U.S. ARMY IGNORES LTC WILCOX'S CALL FOR AIR COVER OVER IRAQ

DoD Sec Defense Rumsfeld said:

"We need to change not only the capabilities at our disposal, but also how we think about war. All the high-tech weapons in the world will not transform the US armed forces unless we also transform the way we think, the way we train, the way we exercise and the way we fight."

--SecDef Rumsfeld's Remarks to National Defense University, 31 Jan 02

Yet, here is what retired LTC Greg Wilcox found from the Army when he tried to share a "transformational" idea that would save lives in Iraq with actual continuous 24/7/365 air cover:

"Good luck on a reply. I sent a copy of my ppt presentation on "Where are the Cessnas?" to Schoomaker via e-mail but never got the courtesy of a reply. Likewise I sent a copy to the G3 shop. There I was told it was sent to the Army Initiatives Group (read Dead Letter drop). Never got a reply from them. Never got a reply from the chief of Army Aviation. Never got a reply from the Secretary of the Air Force.

It used to be a simple courtesy to just send a note, but I think the current people have "better things to do". I have to admit that I don't know if any of the above received my e-mails (other than the G3 HQDA). But I did verify the e-mail addresses before I sent them.

General Krulak made a point of keeping an open line for any e-mail inputs, and he personally replied to every one. I don't know how much time that took him, but you can bet it got peoples' attention. Seems to me too that Edward Lansdale and Ramon Magsaysay invented what was called the 5 cent telegram in the PI during the Huk rebellion of the '50s to get feedback from the people -- and it is said that Magsaysay answered every one (or at least one of his people did). Talk about information operations 101....

There is NO mechanism for feedback to the Army that I can tell.

They did away with happy hour in the '70s. They tried to do away with companycommand.net, a network started up by an enterprising group of former company commanders at West Point to share the knowledge needed to run a company. The colonel in charge of the young majors running the net told them that they had to prove measures of effectiveness or else it would be eliminated. I hope that colonel is no longer in the Army, but at least companycommand.net is still on the air.

The point is, that there is no routine way for people with any desire to submit legitimate suggestions to the Army to do so. In an open organization, this would be encouraged. In business, it is encouraged. In DOD it is not wanted, and such ideas are treated and even labeled as 'crackpot'.

There is too much reliance on contractors and blue chip panels made up of cronies to provide studies and services which tell the Government that what it is doing is really good. One example of this, are the two recent Welch Panels on the FCS. Essentially, they rubber-stamped the FCS. General Schoomaker sat on the first of these panels. This seems to assuage the Army that they are getting 'outside' input. There is very little reliance on any other outside input -- even from magazine articles or internet groups such as this.

So the real question is, how do you make an impact? How do you talk to the CSA? How do you contribute - other than by going along with AUSA or any other 'approved' lobby group? I think this is a legitimate question, and I for one will be interested to see if you get a response out of the CSA."

Greg Wilcox

WHERE IS THE ARMY AVIATION VISION?

The last Army Chief of Staff, indeed, did set an important, valid goal for the Army of moving at least one armored Brigade Combat Team anywhere in the world within 96 hours. Yes, he chose an impotent and overweight 19-21 ton Stryker armored car unable to facilitate this goal. However, the goal is still vital if we want to get there in time to catch Bin Ladens fleeing across nearby borders. Gen Schoomaker and the other Joint Chiefs were just on a panel discussion on CSPAN2 December 3. A weenie reporter from Texas asked him about V-22s for the Army as selfish plug to get Bell Textron "pork" in his home state. Gen Schoomaker said he wanted the SPEED/DISTANCE the V-22 offers so he wouldn't have refuel 4 times like for the Iran rescue operation but he was non-commital to V-22 or the C-130 size quad-tilt-rotor. He said he would see how USMC and USAF does with V-22. I interpret that to meaning that he is aware that V-22 might not work and utterly fail. He also did same thing earlier when discussing the Stryker armored car brigades---"its in Iraq we'll see how it works out". This is a good sign; my guess is he knows the criticisms of these deathtraps and has distanced himself from them so when they fail he can move in a better direction; ie: TRACKED FCS and Piasecki VTDP.

