Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS)
Contemporary Southeast Asia
April 1, 2002
No. 1, Vol. 24; Pg. 12; ISSN: 0129-797X; IAC-ACC-NO: 86389576
Laskar Jihad and the political position
of conservative Islam in Indonesia
By: Michael Davis
AUTHOR-ABSTRACT:
Laskar Jihad introduced itself to the world in April 2000, when a procession of its members marched to the
presidential palace in Jakarta brandishing sabres. By the following month, two to three thousand of the
group's members had travelled to Maluku (the Moluccas), in eastern Indonesia, to fight alongside local
Muslims locked in a cycle of communal violence with the region's Christian population. Their intervention
turned the tables in a conflict in which the Christians had previously appeared to have the upper hand.
Despite widespread criticism of their response to its activities, the Indonesian authorities have so far taken
little sustained action against Laskar Jihad. The group's emergence has aroused speculation on whether it
heralds an expansion of the political influence of conservative Islam among the world's largest Muslim
population.
Introduction
! The 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States have focused unprecedented attention on
militant Muslim groups across the world and prompted strategists and commentators alike to scour the globe
for possible targets in the Bush Administration's "war against terrorism". In the case of Indonesia,
considerable coverage has been devoted to the militant conservative Muslim group, Laskar Jihad, and
allegations of links between this organization and Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda network.
Laskar Jihad is a Java-based paramilitary group which, since April 2000, has intervened on behalf of local
Muslims in the vicious fighting between Christians and Muslims in Maluku, which is estimated to have
claimed more than 9,000 lives. (1) Laskar Jihad leaders have repeatedly expressed their intent to
eradicate Christians from Ambon island (Maluku's political and economic hub) and have used murder and
terror in their efforts to achieve these ends. (2) In November 2001, the group c! arried out its oft-stated
threat to enter a conflict between Christians and Muslim populations in the region of Poso, Sulawesi,
provoking a rapid escalation in the level of violence.
In an interview with the New York Times on 7 January 2002, U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defence, Paul
Wolfowitz, drew attention to the dangers of ungoverned regions within certain countries which had become
"havens for terrorists". Wolfowitz chose to illustrate his point with reference to Maluku and central Sulawesi,
two areas ravaged by communal violence where "outside Muslims, not outside Indonesia, have come in
and exacerbated that situation" -- a clear reference to the armed interventions of Laskar Jihad. This article
examines what can be ascertained about the political position of conservative Islam in Indonesia from the
emergence and activities of the Laskar Jihad. As President George Bush and bin Laden, in different ways,
project a polarizing vision of a world unequivocally divided into ! friendly and hostile forces, how should we
view Indonesia? Do groups such as Laskar Jihad have the capacity to make a difference to whose side, or
which list, or axis Indonesia finds itself on?
Subsequent to a brief examination of the context in which Laskar Jihad emerged, the article focuses on the
activities of the group in Maluku in eastern Indonesia since April 2000. Laskar Jihad's intervention in this
region provided the justification for its creation, and has been its primary zone of operation. As such, it
provides useful indicators as to the possible impact on central Sulawesi, and Indonesia as a whole, of the
Laskar Jihad's recent intervention in Poso. It also offers substantial evidence for the central contention of
this article: that what Laskar Jihad reveals about conservative Islam in Indonesia is the fundamental
weaknesses in its political position and its lack of support among the largest Muslim population in the world.
Laskar Jihad: The Context
Laskar Jihad was established in the early months of 2000 at a time when political gains made
by conservative modernist Muslim groups during the final years of Soeharto's New Order
were in danger of being overturned. Conservative modernist organizations, such as DDII
(Indonesian Council for Islamic Predication) and its offshoot KISDI (Indonesian Committee
for Solidarity with the Islamic World), which spent the first two decades of the New Order set
in lonely and dangerous opposition to the regime's pro-Western, secular outlook, had been
co-opted by Soeharto as he sought to establish new sources of support outside the senior
ranks of the armed forces from the late 1980s onwards. (3) This co-optation saw the Muslim
hardliners attacking Soeharto's opponents in return for state patronage and new freedom to
carry out their activities, which included undermining more moderate Muslim rivals. (4) It
broadly coincided with Soeharto's elevation! of a socalled "Green" (the colour symbolizing
Islam) tendency within the TNI (the Indonesian armed forces) -- officers distinguished less
by personal piety than by willingness to use Islam as a political tool. (5) The convergence of
the "Green" TNI and hardline Muslim organizations behind Soeharto forged alliances
between these two groupings which were subsequently critical to the launching of Laskar
Jihad.
The rising fortunes of conservative modernist Muslims were dealt a double blow, firstly by
the fall of their patron, Soeharto, in May 1998, and secondly by the democratic elections in
June 1999. None of the newly formed Islamist parties performed well at the polls, with the
largest, the PBB (Crescent and Star Party), capturing just 2 per cent of the vote. The
elections, instead, produced an emphatic endorsement of pluralist parties diametrically
opposed to the exclusivist agenda of the conservative Muslims, with the largest share of the
vote (37.4 per cent) going to! the secular nationalist PDI-P of Megawati Sukarnoputri, and a
significant share (17.4 per cent) taken by the PKB led by Abdurrahman Wahid.
This provided the context for the creation of Laskar Jihad. In one sense, conservative
Muslims' worst fears were being realized as the prospect of a democratic system directly
threatened groups with minimal electoral support. On the other hand, the uncertain political
climate continued to offer considerable scope for frustrating a complete transition to
democracy. The opportunities here derived from the weakness of state institutions, the
shattered condition of the Indonesian economy, and the livelihoods of the majority of the
population; while conversely, much of the New Order fabric, notably the networks of militant
Muslim groups' "Green" military allies, remained largely intact. At the same time,
conservative modernist Muslim groups found their public campaigns facilitated by greater
freedom of expression. Another factor from whi! ch conservatives could derive some comfort
was the overall political disorientation of the modernist ummat (community of Muslims). (6)
The election results placed particular pressu re on the putative leader of Indonesian
modernist Muslims, Amien Rais, who had adopted a pluralist political platform for his newly
created PAN party, which spectacularly failed to deliver.
Following voters' rejection of religious exclusivism, conservative groups were left searching
for opportunities to discredit pluralism and assert their interpretation of Islam. Their tack was
to adopt causes with the potential to unite and mobilize the ummat against opposing forces;
that by exploiting points of friction between Muslims and non-Muslims, they might persuade
Indonesian Muslims to discard their electoral allegiances to rally in defence of their faith.
