East
Asia: Ecological problems and migrant labour.
General thesis: economical growth in the region was largely based on
sacrificing both labour’s interest (“exclusion of labour”) and ecological
norms. Migrant labour used to be – and remains – the most vulnerable and most
exploited group in East Asian labour force.
Chinese environmental problems: from “Humanity and Nature: A Review of Development and Environmental Degradation of
Contemporary China”, by Jian Xie: (see: http://www.chinaenvironment.net/papers/)
“China occupies
6.4% of the world’s land area. Its land is mainly composed of mountains (33%),
plateaus (26%) and hills (10%). The plains constitute 12% of the total land and
are concentrated in eastern China. Most of western China is mountains or desert
(100 million hectares of desert areas). Because of the high proportion of
mountainous and hilly land and the large expanses of desert, the land
utilization ratio is very low. China has only 5% of the world’s
arable land and there are very few suitable areas still to be developed. (…)
China has long had the world’s largest population. During the Ming dynasty (1368-1644 A.D.), the population was estimated at some 60 million. It reached 100 million in the 1680s, the early years of the Qing dynasty, and passed 400 million in the 1830s. In 1991, China had about 1.16 billion people, some 22% of the world’s population. The population is still predominately young, rural-based, and poorly educated. Even with the implementation of the population control policy beginning in the late 1970s, the natural growth rate of the population was 1.5% on average per year during the 1980s, corresponding to a net increase of 15 million people per year.
With only 5% of the world’s arable land but
22% of world’s population, China is faced with a
serious shortage of resources in terms of per capita levels. Per capita
holdings of farmland, grassland, forests, land used for agriculture,
afforestation, and runoff are all far below world average figures. For example,
the average area per person is only 31% of the world average, cultivated land
per person 31%, forest per person 12%, grassland per person 50%, water per
person 25% and water power reserve per person per year 84%. These natural conditions and intrinsic problems
are a fundamental factor of environmental degradation in the nation. They,
together with unsustainable growth due to the failure of development policies
that will be discussed later, have inevitably caused a number of severe
environmental problems, such as deforestation, soil erosion, salinization, and
desert encroachment. (…)
Aggressive attitude toward nature is rooted partly in Chinese history and myths about conquering nature and partly in Marxist tradition. The achievements made by the Chinese communists in the late 1940s and early 1950s, including defeating the Nationalist government and quickly curing hyper-inflation, opium-smoking and prostitution, gave many Chinese the confidence that they could create miracles at their will. The belief in humanity’s power and subjective capability can be observed in Mao’s words, such as "as long as there are people, every kind of miracle can be performed" and also from the titles of Chinese articles during the period, such as "We bend nature to our will," "Hard work conquers nature," and "The united will of the people can transform nature." A mass campaign, the GLF, was used as panacea for economic development, and economic rules and ecological principles were largely ignored. The results, however, were contrary to their wishes.
Mao’s belief on population growth
Prior to 1949, China already had population pressure on its natural resources. Its per capita holding of agricultural land had been sharply decreasing for several hundred years. However, by believing in humanity’s subjective capability and ignoring the constraints of low resources per capita on economic development, the Chinese people failed to see the serious consequences of population growth. They were proud of China’s "vast territory with abundant resources and a huge population" (Dida wubo, renkou zhongduo) and naively believed that the larger the population was the bigger the success they could achieve. The ignorance of environmental carrying capacities and the threat of population to the environment is revealed in Mao’s belief on population growth. Mao was confident that "a big population is a very good thing," and even claimed that "even if China’s population multiplies many times, she is fully capable of finding a solution."
The population problem
became worse when Mao criticized Professor Ma Yingchu’s population control
theory in the late 1950s. After surveying southeast China, Ma, then president
of Peking University, realized the potential problem of population growth. The
population was 540 million in 1950, and its annual natural growth rate was
steady at over 2% in the 1950s. In 1957 Ma introduced his theory for
controlling population. In the same year, Ma’s theory was labelled as a new
version of Malthus’s population theory and was criticized nationwide in the
Anti-"rightist" movement launched by Mao. For the next decade and a
half, Mao’s thought on population dominated the Chinese attitudes toward
population growth. China experienced a peak of population growth during the
early 1960s. In 1963, the birth rate reached 4.34% and the natural growth rate
3.3%. The population continued to grow at more than 2.5% per year until 1970.
Chinese scholars have shown that the desired population size of China is under
680 million. In the year of 1964, the population passed that number and, at the
end of 1971, China had a population of nearly 860 million. The huge population
has put tremendous pressure on the environment. The population burden will continue
to be the primary cause of environmental problems for many years to come. (…)
Economic structure policies
(…)
One of the most popular slogans during the Great Leap Forward was "going all out to raise the iron and steel production" (Dalian gangtie). In a short period, numerous small (backyard) iron and steel furnaces and other plants sprouted over the whole nation. In the second half of 1958, more than 600,000 simple iron and steel furnaces, 59,000 small coal mines, 4,000 small hydropower stations, and 9,000 small cement factories were built in the Chinese countryside. Most of the plants were relatively labor-intensive, small-scale, technologically backward, and heavily polluting. They wasted a lot of energy and resources and created a considerable degree of environmental pollution and serious ecological damage.
During the Cultural Revolution, another set of environmentally adverse economic structure policies was widely implemented. They were made popular by slogans such as "Grain production is the key link of agricultural production and steel production is the key link of industrial production" (Nongye yi liangweigang, gongye yi gangweigang). Because of the lack of focus on diversified and ecologically sound use of resources, the policies caused the development of an imbalance economic structure and led to serious damage of ecosystems, such as deforestation, the destruction of range lands, and the reclamation of lakes and lowlands.
For example, thousands of peasants and urban
youths were organized to convert marshes, low-lying wetlands, lakes, and even
mountain slopes into agricultural land. The filling-up of lakes and the
reclamation of marshes and wetlands for agricultural use were extensive during
the period, especially in the Cultural Revolution. A survey conducted in 1980
showed that China had lost more than 1.33 million hectares of water surface
area and about 3.5 billion cubic meters of freshwater holding capacity because
of the filling-up and the sedimentation caused by soil erosion. Hubei province,
known as the "thousand lakes province", had 1066 lakes in 1949 but
only 309 lakes in 1981. Its total water surface was reduced by three-fourths.
In addition, in the late 1960s the government organized thousands of urban
youths to convert a large area of wetland in the Northeast Plain into
cultivated land. Perhaps there is not such a large scale of reclamation of
marshes and wetlands occurred in the world. By destroying so many inland aquatic ecosystems and wildlife habitats
and reducing the flood retention capabilities of water bodies, the filling-up
and reclamation caused severe and long-term damage to the environment. (…).
Industrial location policies
Industrial location policies in the period did not pay attention to potential environmental problems, either. Mao’s approach to industrial location had two goals: evenly distribute the industrial bases and reduce the military vulnerability of industrial bases to a new world war. For historical reasons, China’s pre-1949 industry was concentrated in coastal cities and a few inland cities. In an attempt to balance the distribution, Mao tried to develop inland area. This strategy was consistent with the need for defense preparedness. However, in developing inland industrial bases, especially defense industrial bases, the policy went against the environment.
One of the important industrial location
policies in the 1960s was the "third line" (Sanxian)
construction, implemented after China’s dissolution of relations with the
Soviet Union. The basic idea of the "third line" construction was to
disperse industries in mountains and caves (Shan, san, tong) in interior
China. A great number of factories were built in or moved to remote mountain
areas and deep valleys. Because of the lack of the scale of economy and bad
geographic conditions in terms of pollution dispersion, waste treatment, and
recycling, not only the economic performance of many such constructions was
poor but also serious air and water pollution occurred and spread through rural
China. Because a thorough relocation
of the industries is impossible, many environmental problems still remain today . (…)
Several events served as the catalyst for the kick-off of Chinese environmental protection program. First were a couple of serious industrial pollution cases. One was an urgent case of industrial pollution and severe damage to sea fishing occurred in the spring of 1972 on the shores of the city of Dalian. Almost at the same time, Beijing residents complained that fish taken from the Guanting reservoir had a strange odor. An investigation found that the cause was industrial pollution. The Guanting reservoir is one of two major drinking water reservoirs in Beijing. The incident highlighted the dangers to public health in the capital area. The pollution cases were a serious warning sign to the government that used to view industrial pollution as a product of the capitalist mode of production.
The United Nations
conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm in 1972 marked the turning
point in China’s environmental protection history. At the conference, the
Chinese realized the seriousness and urgency of environmental problems at the
global level. After the conference the Chinese leaders decided to take actions
against pollution. An inter-regional leading group responsible for water
pollution control in the Guanting reservoir was immediately formed. Zhou Enlai,
then Chinese premier, required the leading group to "tightly control
industrial pollution and never leave the harmful to the future
generation." (…)
Beginning in 1973, a series of environmental
quality assessment studies and pollution source surveys were conducted. Based
on the information obtained, pollution control activities were undertaken with
a focus on industries and cities. The main concern in industrial pollution
control was the comprehensive utilization of the "three wastes"
(waste liquid, waste gas, and waste residue). The slogan "turning
wastes into valuable resources and converting threat into benefit" was
widely advertised. In urban
areas, the main concern was the elimination of smoke and dust by improving
methods of burning and adopting purification measures.With of those efforts, China’s environmental
protection movement made certain progress. A number of industrial enterprises
successfully controlled their pollution discharge. However, the Chinese
still blindly believed in their subjective will and the superiority of
socialism in solving environmental problems. They were so confident about
solving environmental problems quickly that they failed to realize that the
control and elimination of pollution is a long-term task. In 1974, the
State Council’s Environmental Protection Leading Group established the targets
of "controlling pollution in five years and eliminating pollution in ten
years." Obviously, the targets were not met. (…)
In summary, in the
period of 1972-77, the Chinese began to be aware of the seriousness of their
environmental problems. Some progress in environmental protection was made
through the formation of environmental protection institutions and the
establishment of a few environmental regulations. However, there were no
significant changes in economic policies and ideology between this period and
the previous one. Although pollution control took place in some industries and
areas, the environment, in general, continued to worsen.