We can fix the Stryker mess by making it an MP vehicle and upgrading light tracked M113 Gavins for Airborne units and M973A2 Ridgways for Air Assault units to be our 3D force platforms.

However, the latest news is that Army Aviation's number #1 priority is "BLADE EROSION cost reductions". The Chief's Army Aviation transformation board is going to have to do better than this.

Since when does cutting COSTS constitute a VISION for the future?

Why don't we just stop having Army Aviation at all?, costs then would be ZERO.

Here we are in the 21st century, with Army Aviators getting shot down and our people killed in slow and short-ranged conventional helicopters and the Army Aviation "vision" is to spend $1 BILLION on making UH-60Ms with glass cockpits for MENTAL improvements but no PHYSICAL increases in range or speed?

Would blade erosion kits and glass cockits have prevented this UH-60 Blackhawk from being shot down over Iraq killing 6 brave Soldiers? 100+ mph of speed and a tan or gray camouflage paint scheme might have saved the helicopter and the Americans on board.

Clearly, its high time that U.S. Army Aviators from across the world, past, present and future to stand up and demand that Army Aviation meet the PHYSICAL challenge of BCT 96-hour deployability and make its helicopters fly farther and faster as well as to acquire its own fixed-wing transports and observation/attack aircraft. Last year, we outlined how the C-27J Spartan twin turboprop transport in the hands of the Army's 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR) would begin to fill the void left when the Caribou was taken away from the Army by the USAF then promptly retired. A squadron of C-27Js in Iraq would do wonders resupplying Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) flanking the hotly contested roads where enemy explosive devices are taking a daily toll of American lives. Or the USAF or civilian contract C-130s could do this if we can use longer runways at FOBs.

Look at the picture at the top of this page!

Its a flight of U.S. Army CV-2 Caribou STOL transports circa 1960s....when Army Aviation was CAN-DO, not "we can't do, we have to cut costs". These aircraft are SELF-DEPLOYING TO VIETNAM HALF A WORLD AWAY IN UNDER 3 DAYS, something we can't do today. The U.S. Army Aviation units of the 1960s could better resupply Army FOBs than our Army can today in Iraq! Its high time we start living UP (not down) to the legacy of the brave Army Aviators who went before us. This means meeting the demands of the dangerous world head-on, not going off into a comfortable corner or "lane" and be irrelevent.

For the cowardly towards the "big, bad USAF fixed-wing aircraft mafia", we remind them that the U.S. Army already owns and operate 6 x 4-engined RC-7A/B STOL fixed-wing aircraft as "Airborne Reconnaissance Low" (ARLs). That's 1-2-3-4-5-6, half a "squadron" in USAF parlance. Maybe we should stop acting like cowards and stand up for our Army and Army Aviation and get the money from Congress to get the tools we need to WIN instead of cowering around whining about blade erosion kits. If we need fixed-wing aircraft (WE DO) then we get them. Its a wonder why none of the Army's excellent RC-7 recon aircraft are flying over the 350 km MSR in Iraq where bad guys are placing roadside bombs to kill Americans at will. When an Army General officer decided he needed RC-7s he got them, amazing what happens when those with rank give a damn and go to bat for the troops. These are aircraft even bigger than the Caribou:

From Global Security RC-7 web page: www.globalsecurity.org/_inc/quinstreet.htm

The Airborne Reconnaissance Low (ARL) is a multifunction, day/night, all weather reconnaissance intelligence asset developed and fielded by the Army in support of an urgent requirement for a low profile intelligence aircraft. It consists of a modified DeHavilland DHC-7 fixed-wing aircraft equipped with communications intelligence (COMINT), imagery intelligence (IMINT), and Moving Target Indicator/Synthetic Aperture Radar (MTI/SAR) mission payloads. The payloads are controlled and operated via onboard open-architecture, multi-func-tion workstations. Intelligence collected on the ARL can be analyzed and recorded on the aircraft workstations in real-time or stored on-board for post-mission processing. During multi-aircraft missions, data can be shared between cooperating aircraft via ultra high frequency (UHF) air-to-air datalink to allow multi-platform COMINT geolocation operations. The ARL system includes a variety of communications subsystems to support near-real-time dissemination of intelligence and dynamic retasking of the aircraft.

