Religion in Contemporary East Asia – after 1945.

Japan: In Buddhist circles, Suzuki acknowledged partly his responsibility for the war time collaboration, as well as the collective responsibility of the Buddhist clergy, but continued to insist that the war was “historically necessary” for the “awakening of Asia”. Other personal declaration of responsibility – Yanagida Seizan (b. 1922), famous Buddhism researcher, defrocked himself in 1955 due to the sense of collective guilt of all Buddhist priests about their war cooperation. Official admissions of the war responsibility by the largest Buddhist sects – only in the later 1980s. Declaration of repentance by the Sōtō sect – saying sorry for “despising other Asian people” (1993). Also repentance about “subordinating Buddhist truth to the worldly teachings in the form of ‘national policy’ doctrine”. One of the results of critical reflection on the wartime collaboration issue – formation of critical Buddhism by Hakamaya Noriyaki (b. 1943) and some other Sōtō scholars in Komazawa Un-ty: “as patriotism is just an extension of self-love and Buddhism acknowledges no eternal or independent ‘self’, Buddhist can not be patriotic or specially love his/her own country. The Buddhists should not acknowledge any non-Buddhist doctrines, nationalist or any other”. Rejection of the idea of “harmony” (wa) – because that can be interpreted as toleration of evil.

Commercialization of the monasteries – income from funeral ceremonies, corporate training programs using the temples (because traditional temple discipline, emphasis on endurance and “sincere submission to the orders of elders” are supposed to have “good influence” on the new employees). Phenomenon of “corporate Zen” and its critics.

Christianity: The postwar Constitution of Japan (1947) provided religious freedom and the separation of church and state. The document also required all religious organizations to register as "'religious judical persons'" and were "placed on equal footing". Thus began the free market religious economy of Japan.

A major population shift occurred in the 1950's and 1960's, because workers were needed in developing industries and efforts for economic recovery. In 1950, 37.5% of the population was urban, and in 1980, that number climbed to 76.1%. In this context, religion was no doubt a means of coping with crises and post-war devastation.

During the early Postwar years, Christian churches gained a considerable following particularly among the educated middle class. Prewar denominations were reestablished. General MacArthur called for "missionary reinforcements" in church recovery efforts and the rebuilding of Japan. Numerous new evangelical churches from Europe and North America emerged. Between 1949 and 1953, 1500 new missionaries sprang up in Japan. Membership leveled out in the 1950's, and this can be accredited to the expanded religious economy of Japan. During this era of growth, the educated middle class was most receptive to missionary efforts. When wartime numbers are compared to post-war figures, Protestant membership doubled (from 190,000 to 400,000) and Roman Catholic membership grew over three times in size (from 100,000 to 323.599).

The number of followers has remained fairly constant in recent years. Christian influences are significant today in Japan and have affected the education and social welfare. Figures from a 1984 NHK Survey on Japanese Religious Consciousness show that 2% of Japanese people are Christians, and 12% the people have empathy towards Christianity. Unlike South Korea, post-war Japan did not grow into a Christianity-dominated country for many reasons, the label of “foreign-originated” religion being one of them. And, unlike Korea, Japan in the 1950s-1960s already perceived itself as a “modern society” – so, the “civilizational work” by the missionaries was not given such importance as in Korea. Also left-wing ideology was legal – and popular among the intellectuals – in Japan, while in Korea until 1987 many left-leaning intellectuals entered Catholic Church or relatively progressive Protestant denominations in order to find the likely minded atmosphere.

Foreign-orientated churches still welcome foreign missionaries and Western churches serve as models for theological understanding and church polity and organization. Some non-indigenous groups include the Anglican Church, the Roman Catholic Church, Lutheran denominations, and the United Church of Christ (Methodist, Reformed, Presbyterian, Congregational). Among these two groups beliefs vary slightly.

Commercialization in Christianity too: “Christmas is almost as prominently featured in Japanese department stores and shopping centers as it is in their American counterparts. Another prominent by-product is the growing popularity of Western-style Christian weddings. even among non-Christians. Some hotels have built their own wedding chapels in order to meet the demand”. 1992 – 31% of all weddings were Christian, “Christian wedding” being a huge industry.

