Battle of Caseros

February 3, 1852

Urquiza deployed his army in the following order of battle: On both flanks he put the cavalry. On the right General Anacleto Medina would lead Entre Rios cavalry along with Santa Fé cavalry divisions. Medina would also have some aid of infantry units. On the center, the artillery and the mass of the infantry were deployed. The battalions here were formed above all of Buenos Aires and Brazilian units. On the left, cavalry under General Juan Pablo Lopez was put along with Uruguayans infantry units. He also had at his disposal six artillery pieces. For the battle, Urquiza and his staff had planned a swift movement made by cavalry on both flanks of the enemy, while artillery would pour fire onto Rosas lines. Once both flank maneuvers had closed the foe escaping route, infantry would advance on the center, dooming the enemy in a pocket. Urquiza was aware that such maneuver required a firm stand in the center in the event the enemy make any attempt to take control of the batteries. Thus, the encirclement should be completed before the foe could make a counterattack onto that position.

Rosas troops deployment are not well known. It seems, however, that his army formation was somewhat similar to the enemy. From the center, on the hills of Caseros, to the right, he put his artillery pieces, while on the left a mix of infantry and cavalry units were deployed. On the top of the hill stood the Casa de Caseros (House of Caseros) a solid brick building with a flat roof and parapets,with a turret. Rosas packed five  infantry battalions into Caseros and constructed a ditch and artillery emplacements in front of it.The army was scattered along the hill one league wide, waiting for the coming attack.

The battle development is also full of controversies. For some the battle started at eight o'clock in the morning, others point out nine o'clock while some others describe that action began at ten o'clock. Nevertheless, one thing  is out of question: the initiative was on Urquiza's side, who managed to cross the Moron. Here the battle will be described in general terms according to the terms the majority of the descriptions mention.

As soon the the Liberation Army wings reached the other margin of the brook both came under fire of Rosas artillery pieces. Once the allies conquered a firm stand, the artillery made fire onto the center of the enemy line.

At the end of this first stage Urquiza and his officers decided to concentrate their efforts on the left flank of Rosas forces. They tranffered some cavalry regiments under Major-General Benjamin Virasoro from the left to the right in order to strenghten the assault on the enemy lines.

The maneuver achieved great success. By eleven o'clock the extreme left-wing of Rosas army was melting under the pressure of Urquiza's cavalry (figure 1). Many soldiers and officer gave themselves up as soon the enemies broke into their lines. Many historians observed that  morale among Rosas soldiers was low since the beginning of the battle and many were unwilling to fight for the dictator.

Nevertheless, on the left things were different. Facing the power of Rosas artillery since the beginning of the attack and deprived of part of his cavalry,  General Lopez men were advancing slowly under heavy fire, putting the maneuver of encirclement in peril. Some infantry battalions from the center were put on the left to support the advance against Rosas right flank. Most of the infantry had to advance in open field on mud terrain, receiving shots from the defenders inside Caseros (figure 2). In some cases Urquiza's men had to take position after position. When both flanks collapsed, only the center held out for Rosas.The men positioned there were encircled in their last positions around the houses on the top of the hill and inside Caseros. While some surrended, others still fought. As artillery began to run out of ammo, the men in Caseros had to keep the fight only with muskets. In a last desperate efforts to stop the allied advance, a hand-to-hand combat with the advancing Brazilians and Uruguayans took place. By one o' clock in the afternoon the last shots were heard. The battle was over. The Liberation Army had conquered the enemy position. Seven thousand prisioners were made. Nevertheless, Rosas was not among them. He had escaped with some of his officers just some minutes before his army gave way, getting aboard a British ship on that same night. He would never return to Argentina again.

The data about the battle are scarce and not free of debate. According to Brazilian sources, the Allied Army's casualties amount to some 400 killed, and a not specified number of wounded. The Uruguayan Division had one officer and three soldiers killed. One officer and 14 soldiers were wounded. The same source mention the Imperial Army losses on the battlefield as following: 14 dead (incluiding one officer), 55 wounded and five missing. Later one officer and some soldiers died from the receiving wounds, but the information is not exact and these numbers maybe underestimated. The Argentinean casualties are not given neither among Rosas forces nor among the Liberation Army. But according to another source,  Rosas army may have suffered some 1,200 dead while the number of captured officers and soldiers was considerable high.

On the 18th Urquiza entered Buenos Aires, taking control of the nation government. This, however, did not lead Argentina to internal peace in the short term.                                                             To South American Military History