China has been experiencing a great transformation since then. (…).The GNP grew at 8.6% per year from 1979 to 1991. Growth rates rose to 12.6% in 1992 and 13% in 1993. In 1992, the communist party formally wrote into the party constitution that its primary task was to build a market economy. The impacts of the economic reform on the economy, as well as on the environment, are significant and profound.
Since 1978, China has taken a series of actions against industrial pollution and environmental degradation. A wide spectrum of environmental protection means, including laws, policy instruments, administration, education, and technology, have It is perceived that the Chinese have "demonstrated that they are serious about holding environmental degradation in check."
However, China’s
environmental situation is far from desirable. (…)
In May 1982, the
government established the Ministry of Urban and Rural Construction and
Environmental Protection. (…).In the same year, the Environmental Protection
Bureau was upgraded to the National Environmental Protection Agency (NEPA).
(…)By 1991, there were over 71,000 officials, researchers, and skilled workers
in environmental protection agencies and subordinated institutions at all
governmental levels. (…)
The "polluter pays" principle was adopted in the early 1970s, which states that whoever pollutes must be responsible for the cleanup. To implement the principle, an effluent fee system was introduced in 1982. The system levies taxes on over one hundred types of pollutants in four groups (wastewater, waste gas, solid waste, and noise). In 1991 alone, 207,965 enterprises were charged for an effluent fee; the total effluent fee revenue was 20 billion Yuan RMB. A pollution discharge permit system is being gradually established to bring the total amount of pollution emissions into check. More than 50 cities had implemented the permit system by 1990.
The policy of preventing environmentally
irrational siting and correcting previous industry location problems was stated
in the 1979 Environmental Protection Law and was reiterated in the 1989
Environmental Protection Law. Guided by the policy, 785 electro-plating or
foundry factories were shut down or transformed with adequate technology in
Beijing, Hangzhou, and Guilin. It
is predictable that the trend of shutting down or relocating polluting
factories will continue in the nation. (…)
Although the Chinese
have put considerable efforts on environmental protection, the country’s
environment is still in a dangerous position. According to the 1993
Environmental Communiqué of China (NEPA, 1994), air pollution was serious in
large and medium cities and had worsened in small cities. Among the
surveyed 94 river sections running through urban areas, 65 (69%) had been
polluted. The quality of the groundwater had become worse, and groundwater
subsidence caused by over-exploitation clearly occurred in 36 cities. Serious
eutrophication was widely observed in lakes and near-shore seas, and red tides
happened frequently. The forest coverage rate was only 12.98% (1989
data), and the timber supply was still very tight. The soil erosion area
expanded to 150 million hectares, or 15.6% of the total land; one-third of the
agricultural land was faced with significant soil erosion problems; and 6.67
million hectares of agricultural land was exposed to industrial wastes and
urban refuse. Finally, the number of rare and extinct animal species
reached 312 and extinct plants 354. The latest data indicate that currently
the annual environmental loss is worth nearly Y 100 billion.
A 1992 World Bank
report found China’s environmental condition even worse. About 60% of city
dwellers and about 86% of rural residents were estimated to have no access to
safe drinking water. Average concentrations of suspended particles in the
air of northern cities ran more than five times the standard of the World
Health Organization. Cultivation of semi-arid or sloping land had eroded almost
17% of the total land. Overgrazing had turned 30% of the once-extensive
grassland into desert. The report stated that "the loss and
degradation of ecosystem on this scale is a matter of immediate urgency and
concern."
The pressure of economic development on the
environment was aggravated after Deng Xiaoping’s inspection trip to southeast
China in early 1992 to encourage faster economic growth. Deng’s trip drove the
economy into another high-speed and overheated stage. The growth rate reached
12.6% in 1992 and 13% in 1993. Foreign investments poured into China. In 1993
alone, 83,265 new foreign-funded enterprises were approved, involving US$110.85
billion on a contract basis and the actual inflow of US$25.8 billion, an
increase of 134%. This new wave of economic development is threatening the
environment. The rate of
increase in industrial pollution has outstripped the rate of increase rate in
pollution control investment, which is accelerating the already worrisome
trends of environmental degradation. Environmental problems, such as the losses of agricultural land, the
shortage of water supplies, and deforestation, have been observed by Chinese
scholars and foreign observers. A number of them have indicated that
environmental degradation would jeopardize economic development and would even
cause serious social conflicts.
Main reasons for the ecological problems:
1)
Pressures of
population growth and economic development. By 1991 the population had reached 1.16 billion, 200 million more than
in 1978. During the same period, the gross national product increased sharply
from 358.8 billion Yuan to 1995.5 billion Yuan (in current
prices). Adjusted by the inflation factor, the economy in 1991 was three times
as large as in 1978. The fast-expanding economy is inevitably using more
natural resources, generating more pollution, and therefore imposing more
pressure on the environment than before. The massive population growth, coupled
with the fast economic development, remains to be the fundamental cause of
China’s environmental problems.
2)
Backward
environmental technology and weak management. High proportion of the technological equipment in use in China is still
obsolete and inefficient in use of materials and energy. The backwardness of
the technology results in low levels of resource utilization and large amounts
of pollution emissions. For instance, the industrial water reuse rate is
only 20-30%, much less than the 70-80% in industrialized countries. The
thermal efficiency of coal burning is about 55% on average, significantly lower
than the 80% in industrialized countries. The energy consumption per unit GNP
is 2.5 times and SO2 emission about 3.6 times the American rates.
In 1991 alone, coal consumption, which makes up over 70% of China’s total
energy source, reached 1.09 billion tons. Given the low energy efficiency of
coal, this huge amount of consumption generates tremendous environmental
pollution. In addition, because of the lack of capital investment in
environmental protection technology, many factories operate without adequate
pollution control devices. (…).Large portion of pollution emissions is
attributed to poor environmental management.
3)
Conflict
between environmental protection and economic development. Although environmental protection has become a
national policy, it is loosely associated with macro- and sectoral policies and
national economic goals, either "four modernization" (Sihua)
or the later "quadrupling Chinese economy" (Fanliangfan).
Environmental assessment is still not a general practice and procedure for most
Chinese decision-makers to decide macro-economic and sectoral policies. As is
true for many developing countries, environmental protection is still seen as a
costly and luxurious expenditure by many Chinese people, including political
leaders. Most political leaders and factory managers tend to put economic
growth first when they have to make a choice between development and
environment protection. China currently spends about 0.7% of its GNP on
environmental protection, much less than the 1-2% in most industrialized
countries and its own need for environmental expenditures.
4)
Overseas
investment and emerging environmental problems. Since its beginning of pursuing the economic
reform and open-door policy, China has attracted a great amount of overseas
investments. The distribution of investments among regions and sectors is
uneven. For example, the direct overseas investment in 1991 ($4.33 billion
dollars in total) was mainly concentrated in coastal regions, in particular,
southeast regions. About 40% were invested in the five special economic zones
in southeast China and the fifteen open coastal cities. Nearly 80% of the
overseas investments were in secondary industry, mostly within electrical and
electronic production, textiles, clothing,
plastics, chemicals, and food manufacturing. Although there are no studies on
the environmental impacts of overseas investment in China at present, many
overseas-funded enterprises are structurally pollution-intensive, even though
they are equipped with more advanced technology than their Chinese
counterparts. The amount of overseas investments reached record high levels in
the two years after Deng’s trip to southeast China. Effectively controlling
environmental pollution caused by overseas investments has become a urgent
issue for the Chinese.
5)
Weak law
enforcement. China’s
collection of environmental laws and regulations may be impressive to many
foreign observers, but the enforcement of environmental laws, in fact, faces
many barriers: the weak court system, incompetent judicial process, frequent
interference in political systems, and the unfamiliarity of the Chinese people
with the legal process. The solutions to most environmental disputes still rely
on the party’s rules or governmental mediations, rather than on the judicial
process. The party and government decisions tend to be in favour of economic
development interests.
Conclusion: The primary causes of environmental degradation today are the acute
pressure of population growth, the fast economic development and
industrialization, the conflicts between economic development and environmental
protection, the use of backward technology, poor environmental management, weak
law enforcement, and the wide dispersion of rural industry. Along with China’s
economic reform and industrialization, the future of the environment remains
worrisome.”
Chinese Migrant Labour – China as a “sending country”: Rural migrants, known as "peasant
workers" or Min Gong, are
a consequence of China's economic reforms that encouraged the diversion of
rural labour into industrial production. Rural migrants, widely put at between
100 and 150 million strong (conservative estimates – 50-80 millions), are still
referred to as a "floating" population. Simply,
whilst a household stands to gain very little from extra hours in the fields,
ten times as much is likely to be gained by the migration of a family member.