A representative post-war “new religion” – Soka Gakkai (“Value-Creation Academic Society”): Soka Gakkai is one of Nichiren sect's several "infant" sects that follow the teachings of the thirteenth century Buddhist monk named Nichiren. Soka Gakkai claims two founders: Makiguchi Tsunesaburo, and Toda Josei (1900-1958). In 1928, both men joined Nichiren Sect, but scholars argue that their commitment was questionable.

Makiguchi, out of his secular concern for Japan's education system, published a magnum opus on value judgement, and he stressed the importance of value judgements that vary among individuals. His focus was on educational reform. As Makiguchi became increasingly active within Nichiren Sect, he began to view religion as the "'fundamental teaching which regulates individual life'".

He determined that only through the teachings of Nichiren could an individual achieve the ultimate goal of happiness. Makiguchi founded Soka Kyoiku Gakkai in 1937 based on this basic assessment, and by 1943 they claimed three thousand members. He was imprisoned with several leading members (including Toda) in 1943 because he refused a 1941 order to consolidate Soka Kyoiku Gakkai with the other Nichiren lay groups. Makiguchi died in prison in 1944.

With the 1945 Occupation, the prisoners from the group were released, and Toda Josei began work to reestablish the group. Toda is said to have given Soka Gakkai a philosophical foundation, as he redefined religious ideas and produced lectures and books. The new leader focused on ”the reformation of the human spirit».

During this post-war period, the movement grew rapidly – idea of ”happiness” as the main goal fitted well new liberal, consumerist society. In Soka Gakkai's post-war form, the group became the "the mobilizing arm of of Nichiren Shoshu," and claimed as many as fifteen million followers. Soka Gakkai grew to include several international branches, support the birth and growth of an influential political party, and help build a multi-million dollar temple that inspires international awe.

In 1955, one of the group's board of directors members won a seat in Tokyo's prefectural assembly. This marked the beginning of Soka Gakkai's political involvement. In 1962, Komekai, or the "Clean Government Association" emerged as a "Gakkai-affiliated" organization and registered with the national government. In 1964, the association became a Komeito, the "Clean Government [Political] Party". The party's angle consisted of ”high Buddhist morals”. So, politization of the movement followed its enrichment and commercialization.

Because of Komeito's affiliation with a Buddhist movement, their platform pronounced the party members to be immune to bribery and corruption, able to resist military entanglements (specifically, US military bases in Japan), and innocent of the danger of communist influence in Japan. As of the late 1960's, Komeito is the third largest political power in the Japan's National Diet. In 1970,the political party formally seperated from Soka Gakkai, however today, nearly all party members support Soka Gakkai members. Another, more profound separation occured in 1992. Soka Gakkai formally separated from Nichiren sect.

Secrets of commercial/political success of Soka Gakkai: emphasis on the proselytising, borrowed from the Protestants (number of new proselytes determines the careers of the sect activists and functionaries inside the sect), accent on the work among both the social “lower orders” (the most exploited groups within the working class, non-unionised workers, etc.) and intellectuals, popular doctrine of “Buddhist socialism” used by Komeito (in fact, it meant a religious variant of very moderate social-reformism), and good connections with banks and industry. Soka Gakkai – “publishing empire” (mass-circulation newspaper, etc.). 1970s – certain crisis of Soka Gakkai popularity, due to the revelations of the undemocratic methods it used, general improvement in the living conditions (“factor of deprivation” disappears). Soka Gakkai – plays up the “progressive card” – signs “reconciliation agreement” with the Japanese Communist Party, etc. At the same time – shift of Komeito to more “mainstream” positions on the question of USA military bases.

Overall: crisis in the religious life in 1980-90s: traditional religiosity is seemingly waning, with traditional religions being ostensibly more and more engaged in non-religious pursuits (economy, politics, etc.). Traditional religions as a part of corporative economy. Alternatives “New Age” cults in Japan.

