I. China
– after 1949. Power – taken by the people with comparatively small
exposure to the Western culture. They tended to identify a “modernized”
“socialist” state with their traditional early nationalist ideal of “powerful
and wealthy state”, while “foreignness” was identified with “threat” and
“pollution”. This kind of dichotomy was strongly “statist” and nationalistic in
its underpinnings, but only “socialist” and “anti-imperialist” outwardly. The
last quality did help Maoism, at some point, became a highly marketable
commodity in the international ideology marketplace, especially for the 3rd
World revolutionaries.
First
ideological expressions of the new “socialist” state: writer and critic Mao Dun
(1896-1981; Minister of Culture in 1949-1965): “Comprador culture, the godchild
of imperialism”, “the worshipping of Western people”, “the intoxication with
European and American life”, “seeds of inferiority complex inside our people”
should be attached. In fact, nationalist modernizing intelligentsia used the
moment for shedding off their strong inferiority complex forced on them by
perceived “domination” of the West over Chinese life, “treaty port system”,
etc.
Mao Zedong:
<”Friendship” or Aggression> (1949): defines the whole of the history of
USA-Chinese relationship as “history of aggression”, and American
missionary/educational undertakings in China as “spiritual aggression”.
“Foreignness” is identified as totally inimical. At that period “fondness for
Coca-Cola” could be a ground for imprisonment.
*At the
same time, “Han chauvinism” is strongly criticized (1953): “Chinese” is
defined as “unity of nationalities”, although there are no doubts that the Han
Chinese should lead “Chinese nation” into “modernization” and “socialism”. The
state constitution of 1954 declared the country to be a "unified,
multinational state" and prohibited "discrimination against or
oppression of any nationality and acts which undermine the unity of the nationalities."
All nationalities were granted equal rights and duties. Policy toward the
ethnic minorities in the 1950s was based on the assumption that they could and
should be integrated into the Han polity by gradual assimilation, while
permitted initially to retain their own cultural identity and to enjoy a
modicum of self-rule. Accordingly, autonomous regions were established in which
minority languages were recognized, special efforts were mandated to recruit a
certain percentage of minority cadres, and minority culture and religion were
ostensibly protected. The minority areas also benefited from substantial
government investment.
*The rift
with Soviet Union beginning in 1959 – causes were complex (ideological,
political differences, etc.), but one of the underlying motives was also a
“national struggle” against perceived “foreign [Soviet] dominance” over
international politics of the Communist block, Chinese economy and technology,
etc. 1960 – all Soviet advisors (now viewed more or less in the same way as
past “spiritual aggressors” from USA) withdrawn. 1963 – China officially raises
territorial question – Russia/USSR being accused in “plundering Chinese
territory” through the “unequal treaties” in Tsarist times. By the 1967-8, the
USSR is identified as “imperialist”, an “enemy of Chinese people”: dichotomy
“our nation versus imperialism” has been applied.
*Nationalistic
emotion is based on the emulative patterns – the aim of the Great Leap Forward
(1958) is defined as “to catch up and overtake the imperialist countries”. “In 1955,
Mao had proposed that ten years would be required to ‘build socialism’, and
fifty to seventy years ‘to catch up with, or overtake the United States’. But
by 1962, the prospects were less sanguine: ‘As for the construction of a strong
socialist economy in China, fifty years won’t be enough; it may take one
hundred years or even longer ... China has a large population, resources are
meager, and our economy backward, so that in my opinion it will be impossible
to develop our productive powers so rapidly as to catch up with and overtake
the most advanced capitalist countries in less than one hundred years’.” (Nigel Harris). Idea of “catching up” with
the “role models” in the West – typical for the peripheral nationalism in the
world-system.
Cultural revolution decade (1966-1976)
– strong nationalist anti-imperialist underpinnings: burning down of English
Embassy building in Beijing, harassing of Soviet diplomats, etc. Lao She, a
famous writer – beaten to death for, among other thing, being “too polluted
with Western education and ideas”. Strong idea of the “struggle of the Orient”
against “Western/Soviet imperialism” – in effect, drew on very old
Pan-Asianist ideas. “Solidarity” with Vietnam, Burmese communists, Thai
Communists, etc.
