I. China
– after 1949. Power – taken by the people with comparatively small
exposure to the Western culture. They tended to identify a “modernized”
“socialist” state with their traditional early nationalist ideal of “powerful
and wealthy state”, while “foreignness” was identified with “threat” and
“pollution”. This kind of dichotomy was strongly “statist” and nationalistic in
its underpinnings, but only “socialist” and “anti-imperialist” outwardly. The
last quality did help Maoism, at some point, became a highly marketable
commodity in the international ideology marketplace, especially for the 3rd
World revolutionaries.
First
ideological expressions of the new “socialist” state: writer and critic Mao Dun
(1896-1981; Minister of Culture in 1949-1965): “Comprador culture, the godchild
of imperialism”, “the worshipping of Western people”, “the intoxication with
European and American life”, “seeds of inferiority complex inside our people”
should be attached. In fact, nationalist modernizing intelligentsia used the
moment for shedding off their strong inferiority complex forced on them by
perceived “domination” of the West over Chinese life, “treaty port system”,
etc.
Mao Zedong:
<”Friendship” or Aggression> (1949): defines the whole of the history of
USA-Chinese relationship as “history of aggression”, and American
missionary/educational undertakings in China as “spiritual aggression”.
“Foreignness” is identified as totally inimical. At that period “fondness for
Coca-Cola” could be a ground for imprisonment.
Important
for “nationalist communism” politics – overseas Chinese are given representation on the Chinese
People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC)
from 1949. It meant
that state nationalism included also some elements of ethnic nationalism – the
urge for ethnic consolidation. But, according to the 1980 Nationality Law,
the dual nationality for the overseas Chinese is not allowed – thus, state
nationalism takes precedence.
Evocation
of the “patriotic” nationalism in connection with the border wars – almost 1-2 serious wars/conflicts
in a decade. 1950-1953 – Aid Korea Resist America campaign, then war
against India in 1962, border clash with USSR in 1969, invasion of Vietnam in
1979, constant mentions of the Hong Kong and Taiwan “sovereignty” questions. As
usual, wars/conflicts and the irredentist (“returning the lost lands”) rhetoric
help to build the unified national/nationalist consciousness – for any
nationalism, the topic of “their threat to us”/”our defence from them” is
paramount. Tensions in the “symbolic relationship” with Japan –
territorial disputes, “the politics of the past” (Japanese right-wingers’
refusal to acknowledge the WWII crimes) – also contribute to the maintenance of
the lively, palpable nationalist
emotion.
*At the
same time, “Han chauvinism” is strongly criticized (1953): “Chinese” is
defined as “unity of nationalities”, although there are no doubts that the Han
Chinese should lead “Chinese nation” into “modernization” and “socialism”. The
state constitution of 1954 declared the country to be a "unified,
multinational state" and prohibited "discrimination against or
oppression of any nationality and acts which undermine the unity of the nationalities."
All nationalities were granted equal rights and duties. Policy toward the
ethnic minorities in the 1950s was based on the assumption that they could and
should be integrated into the Han polity by gradual assimilation, while
permitted initially to retain their own cultural identity and to enjoy a
modicum of self-rule. Accordingly, autonomous regions were established in which
minority languages were recognized, special efforts were mandated to recruit a
certain percentage of minority cadres, and minority culture and religion were
ostensibly protected. The minority areas also benefited from substantial
government investment.
*The rift
with Soviet Union beginning in 1959 – causes were complex (ideological,
political differences, etc.), but one of the underlying motives was also a
“national struggle” against perceived “foreign [Soviet] dominance” over
international politics of the Communist block, Chinese economy and technology,
etc. 1960 – all Soviet advisors (now viewed more or less in the same way as
past “spiritual aggressors” from USA) withdrawn. 1963 – China officially raises
territorial question – Russia/USSR being accused in “plundering Chinese
territory” through the “unequal treaties” in Tsarist times. By the 1967-8, the
USSR is identified as “imperialist”, an “enemy of Chinese people”: dichotomy
“our nation versus imperialism” has been applied.