China: Communist China: The attitude of the party has been that religion is a relic of the past, evidence of prescientific thinking, and something that will fade away as people become educated and acquire a scientific view of the world. On the whole, religion has not been a major issue. Cadres and party members, in ways very similar to those of Confucian elites, tend to regard many religious practitioners as charlatans out to take advantage of credulous people, who need protection. In the 1950s many Buddhist monks were returned to secular life, and monasteries and temples lost their lands in the land reform. Foreign missionaries were expelled, often after being accused of spying, and Chinese Christians, who made up only a very small proportion of the population, were the objects of suspicion because of their foreign contacts. Chinese Christian organizations were established, one for Protestants and one for Roman Catholics, which stressed that their members were loyal to the state and party. Seminaries were established to train "patriotic" Chinese clergy, and the Chinese Catholic Church rejected the authority of the Vatican, ordaining its own priests and installing its own bishops. The issue in all cases, whether involving Christians, Buddhists, or members of underground Chinese sects, was not so much doctrine or theology as recognition of the primacy of loyalty to the state and party. Folk religion was dismissed as superstition. Temples were for the most part converted to other uses, and public celebration of communal festivals stopped, but the state did not put much energy into suppressing folk religion.

During the early stages of the Cultural Revolution, in 1966 and 1967, Red Guards destroyed temples, statues, and domestic ancestral tablets as part of their violent assault on the "four olds" (old ideas, culture, customs, and habits). Public observances of ritual essentially halted during the Cultural Revolution decade. After 1978, the year marking the return to power of the Deng Xiaoping reformers, the party and state were more tolerant of the public expression of religion as long as it remained within carefully defined limits. Some showcase temples were restored and opened as historical sites, and some Buddhist and even Taoist practitioners were permitted to wear their robes, train a few successors, and perform rituals in the reopened temples. These actions on the part of the state can be interpreted as a confident regime's recognition of China's traditional past, in the same way that the shrine at the home of Confucius in Shandong Province has been refurbished and opened to the public. Confucian and Buddhist doctrines are not seen as a threat, and the motive is primarily one of nationalistic identification with China's past civilization.

Similar tolerance and even mild encouragement is accorded to Chinese Christians, whose churches were reopened starting in the late 1970s. Still, officially foreign missionary work is still not permitted.

The most important result of state toleration of religion has been improved relations with China's Islamic and Tibetan Buddhist minority populations. State patronage of Islam and Buddhism also plays a part in China's foreign relations. Much of traditional ritual and religion survives or has been revived, especially in the countryside. In the mid-1980s the official press condemned such activities as wasteful and reminded rural party members that they should neither participate in nor lead such events, but it did not make the subject a major issue. Families could worship their ancestors or traditional gods in the privacy of their homes but had to make all ritual paraphernalia (incense sticks, ancestral tablets, and so forth) themselves, as it was no longer sold in shops. The scale of public celebrations was muted, and full-time professional clergy played no role. Folk religious festivals were revived in some localities, and there was occasional rebuilding of temples and ancestral halls. In rural areas, funerals were the ritual having the least change, although observances were carried out only by family members and kin, with no professional clergy in attendance. Such modest, mostly household-based folk religious activity was largely irrelevant to the concerns of the authorities, who ignored or tolerated it.

1990s: religious boom, mainly due to the disenchantments with the official ideology and the upheavals accompanying the capitalist reforms – growth of migrant population, social tensions, visible social differentiation, growing resentment of the corruption in the ruling Party circles. Underground missionary work (also by South Koreans), and emergence of highly popular new religions (falun gong – persecuted recently). “Explosion of religiosity” in the time of transition to Western capitalist model – also experienced by Japan in Meiji times and again in the 1950-60s, and in South Korea in the 1950-70s.

Additional material: "China's Persecuted Churches," The Washington Times, June 24, 1997, by Paul Marshall --

”China's underground Christians are the target of what they themselves describe as the most brutal repression since the early 1980s when China was just emerging from the terror of the Cultural Revolution. These Christians are the last nationwide stronghold of independent thought and expression in China. In a land of 1.2 billion people, there is no dissident organization, no Moscow Helsinki-style human rights group and no Solidarity labor union.