But for the household as a whole the most lucrative option is local, off-farm
employment. Opportunities for employment of this kind are most likely to arise
in coastal provinces since these have the highest concentrations of township
and village enterprises. The remote, rural areas of inland and western
provinces still tend to rely almost exclusively on agriculture; and
consequently, the incentive to migrate is greatest there. Escaping poverty,
moreover, is not the only motivation for migration. Numerous studies and
reports suggest that migrants also commonly aspire to self improvement, the
broadening of their horizons and, quite simply, a more interesting life than
the village can offer. One survey conducted in Henan province found that more
than one third of all households had at least one migrant member. Of these, 90%
were male, and more than half went into construction work. A survey conducted
in Shanghai in 1995, by contrast, found the highest percentage of migrants to
be working in restaurants or street trading (28%), followed by manufacturing
(24%) and construction (19%), with gender ratios varying distinctly according
to occupation. Women accounted for slightly more than half of the migrant jobs
in manufacturing and 40% of the jobs in restaurants and trade.
Migration patterns, and strategies, can thus differ significantly between areas. In terms of distance, moreover, there are three different levels of migration:
1) to different provinces which usually implies a long stay, returning home, if at all, only during the Chinese New Year festival;
2) within the same province, to main cities and the provincial capital; and
3) within the same county, perhaps to the main town or to a township and village enterprise in a different township, in which case migrants may return quite frequently, for example at weekends.
In each of these categories the great majority
of migrants find work through informal channels and networks, based on friends
and fellow villagers from their areas of origin. These are generally fairly
efficient at allocating labor
Under the household
registration (hukou) system created during the Mao era, migrants are
not permitted to live permanently in areas where they find work. This system
was an instrument of social control, rigidly enforcing the rural-urban divide,
and limiting access to urban life with its higher wages and subsidized
services. This system was originally implemented in connection with the
rationing of food in the cities – the state’s abilities to provide the cities
with food were limited, and the population was to be kept in check. But today,
the system – which makes rural migrants largely helpless and denies them
various kinds of legal and social protection – effectively serves as a mechanism
of “driving wages down”, thus guaranteeing that China can “undercut” even
Cambodia or Vietnam on the market of cheap garment and footwear. Thus, this
element of Maoist “socialism” (indeed, regimented modern state) became an
important component of China’s “success” in the worldwide “race to the
bottom” – price competition between low-wage “periphery” countries churning
out labor-intensive consumers’ goods.
Migrants to other
provinces are generally required to supply family planning, education and
medical certificates, for which charge is levied as a prerequisite for
obtaining employment registration cards from labor bureaux in their provinces
of origin. This should enable work permits to be issued by the destination province.
But restrictions, bureaucracy and charges of this kind notwithstanding, China's
peasants can now move relatively freely in search of work and remain for long
periods away from the villages where they are registered. In Beijing and other
cities where migrant communities have been established, some migrants have been
away from their home villages for more than ten years and show little
inclination to return. Urban registration and rights of permanent residence can
be bought: but at a price which effectively limits the purchase to a tiny
number of "self made" migrant entrepreneurs. In the Pearl River
Delta, the going rate is RMB 300,000 (US$ 36,000), Shanghai tops the list with
a current rate of RMB 1 million (US$120,000). Yet although the vast majority of
migrants cannot afford to buy formal rights for urban residence, de facto
migrant communities are becoming more established.
Most Chinese migrant
workers have to pay RMB 3,000 to 60,000 for administration charges and deposit.
Labor service companies in China are legally allowed to charge a total of 25%
of a worker's monthly wage. Under Chinese law, half the sum is used to maintain
welfare benefits for the workers while they are away from home, and the rest is
to cover company expenses. The root of the problem of abuse of exported labor
lay with some middlemen, who illegally add on a high service charge. The docility
of migrant labor is ensured also through the regular crackdowns on the
“illegal migrants”, when sometimes up to 100 thousand people are deported at
once (as in Shanghai in 1997).
As a result of general
despair and penury among the redundant peasants-turned-migrant workers, as well
as brutally efficient internal passport (“household registration”) system, the
wages in the manufacturing are successfully driven to the lowest physically
possible levels in China – and largely remain there, as newly-earned wealth
doesn’t trickle down to the workshop floor level. Highest minimum wage is found
in China in Shenzhen – and that is only monthly 42$. The workers are rarely
paid anything above the minimal wage, and sometimes are even not paid the
amount officially due to them – about 43% of all complaints lodged to the
Shenzhen authorities by the migrants in 2001, referred to the unpaid wages. In
many cases, the workers are really “bonded labour” – they are forced to pay
their factories “deposits” (as guarantee they will not run out), and portions
of their wages may be withheld, to be paid on leave. Thus, they cannot leave at
will. Workers are cowed and “tamed” by regular physical abuse and
military-style disciplining – their dormitories being thoroughly controlled. As
independent trade unions are prohibited, the workers are given very little
chance to protect themselves (lodging of complaints to the authorities, newspapers,
etc.). In fact – the emergence of the heavily exploited, alienated, and
excluded stratum of low-paid, harshly-disciplined migrant workers became the
price China had to pay for the re-entry into the world economy in the 1980s as
a part of world “periphery”. The surplus profits extorted from the migrant
labour – became the basis of the relative growth in the urban middle-class
living standards.
Still, sometimes
authorities also try to ameliorate the conditions of the migrant labourers in
order to stabilize the society in general. Example - <People’s Daily>,
August 8, 2002:
Urban citizenship, social security coverage, a pension after retirement
- for Peng Juan, a 34-year-old rural migrrant worker in central China's Henan
province, these are just wonderful but remote dreams.
This year however
her dreams have come true. With new policies adopted by the government of
Yancheng county, where Peng has lived for the past four years, all migrant
workers from rural areas are now being given the same treatment as their urban
compatriots.
This means they
can get a Hukou, or permanent urban residence permit, just by proving that they
are employed, choose whatever occupation they want and join the city's medical,
pension and other insurance schemes. Their children will also be accepted and
treated similarly to urban kids by local schools.
"For me it's
like a pie falling from the sky," said an overjoyed Peng, who was recently
hired by the Rikang Company, a booming local private enterprise. In the past
she could only subsist on odd jobs, as under the old policies "good
enterprises only wanted to hire urbanites".
For millions of
rural migrant workers driven to the cities by their yearning for a better and
more modern life, what has happened in the small and obscure Yancheng city
might be the start of a revolution, which will completely change their destiny.
The bold
"reform experiment", as the local government in Yancheng puts it, has
been sanctioned and backed by key central government ministries including the
Ministry of Labor and Social Security and the State Development Planning
Commission. Similar "experiments" are also underway in 15 other
counties across China.
This reform is
intended to abolish all discriminative policies leading to inequality in
employment for laborers of urban and rural origins, establish a unified
employment system for urban and rural labor, and draw migrant workers into the
social security system, said Wang Aiwen, an official with the Ministry of Labor
and Social Security.
There are
currently more than 80 million rural migrant workers in China, most of whom
have swarmed into the cities in the past decade since the government started to
replace the decades-old planned economy with a stark new market economy.
But many migrant
laborers have had bitter experiences in their urban lives: their job
opportunities have usually been restricted to the most dirty and back-breaking
work scorned by city dwellers, and they have often been underpaid and have
always been excluded from the social security systems all Chinese cities are
now establishing.
Before the reform,
migrant workers in Yancheng were even not allowed to sign labor contracts
longer than one year and local enterprises were frequently advised to leave
better jobs to urban laid-off workers, said Zhou Qifang, the deputy county
magistrate. Migrant workers also had to pay a variety of fees, and the
so-called "urban accommodation and management fee" rose to over 400
RMB yuan (about 50 US dollars) a year per head.
"Now the
situation has completely changed and both the migrant workers and local
enterprises welcome the change," said Zhou.
Tian Xinmin,
deputy general manager of the Rikang Company, said the reform has greatly
simplified the procedure for hiring a rural labourer and enabled his company to
recruit really competent workers. Now more than 70 percent of the company's
400-strong employees are rural migrant workers.
The reform in
Yancheng has removed the "identity gap" between urban and rural
citizens and offered them an equal playing field in employment, thus reflecting
the principles of "equality" and "fair play" stressed by
the society after China's entry into the World Trade Organization, said Shi
Maosheng, president of the Zhengzhou University law school.
Meanwhile, the
reform has also found a "safe passage" for China's huge force of
rural surplus labor, an issue the Chinese government has to tackle very
carefully in the country's road to modernization, Shi noted.
With a rural
population of over 900 million, China has the world's largest rural surplus
labor force, which experts say could reach 200 million by 2005.
Officials from the
Ministry of Labor and Social Security hinted that China might be thinking of
using its cities, especially those newly-developed small cities and towns, as a
potential channel for the diversion of the surplus rural labor.
"The thriving
of the non-public sectors and the mushrooming of small cities and towns have
made the time ripe to form a unified labor market in China," said Wang.
"And we hope a breakthrough can first be achieved in some small and
medium-sized cities."
State-organized export
of labor abroad dates back to the 1950s, when the Chinese Communist
Party sent tens of thousands of workers to help ease labor shortages in the
former Soviet bloc. In the 1960s and 1970s, Chinese
workers were sent in the form of aid to developing countries, mainly in Africa.
From 1976 to 1979, China had only 43 contracted projects and labor services
cooperating with foreign countries, amounting to US$ 53 million. Shortly after
China launched its economic reforms and open-door policy in 1978, the Ministry
of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation started commercializing the system by
sending labor overseas on a contract-basis. The government had two incentives:
to get foreign currency and help alleviate the unemployment problem. Between
1979 and 1984, the Middle East and North Africa were the major markets for
Chinese labor. During that period, workers posted overseas under the Moftec
system jumped from 2,190 to about 50,000. This was followed by five years of
stagnation from 1985 to 1990, when recessions in the big industrial economies
and reduced oil demand globally slashed the need for foreign labor in many
Middle Eastern countries. Labor exports picked up in the early 1990s, however,
posting an average growth rate of 34% through 1995. By late 1995, the Moftec
system alone accounted for 250,000 Chinese working overseas-largely due to the
licensing of new labor-exporting agencies. At the same time, the market for
Chinese manpower shifted away from the Middle East towards the former Soviet
Union, which has about 10,000 Chinese agricultural workers, and to countries in
fast-growing East and Southeast Asia. Hong Kong, Japan, South Korea and
Singapore - countries with labor shortages - have absorbed the lion's share of
Chinese workers since the start of the decade. Now labor from China has become
a thriving business, serving as a safety valve for the pressures of severe unemployment.