Since fighting erupted in Ambon in January 1999, conservative hardliners had attempted to
channel Indonesian Muslims' outrage at the gove! rnment's failure to protect Maluku's
Muslims into action against their Christian Moluccan antagonists. Their campaign acquired
new impetus following the massacre by Christian militia of at least 500 Muslims in Halmahera,
North Maluku, in December 1999, and culminated in a rally in Jakarta on 7 January 2000,
which attracted tens of thousands. (7) This rally was addressed not only by conservative
Muslim activists and members of Islamist parties such as the PBB but also by the "cornered"
Amien Rais and PPP (United Development Party) leader and current Indonesian
Vice-President, Hamzah Haz, who endorsed calls for a jihad (holy war) in Maluku. (8)
The rally's conservative Muslim organizers moved rapidly to harness the momentum it had
generated. Activists including Ahmad Sumargono of KISDI and the PBB and Eggy Sudjana
of HMI-MPO (a faction of the Indonesian Muslim Students Association, HMI), channelled
their energies via a hitherto obscure group called the FKAWJ (Sunni Commun! ication
Forum) set up one year earlier. The FKAWJ, which pursues an exclusivist brand of Islam and
seeks to impose Islamic Shariah law in Indonesia, is led by a preacher named Ja'far Umar
Thalib, a former member of the anti-Soviet Mujahidin in Afghanistan. The group formally
established on 30 January Laskar Jihad, a force for the defence of Moluccan Muslims against
kafir harbi (belligerent infidels). In the weeks that followed, an initial trickle of Muslim fighters
made their way to Maluku. However, the Laskar Jihad's mobilization began in earnest in April
when it established a military training camp near Bogor in West Java. (9) The following
month, two or three thousand Laskar Jiha d fighters travelled unhindered to Maluku despite
government pledges to prevent them from leaving Java. In the weeks that followed,
allegations began to surface that Laskar Jihad was engaging in military offensives against
Christian communities in the Moluccas.
Jihad in Maluku
More than three years after it began, there is as yet no authoritative explanation for the
causes of the conflict in Maluku. A range of theories variously place emphasis on rivalries
between Moluccan Christian and Muslim communities dating from the colonial era, and
recent shifts in the balance of power between them; the destabilizing impact of the
reintroduction of electoral politics as the means of contest between local elites; and outside
interference by political elites in Jakarta and factions of the TNI. While there are abundant
indications of external interference, there is compelling evidence pointing to underlying
causes centred in political struggles at a local level. (10)
The intractability of the conflict relates not only to the same factors which caused it, but also
to the changes and new agendas which the fighting has wrought in the leadership
hierarchies of each community. The conflict has permitted previously peripheral, e! ven
disreputable, figures on each side to attain new positions of power, the preservation of which
is contingent on the conflict's perpetuation.
In assessing the decision to undertake jihad in Maluku, it is important not to lose sight of the
fact that the anger expressed by conservative modernists and Indonesian Muslims generally
at the plight of Moluccan Muslims was sincerely felt. Indonesian Muslims inside and outside
Maluku perceived the conflict to have been instigated by the Christians, and believed that
Christian fighters were the recipients of assistance, in the form of money and weapons, from
Christian Moluccans in the Netherlands, as well as political and military figures in Indonesia.
(11) Outrage was almost certainly fuelled by the long-standing sense among Muslims that
the Christian minority in Indonesia, through the New Order period, in particular, had built up
levels of political and economic influence vastly out of proportion to its numbers. (12) The
issu! e of high-level Christian influence had long been a primary focus for the campaigns of
conservative Muslim groups such as DDII.
In other respects, however, the creation of Laskar Jihad was based on calculation and
opportunism, reflecting the political priorities of conservative Muslim groups following the
1999 elections. The Maluku violence presented an opportunity because it was so readily
represented and perceived as a religious war. Whatever its full complexities, both sides in the
conflict have contributed to the impression that it is based primarily on religion. Moluccan
Christians have portrayed it as part of a wider campaign by militant Muslims to Islamicize
Indonesia. (13) Muslims, meanwhile, have attempted to cast the violence as part of an
international Christian conspiracy against Islam and Indonesian Muslims in particular. (14) In
mobilizing against a Christian enemy, Laskar Jihad attempted to elevate the meaning of the
communal violence in Maluku for the In! donesian ummat; to polarize Indonesians along
religious lines and in the process position itself as a standard bearer for Islam.
Through mobilization of Indonesian Muslims, Laskar Jihad could hope to capture for
conservative Muslims a political platform outside the nascent democratic system, which
threatened to undercut their influence and to exercise leverage over Indonesia's political
transition. That a stalling or destabilizing role was one of Laskar Jihad's objectives was
implicit in Ja'far Umar Thalib's earliest public pronouncements, in which he demanded
President Wahid's resignation. (15) Another political function of jihad against Moluccan
Christians was the targeting of a community which had voted overwhelmingly in the
elections for the secular-oriented PDI-P of Megawati.
An important facet of the decision to launch jihad was that in intervening in Maluku, Laskar
Jihad could claim the additional justification of combating the presumed RMS (Republic of
So! uth Moluccas) secessionist movement. (16) That opposition to separatism is strictly a
secondary motivation has been admitted by the group's members, who state, in reference to
Aceh, that they will not intervene in separatist conflicts unless these can be tied to issues of
religion. (17) In the case of Maluku, Laskar Jihad links jihad with separatism via the argument
that East Timor's independence is the first stage in a conspiracy by Christians in Indonesia
and internationally, to amputate regions in which Christianity predominates in order to
weaken (Muslim) Indonesia. (18)
In one sense, the anti-separatism rhetoric conveniently underpins the jihad. Viewed from
another angle, however, it implicitly recognizes that many Indonesian Muslims have more
sympathy with the unitarian nationalist policies identified with Megawati than with the
conservative modernist world-view. The anti-separatism plank in the Laskar Jihad manifesto
acknowledges that jihad, in the sense of a str! uggle based on faith, may not be enough to
stir most Indonesian Muslims and it must be seen as an essentially defensive device. It is
significant that Laskar Jihad has articulated this objective most vigorously when under
pressure. In the weeks following his arrest on 4 May 2000, Ja'far Umar Thalib took great pains
to emphasize Laskar Jihad's anti-separatist credentials, going so far as to state publicly that
the conflict in Maluku and Laskar Jihad's involvement were brought about not by religion but
by separatism alone. (19)
There are further aspects to the choice of Maluku as a venue for intervention, which
underline the weaknesses of the Laskar Jihad position from the outset. Features of the
conflict, visible even in early 2000, suggested that involvement in Maluku did not offer an
effective means of stalling democratic reform and undermining Indonesia's pluralist political
leaders. Moreover, the localized nature and scope of the violence had not encouraged the
sense! of involvement among Muslims elsewhere in Indonesia, which might dispose them to
answer the call for jihad. By the time Laskar Jihad set off from Java, the extent of the fighting
was in fact already contracting, following successful reconciliation initiatives in southeastern
Maluku. The potential for broadening the conflict to engulf other areas of Indonesia thus
appeared limited.