A new human rights lobby comprised of American churches has catapulted the religious persecution issue to the forefront of the foreign policy debate. Unconscionably, some within the Christian community have now taken up Beijing's own defense and deny that religious persecution exists, or else that which does is minor. In reference to China, Victor W. C. Hsu, East Asia and Pacific secretary for the U. S. National Council of Churches, said, "I would definitely not use the word persecution." Their contention relies on the fact that a minority of the Christians in China, in the government controlled and supported Patriotic churches, are allowed to operate and are expanding.

Most Patriotic clergy and their growing congregations are sincere Christians, but independent churches they are not. Once a church registers it comes under the control of the Religious Affairs Bureau, headed since July 1995 by atheist and communist hard liner Ye Xiaowen. On June 6, Mr. Ye described unregistered Christian churches as "evil, illegal organizations that undermine social order." In 1995 China's President Jiang Zemin declared to the Bureau that "We are engaged in a secret struggle against the Church."

Members of the Patriotic churches must be organized into one non-denominational body and are restricted in working with people under eighteen. The clergy cannot preach outside their own area, they must be approved by the government, and their services are subject to monitoring. The Patriotic Catholic Church rejects the authority of the Pope and its bishops are appointed by the government in defiance of the Vatican. Sermons must steer clear of forbidden topics like the second coming of Christ or abortion.

The members of the underground who refuse to join the "Patriotic" churches are hence not some Chinese version of Montana Freeman who perversely refuse legitimate government control. They simply want to worship according to the dictates of conscience. For this they will worship in caves, be baptized at night in ice-rimmed rivers, live underground--and endure persecution.

In 1994-1996 the government intensified its nationwide crackdown on unregistered churches. A further intensification began in mid-1996. The state has begun to target underground house-church leaders for arrest and dole out sentences of three-years "re-education" in their labor camps. Protestant leaders report that about 40 percent of inmates in Henan labor camps are there for belonging to the Christian underground. In Henan Number One Labor Camp approximately 50 out of 126 inmates are imprisoned for underground church activities. During the Freedom House team's visit 85 house-church Christians were rounded up and arrested in two dragnet operations on May 14 in Zhoukou, Henan. On March 16, Peter

Xu Yongze, perhaps the most important underground Protestant leader, was arrested and jailed with seven others in Henan. Reportedly 300 Protestants have been arrested in Louyang in Henan since July, 1996. And it was in Henan that Zhang Xiuju, a 36-year-old woman, was beaten to death by police last year.

The enormous underground Catholic pilgrimage in Donglu, Hebei Province, was banned again this May. Last year, according to the Connecticut-based Cardinal Kung Foundation, 5,000 troops, supported by armored cars and helicopters prevented Roman Catholics from attending the annual pilgrimage to the Shrine of Our Lady of China. In 1995, tens of thousands had participated. A number of Roman Catholic priests and lay people were detained. Others were placed under house arrest, forced to renounce their faith or are subjected to severe restrictions. Around the same time three Catholic bishops were incarcerated and remain imprisoned a year later, and another has disappeared.

Underground Christians report brutal beatings and other torture, including a method seemed designed for Christians that entails crushing the ankles of victims while they are forced to kneel--this "Christian" torture was applied to Liu Zhenying, one of the eight arrested in Henan in March, breaking his ankle.

On Sept. 24, 1996, in Tanghe, Henan, police arrested Elder Feng, Brother Zheng, Brother Xin, Sister Li, and Sister Luo. According to a note smuggled from prison, the authorities bound Sister Luo's arms behind her in an agonizing position and she was beaten unconscious. One of the men almost died from being beaten "for nine days and nights." Members of the group were also poked with electric cattle prods, often while bound. They have been sentenced to three years' labor camp.

In Sichuan the police have been arresting and fining Christians once or twice a year as a form of extortion. If the family can't pay, the police beat the detainee, sometimes while he is suspended from the ceiling. Often they will do this in the presence of the family until the family is ready to do anything to pay.

After witnessing such a scene, a woman hanged herself because she could not find the money to release her grandson.”