Research by the Academy of Social Sciences in China indicates that the
proportion of Chinese export labor in the global labor market should grow from
the present 0.3% to at least 3% within 10 years. The government fears that the
huge pool of unemployed could trigger major unrest. But as state firms continue to shed workers
(about 10 million were laid off in 1996) the problems are only expected to get
worse. For the workers themselves, a job overseas offers
higher wages as well as the chance to pick up new skills.
In 1996, foreign workers sent home remittances
of $840 million-equivalent to about 1.6% of China's 1994 foreign-exchange
reserves. The best estimate for the number of Chinese working overseas,
including about 75,000 who are working illegally, is 380,000 as of 1996. More than ever before, neighboring economies
are soaking up the surplus.
Japanese Migrant
Labour – Japan as a “receiving country”: In June 1990, the "Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition
Act" came into effect. This was one of the most
significant amendments since the Immigration Law was promulgated in 1951. While
it opened migration to a wider range of "skilled workers," the term
"unskilled" was allocated to the small-scale industries of
"Japanese descendants."
Due to rapid economic growth and the continued labor shortage in small-scale industries, the number of migrant workers increased significantly during the 1980s. The small-scale industries, along with the Chambers of Commerce and Industry, asked the government to provide migrant workers to cope with the labor shortage. In order to deal with the increasing number of migrant workers, the revised Immigration Act was agreed upon in the Diet in December 1989, and came into effect in June 1990. However, as far as "unskilled" labor was concerned, an estimated 180,000 overstayed workers who made up for the labor shortage in the Japanese economy at the time were not legalized by the revision. Instead, descendants of Japanese abroad were given new work permits to fill the labor shortage, and the number eventually increased to 180,000 as of 1996.
Another significant change in the revision was the expansion of the "trainee" system introduced in 1982 which allowed businesses to hire migrants as low-paid trainees, thereby avoiding minimum wage payments. Between 1986-1994, the number of trainees steadily increased. Also under the 1990 revision, a person who encouraged illegal work risks punishment. The penal regulation targeted brokers as well as employers who hire undocumented workers. Because of this sanction, employers either laid-off overstayed workers, or kept employing them despite the risk. However, the policy seriously affected the undocumented migrant workers by fostering exploitative working conditions. Moreover, this sanction has been used as a pretext to crackdown on activists who assist undocumented workers who have problems. For example, Mr. Nobuyuki Aoyagi (1994) and Rev. Songi Kim (1996) were arrested on separate occasions for allegedly abusing the Immigration Act by "mediating foreign workers for illegal work." But in fact, they both were simply providing counseling, and the basic human needs and care to jobless migrants in the community.
Since 1990, the number of detainees in immigration detention centers has increased significantly due to the tightened controls toward undocumented workers. Immigration officials have also reportedly occasionally used violence on such migrants.
In the mid-1990s however, the "bubble economy" collapsed, and Japan's economy declined. The recovery process has been slow since bottoming out in 1994. Foreign migrant workers in particular have had a difficult time during this period. Intent on discouraging Japanese-South Americans from staying in Japan, the government tightened conditions for extensions on working visas for Japanese descendants. Consequently, many migrant workers were either laid off or had their wages decreased considerably.
Migrant workers are used as economic
instruments; in particular, migrants who are labeled "illegal" are
used as cheap labor. Employers hire them when convenient, and fire them when
inconvenient. Ever since Nagano was selected in 1991 to host the 1998 Winter
Olympics, many migrant workers arrived in the prefecture in search of jobs, and
due to a desperate shortage of labor, many construction subcontractors hired
undocumented workers . However, when the construction projects were completed,
these migrant workers were pursued and arrested by the police. According to a
newspaper report, as of November, Nagano Prefecture Police arrested or deported
397 foreigners, conducting 13 raids on homes and other locations where
undocumented foreign workers could be found. The migrant support groups have
criticized police for cracking down on foreign workers and violating their
rights after exploiting their labor for years.
Cases of attempted suicide, unknown death,
violence, murder, rape and sexual harassment have been continuously brought to
migrant support groups. This year, there were cases of abuses against children of
migrant workers in school. The most outstanding case was a murder of a
Brazilian-Japanese boy.
His parents are Japanese descendants who migrated from Brazil. The boy was killed in November by a Japanese joyrider group though he had no connection with them, because of their hatred against Brazilians of Japanese descent.
In another case in Utunomiya City in March 1997, a Brazilian boy had to quit junior high school in order to avoid bullying by classmates. He had been bullied by some classmates who verbally abused him, saying " You stink!" and his notebooks and pencils were throw in a dust bin. He spoke very little Japanese, but he was eager to learn. Such cases are only a few incidents which have surfaced, therefore, we suspect that they are only the tip of an iceberg.
Treatment of migrant
workers in immigration detention centers has been continuously problematic,
despite a widely publicized case in 1994 in which a Chinese woman was hit and
kicked fiercely by an immigration officer. A recent case involved a Chinese
family consisting of a mother (45 years old), grandmother (74 years old) and a
baby (1 year and seven months old) detained in Ushiku detention center even
though they were not in good health. The baby had never
seen the outside world since birth, until eventually they were temporarily
released after strong protests by various people and groups both in Japan and
other countries.
South Korea –
former ”sending country” that became a ”receiving country” now:
South Korea – the
history of sending labour abroad – Western Germany (miners, nurses – 1960s),
Gulf monarchies (around 400 thousands of workers and technicians on short-term
contracts and projects – 1970s). Became a “receiving country” after 1987 – as
the gains made by the Korean organized labour during the strikes of 1987-88
(large-scale wage hikes) precluded further over-exploitation by the bigger
companies, and the workforce wishing to toil for the smaller firms became more
scarce, the labour-intensive small- and medium-sized enterprises began to
import the cheap South East Asian and Chinese labour. Today – according to some
estimates, there are around 270-300 thousands of low-paid and abused foreign
workers in South Korea. In a way, South Korean economy combines
technology-intensive, high-wage corporate sector (semiconductors, etc.) and
labour-intensive, low-wage small- and medium-scale sweatshops – “The First and
Third World Together”.
See the following
research article by Prof. Seol Dong-Hoon:
(found on: http://dhseol.com.ne.kr/publish/jn2000_02.html
).
Dr. Seol
Dong-Hoon
Korea,
once a major labor-exporting country, opened its labor market to foreign
migrant workers after the mid-1980s. Beginning around 1987 Korea has become a
magnet for migrant workers from late-developing or undeveloped countries,
whereas nearly two million Korean workers went overseas in the three decades of
1960-1980s. The Dong-A Ilbo, one of the major daily newspapers in Korea,
reported in 1987 that there were hundreds of Filipina domestic helpers in
Kangnam, the southern part of Seoul. Although this was the first time that the
presence of migrant workers was publicly reported in Korea, the number of foreign
workers in Korea has increased drastically since then. As Table 1 shows, the
number of migrant workers in Korea has increased quite noticeably: 6,409 in
1987, 14,610 in 1989, 21,235 in 1990, and 45,449 in 1991.
At that
time, all of them were undocumented migrant workers not having proper visa
status. A series of human rights violations emerged as one of the major social
problems in the country. Since the public was not prepared to deal with such a
sudden increase in the number of migrant workers, governmental measures had not
been able to keep pace with reality. The number of undocumented migrant workers
repatriated to their home country increased through arbitrary enforcement, and
a lot of employers were also subjected to penalties following investigations by
authorities. Yet at the same time it was clear that the expanding business
firms needed some kind of governmental aid in order to keep up with the
economic boom in the 1980s. As a consequence, employers in small and medium
businesses (SMBs) suffering from a severe manpower shortage had pressured the
government to legalize the employment of foreigners. Business organizations
like the Korea Federation of Small Business (KFSB) frequently asked the
government to import foreign labor in the late-1980s.
INDUSTRIAL AND TECHNICAL TRAINING PROGRAM FOR FOREIGNERS, 1991-1997
Korea
insists on defining itself as a non-immigrant country. No immigration law
exists. The basic pattern of Korean political discourse strongly based on jus
sanguinis. The contradiction between the demands of economic rationality and
ideology remained the characteristic feature of Korean non-immigration policies.
In 1991,
political regulations and administrative institutions were introduced to
recruit labor from foreign countries. The Korean government found a solution
in the Japanese model of the Industrial and Technical Training Program for
Foreigners (ITTP). The specific criteria to become a foreign industrial and
technical trainee in Korea included the following companies and conditions:
those companies, in accordance with the Foreign Exchange Act, investing in
foreign countries jointly with a foreign company; those companies providing
technical support to foreign countries based on the Foreign Technological
Development Act; those companies exporting industrial supplies to foreign
countries based on the Import-Export Act; and those companies get a recognition
from the Ministries which decides the legitimacy of hiring foreign trainees. Launched
on October 26, 1991, the program was based on the Guideline of Issuing
Foreign Industrial and Technical Trainee Visa and promulgated by the Ministry
of Justice. According to the program, the imported foreign workers would enter
Korea as trainees not workers. Although their visa status is trainee, they
actually work in the factory without training and are regarded as disguised
workers. These migrants are denied the workers three basic rights of
unionizing, collective bargaining and collective action. This strategy was so
effective that no trade union objected to the launching of the program.