A key feature of the Maluku conflict, both before and after the creation of Laskar Jihad, has
been the reluctance of Indonesian Governments to expend political capital on attempts to
resolve it. The contribution of the Wahid administration, for example, was largely confined to
fleeting visits to Maluku by the President and his deputy, Megawati, who was personally
charged with bringing about an end to the fighting. Despite her claims to have been working
energetically behind the scenes, Megawati devoted little attention to Maluku; opting to go
on holiday in Hong Kong over the millennium, as th! e fighting in the region flared once
more.
This neglect to some extent reflects the weakness of the post-Soeharto governments and the
magnitude of the challenges they have faced. It also indicates, however, their hard-headed
assessment of Maluku as being of low political significance at the national level. Both the
characteristics of the region itself -- far from Indonesia's political centre-stage and home to
less than one per cent of its population -- and the local character of its conflict mean that
Indonesia's leaders feel that they can ignore it at relatively low political cost. Unlike Aceh,
the fighting in Maluku does not pose a serious threat to Indonesia's territorial integrity. Its
lack of political weight, even subsequent to the involvement of Laskar Jihad, was revealed by
the fact that Wahid's opponents, rather than heeding the demand of Ja'far Umar Thalib to
impeach the President for his failure over Maluku, considered two tenuous allegations of
corruption mo! re compelling grounds for his removal in August 2000.
Meanwhile, Megawati's disregard of her responsibility for resolving the Maluku conflict has
proved to have few political repercussions. Her early disinterest earned her a mild rebuke
from PDI-P delegates but constituted no obstacle to her assumption of the Indonesian
presidency. Particularly telling is the fact that the PPP and other modernist Muslim parties,
whose primary concern is the advancement of the position of Muslims in Indonesia regarded
the Maluku conflict as so peripheral that they saw no political embarrassment in forming a
governing coalition with the politician who had most conspicuously neglected this issue.
Recognition by Laskar Jihad that intervention in Maluku was not the optimum means of
advancing its agenda at a national level was implicit in its threats to launch a jihad in Java if
the government prevented it from travelling to Maluku. This amounted to tacit admission that
action in Java ! would have a far greater impact politically. Going to Maluku represented a
second-best option, but the limitations of the Laskar Jihad position meant that it was unable
to undertake a comparable initiative in a more politically significant region. The choice of
Maluku was furthermore informed by Laskar Jihad's realization that it could only hope to
establish itself in an area in which government control had chronically broken down.
It is likely that the beleaguered Wahid government was relatively content to see Laskar Jihad
confined to a remote, politically unimportant region of the country. The lacklustre efforts to
prevent the group from travelling to Maluku in May 2000 might, as has been suggested, have
derived from collusion between conservative Muslim groups and the police. (20) An
alternative explanation, however, is that the government, for all its protestations, may have
sanctioned the police inaction in the interests of getting Laskar Jihad out of Java. By inve!
sting their political and financial resources in the intervention in Maluku, the hardline Muslim
groups behind Laskar Jihad must have known that they risked confining themselves to the
political margins.
Sources of Support
Laskar Jihad unquestionably has access to substantial funds. It claims to have offices in all major towns in
Java, Sumatra, Sulawesi, and Kalimantan, while in Maluku it owns a hospital, a radio station and about ten
speedboats, as well as a sizeable military arsenal. (21) Spokesmen for Laskar Jihad claim that most of its
funds are contributed by sympathetic members of the Indonesian public. (22) Laskar Jihad's leader, Ja'far
Umar Thalib, however, has stated that the majority of its financing comes from overseas, in particular New
Jersey (USA), Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, and Singapore. (23)
Since the start of the Maluku conflict, allegations have repeatedly surfaced that the Soeharto family and their
a! llies are funding groups such as Laskar Jihad, a suggestion denied vigorously by Ja'far. (24) The
presumed motive of Soeharto and his associates was to destabilize post-New Order governments which
might be inclined to investigate their alleged crimes and confiscate their personal fortunes. Whatever the
veracity of these particular claims, the fact that much, if not most, of Laskar Jihad's budget is covered by
overseas benefactors, is enough to inform us that the organization's affluence should not be interpreted as
a reflection of support from Indonesia's Muslims.
Members of the Indonesian security forces have taken sides in the fighting in Maluku since the early stages
of the conflict and there is credible evidence of collusion between Laskar Jihad and sections of both the
military and the police. (25) Assistance has been provided by the military from an early stage. Indeed,
Laskar Jihad members admit readily to receiving training from TNI officers. (26) In Maluku, TNI! troops
have even been filmed fighting alongside Laskar Jihad paramilitaries. Ja'far Umar Thalib boasts of
co-operation at the highest level, and has claimed to have a hotline to the Indonesian Armed Forces
Commander. (27) Laskar Jihad spokesmen contend that their fighters are equipped only with home-made
weapons, guns salvaged from World War II wrecks and weapons dumps, and firearms captured from
Christian combatants. (28) Eyewitness reports, however, suggest that the group is, in fact, equipped with
military-issue weaponry. (29)
These military connections show that Laskar Jihad has been able to build on alliances forged between
conservative Muslims and TNI factions during the last years of the New Order period and exploit areas of
common interest. Like Laskar Jihad, sections of the military wished to destabilize the Wahid government,
with a view to preventing reform of the TNI and the prosecution of officers for crimes in East Timor and
other areas. Moreover, the disr! uption in Maluku and Laskar Jihad's conjuring up of a separatist threat
justified the expansion of the military's role in the region, as outbreaks of violence likewise have done in
other areas of Indonesia. (30)
Unless the TNI factions working with Laskar Jihad have a strong attachment to the group and its ideals,
however, they are likely to see no interest in sustaining its activities once it has outlived its usefulness. Here
one can reflect on a range of precedents for the TNT assembling and/or co-operating with paramilitary or
criminal groups, before later discarding them. (31) A recent example of this phenomenon is offered by the
militia created in East Timor in 1998--99, some of whose redundant leaders now claim to live in fear of TM
assassination. (32)
Support from or toleration by the security forces in Maluku is vital to Laskar Jihad's capacity to operate.