After
the Cultural revolution: gradual emergence of the “Occidentalist” paradigm – West again came to
be perceived by many intellectuals as the “better Other”, embodiment of “modern
values”. Vivid interests to Western modernist poetry, etc – suppressed before.
Renewed admiration of Western consumer goods. Subsequently – campaigns against
“spiritual pollution” (1983), and “bourgeois liberalism” (1986). Still,
“Occidentalist” discourse strengthens – Su Xiaokang (born 1949) and TV series
“River Elegy” (Heshang; 1988): “The Yellow River has been a source of
flooding and disaster for the Chinese since ancient times, and it is used to
represent the cyclical nature of Chinese history. The six episodes in ‘River
Elegy’ each address an element of tradition still keeping China from moving
forward. The authors argue that China's inward looking stifling cultural
traditions-- manifested in its values-- are keeping China from developing.
Where once it was the ruler, in the form of the emperor, that was the impediment
to change, now it is the Communist Party.” The series directly compared China
with Western countries (mostly unfavorably) and took a critical look at the
cultural symbols vital for nationalist discourse – “Great Chinese Wall” was
taken as a symbol of meaningless isolation, for example. Far Eastern
Economic Review:
“In the
first episode of River Elegy, Searching for Dreams, writer Su states his
position categorically. 'There is a blind spot in our national psyche: it is a
vague belief that all of the shame of the past century is the result of a break
in our glorious history. Ever since 1840, there have been
people who have used the splendours and greatness of the past to conceal the
feebleness and backwardness of our present state. It is as though we crave this
ancient and time-worn poultice to salve the painful realities of the past
century. We seen to find great solace in every earthshaking archaeological
discovery. Yet the fact remains,
our civilization is moribund.’
Su and his colleagues break one of the great taboos of Chinese popular propaganda by repeatedly discussing China's culture in terms of other ancient, decayed, and impoverished cultures, such as those of the Middle East, Africa, South America and India.
The series takes as its central elegiac theme the Yellow River and its countless victims, the symbol of the irrational, erratic and earth-oriented character of the Chinese. It is the dragon, the totem of water, that Su and the other writers identify as an icon for the violent wilfulness of the river.
’People say that there
is an element in Chinese culture that allows for the toleration of the power of
evil; others say that the fatal weakness of the Chinese national character is a
slyness, resignation to the fiats of nature, and a mute acceptance of
suffering. Surely this is no accident...water is the
lifeblood of agriculture, and it is the dragon king who rules over water. For
this reason, this nation both loves and hates the dragon, lauds him and curses
him. It is a complex combination of emotions... In turn, it has made the Chinese a complex people.’
When the commentary turns to a discussion of
the ravages of the drought in the countryside, sequences from the rain-praying
scene in the film Yellow Earth and the peasant battle in Old Well
are used to bring the point home. Then
the viewer is introduced to the author of the Old Well, Zheng Yi, an
ex-Red Guard leader turned novelist, who waxes lyrical on the horrors of the
loess region of China's northwest, flying in the face of the fad for romanticizing
the 'earth’ among intellectuals and audiences of the urban East China seaboard.
We are presented with
a picture of China as an impoverished Third World country, relying on massive
infusions of foreign capital and technology to create an illusion of modernization.
'Our pride and our grief,’ writes Su, ‘are invariably the same thing.’
Concluding the episode, he observes: ‘History has proved time and again that
the root cause of cultural decline is not the attacks of some outside force,
but rather because of the degeneration of its internal mechanism.’”. The series
were vilified by the official propaganda for “lack of patriotism” and
prohibited afterwards, and Su had to flee the country. In fact, he recreated
the dichotomy of the early nationalist thinkers (Liang Qichao, etc.) –
“degenerate”, weak, “corrupt” China versus “strong Western countries” as the
model of “progress”.
The 1990s: economical
growth strengthen elite and popular self-confidence, while basic feeling of
“inferiority” still remains strong. Acute need in self-assertion. Symbolical
self-assertion – while traditionally foreign (White) predations in China were
seen as “male/Western rape of female/orient”, now “screwing a [White]
foreigner” is seen as “reverse of positions”. “SCREWING FOREIGNERS IS PATRIOTIC
In 'A Beijing Man in New York' (Beijingren zai Niuyue), China's popular 1993
tele-series, the protagonist Wang Qiming, a man on his way to making a fortune
after a train of failures and betrayals, hires a New York prostitute. She is
white, blonde and buxom. Wang decides to take some of his frustrations out on
her. While thrusting himself on to the prostrate prostitute, Wang showers her
with dollar bills. As the money swirls around the bed, Wang demands that she
repeatedly cry out: 'I love you'.