Korean
firms with a foreign affiliate have been allowed to bring trainees into Korea
since 1991. The
number of foreign trainees can neither exceed 50 nor surpass 10 percent of the
native workforce in the same company. The training period is set for six months
with a possible extension of an additional six months with explicit consent
from the Ministry of Justice. In 1992-1993, though the number of foreign
trainee entrants annually was about 8,000 to 9,000, their presence in Korea did
not draw much attention from the public.
About
the same time, the number of undocumented migrant workers dramatically
increased, when
many of them entered the country through tourist or short-term visiting visas,
and occupied positions in a variety of SMBs in Seoul and its satellite cities.
On July 31, 1992, the number of undocumented migrant workers was 65,528, about
88.7% of the total migrant workers.
The
government set a period from June 10th to the end of July in 1992 in which employers
were obliged to report undocumented migrant workers. In August 1992, companies
without a foreign affiliate were also able to import foreign trainees on the
amount of 10,000 The number of the repatriated undocumented migrant workers was
10,000. if they had been approved by the Minister of Commerce and Industry.
Since 1992, SMBs without an overseas presence have been permitted to bring in
foreign trainees. They typically did so through private recruiting agencies. Up
to 10,000 trainees were authorized to work for one year in SMBs in selected
manufacturing sectors. In June 1993, the government extended the length of
traineeship from less than one year to maximum two years.
There
were an insufficient number of trainees to supply manpower to SMBs in Korea,
and the attempt to crack down on undocumented migrant workers met strong
resistance by the employers. By extending the repatriation date to the end of the same year,
companies that reported to the authorities were in fact tacitly given permit to
employ undocumented migrant workers. Of course, this was not an attempt to
legalize the employment of undocumented migrant workers. In reality, this
measure was a desperate attempt at alleviating labor shortage pressures in SMBs
by implementing temporary legalization. In this way, the government repeatedly
extended the repatriation period, culminating in the fourth extension to the
end of June in 1994.
In
November 1993, the government decided to enlarge the scale of importing foreign
trainees, under
the supervision of the Korea International Training Cooperation Corps (KITCO).
After 1994 there are two kinds of trainees in Korea. Workers from one group
entered Korea as trainees through their country under the control of KITCO
under KFSB. Workers from the other group came to Korea for the purpose of
training as employees of overseas Korean companies. under the auspices of the
KFSB, a copied version of the Japan International Training Cooperation
Organization (JITCO). The government gave KITCO the right to exclusively conduct
the process of importing and distributing trainees. While JITCO was composed of
three different parts representing labor, business and government, KITCO was a
subsidiary organization of an employers association and thus functioned to meet
the interests of the employers. Because KITCO was working on behalf of the
employers, it was inevitable that the ITTP would not be successful.
The
government allowed the importation of 20,000 trainees on November 24, 1993, and
10,000 additional trainees on September 2, 1994 for the garment and footwear
sectors. In the footwear sector, large enterprises also became eligible to
import foreign labor, and in 1995 the government decided that another 20,000
trainees for manufacturing would be brought into the country. In January 1996, President Kim
Young-Sam also promised to allow 1,000 trainees for the fishing industry that
was also experiencing labor shortages. The Korea Fishery Federation runs the
trainee program for this sector. Moreover, in 1996, another 30,000 trainees
were authorized for the manufacturing sector. The training period was also
extended to maximum three years. In 1997, the Koran Construction Federation was
allowed to import trainees.
KITCO
under the auspices of the KFSB recruited from lots of agencies in 14 Asian
countries. KITCO have the rights to selecting agencies, so many brokers
relating the agencies in sending countries tried to access and give some bribes
to staffs in KITCO. They were accused of bribery. In July 1997, KFSB
decided to deliver their (KITCOs) rights to the governments of sending
countries, for the purpose of preventing bribery. Eventually, KITCO came to be
a hotbed for many brokers.
The
agencies received a lot of brokerage fees from trainees. They often charged
trainees US$2,000-3,000 and even US$8,000 for a placement in Korea. It was considered that trainees
paid unduly much money because the agencies spent a lot of money for being
selected as the recruitment agencies from KITCO. Even though the agencies
subtracted their payment from the trainees monthly wages, In legal terms, the
money they earned is not wages but allowances because they are not workers but
just trainees. with brokerage fees so high it was extremely difficult to pay
them back, and a significant number of trainees escaped from their designated
companies to become undocumented migrant workers whose wages more closely
resembled labor market price. However, because of their illegal visa status,
undocumented migrant workers had more severe human rights violations than trainees.
As
a result of Korea's absurd foreign labor policy, amidst the worsening
conditions of human rights violations, two rallies by migrant workers led to a
high level of public criticism.
First, undocumented migrant workers suffering from industrial accidents staged a sit-in at the auditorium of the Citizens Coalition for Economic Justice in January of 1994 for a period of one month, demanding medical treatment and compensation. As their rallies drew the attention of the public, the government decided to acknowledge the basic rights of undocumented migrant workers and to allow them to be covered by the industrial accident compensation insurance. The government not only decided to compensate for those who left the country with industrial accidents, but also ordered the Ministry of Labor to take charge in monitoring violations of labor laws, including unpaid wages.
Second,
trainees from Nepal staged a sit-in at Myongdong Catholic Cathedral from
January 9 to 17, 1995, protesting unjust treatment from their employers and
intermediary exploitation at the hands of their brokerage agencies. Over 38
human rights organizations in Korea joined the rallies, and formed the
Association for the Human Rights Protection of Foreign Industrial and Technical
Trainees. It was reorganized and extended as Joint Committee of Migrant Workers
in Korea (JCMK) on July 1, 1995.
As a response to the rallies, the Ministry of Labor announced Measure
Pertaining to the Protection and Control of Foreign Industrial and Technical
Trainees on February 14, 1995. It stated that foreign trainees should be paid at least the
minimum wage set by the government, should receive wages directly from the
employers, and should not have to surrender their passports to employers or to
any other party. This reduced the chances of exploitation by agencies that
handle remittances. The migrants and their supporting NGOs including the JCMK
were stepping up their campaign for the Protection Act of Foreign Workers since
1996.
Two major parties including the ruling New Korea Party (NKP) and the opposition National Congress for New Politics (NCNP) submitted bill of Employment of Foreign Workers Act to the National Assembly respectively in 1997. The key concept of the bills is launching the Employment Permit Program for Foreigners (EPP). With a high level of public support, many felt reform was possible.
Unfortunately,
the reform was not successful. In the summer of 1997 employers of KFSB had a
couple of rallies in front of the government complex buildings at Kwachon. They
argued that there was no need for the Employment of Foreign Workers Act, as
even Japan did not have a similar law.
WORKING
AFTER TRAINING PROGRAM FOR FOREIGNERS, AFTER 1998
After a
long discussion, the Working After Training Program for Foreigners (WATP), an
extension of the ITTP, was introduced in April 1998 under the supervision of
the KITCO under the auspices of KFSB. The government revised a part of the
Departures and Arrivals Control Act (DACA). DACA is a functional equivalent of
Immigration Act of USA to implement WATP. Within the framework of WATP,
trainees, who pass certain skill tests after two-year-training, can work for
one year as workers thereby changing their visa status to the working after
training (E-8) category. The person who wants to receive the alternation
allowance of stay qualification due to the stipulation about Industrial and
Technical Trainee Control, should (a) pass the technique qualification
examination due to the National Technique Qualification Act or the Technique Qualification
Examination corresponding with this, (b) have trained for two years as an
industrial and technical trainee at the designated company, and (c) have the
qualification for training employment according to the chief of the related
administrative institutions. The person who receives the alternation allowance
of stay qualification of training employment, should work for the company where
he/she originally worked as a trainee. He/she can move to another company, if
the chief of the company agrees it or KITCO decides the turnover is necessary.
Workers after training become entitled to the same rights as their Korean
colleagues vis-a-vis the Labor Standards Act, the Minimum Wages Act, and other
labor-related acts. In addition to possessing good working skills, they are to
play an important role in supervising and assisting the regular trainees.
However,
WATP has been blamed for the fact that it keeps the basis of the ITTP. There is
growing doubt about the KITCO? ability to administer more than 70,000 trainees.
There are recurring problems, such as the corruption on sending trainees
agencies, the high-handed supervisory agencies, and the forced savings system
(JCMK 2000).
The number
of migrant workers had dramatically increased in 1994-1997 (77,546 in 1994,
142,405 in 1995, 210,494 in 1996, and 245,399 in 1997) before the situation
abruptly changed. The collapse of Korea? economy at the end of 1997, the worst
in its post-war history, prompted a US$57 billion International Monetary Fund
(IMF) rescue package. The crisis deepened in 1998 and labor unrest escalated.
Amid the economic crisis and massive layoffs in 1998, a number of migrant
workers departed Korea. It is becoming increasingly difficult for migrant
workers to find jobs and the rapid devaluation of the Korean currency reduced
the wages of migrant workers in terms of the US dollar. Many migrant workers,
therefore, had no choice but to move to other countries or to return home.
The
government announced its intention to strengthen the monitoring of undocumented
migrant workers and to freeze the total quota of trainees. In 1998, the quota
was not filled for the first time as result of lack of demand. In 1998 alone
the government set a penalty exemption period four times in which undocumented
migrant workers would be allowed to go back home without paying penalties. To
encourage more companies to dump undocumented migrants, the government also
offered an incentive scheme by providing subsidy to companies who hire native
workers instead of undocumented migrant workers. From 27 December 1997 to the
end of August 1998, a total of 61,689 undocumented migrants left Korea; 92,686
undocumented migrant workers remained as of 31 August 1998. In any case, the
number of total migrant workers had sharply decreased to 157,689 as of 31
December 1998.