While such support may reflect the personal sympathies of individual officers concerned, it is not a!
sustainable basis for Laskar Jihad's position in the long term. Military co-operation, moreover, is certainly
not a reflection of popular grassroots support among Indonesian Muslims. In view of the low credibility of
the TNI, the association is, in fact, likely to dissuade many Indonesian Muslims from supporting Laskar
Jihad.
Since its inception, Laskar Jihad has enjoyed the active support of other conservative Muslim groups.
Organizations such as KISDI, DDII and FPI (Front for the Defence of Islam) have backed Laskar Jihad's
activities with rallies, demonstrations, and endorsements in media publications. Prominent conservative
Muslim activists act as advisers to the group; for example, Eggy Sudjana is one of Ja'far Umar Thalib's
legal representatives. Affiliated conservative Muslim political parties have also been at the core of Laskar
Jihad's support network. Abmad Sumargono, PBB member of the DPR (House of Representatives) and
leader of KISDI, appears to have acted ! as an unofficial spokesman on behalf of the group during the
period when it was being convened at Bogor in April 2000. Important PBB links extend to Maluku itself,
where local PBB (and DDII) leader Au Fauzi is commander of the locally-levied Ambon Mujahidin.
The attitude towards Laskar Jihad of mainstream modernist Muslim parties and associations, however, has
been far more equivocal. As outlined above, in January 2000, conservative activists' exploitation of a
public outcry over the death of Muslims in Halmahera, combined with the post-election disarray of
modernist Muslim politicians, enabled them to push more mainstream leaders into supporting calls for Jihad.
Since then, Laskar Jihad and its supporters have on occasion successfully used media campaigns to
create similar conditions in which moderate Muslim leaders have felt forced to choose between endorsing
Laskar Jihad's position (or at least criticizing their enemies) and being perceived to desert the interests of!
Indonesian Muslims. Such episodes have arisen from the arrest of Ja'far Umar Thalib on 4 May 2001 (for
allegedly ordering the public stoning of one of his followers in Ambon), and also the Yon Gab (TNI
combined battalion) attack on Laskar Jihad in Kota Ambon (Ambon town) on 14 June 2001. (33) Foll
owing these events, several Muslim organizations, including the MUI (Indonesian Council of Preachers),
whose Ambon office has hostile relations with Laskar Jihad, and the youth wing of Muhammadiyah, were
moved to speak out against the arrest and against Yon Gab. (34) Their sentiments were echoed by
provincial leaders of mainstream Muslim parties, such as the PPP and PAN. The pressure that Laskar
Jihad succeeded in generating, following the Yon Gab attack, appeared to account for the hasty transfer
out of Maluku of the battalion's commander, I Made Yasa, just three weeks later. (35)
These moments are the closest that Laskar Jihad has come to capturing the position of the rally! ing point
for Indonesian Muslims; however, they have been few and far between. Although some junior
representatives of the PPP and PAN have continued to show support for Laskar Jihad, securing the
wholehearted backing of the leaders of mainstream modernist Muslim parties and mass-membership
organizations has proved beyond the conservative Muslims since January 2000. The elusiveness of such
moments in part reflects the peripheral position in Indonesia, both geographically and politically, of the
conflict in Maluku. It is also indicative of the reluctance of mainstream Muslim figures to endorse an
enterprise launched by abrasive and unscrupulous conservative Muslim groups which command little
popular support.
The composition of Laskar Jihad's 3,000-10,000-strong membership has been a source of considerable
speculation. (36) Some observers have suggested that as many as 80 per cent of its members are, in fact,
serving members of the TNI, while others have alleged the invol! vement of substantial numbers of
foreigners in the group's ranks. (37) Laskar Jihad spokesmen state that their membership reflects a
genuine cross-section of Indonesian society, although the organization's website stresses that its members
"mostly are university students in Java, Kalimantan, Sulawesi and Sumatra". (38) The group's spokesmen
claim that recruits come from pesantren (Islamic schools) run by teachers sympathetic to Laskar Jihad, or
have been inspired to join by conservative Muslim media publications. (39) In tapping into such sources of
support, Laskar Jihad is drawing on the efforts of organizations such as DDII and KISDI, both of which
have long cultivated followings on university campuses and in pesantren for their campaigns agains t
pluralism and Western political values, such as liberal democracy and human rights. (40)
While examining Laskar Jihad's membership reveals more about the kinds of support that conservative
Islam in Indonesia can draw on, the! usefulness of such analysis has to be set in the context of the small
numbers the group has succeeded in recruiting. Ultimately, the mobilization of 3,000-10,000 from a
population of around 185 million Muslims does not amount to a mass movement or signify a sea-change in
the character of Indonesian Islam. Even Laskar Jihad members drawn from supposed hotbeds of radical
Islam, such as ITB (the Bandung Institute of Technology) admit that their peers and families were
perplexed by their decision to join the jihad. (41) While Laskar Jihad leaders have claimed that their ranks
are expanding, there are grounds for questioning this assertion. Since closing their training camp in Bogor
in April 2000, Laskar Jihad, has, by its own admission, not held any further large-scale training and
recruiting programmes and state that training is now only conducted in Ambon itself. (42) While bot h the
group and its allies claim that new members are still being recruited, they are reluctant to gi! ve any precise
figures. (43)
The inability of conservative Islam to find broader support can be traced in part to the position of Islam
under the New Order. Until Soeharto's final years and his cultivation of conservative modernist groups, the
overtly political brand of Islam promoted by conservative Muslims was suppressed by the regime, which
maintained a resolutely anti-sectarian stance and heavy restrictions on all political activity not under its
control. Conversely, the New Order did offer space for other interpretations of modernist Islam, which
promoted the progress of Muslims outside the realm of politics. This, combined with other social and
educational policies of the Soeharto era, stimulated the emergence of a self-consciously Muslim middle
class which had little affinity with the outlook of conservative hardliners. (44)
Groups representing conservative modernist Islam, such as the DDII, continued to maintain their core
following among sections of the ! lower-middle and working classes and networks in pesantren and
universities. (45) Since restrictions on their activities were lifted, however, they have not expanded their
overall popular support among the ummat. This can partly be explained by conservative groups' belated
alliance with discredited New Order interests. Moreover, they are promoting an authoritarian and
exclusivist form of political Islam at a time when most indicators suggest that Indonesian Muslims are keen to
consolidate the freedoms they have won since 1998.