*Nationalistic
emotion is based on the emulative patterns – the aim of the Great Leap Forward
(1958) is defined as “to catch up and overtake the imperialist countries”. “In 1955,
Mao had proposed that ten years would be required to ‘build socialism’, and
fifty to seventy years ‘to catch up with, or overtake the United States’. But
by 1962, the prospects were less sanguine: ‘As for the construction of a strong
socialist economy in China, fifty years won’t be enough; it may take one
hundred years or even longer ... China has a large population, resources are
meager, and our economy backward, so that in my opinion it will be impossible
to develop our productive powers so rapidly as to catch up with and overtake
the most advanced capitalist countries in less than one hundred years’.” (Nigel Harris). Idea of “catching up” with
the “role models” in the West – typical for the peripheral nationalism in the
world-system.
Cultural revolution decade (1966-1976)
– strong nationalist anti-imperialist underpinnings: burning down of English
Embassy building in Beijing, harassing of Soviet diplomats, etc. Lao She, a
famous writer – beaten to death for, among other thing, being “too polluted
with Western education and ideas”. Strong idea of the “struggle of the Orient”
against “Western/Soviet imperialism” – in effect, drew on very old
Pan-Asianist ideas. “Solidarity” with Vietnam, Burmese communists, Thai
Communists, etc.
After
the Cultural revolution: gradual emergence of the “Occidentalist” paradigm – West again came to
be perceived by many intellectuals as the “better Other”, embodiment of “modern
values”. Vivid interests to Western modernist poetry, etc – suppressed before.
Renewed admiration of Western consumer goods. Subsequently – campaigns against
“spiritual pollution” (1983), and “bourgeois liberalism” (1986). Still,
“Occidentalist” discourse strengthens – Su Xiaokang
(born 1949) and TV series “River Elegy” (Heshang;
1988): “The Yellow River has been a source of flooding and disaster for the
Chinese since ancient times, and it is used to represent the cyclical nature of
Chinese history. The six episodes in ‘River Elegy’ each address an element of
tradition still keeping China from moving forward. The authors argue that
China's inward looking stifling cultural traditions-- manifested in its
values-- are keeping China from developing. Where once it was the ruler, in the
form of the emperor, that was the impediment to change, now it is the Communist
Party.” The series directly compared China with Western countries (mostly
unfavorably) and took a critical look at the cultural symbols vital for
nationalist discourse – “Great Chinese Wall” was taken as a symbol of
meaningless isolation, for example. Far Eastern Economic Review:
“In the
first episode of River Elegy, Searching for Dreams, writer Su states his
position categorically. 'There is a blind spot in our national psyche: it is a
vague belief that all of the shame of the past century is the result of a break
in our glorious history. Ever since 1840, there have been
people who have used the splendours and greatness of the past to conceal the
feebleness and backwardness of our present state. It is as though we crave this
ancient and time-worn poultice to salve the painful realities of the past
century. We seen to find great solace in every earthshaking archaeological
discovery. Yet the fact
remains, our civilization is moribund.’
Su and his colleagues break one of the great taboos of Chinese popular propaganda by repeatedly discussing China's culture in terms of other ancient, decayed, and impoverished cultures, such as those of the Middle East, Africa, South America and India.
The series takes as its central elegiac theme the Yellow River and its countless victims, the symbol of the irrational, erratic and earth-oriented character of the Chinese. It is the dragon, the totem of water, that Su and the other writers identify as an icon for the violent wilfulness of the river.
’People say
that there is an element in Chinese culture that allows for the toleration of
the power of evil; others say that the fatal weakness of the Chinese national
character is a slyness, resignation to the fiats of nature, and a mute
acceptance of suffering. Surely this is no
accident...water is the lifeblood of agriculture, and it is the dragon king who
rules over water. For this reason, this nation both loves and hates the dragon,
lauds him and curses him. It is a complex combination of emotions... In turn, it has made the Chinese a
complex people.’
When the commentary turns to a discussion of
the ravages of the drought in the countryside, sequences from the rain-praying
scene in the film Yellow Earth and the peasant battle in Old Well
are used to bring the point home. Then the viewer is introduced to the author of the Old Well, Zheng Yi, an ex-Red Guard leader turned novelist, who waxes
lyrical on the horrors of the loess region of China's northwest, flying in the
face of the fad for romanticizing the 'earth’ among intellectuals and audiences
of the urban East China seaboard.