Meanwhile,
migrant workers were falling victim to nonpayment or delayed payment of wages.
Sometimes the factory owner had indeed gone bankrupt and could not pay, but in
many cases, employers were withholding wages in the anticipation that the
migrants would flee Korea. Since 15 October 1998, all the migrant workers
have been covered by the Labor Standards Act. This is a product of the
continuous advocacy by migrants and supporting NGOs. However, while these labor
laws and the industrial accident compensation insurance had been made
applicable even to undocumented migrant workers, they were still not applicable
to trainees simply because trainees were not legally considered as workers.
Undocumented migrants are also still excluded from medical insurance benefits.
Worker-cum-trainees are protected by the selected 8 articles of the Labor
Standards Act, the Industrial Safety Act and the Minimum Wage Act. They are
also covered by the medical and the industrial accident compensation insurance.
Because their length of stay is a maximum three years and there is little risk
of job loss, unemployment benefits and public pensions are not applied to
trainees. They do not want to pay into such an insurance scheme where there is
little probability of receiving defined benefits. Undocumented migrant workers
are protected by all the articles of the Labor Standards Act. They also covered
by the industrial accident compensation insurance, which includes bottom-line
protection of human rights, though employers do not pay insurance fees for
them. However, they are excluded from other social protection benefits because
they do not contribute to the system and because they do not have proper visa
status.
In the
beginning of 1999 the worst seemed to be over and the economy began to recover.
As soon as the news of the recovery of the Korean economy spread, the entrance
of migrant workers was increasing again. The number of migrant workers has rapidly
increased to 217,384 at the end of 1999, and to current estimates of
anywhere over twenty-four thousand. According to the statistics released by the
Ministry of Justice, there were 243,363 migrant workers, representing over
thirty countries as of May 31, 2000. It accounted for around 1.2 percent of the
number of countrys total workforce of 20.6 million.
BACKGROUND
OF MIGRANT WORKER INFLUX
The
structural background of the migrant workers influx to Korea lies in the
changing characteristics of the world system and the upward mobility of Korea
in the system.
In the late 1980s, international labor migration had been activated worldwide, and this is generally attributed to three factors. First, the microelectronics and telecommunication technology facilitated international capital mobility, therefore the globalization of economic activities was enlarged. Second, after a dividing ridge of 1989; the socialist bloc disappeared on the stage of history and joined the capitalist world economy. And last, the Gulf War changed the directions of international labor migration in Asia, and new labor-receiving countries such as Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Brunei, and Malaysia began to appear. Though these countries did not import migrant workers officially, they became destinations of masses of wandering workers.
Moreover,
Korean government revised DACA to allow easy access to tourist visas in
preparation for the 1986 Asian Games and the 1988 Olympics. At the same time,
Korea has grown into Asia? next giant (Amsden 1989) or one of the four little
dragons (Vogel 1991) with abundant business opportunities and a flourishing
economy. The Korean economy was ranked 12th in 1995 (World Bank 1995). It is
certainly one of the most bustling economies with a gross national product
(GNP) already exceeding 9 percent, and its per capita income passed the
ten-thousand-dollar mark. In short, there are many job opportunities in Korea
when its economic activities are thriving.
In detail,
Korea has grown into a developed economy with relatively high wages and good
working conditions. The emergence of a strong labor movement since 1987 is
responsible to a significant extent for both the rapid rise in wages and the
improved working conditions. A gap, however, in wages and working conditions
between big companies and SMBs has enlarged. In other words, SMBs fell out of
popularity in the minds of the general labor force.
The Korean
labor market had been experiencing nearly full employment since the mid 1980s,
with unemployment rates around 2.5 percent. Nevertheless, the Korean economy
has suffered from a severe shortage of unskilled production workers in the SMBs
across industries. These jobs include working in dyeing, plating, heat-treat,
casting and tempering, machinery, footwear, glass, leather, electric, and
electronics factories as well as construction. The so-called three-D syndrome,
or the aversion to difficult, dangerous, or dirty jobs, started to be felt in
Korea in the late 1980s. The labor movement has influenced the labor values
as well as wages and working conditions. In addition, in the early 1990s, a
boom in the housing construction industry drew throngs of Korean workers out of
low-paying factory jobs in manufacturing into the relatively higher-paying
construction industry, leaving those factories empty or undermanned.
Migrant
workers have increasingly trickled into Korea, and they have taken these jobs
without hesitation.
They worked in sweatshops and other three-D jobs. As a consequence, Korea had
become an increasingly attractive destination for foreign workers, as these
migrant workers were filling up the big hole in the domestic labor market. As
the labor shortage of blue-collar workers became more severe, there was
increasing demand for unskilled migrant workers whose reservation wages were
reported to be much lower than those of native workers. There were two
competing arguments on the issue (Uh 1999). The argument favoring migrant
workers is that they do not compete with, but rather complement the native
workforce. Furthermore, SMBs cannot afford to move their production sites
overseas to find low-paid workers. So the employment of unskilled migrant
workers is necessary for both firms and their native workers to stay in
business and in employment. The contrary argument is that the above can be true
only within a certain limit. More importantly, it points out that the
immigration of unskilled workers would delay the industrial restructuring
required to keep the Korean economy competitive.
In
November 1997, a financial crisis hit the Korean economy. The government
announced a strong industrial restructuring plan, including financial market
reforms, to promote foreign investments into Korea. Economic growth was
therefore expected to slow down to -5% in 1998. The collapse of the Korean
economy had a devastating influence on the labor market. Unemployment ballooned
from 658,000 on 31 December 1997 to 1,665,000 on 31 December 1998. The
unemployment rate had increased to around 7%, which more than doubled the rate
of the previous year.
Increased
unemployment was the biggest problem faced not only by native workers, but also
by migrant workers in Korea. For example, thousands of foreign trainees under
the WATP were retrenched in 1998. >From 1994 until August 1998, an estimated
13,061 trainees have been dismissed. Of these, 8,286 (63.4%) were dismissed in
1998 alone. This figure represents only the number of trainees who had
completely lost their jobs, excluding those given part time jobs. Undocumented
migrant workers were even more vulnerable to unemployment, as most of them were
working in the vulnerable SMBs which went bankrupt at an average of about 150 a
day in 1998. About 100,000 migrant workers left Korea at the end of 1997 alone
due to the economic crisis and the IMF bailout package.
Even in
such hard times, the three-D jobs in Korea were not filled with native workers.
. Many companies had difficulty in hiring native workers for jobs that were
vacated by migrant workers. Korean workers did not tolerate the poor working
conditions any more, so the governments incentive scheme of replacing foreign trainees
by native workers ultimately failed. These jobs were exclusively for migrant
workers. This indicates that migrant workers in Korea are not taking jobs away
from native workers. On the contrary, they are helping the Korean economy by
accepting jobs Korean workers would not consider.
With the
recovery of the Korean economy in 1999, the demand for migrant workers has also
increased. The government did not expand the quota of trainees, so the number
of undocumented migrant workers has also dramatically increased.
BASIC
CHARACTERISTICS OF MIGRANT WORKERS IN KOREA
Visa
status
The employment of migrant workers in Korea has been very limited to
date. There are three categories of visa status for migrant workers: the
legally employed, the industrial and technical trainees, and the undocumented
migrant workers. In general, DACA does not allow unskilled foreign
labor to enter Korea as an additional part of the workforce; unskilled migrant
workers are allowed to enter only as an industrial and technical trainee. Nevertheless, a large
number of unskilled migrant workers have entered Korea for the purpose of
employment. The number of foreign migrant workers who came to Korea as of the
end of May 2000 totals 243,363. Among them, there were 14,697 legally employed
migrant workers, 80,915 industrial and technical trainees, and 134,030
undocumented migrant workers.
The first
category of legal migrant workers is composed of professionals and production
workers after training. Professional and technical workers, such as university
professors (E-1), language teachers (E-2), researchers (E-3), technology
instructors (E-4), professionals (E-5), entertainers (E-6), and those under
specific activities (E-7) who cannot be substituted by native workers.
Therefore they can easily obtain a valid visa for employment in Korea. Most of
them from advanced countries such as USA, Canada, Japan, UK, Germany, or France
are working as professionals. According to Table 2, as of the end of May in
2000, there were some 14 thousand professional workers in Korea. Language
teachers make up more than half. It is expected that the number of foreign
professionals will increase very rapidly as the Korean government has recently
deregulated the immigration policy for this category of workers. Accompanying
the globalization of the Korean economy, demand for foreign professionals who
could transfer their knowledge, skills and technologies to the Korean people
has increased. Furthermore, allowing free mobility of highly skilled workers
provides a foundation to promote foreign investment. To encourage this, the
government abolished the maximum period of stay so as to permit almost
unlimited residence in Korea. Administrative regulations on the entry and stay
of professionals were relaxed and formalities were simplified to speed up the
visa process. The open-door policy for professionals is to be strengthened in
the near future. A one-stop service will be provided and the acquisition of the
nationality will be eased. In 1997, the government also deregulated most the
policies of foreign investment into Korea, just after the financial crisis. It
is expected that more professionals associated with foreign direct investment
and portfolio investment will work in Korea. The production workers after
training (E-8) are just 440, because the first skill-test was conducted in
April 2000.