Laskar Jihad: Activities, Impact and Prospects
Despite its protestations to the contrary, there can be little doubt that Laskar Jihad's emphasis in Maluku has
been on paramilitary activity. The group's involvement in offensives against Christian communities reflects
Indonesian conservative Muslims' long-held view of Christianity as a threat. More specifically, the manner
of the attacks and Laskar Jiha! d's public pronouncements point to an attempt to displace and expel
Christians from Maluku and thus alter the region's ethnoreligious balance. (46)
Laskar Jihad employs tactics designed to undermine any prospect of reconciliation between Christians and
Muslims. Just one example is the group's use of snipers in Kota Ambon, who target civilians and thus
reinforce the atmosphere of fear and suspicion which pervades both communities in the town. (47) Such
violence forms the major part of a sustained effort to polarize the two communities ever more completely.
This objective is also pursued via suchmeasures as the severing of intercommunal commercial relations.
(48) The desire for communal segregation derives in part from the hardline modernist antipathy towards
pluralism and secular society.
At another level Laskar Jihad's emphasis on violence derives from basic self-interest: no conflict, no Laskar
Jihad -- only the maintenance of hostilities legitimates the group's! position within Moluccan Muslim
communities. Ensuring that the parameters of life for Moluccan Muslims are shaped (and narrowed) by
constant interreligious violence, helps Laskar Jihad to overcome any reluctance on the part of their local
co-religionists to define their loyalties and responses to the conflict solely on the basis of their faith. In order
to equate identification as a Muslim with identification with Laskar Jihad, the group has taken steps to bring
the symbols and centres of Muslim worship in Ambon under its control. (49)
Beyond the use of violence for aims specific to Maluku itself, it has been suggested that Laskar Jihad has
sought to provoke new outbreaks of fighting in order to pressure the government, or otherwise create an
impression of democratic reform leading to instability in Indonesia. (50) Laskar Jihad's attempts to expel
communities of Christians may also be calculated to create instability and communal tension in other areas
of Indonesia for! ced to play host to large groups of Christian Moluccan refugees. (51)
While fighting Moluccan Christians is the most important aspect of Laskar Jihad's activities, the group has
also carried out humanitarian and community work in Muslim areas of Maluku -- for example, in
establishing a fully-staffed hospital in Kota Ambon. (52) It has also sought to impose Shariah law in the
zones under its control and to close down "places of sin". (53) Such measures represent a rejection of the
institutions of the secularized state and the creation of an alternative model founded on the principles of
conservative modernist Islam. They are also an important means of exercising control over local Muslims.
These actions notwithstanding, Laskar Jihad's insistence that their jihad is based primarily around
humanitarian assistance and dakwah predication cannot be accepted at face value. While Ja'far Umar
Thalib claims that members of the Laskar Jihad are "basically religious preachers, arme! d with religious
knowledge to preach to locals", more junior spokesmen for his organization admit that few of their number
have sufficient knowledge of Islam to preach to Moluccan Muslims. (54)
All observers agree that the intervention in Maluku by Laskar Jihad has had a very substantial impact on
the complexion and intensity of the conflict. The group's presence has undoubtedly eliminated any chance
that may have existed of the Christians scoring a military victory over their Moluccan Muslim opponents.
(55) Furthermore, Laskar Jihad has clearly succeeded in its goal of prolonging and deepening the conflict.
Among Muslim communities in those areas of Maluku in which it operates, Laskar Jihad has succeeded in
asserting itself as a symbol of Islam and pahlawan (champion or hero) for local Muslims, regardless of their
empathy with Laskar Jihad's brand of conservative Islam. (56) Observers on all sides, for example, agree
that Laskar Jihad very effectively presented ! the Yon Gab attacks on its personnel and premises on 14
June 2001 as an attack on all Moluccan Muslims, and that this served to entrench the group's position
within Maluku. (57) Other factors facilitating this entrenchment include Laskar Jihad's exploitation of
factionalism within the local Muslim leadership, and, above all, its capacity for defending Moluccan Muslims
from Christian attack. Alongside its alliances with factions of the TNI, the position Laskar Jihad has carved
out for itself within Maluku has so far helped to deter sustained attempts by the central government to
dislodge it. must, however, be put in context. The scope of the group's activities and influence have only
been made possible by civil war, the almost total breakdown of state control, and the convergence of
Laskar Jihad's agenda with that of other groups. While Laskar Jihad has succeeded in intensifying the
polarization of the communities in the region, it has merely exacerbated a situation which pre-d! ated its
arrival.
Viewed in this perspective, Laskar Jihad's achievements in Maluku have, in many ways, been strikingly
limited. Although the group has repeatedly attacked Christian settlements, it has had little success in
redrawing communal boundaries, which have changed little since it arrived in the region. (58) Religious
segregation has now been effected in most areas previously inhabited by both Christians and Muslims.
(59) Even here, however, Laskar Jihad has not been entirely successful, failing to break down the mixed
Catholic and Muslim community of Wayame in Ambon, for example. (60)
Laskar Jihad's zone of operations has not expanded greatly since the weeks following its arrival in Maluku
in April-May 2001. Although the trigger for its intervention was atrocities committed against Muslims in
Halmahera, North Maluku, Laskar Jihad has had minimal involvement in the conflict in the northern areas.
The group's commanders were, at an early stage, informed by! their North Moluccan Mujahidin
counterparts that their assistance was surplus to requirements, and they were subsequently deterred from
interfering in the province by North Maluku's assertive acting governor. (61) In the southern regions of
Maluku, meanwhile, a reconciliation process has prevented Laskar Jihad from making an impact. Even in
those areas in which it is well entrenched, observers note rising tensions between the non-Moluccan
Laskar Jihad and local Muslim communities which resent the group's domineering behaviour. (62) This
underlines the impression that the organization is likely to maintain its position of power only as long as the
violence continues.
In the context of Indonesia as a whole, Laskar Jihad's impact has been highly localized. Although it has
recently tried to establish itself in Poso, the general absence of the particular kind of religious strife the
group requires as a precursor for further jihad has made large-scale expansion of its activi! ties difficult.
(63) In Maluku, the group has failed to involve significant numbers of Indonesian Muslims in its campaign.