Reportedly, this was an extremely popular scene with mainland audiences,
in particular with the Chinese intelligentsia. (1) It is the type of encounter
that has a certain paradigmatic significance about it. It could be argued that
by having his way with an American whore while buying her endearments with a
shower of greenbacks, Wang Qiming's action is the most eloquent recent
statement (and inversion) of the century-old Chinese-foreign dilemma. (2) This
tele-series appeared at a time when both the Chinese authorities and segments
of the population were becoming increasingly irate about their (perceived)
inferior position in the New World Order and the attitude of the United States.
(3) To an extent the series is a reprisal of the Boxers without any belief system.
It represents the coming of age of Chinese narcissism, and it bespeaks a desire
for revenge for all the real and perceived slights of the past century. (4) In
their representation of China as a nation ruthlessly violated by Western
imperialism after the Opium Wars, from the mid-19th century onward, many
literati pointed out that China's military and spiritual weakness had made it
an easy prey to aggressive foreigners. Questions of racial and political
impotence have been central to Chinese thought and debates ever since.”
All in all – dichotomy “West – China” has been seen after varying angles
in diverse periods. West could be “threat” (Maoism) or “model”
(“Occidentalism”), but it always remained the “significant Other” – “yardstick”
by which Chinese nationalism tried to fathom its position in the world order.
Simultaneously, non-Western “foreigners” always was perceived more
paternalistically – “Asia and Africa” were object of “anti-imperialist help” in
the 1960s, and tropes for “backwardness” in the 1980s.
II. Post-war Japan.
1950-60 – crisis in “national” discourse – aftershock of the defeat. Popularity
of Marxism, and inherently “Occidentalist” content in Japanese Marxism –
Japanese imperialism was viewed as “singularly cruel”, “specially reactionary”,
etc. Paradigmatic Marxist intellectual (with strong Weberian inclinations) –
Maruyama Masao – theory of “modernization” and “nation-state building”.
Characterized Japanese “modern project” and “secondary” and “incomplete”.
1970s: strengthening of self-confidence due to
the economical successes. “Secondary nationalism” – ascribing the already
existing nation certain desirable (or undesirable) qualities. In Japan of the
1970s, “secondary nationalism” took the form of “nihonjinron” – theories on Japanese
distinctiveness. “Secondary nationalism” – both political and commercial
phenomenon. Politically, the elite defines “Japan-ness”, and, by manipulating
the definition, encourages – or legitimises – certain type of social actions
(ex: the Japanese are described as “harmony-loving in the employment
relationship”, “inherently dependent on others” – thus, such mode of action is
either encouraged or, at least, legitimised as normal). Commercially, many of
these books were enthusiastically consumed and became bestsellers. Common
features of such books: Japanese society is described is:
-
group-oriented,
vertically stratified.
-
Based on
emotional understanding, not formal logic
-
Homogenous and
“uni-racial”
-
Completely unique – “foreigner never can
master all the intricacies of our language”
In a word – right-wing attempt to manipulate
the perception of “Japan-ness” in the manner conducive to the maintenance of
the “soft authoritarian” society, and also satisfy the need of masses in
cultural “self-definition”. Basic feature of “nihonjinron” – “essentialism”,
“totalising” discourse – it is presupposed that all Japanese are
“basically the same” (the same supposition in Western Orientalism). “Others”
outside are denigrated – “Westerners” (main reference point is still West)
are described as “too logical”, “cool-hearted”, etc. “Others” inside Japan are
simply ignored – around 657 thousands of Koreans (with North or South Korean
citizenship), several millions of former “base people” (“burakumin”), and so
on.
One reason for long-time market success of
“nihojinron” – national discourse ingrained into history education. Japanese
are described in the textbooks as a “homogenous nation” from the ancient time,
and Japanese culture is explained outside of regional or world context. Masses,
already accustomed to such descriptive models, are more prone to consume
“nihonjinron”.
Late 1990s: post-“essentialist”, post-modernist
trends. Popularity of intellectual self-reflection over the artificial nature
of “national” discourse – Karatani Kojin, etc.