The second
category of industrial and technical trainees is not legal workers but
trainees. Korean government prohibits unskilled workers immigration, and only
unskilled industrial technical trainees having been issued D-3 visa are
admitted. In 1991 the Korean government launched the ITTP, modeled after
Japanese policy, to solve the labor supply shortage in the manufacturing
industry, and the purpose of this program was to supply migrant workers for the
SMBs suffering from a severe labor shortage in the short run. In fact, they
receive no industrial technical training but merely work as simple laborers or
fishermen in SMBs, in the sites of construction, or in inshore fishing grounds.
In other words, they are disguised workers never being admitted their status as
a worker by the Labor Standards Act. Thus I regard the ITTP as an expediential
policy far from rational.
With the
globalization of many large companies since the late 1980s, managers from
overseas branches would be sent to factories in Korea for a period of training.
The Korean government permitted this kind of training on one-year basis,
marking the beginning of the ITTP 1991. The program was later extended to SMBs
in the manufacturing sector after 1992. Employers who suffered from labor
shortages welcomed the foreign trainees.
In this
way, the ITTP became the migrant workers recruiting program in Korea after
1994. Fourteen countries were selected for sending their nationals as a
industrial and technical trainee: China, the Philippines, Indonesia, Vietnam,
Thailand, Myanmar, Nepal, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Uzbekistan,
Kazakhstan, Iran, and Mongolia. Foreign industrial and technical trainees
should be between 18 and 35 (between 20 and 50 from March 1993) years old
without criminal records.
The third
category, undocumented migrant workers, is for those having neither
valid employment visa nor valid industrial and technical trainees visa.
Undocumented migrant workers came to Korea seeking employment opportunities, as
wages increased and the labor shortage became much more severe since the late
1980s. Their figures jumped from around 4,000 in 1987 to 153,879 in 2000.
They are illegal in the sense that they violate the DACA. Most undocumented
migrant workers are those who stay to work longer than the permitted period.
Some of them also have improper visa status, namely by violating their purpose
of stay. Others, to a lesser degree, have entered Korea without any legal
permission. All these workers can be classified as undocumented migrant
workers. No exact statistics on undocumented migrant workers exists, but their
numbers can be estimated from the figure for undocumented foreigners.
Among
them, about twenty percent are former trainees. Many trainees became
undocumented migrant workers after the expiration of their visa, and some were
even found to have moved to other factories, without permission, immediately
after entry.
Most of
them come from late developing countries such as China, the Philippines,
Bangladesh, Thailand, Pakistan, Mongolia, India, Nepal, Myanmar, Iran, Peru,
Vietnam, Sri Lanka, Nigeria, Indonesia, Ghana, Uzbekistan, and so forth.
Hereafter, I focus on unskilled manual workers, excluding professionals.
Ethnicity
About
one third of foreign migrant workers are ethnic Koreans. They are descended from those who
crossed national boundary and established settlements in the northeastern
provinces of China in the area formerly called Manchuria, Siberia, Sakhalin island,
and Central Asia in the late Chosun dynasty from 1860s to 1900s and Japanese
colonial rule 1910-1945.
The ethnic
Korean migrant workers group is made up of three categories of residents. Of
the ethnic Korean migration flowing back into Korea, most are from China, but
there are also ethnic Koreans coming from Russia, Uzbekistan, or Kazakhstan. As
of December 31, 1996, there were 40,286 Korean Chinese, and 51 citizens of the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).
Migration
channels
Migrant
workers have migrated to Korea through both material and cultural-ideological
linkages. The number of migrant workers is determined neither by the income gap
nor the size of surplus labor force but by the amount of export from Korea and
the size of ethnic Koreans. In other words, foreign workers immigrate much more
from those countries having strong social linkages than from poor countries
having abundant surplus labor force. This fact is reaffirmed by investigation
of the major reasons why migrant workers choose Korea as their destination. In
short, social networks play an important role in international labor migration.
The influx
channels of migrant workers vary by visa status. According to Table 2, 26.8
percent of the industrial and technical trainees are recruited by Korean firms
with a foreign affiliate, while the other (73.2 percent) industrial and
technical trainees arrive in Korea through invitation by the KITCO under the
KFSB and international manpower recruiting agencies. Undocumented migrant
workers having a tourist or visiting visa flow into Korea through illegal
immigration agency or by the help of informal and individual ties.
Wages
Two key
variables, the visa status and the ethnicity of migrant workers, were found to
have effects on workers wage differentials. Undocumented migrant workers earn
more than industrial and technical trainees do, and overseas Koreans earn more
than non-Koreans.
Low
wages of industrial and technical trainees are institutionalized by ITTP and
WATP, and by the KITCO under the auspices of KFSB that regulates the wage level
based on only GNP per capita of labor sending countries irrespective of
domestic wage levels.
The fact
that the wages of industrial and technical trainees are much lower than those
of undocumented migrant workers results in the disengagement of trainees from
the arranged companies. Moreover, as ethnic Korean undocumented migrant workers
are fluent in Korean, they can get a job in non-manufacturing sectors, such as
construction and catering, with relatively higher wages. That is, they are
capable of taking jobs different from those of the other migrant workers.
As migrant
workers are engaged in unskilled jobs, where the ability of workers matter
little, most of them get much lower wages than native workers. However, the
wage level of undocumented migrant workers is approaching the market wage
reflecting their skills. In other words, in the case of undocumented migrant
workers, no wage discrimination exists within a firm, although there are some
wage differentials among industries such as manufacturing, construction, and
service sectors, or due to their job career.
The
discrimination against migrant workers in the workplace is manifested in work
allocation process. As eternal novices, they take charge of undesired jobs. As
an underclass, most migrant workers believe that discrimination is prevalent in
Korea. Their feeling of discrimination does not originate from the specific
experiences of individuals, but from work life in general. Although overseas
ethnic Korean workers get a higher wage than other migrant workers, they feel
more discrimination because their reference group is not migrant workers but
indigenous Korean workers.
At the
initial stage of the ITTP, trainee wages were about half that of native workers.
After 1995 minimum wages were guaranteed to trainees, who were covered by
the industrial accident compensation insurance. But market forces soon raised
the migrants wages to the level of their productivity, estimated at 87.5
percent of native workers by the employers (SMBA 1999).
PROBLEMS
AND RESPONSES
Migrant
workers face many problems in their work life: long working hours, low wages,
physical abuse, overdue wages, and poor working conditions. In addition, they
are often exposed to great damages in the workplace.
Industrial
and technical trainees
Though it
is clear that the industrial and technical trainees are offering valuable labor
power in much needed industries in Korea, the government treats them merely as
trainees, taking away all the rights and privileges of being workers. Because
of this labeling and subsequent inapplicability of labor acts to
worker-cum-trainees, this program is in need of major reform. As a result,
numerous trainees attempted to escape from their assigned jobs. It made sense
economically to many industrial and technical trainees to find illegal
employment that pays significantly more. According to data released by the
Ministry of Justice, 37.5% (50,980) of all the industrial and technical
trainees in the 1994-2000 period (135,769) escaped from companies with which
they contracted to work and the number is expected to increase year by year.
In some
ways, industrial and technical trainees are in worse conditions than
undocumented migrant workers. This contradiction can be easily found in the existing ITTP and
WATP. One of the serious flaws in the recruitment strategies employed by these
mediating agencies concerns false and/or exaggerated advertisements. In many
cases, these agencies advertise that migrant workers are able to make between
$210-260 per month. As such, the labor recruitment and management agencies
manipulative tactics and their threats to detain workers have become an
additional problem. If trainees happen to retaliate in some form, a number of
agencies would send people to physically abuse and forcibly take away part of
their wages. Many of the counseling centers dealing with such cases have
described this situation as a modern form of slave labor.
Nowadays,
trainees still suffer from basic human rights violations such as discriminatory
low wages, compulsory overtime working and holiday working, frequent occurrence
of industrial accidents, intermediary exploitation by agencies, passport
seizure, prohibition of going outside company, violence, abusive language, and
so forth. The JCMK published a white paper titled The Report on Oppressed Human
Rights of the Migrant Trainee Workers in March 2000. It reminded the public that the human
rights violations of migrant workers are prevalent in Korea. The overall
situation has not changed since the launching of WATP in April 1998.
Especially, trainees under overseas joint venture are, more often than not, in
quite a poor situation. They receive extremely low wages of 80-120 thousand Won
every month and even if they encounter industrial accidents, they cannot be
entitled to industrial accident compensation insurance.
Undocumented
migrant workers
Though the
problems related to industrial accidents were unacceptable initially, the
seriousness of most cases subsided as a result of government measures to
provide industrial accident compensation insurance to illegal migrant workers
beginning March 1993. Yet, other problems such as concealing industrial
accidents still loom large. It is fortunate that the government decided to compensate
those who returned to their countries with injuries. But as long as the primary
concern for illegal migrant workers is the danger of being repatriated to their
countries after reporting injuries to authorities, many employers use this
weakness to conceal industrial accident cases.
In some
cases workers must surrender their passports and work overtime against their
will. In worst
cases, employers beat foreign employees or sexually abuse foreign women workers.
The over-crowded living conditions and unsafe working arrangements induce
serious health problems.
One
problem I cannot leave out is the clandestine recruitment activities of migrant
workers. People who come to Korea through such networks take out a loan and
spend about $1,700-$2,500 for travel and broker fees; usually they save money
in Korea and pay their debt upon returning to the country of origin.
Once they make a decision to return to their home country, the illegal workers must pay heavy fines. According to the DACA, undocumented migrant workers are subject to less than $135,000 fine and up to 3 years of jail sentence. On average, they pay about 1,000,000 Won for each year they stayed illegally. In the process of repatriating illegal workers, problems related to detaining and processing them emerge. In Seoul, where one of the detention centers is located, its small facility is unfit for humans and other physical abuse and battery incidents occur on a regular basis, making this detention center the last hell in Korea.