Whereas circumstances have largely compelled Moluccan Muslims to accept partisanship based on
religion, Laskar Jihad's rhetoric has not persuaded their co-religionists elsewhere in Indonesia to respond
to the conflict in the same way.
As noted, there have been occasions on which Laskar Jihad and its conservative Muslim backers have
been momentarily able to elicit support from more moderate Muslim groups. However, apart from the initial
rally of 7 January 2000, these rare successes have not come in the context of Laskar Jihad generating
new momentum for its activities. They have instead occurred in desperate situations in which the
organization has found the need to portray itself as a victim: notably the arrest of Ja'far Umar Thalib and the
Yon Gab offensive in Kota Ambon. In the latter case, Laskar Jihad's response suggested that it believed it
cou! ld not rely on its credibility as an Islamic organization to bail itself out of trouble. Rather than referring to
the Middle Eastern ulamas' fatwas that it claims to legitimate its activities in Maluku, Laskar Jihad has based
its robust media campaign against the "communist" Yon Gab around the same "Western" values it argues
that Indonesian Muslims should reject, leading with the accusation that Yon Gab's actions constituted gross
violations of Laskar Jihad members' human rights. (64)
While the launching of Laskar Jihad has generated for Muslim hardliners considerable attention, it has failed
to make a serious impact on Indonesian politics at the national level. The group's activities have not
afforded conservative Muslims significant political leverage in Jakarta. As the transfer of presidential office
from Wahid to Megawati in 2000 demonstrated, Laskar Jihad has been unable to shake the hold on power
of its pluralist political opponents.
The ascendance of Megaw! ati in many ways encapsulates the increasing difficulties Laskar Jihad and its
conservative supporters are now facing. Megawati is perceived as representing a range of political values
directly antithetical to those of Laskar Jihad: notably, secular nationalism, pluralism, and democracy.
Moreover, in contrast to the rickety presidential platform of Abdurrahman Wahid, who acquired the office
via elaborate political horse-trading, Megawati has become President with a mandate from the electorate,
together with endorsement by the military and modernist Muslim coalition partners (notably the PPP), who
had previously echoed conservative Muslims' opposition to the idea of a female President. The
conservatives are thus faced with a much stronger President, who has neither use nor sympathy for
groups such as Laskar Jihad, and who has formed alliances with elite groups (mainstream modernist
Muslim politicians and the TM), on whom Laskar Jihad depends for support.
This inauspiciou! s outlook does not necessarily signal Laskar Jihad's imminent collapse. In the short-term,
the Megawati government faces several political hurdles it may wish to clear before turning its attention to
clamping down on Laskar Jihad. Not least of these is securing its relationship with the army, which could be
tested by international pressure for the prosecution of TNI officers who oversaw the destruction of East
Timor in September 1999. That the government is choosing to leave the Laskar Jihad issue on the
back-burner reflects in part the range of complex challenges it faces. It also highlights the minimal political
threat that the group in fact poses.
If anything, the impact of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States may be to hasten
rather than avert government action against Laskar Jihad. Although the U.S. bombing of Afghanistan
caused considerable disquiet among Muslims in Indonesia, it did not precipitate a sudden surge in support
for the exclusi! vist brand of Islam espoused by the Taliban, nor the international terror agenda of Osama
bin Laden. For Indonesia, the key outcome may prove to be less the immediate reaction of the country's
Muslim population than the acceleration of the U.S. government's efforts to see the resumption of ties with
the Indonesian military. Such an eventuality would offer the TNI a degree of political rehabilitation and
access to resources far more valuable than continued connections with militant Muslim fringe groups. As the
comments of Paul Wolfowitz and others make clear, a condition of any kind of U.S. rapprochement with the
TM would undoubtedly be the elimination of Laskar Jihad.
As already observed, Laskar Jihad has been most successful in finding support beyond its narrow core
constituency when portraying itself, or those it purports to defend, as victims of aggression. Ironically, the
group's best chance of securing sympathy from the Indonesian ummat might come through a badly ! timed
or executed government operation against it, although this can hardly be a scenario Laskar Jihad would
wish to pin its hopes on.
In the aftermath of 11. September, Laskar Jihad has chosen to concentrate on reigniting the conflict
between Christians and Muslims in the vicinity of Paso, Central Sulawesi, perhaps gambling on greater
popular approval within Indonesia following the U.S. bombing of Afghanistan. The extent of Laskar Jihad's
commitment in the Poso region is not yet clear. Assessment of the intervention, however, requires
consideration of the limitations on Laskar Jihad's resources and available manpower. There is little
evidence to suggest a sudden expansion in the group's capacities sufficient to cover two similarly vigorous
campaigns in different parts of Indonesia. If the group has indeed decided to concentrate its efforts on
Sulawesi, this will almost certainly necessitate a commensurate downsizing of its operations in Maluku.
Needless to say, a withd! rawal from Maluku at this stage would be a significant admission of the failure of
the jihad to achieve its objectives.
Conclusion
In conclusion, we can see that the capacity of conservative modernist Muslims to launch Laskar Jihad in
early 2000 reflected a position of political influence built up during the last years of Soeharto's presidency
and the brief period of Habibie's presidency. The stimulus for Laskar Jihad was the threat posed to this
influence by Indonesia's movement towards greater democracy. The jihad project revealed the ability of
hard-line Muslim groups to take advantage of the breakdown in state control wrought by the conditions of
political transition. These groups, moreover, showed themselves adept at using alliances with other
interests threatened by political reform, and skilful in exploiting the disarray of modernist Muslim rivals. In
the context of an increasingly hostile political environment, Lask! ar Jihad was an attempt to shore up the
position of conservative Islam and to hamper the unwelcome democratic transition in whatever way
possible. It sought to overturn the ummat's allegiance to secular or pluralist po litical parties in favour of
asserting religion as an overriding point of identity. However, although the creation of Laskar Jihad was
nothing if not audacious, aspects of the venture reveal weaknesses in the conservative position even at the
moment of its inception. The Laskar Jihad experience highlights the paucity of causes capable of rallying
the Indonesian ummat behind the self-appointed champions of Islam. Maluku, while in some senses an
obvious venue for conservative Muslim intervention, was in many respects a less than ideal choice,
principally because of its lack of political significance.