We are
presented with a picture of China as an impoverished Third World country,
relying on massive infusions of foreign capital and technology to create an
illusion of modernization. 'Our pride and our grief,’ writes Su, ‘are
invariably the same thing.’ Concluding the episode, he observes: ‘History has
proved time and again that the root cause of cultural decline is not the
attacks of some outside force, but rather because of the degeneration of its
internal mechanism.’”. The series were vilified by the official propaganda for
“lack of patriotism” and prohibited afterwards, and Su had to flee the country.
In fact, he recreated the dichotomy of the early nationalist thinkers (Liang Qichao, etc.) – “degenerate”, weak, “corrupt” China versus
“strong Western countries” as the model of “progress”.
The 1990s:
- CCP elite tried
hard to legitimize the Tiananmen massacre with the “patriotic” rhetoric:
<People’s Daily>: “to shake off the foreign enslavement and become
self-reliant is the prerequisite for development” + revocation of the “Chinese
and dogs forbidden to enter” topics (22 July, 1989). “Bourgeois liberalism” is
unequivocally equalled with “flunkeyism to the
foreign powers”, the dissidents are portrayed as “proxies and pawns”. “National
nihilism” is condemned. Deng Xiaoping – mentions the role of the “big
international environment” in the “instigation” of the demonstrations. In 1990
– Deng Xiaoping pronounces in Hong Kong that, with the Gorbachev’s “betrayal of
socialism”, “all the USA attention will be focused on us, they will start
creating troubles for us”. Thus, “socialist system” and “patriotic nationalism”
are equalled. “Bourgeois liberalism” is called “spiritual opium” –
evoking the association with the worst moment of national humiliation, the
Opium War. Inside the Chinese
bureaucracy – the PLA usually takes more assertive
nationalist stance so that to secure higher military outlays. At the same time
– China’s nationalism looked “confident”, not that really alarmist – “hegemonic
infiltrations of the external forces” were usually not taken as lethal or
immediate threat, and the concurrent development of “friendly relations” with
the West was advocated. But in the early 1990s, appeals to the
“anti-foreign” nationalism did not seem to sell well with the larger populace –
“Occidentalist” sentiments of admiring the “Western successes” still remained
stronger.
- economical growth strengthen elite and
popular self-confidence, while basic feeling of “inferiority” still remains
strong. Acute need in self-assertion. Symbolical self-assertion – while
traditionally foreign (White) predations in China were seen as “male/Western
rape of female/orient”, now “screwing a [White] foreigner” is seen as “reverse
of positions”. “SCREWING FOREIGNERS IS PATRIOTIC
In 'A Beijing Man in New York' (Beijingren zai Niuyue), China's popular 1993
tele-series, the protagonist Wang Qiming,
a man on his way to making a fortune after a train of failures and betrayals, hires
a New York prostitute. She is white, blonde and buxom. Wang decides to take
some of his frustrations out on her. While thrusting himself on to the
prostrate prostitute, Wang showers her with dollar bills. As the money swirls
around the bed, Wang demands that she repeatedly cry out: 'I love you'.
Reportedly, this was an extremely popular scene
with mainland audiences, in particular with the Chinese intelligentsia. (1) It
is the type of encounter that has a certain paradigmatic significance about it.
It could be argued that by having his way with an American whore while buying
her endearments with a shower of greenbacks, Wang Qiming's
action is the most eloquent recent statement (and inversion) of the century-old
Chinese-foreign dilemma. (2) This tele-series
appeared at a time when both the Chinese authorities and segments of the
population were becoming increasingly irate about their (perceived) inferior
position in the New World Order and the attitude of the United States. (3) To
an extent the series is a reprisal of the Boxers without any belief system. It
represents the coming of age of Chinese narcissism, and it bespeaks a desire
for revenge for all the real and perceived slights of the past century. (4) In
their representation of China as a nation ruthlessly violated by Western
imperialism after the Opium Wars, from the mid-19th century onward, many
literati pointed out that China's military and spiritual weakness had made it
an easy prey to aggressive foreigners. Questions of racial and political impotence
have been central to Chinese thought and debates ever since.”
- “China can say no” – boom: <中国可以说不—冷战后时代的政治和情感抉择> (China Can Say No: Political and
Emotional Choices in the Post-Cold-War Era), is a collection
of essays critiquing the pro-West (read pro-America) trend in China’s economic, diplomatic, military, and cultural arenas. The authors intend to convince the reading
public that despite ongoing economic and cultural globalization, China is still
endangered by Western (mainly American) ideological penetration, cultural
colonization, and above all, military conquest.