Responses
The major
responses of migrant workers to these problems include appealing to the
manager, transferring to another company, or simple endurance according to my
survey research (Seol 1999). While industrial and technical trainees usually
appeal to managers, undocumented migrant workers choose to transfer to other
companies.
The
expansion of the migrants social networks has the effect of reducing the risks
of failure in Korea. Social networks among migrant workers are based on their
origins. They meet one another regularly at local concentration centers, and
manage some associations for mutual assistance. These associations provide
programs for adaptation. The development of social networks among migrant
workers may be an important reason for their continuous stay in Korea
1998-1999. Hence the migrants tend to stay despite relative decreases in their
earnings.
DISCUSSIONS
The
influx of migrant workers presents a new challenge for the Koreans, because
they have lived in a homogeneous culture for many centuries. Cultural pluralism
is a new idea to them, and international marriage is very unpopular in Korea. They don’t have
multi-cultural attitudes toward foreigners, and their attitudes are
characterized by discrimination and prejudice. The near-sighted policy of Korean government
dealing with migrant workers fostered this false consciousness. The government
issues a trainee visa not an employment visa for foreign unskilled workers,
which, in turn, results in a very low wage and easy control. As such, the
government denies them the privileges and rights as workers. Many policy makers
still believe that by not legalizing the import of foreign labor and by
accepting them as trainees, Korea will be able to reduce the possible negative
economic and social impacts of foreign migrant workers but still enjoy the
benefits of their services.
However, a
lot of academics, civil movement activists, and policy makers had raised the
question as to whether there was a better scheme to maximize the economic
benefits from the inflow of unskilled migrant workers without discriminating
them economically and socially. They suggest the government to enact the
Foreign Workers Human Rights Act to fundamentally solve these issues since
1999.
The
government also realized that the introduction of new employment program is
inevitable to better protect the human rights of foreign workers staying in
Korea. In Spring 2000, President Kim Dae-Jung instructed the cabinet and the
ruling New Millennium Democratic Party (NMDP) to work out measures to eliminate
violations of foreign workers human rights.
NMDP and
the Ministry of Labor try to launch EPP, and are now making a bill for the
Employment of Foreign Workers Act. Germany, Singapore and Taiwan had already
introduced EPP, which seemed to be successful in dealing with the short-term
importation of unskilled migrant workers. Under EPP, a firm intending to hire
foreign workers shall have an employment permit from the government, and the
foreigners will obtain work permits. Foreign workers will be entitled to bonus
allowances, retirement pay, the three basic labor rights and dormitory, if the
new program is enacted.
On the
contrary, the employers of KFSB, and the officials of SMBA and the Ministry of
Justice are insisting on keeping WATP. They argue that WATP is a program
improved from ITTP, and most human rights violations involving foreign workers
occurred for undocumented migrant workers. It is expected that the group, which
wants to maintain WATP, will campaign to stop passing the bill in the National
Assembly as they did in 1997.
It is
difficult for pro-migrant activists to enact EPP without the backing of
universal norms of human rights, partly because there have not been powerful
domestic actors pushing for migrant rights. Thus, business pushed for migrant
workers at various times, but not for rights and not for integration. However,
as globalization continues, Koreans should also learn to live together with
people having different cultures, languages and religions. Even though the
employers including KFSB stubbornly oppose the EPP, the enactment of EPP will
be realized in the near future.
REFERENCES
· Amsden, Alice H. 1989. Asias Next Giant:
South Korea and Late Industrialization. New York: Oxford University Press.
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Migrant Yearbook 1999: Migration Facts, Analysis and Issues in 1998. Hong
Kong: AMC.
· Association for Foreign Workers Human Rights
in Pusan (AFWHR). 1999. Migrant Workers Guide Book. Pusan: AFWHR.
· Gurowitz, Amy. 1999. Mobilizing International
Norms: Domestic Actors, Immigrants, and the Japanese State. World Politics
51(3):413-445.
· Joint Committee of Migrant Workers in Korea
(JCMK). 1999. Migrant Workers and Cooperation: Annual Report of JCMK Activities
in 1998 (Iju nodongja, kurigo kudulkwa hamkke handanun kot: 1998 nyon oenohyop
hwaldong charyojip). Seoul: JCMK.
· ______. 2000. The Report on Oppressed Human
Rights of the Migrant Trainee Workers (Oekukin sanop kisul yonsusaeng inkwon
paekso). Seoul: JCMK. Kang, Su Dol. 1996. Typology and Conditions of Migrant
Workers in South Korea. Asian and Pacific Migration Journal 5(2/3):265-279.
· Korean Federation of Small Business (KFSB).
2000. Current Conduct and Countermeasures of the Industrial and Technical
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teachaek). Unpublished Paper.
· Lee, Hye-Kyung. 1997. The Employment of
Foreign Workers in Korea: Issues and Policy Suggestion. International Sociology
12(3):353-371.
· Massey, Douglas S. 1990. Undocumented Migrants
Earn Lower Wage than Legal Immigrants? New Evidence from Mexico. International
Migration Review 21(2):236-274.
· Ministry of Justice. 2000. Problems and
Countermeasures for the Growth of Foreign Illegal Sojourners. (Pulbob cheryuja
cheungka e tareun munjejom mit taechaek). Unpublished Paper.
· Ministry of Labor. 2000. Employment and
Control of Foreign Manpower (Oekuk inryok eui koyong mit kwanri taechaek).
Unpublished Paper.
· New Millennium Democratic Party (NMDP).
2000. Report of the Protection Measures for Foreign Workers (Oekukin nodongja
Poho Taechaek Pogoso). Unpublished Paper .
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les migrations). 1999. Trends in International Migration: Continuous Reporting
System on Migration Annual Report 1999. Paris: Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD).
· Park, Seok-Woon, Chongkoo Lee, and Dong-Hoon
Seol. 1995. A Survey of Foreign Workers in Korea 1995. Pp. 317-356 in Korea
Research Institute for Workers Human Rights and Justice (ed.), Policies and
Protective Measures Concerning Foreign Migrant Workers. Seoul:
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kyolkwa). Unpublished Paper.
· ______. 2000. Current Conduct of the
Industrial and Technical Training Program for Foreigners and the Investigation
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unyong hyunhwang mit koyong hokaje komto). Unpublished Paper.
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1995: Workers in an Integrating World. New York: Oxford University Press.
However, the new Foreign Workers’ Permit Law was
introduced in South Korea on July 31, 2003. In essence, 3-4 years of work for
the foreign unskilled workers are permitted by the new law, but the mobility of
such contracted labour is still restrained, and there is no guarantee that the
wage/condition discrimination would be fully eliminated. The 3-4 year contracts
for the foreign workers are, in principle, not renewable, and they are not
allowed to bring families with them. Thus, Korea remains a country effectively
prohibiting legal labour immigration. New model – close to that found in
Singapore or Taiwan (short-term contract labour). See reaction on the
Philippines (a major “sending country”):
South Korean parliament approves Foreign Worker Permit
Law; OFWs' fear of deportation quashed
August
5, 2003
Labor and Employment Secretary Patricia A. Sto. Tomas
yesterday announced that the National Assembly, South Korea's parliament, has
approved the Work Permit Law for Foreign Workers on July 31, by a vote of 148
in favor, 88 against, and nine abstentions.
The passage into law of the measure, much-awaited by overseas Filipino
workers (OFWs), was relayed to Sto. Tomas by Philippine Labor attaché to South
Korea, Reydeluz Conferido, who cited the collective efforts of those who
supported its approval for the protection of the rights of migrant workers in
South Korea, led by no less that President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.
"There is no doubt President Arroyo's state visit to South Korea
last June was a major boost to the passage of the measure," Sto. Tomas
said, recalling that during the visit, the President met and made strong
representation with South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun, Prime Minister Goh
Kun, members of the Korean National Assembly, and other South Korean top
officials on the passage of said bill.
This, Sto. Tomas noted, was another concrete demonstration of the
President's genuine concern for the welfare of OFWs.
"The passage of the Work Permit Bill is one of our important
concerns in Korea. Now that it is a law, it should afford Filipino migrant
workers better employment security status and equal opportunity in the areas
where they may be allowed to work," Sto. Tomas added.
The labor and employment secretary has written Hong Sa-Duk, floor
leader and Grand National Party Representative to the National Assembly,
thanking him for his commitment, support and personal efforts in facilitating
the passage of the measure.
The passage into law of the Work Permit Bill effectively quashed the
feared mass deportation of illegal migrant workers in South Korea, including
about 18,000 OFWs.
It can be recalled that prior to the law's enactment, illegal foreign
workers in South Korea were fearful they might be deported by the end of August
this year, following the expiration of the latest amnesty period given to
illegal workers.
The Philippine embassy and labor office in Seoul had lobbied hard for
the passage of the bill in the National Assembly and enlisted the help of the
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), International Organization for
Migration (IOM), other labor attachés and friendly legislators form both the
majority and minority parties in the Assembly.
In his report to Sto. Tomas, Conferido said the new law is applicable
to those who registered under the Voluntary Registration Program implemented
since March of 2002. Those who have not registered will be treated under the
ordinary provision of the Korean Immigration Law.
Relative to this, Conferido said that of the illegal OFWs in South
Korea, more than 17,0000 had registered during the Voluntary Registration
Period.
"This is good news for us," Conferido said, saying that because of this, he expects to encounter only a few problems once that law is implemented.
Sto. Tomas assured OFWs the Department of Labor and Employment, thru
its appropriate offices, will shortly explain fully the other important
provisions of the Work Permit Law once an official translation is obtained.