The emergence of Laskar Jihad shows how conservative Muslims have been able to secure backing from
powerful sections of the Indonesian military, as well as a n! etwork of foreign funders. However, it also
reveals the low level of support for their brand of political Islam among Indonesian Muslims. This limited
support reflects the failure of conservative Muslim groups to convert state patronage during the last years of
the New Order into a significant broadening of their constituency. Moreover, the uncompromising approach
of the conservatives has hindered their efforts to gain the endorsement of mainstream Muslim political
parties and associations. Critically, the activities of Laskar Jihad have not been of sufficient scope to touch
the lives of most Indonesian Muslims, let alone to persuade them to take sides in the struggle between the
group and its opponents.
To sum up, while the Laskar Jihad venture is spectacular, not to mention violently destructive, it illuminates
fundamental fragilities in the position of its conservative Muslim architects. For conservative Islam in
Indonesia, Laskar Jihad constitutes less a dramatic ad! vance, so much as a bloody rear-guard action.
NOTES
The author is particularly grateful to John Sidel for advice on the preparation of this article and to Nicola
Frost for helpful comments on an earlier draft.
(1.) Kompas, 30 March 2001.
(2.) Jakarta Post, 11 September 2000.
(3.) Robert W. Hefner, "Co-option, Enmitization and Democracy: The Modernist Muslim Dilemma in
Indonesia" (Paper prepared for the conference on "Consolidating Indonesian Democracy", Ohio State
University, 11-13 May 2001), pp. 17-18.
(4.) Robert W. Hefner, "Print Islam: Mass Media and Ideological Rivalries among Indonesian Muslims",
Indonesia 64 (October 1997).
(5.) Robert W. Hefner, Civil Islam (Princeton University Press, 2000), p.151.
(6.) Robert W. Hefner, "Cooption, Enmitization and Democracy: The Modernist Muslim Dilemma in
Indonesia", p. 29.
(7.) Jakarta Post, 10 February 2000.
(8.) According to Moluccan sociologist Tamrin Amal Tomagola, Am! ien Rais told him after the 7 January
rally that he had been "cornered" by the Muslim outcry against the Halmahera killings. Political pressure
had left him with no choice but to offer his endorsement of conservative Muslims' jihad initiative. Interview,
29 June 2001.
(9.) International Crisis Group, Indonesia, Overcoming Murder and Chaos in Maluku, ICG Asia Report
No.10 (19 December 2000), p. 8.
(10.) For contrasting interpretations of the involvement of local and national elites in triggering the conflict in
Maluku, see George Aditjondro, "Guns, Pamphlets and Handie-Talkies: How the military exploited local
ethno-religious tensions in Maluku to preserve their political and economic privileges" (Paper prepared for
the Conference on "Conflicts and Violence in Indonesia", Humboldt University, Berlin, 3-5 July 2000); and
Gerry Van Klinken, "The Maluku wars: Bringing Society Back In", Indonesia 71 (April 2001).
(11.) A Muslim leader from Ambon claims that he ! and other Muslims discovered at the start of the conflict
that Moluccans in the Netherlands were shipping guns to the Christians in Ambon, hidden in coffins with
false bottoms. Interview, April 2001.
(12.) John T. Sidel, "Macet Total: Logics of Circulation and Accumulation in the Demise of Indonesia's New
Order", Indonesia 66 (October 1998): 166-67.
(13.) Jubilee Campaign, UK, Analysis of the Sectarian Conflict in Maluku and its Role in the Islamicisation of
Indonesia (Jubilee Campaign, UK, December 1999), pp.3, 7,
(14.) Interview with Dr Fawzy A.R., Head, Yogyakarta branch of the United Development Party (PPP), 22
June 2001.
(15.) Jakarta Post, 15 May 2000.
(16.) Moluccan Muslims allege that Christians have resurrected the RMS (Republik Maluku Selatan or
Republic of South Moluccas) separatist movement. The original RMS was an unsuccessful attempt by a
group of predominantly Christian members of the Moluccan elite to establish a separate stat! e, outside the
nascent Republic of Indonesia, in the early 1950s.
(17.) Interview with Laskar Jihad spokesmen, 29 June 2001.
(18.) Ibid.
(19.) Antara, 14 June 2001.
(20.) Aditjondro, op. cit.
(21.) Interview with Laskar Jihad spokesmen, 29 June 2001. Interview with Ichsan Malik, Facilitator, Baku
Baa Maluku reconciliation programme, 26 June 2001.
(22.) Interview with Laskar Jihad spokesmen, 29 June 2001.
(23.) Jakarta Post, 15 May 2000.
(24.) Ibid.
(25.) Anonymous interview with an Indonesian analyst of the Maluku conflict, June 2001. This analyst
claims to have videotaped footage of former Chief of Police in Maluku, Firman Gani, helping to organize a
Laskar Jihad operation. See International Crisis Group, Indonesia, Overcoming Murder and Chaos in
Maluku, p. 20.
(26.) Greg Fealy, "Inside the Laskar Jihad", Inside Indonesia (January-March 2001), p. 29.
(27.) Ibid.
(28.) Interview with Laskar Jih! ad spokesmen, 29 June 2001.
(29.) Personal communication with Jonathan Miller, maker of "A 21st Century War" documentary film for
Channel 4 (UK).
(30.) Such as Aceh and West Kalimantan, as well as Maluku.
(31.) This trend can be traced all the way back to the creation of the TNI in 1947 and its cooptation of the
first Indonesian paramilitary groups adopting the moniker lasykar during the Indonesian Revolution.
Another more recent case was the use of criminals during the 1982 elections, who were subsequently
murdered in the so-called "Petrus" killings. Robert Cribb, Gangsters and Revolutionaries- The Jakarta
People's Militia and the Indonesian Revolution 1945-1949 (University of Hawaii Press, 1991).
(32.) Jane's Intelligence Review, 1 December 2000.
(33.) Tempo, 15 May 2001.
(34.) Interview with Human Rights Representative, Moluccan Protestant Church, 27 June 2001.
(35.) According to Yogyakarta region PPP leader, Dr Fawzy A.R., o! n 14 June, Yon Gab dragged 20
people out of their houses in Kebun Cengkeh, Kota Ambon, made them lie down in the street and then ran
them over with a truck. Interview, 22 June 2001. Pikiran Rakyat, 10 May 2001; and Jakarta Post, 12 May
2001.
(36.) Laskar Jihad spokesmen stated in June 2001 that there were 3,000 Laskar Jihad personnel in
Maluku. Other estimates have been as high as 10,000. Interview, 29 June 2001.