The DeHavilland of Canada Dash-7, a four-engine, turboprop, commuter airplane was chosen as the platform for SIGINT and IMINT collection. The Dash-7 aircraft's ability to operate out of austere runways, its ability to carry the mission payload and its endurance led to the Dash-7's selection. It is an extensively modified aircraft that has a higher maximum gross weight and extended range capability added in the ARL conversions. The Dash-7 is a medium sized, four-engine, passenger and cargo transport. It is pressurized and can operate at up to 20,400 feet with a full mission crew. Mission duration can be up to eight hours with a range of 1,400 nautical miles at a cruising speed of 230 knots. Proposed future engines and "wet wing" fuel tanks may extend the range to 2,800 nautical miles. The cockpit has been upgraded to Airspace 2000 standards.

This year we will discuss how the C-27J Spartan could be made Extreme Short Take-Off and Landing (ESTOL) capable to land on water, snow, ice and literally almost anywhere. To go FORWARD not backwards---in physical capabilities. The C-27J can air-mech light tracked Armored Fighting Vehicles like the M113A4 Gavin and the ultra-light M973A2 Ridgway up-armored Small Unit Support Vehicle to create "Air-Mech-Strike" capabilities within both Army light and heavy units. A small fleet of C-27Js could shuttle supplies safely thousands of feet above MANPADS, RPGs and land mines in Iraq instead of running hundreds of vulnerable trucks up and down 350 kilometers of roads easily ambushed by the enemy.

What most people do not know is that the active U.S. Army and National Guard DO operate fixed-wing transports: C-23s, C-25s and C-26s. Under the Aviation Restructuring Initiative (ARI) the Army says it needs 54 x M3T2 aircraft to simplify these aircraft down to one type called the Multi-Mission Medium Tactical Transport (M3T2).

ARI REQUIREMENTS

C-XX Short Range (SR); mission currently performed by U-21, et al
C-XX Medium Range (MR); currently performed by C-12
C-20 Long Range (LR); currently performed by C-20, C-21
Multi-Mission Medium Tactical Transport (M3T2), currently performed by C-23, C-26

Our Army is getting clobbered hauling supplies in unarmored trucks in Iraq. We could quickly and inexpensively convert the former SOUTHCOM 7 x C-27As sitting in storage at Davis-Monthan AFB and make them into U.S. Army C-27Js to haul supplies by air into FOBs and avoid Iraqi road side bombs. The C-27J should be the Army's Multi-Mission Medium Tactical Transport (M3T2) because it has the payload, range, speed and roll-on/off loading rear ramp required to quickly offload supplies by airland/airdrop to resupply our Soldiers in combat zones. The Golden Knights Army parachute demonstration team could improve their performances with a large ramp equipped aircraft to exit more jumpers out at a time.

We will further outline how Army helicopters could double their speed and range via Piasecki VTDP technology to enable world-wide self-deployments as well as 3D air-mechanized asaults that beat the enemy's optically aimed-weapons.

The fact that conventional helicopters are noisy and costly to maintain and fly, combined with the failure of UAVs to actively scout for Iraqi enemies demands that the Army obtain a 2-seat fixed-wing observation/attack aircraft. That aircraft can be an upgraded T/A-37 or the T-6B Texan II attack version of the current T-6A USAF trainer, dubbed an "OV-6B".

The following above constitutes an Army Aviation "vision". However, if we continue to be led by leaders without vision we will not have to worry long about blades having any "erosion".

How should Army Aviation operate from the dirt in the future?

The critical factor driving the rotary-wing VTOL versus ESTOL fixed-wing issue is how much and what type space on the GROUND is require: runway yes or no?. To get VTOL capability to not need runways with helicopters extracts a huge price in maintenance costs and you get a platform that doesn't fly fast or far.

