on the contention that a different historical era, with its unique sociopolitical circumstances, requires an appropriately unique revolutionary ideology. Accordingly, Marxism and Leninism were valid doctrines in their own times, but had outlived their usefulness in the era of chuch'e, which prophesies the downfall of imperialism and the worldwide victory of socialism and communism.

As the years have passed, references to Marxism-Leninism in party literature have steadily decreased. By 1980 the terms Marxism and Leninism had all but disappeared from the pages of Kŭ lloja. An unsigned article in the March 1980 K lloja proclaimed, "Within the Party none but the leader Kim Il Sung's revolutionary thought, the chuch'e ideology, prevails and there is no room for any hodgepodge thought contrary to it." The report Kim Il Sung presented to the Sixth Party Congress in October 1980 did not contain a single reference to Marxism-Leninism, in marked contrast to his report to the Fifth Party Congress in November 1970. In the 1980 report, Kim declared: "The whole party is rallied rock-firm around its Central Committee and knit together in ideology and purpose on the basis of the chuch'e idea. The Party has no room for any other idea than the chuch'e idea, and no force can ever break its unity and cohesion based on this idea."

Chuch'e is instrumental in providing a consistent and unifying framework for commitment and action in the North Korean political arena. It offers an underpinning for the party's incessant demand for spartan austerity, sacrifice, discipline, and dedication. Since the mid-1970s, however, it appears that chuch'e has become glorified as an end in itself.

In his annual New Year's message on January 1, 1992, Kim Il Sung emphasized the invincibility of chuch'e ideology: "I take great pride in and highly appreciate the fact that our people have overcome the ordeals of history and displayed to the full the heroic mettle of the revolutionary people and the indomitable spirit of chuch'e Korea, firmly united behind the party . . . . No difficulty is insurmountable nor is any fortress impregnable for us when our party leads the people with the ever-victorious chuch'e-oriented strategy and tactics and when all the people turn out as one under the party's leadership."