(37.) Ichsan Malik, Facilitator for the Baku Bae Maluku Reconciliation Programme, visited Laskar Jihad's
headquarters in 2000 and estimated that perhaps as many as 80 per cent of the group's members were
TNI personnel. Interview, 26 June 2001.
This view that a proportion of the Laskar Jihad are in fact soldiers is echoed by other researchers of the
conflict, as well as eyewitness accounts of soldiers disguised in white robes launching attacks on Christian
villages. Aditjondro, op. cit.
TNI spokesman Air Rear-Admiral Graito Usodo has admitte! d that "there are some troops roaming around
and creating chaos outside the chain of command and some even joined the Laskar Jihad warriors".
Jakarta Post, 1 March 2001.
It is commonly alleged that Laskar Jihad forces include foreign fighters from countries such as Pakistan and
Afghanistan. Laskar Jihad has admitted that it has received assistance from a few foreign volunteers, but
say that these men have come of their own volition and only take part in humanitarian activities. Interview
with Laskar Jihad spokesmen, 29 June 2001. An assessment of these claims is complicated by the fact that
the locally levied Mujahidin forces in Maluku have recruited a number of foreign fighters who have no
formal connection with Laskar Jihad. Philip Hatch-Barnwell, unpublished journal account of working in
Maluku with Kompak, a Muslim relief organization affiliated with DDII, September to November 2000.
(38.) Interview with Laskar Jihad spokesmen, 29 June 2001. Press release, la! skarjihad.or.id, 10 May
2001. A Muslim leader in Ambon claims that Laskar Jihad has attempted to coerce Muslim villages in
Maluku into providing it with recruits. Interview, 1 April 2001.
(39.) Interview with Laskar Jihad spokesmen, 29 June 2001.
(40.) Robert W. Hefner, Civil Islam, pp. 109-10.
(41.) Interview with Laskar Jihad spokesmen, 29 June 2001.
(42.) One of Laskar Jihad's training camps in Ambon is the formerly Christian village of Waai, which was
attacked and largely destroyed by Laskar Jihad in July 2000. Jakarta Post, 28 March 2001.
(43.) Interview with Laskar Jihad spokesmen, 29 June 2001. Interview with Dr Fawzy A.R., leader of the
Yogyakarta branch of the United Development Party (PPP), 22 June 2001.
(44.) John T. Sidel, "Macet Total: Logics of Circulation and Accumulation in the Demise of Indonesia's New
Order", Indonesia 66 (October 1998): 171-72.
(45.) Robert W. Hefner, "Print Islam: Mass Media and Ideological R! ivalries among Indonesian Muslims",
Indonesia 64 (October 1997): 91.
(46.) Jakarta Post, 11 September 2000.
(47.) Paul Brass analyses the role played in instigating and sustaining communal violence in northern India
by "fire-tenders" who form part of managed riot networks. Paul R. Brass, Theft of an Idol: Text and Context
in the Representation of Collective Violence (Princeton University Press, 1997).
(48.) Interview with a representative of Baileo, a Moluccan non-government organization (NGO), 27 June
2001. FKAWJ press release, 4 May 2001.
(49.) Interview with a member of a conflict resolution team from Gadjah Mada University, Yagyakarta, 20
June 2001.
Domination of Maluku's Islamic institutions by an outside group led by a preacher of Arab extraction (Ja'far
Umar Thalib is of Yemeni descent) constitutes a somewhat ironic development in the context of Islam in the
region. Richard Chauvel writes that the erosion of the traditional religious a! uthority of Arab preachers in
Kota Ambon was a significant element of what he terms the "emancipation of the (Moluccan) Moslem
community" in Ambon during the 1930s. Richard Chauvel, Nationalists, Soldiers and Separatists (Leiden:
KILTV Press, 1990), pp. 163-64.
(50.) Interview with Human Rights Representative, Moluccan Protestant Church, 18 April 2001.
(51.) The displacing of communities for strategic ends was carried out within Aceh by both the TNI and the
Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka), for example.
(52.) Interview with Dr Fawzy A.R., leader of the Yogyakarta branch of the United Development Party
(PPP), 22 June 2001.
(53.) FKAWJ press release, 25 March 2001.
(54.) Jakarta Post, 15 May 2000. Interview with Laskar Jihad spokesmen, 29 June 2001.
(55.) International Crisis Group, Indonesia, Overcoming Murder and Chaos in Maluku, p. iii.
(56.) Interview with Ichsan Malik, Facilitator, Baku Bae Maluku Reconciliation Prog! ramme, 26 June 2001.
(57.) Interview with a member of a conflict resolution team from Gadjah Mada University, Yogyakarta, 20
June 2001. Interview with Human Rights Representative, Moluccan Protestant Church, 27 June 2001.
(58.) Interview with Ichsan Malik, Facilitator, Baku Bae Maluku Reconciliation Programme, 26 June 2001.
(59.) Ibid.
(60.) Interview with Laskar Jihad spokesmen, 29 June 2001.
(61.) Interview with Moluccan sociologist Tamrin Amal Tomagola, 29 June 2001.
(62.) Philip Hatch-Barnwell, op. cit. Personal communication with Jonathan Miller, maker of "A 21st Century
War" documentary film for Channel 4 (UK). Interview with a member of a conflict resolution team from
Gadjab Mada University, Yogyakarta, 20 June 2001. Interview with a Muslim leader from Ambon, 1 April
2001. Muslim residents of Tial village were reported as complaining about the unwanted presence of
Laskar Jihad in their village. Jakarta Post, 8 November 2000.
!
(63.) Laskar Jihad has also investigated the feasibility of involving itself in the communal violence in Sampit,
Kalimantan. Interview with Laskar Jihad spokesmen, 29 June 2001.
(64.) On 25 June 2001, Ja'far Umar Thalib went in person to the office of leading human rights NGO
YLBHI to complain that his followers' human rights were being abused. Interview with Ichsan Malik,
Facilitator, Baku Bae Maluku Reconciliation Programme, 26 June 2001.
On a previous occasion, following a Yon Gab raid against a Muslim base in Kota Ambon, Ja'far lodged
similar complaints with the state human rights organization Komnas HAM. Kompas, 10 February 2001.
This concern with human rights might be contrasted with the vigorous critique of the Western human rights
doctrine by Laskar Jihad supporters KISDI. Robert Hefner, Civil Islam, p. 110.
The "communist" way of thinking of the Yon Gab is referred to by www.laskarjihad.or.id, 19 June 2001.
MICHAEL DAVIS is a Researcher at the International NGO Training and Research Centre
in Oxford, United Kingdom.
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