What is the heartburn with having to make a runway anyway?

In WWII, smaller prop-driven fixed-wing attack aircraft could take off from grassy fields without any smoothed out runway. Today, even helicopters after awhile need their landing spots smoothed over and hardened by mo-mats etc. The longer you stay/operate aircraft from one location, the more engineering you need towards the ground; be it a runway to roll down and create lift over fixed wings or to keep dirt from flying during rotary-wing hovering take-offs and landings.

The O-2 SkyMaster can operate from 1,000 foot long runway; with Wren type STOL devices under 300 feet. 300 feet is a football field. Most fixed-wing UAVs will need at least a football field anyway to operate from. So why not obtain a fixed-wing CAS/MAS observation/attack unmanned/manned combat air vehicle (U/MCAV) since small fields will be created anyway? Crop duster pilots do ESTOL every day. Why not the U.S. Army? The Army used to do this with its O-1 Bird Dog aircraft in Korea and Vietnam. The German Army in WWII had General Rommel hoping in and flying a Fleisher Storch ESTOL observation aircraft. General Patton knew how to fly our "Grasshopper" observation aircraft. I think the helicopter-as-a-V/TOL-panacea mentality has smothered out the fixed-wing aircraft from Army Aviation and its wrong. We need both, if anything helicopters need to become part-fixed wing.

Flying in Laos During the Vietnam War

www.neto.com/rcr/flying.html

The aircraft also had the Wren STOL conversion kit. This meant it was outfitted for truly low-speed flying and short takeoffs and landings. Big Fowler flaps, a Canard surface up front (a kind of front-mounted auxiliary elevator that helped at low speeds) were the main mods that allowed this plane to stay in the air at about 30 miles and hour!

Most of my landings were made power off, that is, in a gliding mode. Flying power-off teaches you better how to land an airplane. You must judge your glide, put your flaps down at the right time, be mindful of the steepness of your turns, and so on, to land at a predetermined spot on the runway or in the jungle. Another advantage is that you do not depend upon the engine to "pull" you to your landing spot. Dragging in with flaps down and high power can really set you up for a rude shock if the engines falters or quits. Like dropping into a lake, a cliff, a house, or whatever.

RETURN OF THE CESSNA BIRD DOG?

The Army used to have artillery spotter planes like the O-1 Bird Dog that could land and take-off under 300 feet. LTC Wilcox is absolutely right that the Army can and should have small observation planes to do COIN missions.

What the hell happened?

The U.S. Army's own Field Manual, FM 90-8 "Counterguerrilla Operations" Chapter 3 states:

b. The guerrilla knows this and will attempt to capitalize on it by engaging US forces at locations where US fire would endanger civilians or damage their property. While the temptation to return fire may be great, a few dead or injured enemy will in no way compensate for the ill will of the local populace if some innocent civilians are killed or injured or their homes and property destroyed.

e. No matter what political atmosphere prevails in the host country, the brigade commander must engage the guerrilla with every asset at the commander's disposal.

If the commander encounters government officials who habitually hinder operations against the guerrillas through incompetence, self-interest, or suspected sympathy for the guerrilla cause, he should document his case and forward it to the next higher commander for disposition.

[EDITOR: HAAA! WHAT DO YOU DO IF ITS YOUR OWN DOD AND ARMY BUREAUCRATS?]

(d) Aviation assets (augmentation from division).

(e) Aerial imagery reconnaissance (from corps).

These units conduct independent operations such as patrols and ambushes, under centralized control (company or battalion). This enables them to cover more area simultaneously than a larger unit and still have the firepower to deal with the typical guerrilla unit they might encounter.

Counterguerrilla forces most possess mobility equal to or greater than that of the guerrilla in order to find, fix, fight, and pursue him.

(2) Commanders should not overburden Soldiers with excessive loads because the guerrillas will be able to outrun them. Soldiers should carry only the things they need to find and fix the guerrilla. Once this is accomplished, they can be resupplied by ground or air.

The use of indirect fire, while effective in some cases, is not a substitute for maneuver.