Published in 1995, it has become a nationwide bestseller and has
therefore signaled the resurgence of Chinese nationalism. Nationalist
appeals became to look more credible in the mid-1990s, largely to the
highly-publicized “China-bashing” campaigns in the USA, general awareness of
the unchecked USA influence in the “unipolar”
post-Cold War world, and the vision of China as America’s potential rival
espoused by some in the American military and political establishment.
- After the American
bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999 – which Chinese largely did
not believe to be “accidental” – new internet protest campaign started, among
them a forum called “Strengthening the State – forum” (http://bbs.peopledaily.com.cn/bbs/chbrd?to=14
) where the strongly-worded nationalist opinions usually avoided by the
mainstream press, can be found. Anti-American nationalism became to achieve
real credibility in the late 1990s – early 2000s, due to America’s perceived
threatening posture and plans of “containing” China’s growing influence. Bombing
of the Chinese embassy and the incident with the American surveillance plane (On April 1, 2001, a US spy plane
collided with a Chinese fighter while gathering intelligence off the Chinese
mainland. The US plane landed on a Chinese island, where the US crew was
detained for eleven days. The Chinese pilot died) were the “landmarks”, which have
showed the “danger” as visible, perceivable reality, and thus contributed
greatly in sharpening the Chinese
popular attitudes.
All in all – dichotomy “West – China” has been
seen after varying angles in diverse periods. West could be “threat” (Maoism)
or “model” (“Occidentalism”), but it always remained the “significant Other” –
“yardstick” by which Chinese nationalism tried to fathom its position in the
world order. Simultaneously, non-Western “foreigners” always was perceived more
paternalistically – “Asia and Africa” were object of “anti-imperialist help” in
the 1960s, and tropes for “backwardness” in the 1980s.
II. Post-war Japan.
1950-60 – crisis in “national” discourse – aftershock of the defeat. Popularity
of Marxism, and inherently “Occidentalist” content in Japanese Marxism –
Japanese imperialism was viewed as “singularly cruel”, “specially reactionary”,
etc. Paradigmatic Marxist intellectual (with strong Weberian
inclinations) – Maruyama Masao – theory of “modernization” and “nation-state
building”. Characterized Japanese “modern project” and “secondary” and
“incomplete”.
1970s: strengthening of
self-confidence due to the economical successes. “Secondary nationalism” –
ascribing the already existing nation certain desirable (or undesirable)
qualities. In Japan of the 1970s, “secondary nationalism” took the form of “nihonjinron” – theories on Japanese distinctiveness.
“Secondary nationalism” – both political and commercial phenomenon.
Politically, the elite defines “Japan-ness”, and, by manipulating the
definition, encourages – or legitimises – certain type of social actions (ex:
the Japanese are described as “harmony-loving in the employment relationship”,
“inherently dependent on others” – thus, such mode of action is either
encouraged or, at least, legitimised as normal). Commercially, many of these
books were enthusiastically consumed and became bestsellers. Common features of
such books: Japanese society is described is:
-
group-oriented, vertically stratified.
-
Based on emotional understanding, not formal logic
-
Homogenous and “uni-racial”
-
Completely unique – “foreigner
never can master all the intricacies of our language”
In a word – right-wing attempt to
manipulate the perception of “Japan-ness” in the manner conducive to the
maintenance of the “soft authoritarian” society, and also satisfy the need of
masses in cultural “self-definition”. Basic feature of “nihonjinron”
– “essentialism”, “totalising” discourse – it is presupposed that all Japanese
are “basically the same” (the same supposition in Western Orientalism).
“Others” outside are denigrated – “Westerners” (main reference point is
still West) are described as “too logical”, “cool-hearted”, etc. “Others”
inside Japan are simply ignored – around 657 thousands of Koreans (with North
or South Korean citizenship), several millions of former “base people” (“burakumin”), and so on.
One reason for long-time market
success of “nihojinron” – national discourse
ingrained into history education. Japanese are described in the textbooks as a
“homogenous nation” from the ancient time, and Japanese culture is explained
outside of regional or world context. Masses, already accustomed to such
descriptive models, are more prone to consume “nihonjinron”.
Late 1990s: post-“essentialist”,
post-modernist trends. Popularity of intellectual self-reflection over the
artificial nature of “national” discourse – Karatani Kojin, etc.