[EDITOR: DOES RUMMY/WOLFIE/DOD/USAF/"RMA" CROWD KNOW THIS?]

f. Patience. Counterguerrilla forces must anticipate long periods without making contact. The guerrilla knows he is outnumbered and outgunned and avoids engagement unless it is on his terms. Counterguerrilla forces should not develop a false sense of security if it appears the guerrilla has ceased operations in their area. It must be assumed that the guerrilla is always observing the operating patterns of the counterguerrilla force for weak points, and waiting for lax security to strike with minimum risk. A guerrilla attack must be expected at any time.

[EDITOR: EVERYBODY FIGHTS, EVERYBODY WORKS. COIN IS A NON-LINEAR BATTLEFIELD.

EVERY VEHICLE A COMBAT VEHICLE.]

(6) The reserve unit should be highly mobile. Air transport is the preferred method for moving the reserve because it is fast and not dependent on open ground routes as are motorized or mechanized modes of transport. Whatever its mode of transportation, the reserve's vehicles are dedicated to the reserve and immediately available for employment.

3-10. Organization.
Brigades assigned strike campaign missions either are relieved from area responsibility in advance of the mission or, preferably, are constituted as specialized forces held at the national or regional levels. Brigade strike forces are organized as self-sufficient task forces capable of operating in areas remote from logistical bases. Brigades are assigned support bases in secure areas for elements not committed to operations.

b. Patrolling by counterguerrilla forces increases the chances of detecting guerrillas before they can emplace mines or demolitions, or establish ambushes or roadblocks. During Phases I and II of an insurgent action, military police can do most of the patrolling of ground lines of communication, but the tactical situation may dictate combat forces having to perform this mission.

d. Aerial patrols are effective for covering large areas in a short time.

e. Surface patrols are slower, but they can check routes in greater detail. Surface patrol members must be trained in the detection of mines and booby traps. Mine detectors and infantry scout dogs, if available, may aid them in this task.

j. Engineers are used to help keep lines of communication open. They can locate and clear mines, clear potential ambush sites, and repair damage. They may also prepare defensive systems around chokepoints.

(3) Aircraft. Experience has shown that the presence of aircraft deters ambushes. Column movement covered by traveling overwatch or bounding overwatch attack helicopters, in conjunction with a route reconnaissance by scout helicopters or fixed-wing strike aircraft, maybe requested. Planning includes the type, number, and method of employment of aircraft. Methods of employment include column cover, air alert, and ground alert. Column cover by fighter aircraft is expensive in terms of crew fatigue and equipment maintenance; therefore, light observation-type aircraft that can direct on-call air support are used for short movements over frequently used routes in more secure areas. When air support is planned, communications information concerning radio frequencies, call signs, and identification procedures is provided to all who may need to use them. In addition, the supporting air unit knows the maneuver intentions of the ground element in case of ambush.

This maybe done by placing pickets along critical stretches of the route or by selective placement of tactical units.

d. Convoys may be escorted by reconnaissance aircraft or attack helicopters and may have tactical air support on call. The use of reconnaissance Army aircraft to survey routes immediately forward of a convoy often provides early warning of danger.

3-54. Armor and cavalry movement.
a. During movements, unit vehicles and equipment are arranged to facilitate their employment upon contact with, or interference from, the enemy. Traveling, traveling overwatch, and bounding overwatch techniques are used in movement. (See FM 71-2 for armor ground movement security techniques, and FM 17-95 for cavalry movement techniques.)

b. Air cavalry can be used to provide column cover and to give early warning of hostile activity. Security measures are employed to keep the enemy from learning of the movement or its destination once the column has begun moving.

c. Terrain and weather permitting, aground security force (advance guard, flank security, and/or rear guards) are used to provide security. When terrain precludes the use of these ground security elements, air cavalry may perform these activities as part of the security mission.

b. The population density requires emphasis on the use of nonlethal weapons and the careful use of weapons of destruction when force is necessary. The application of "minimum essential force" to minimize loss of life and destruction of property requires detailed planning, coordination, and control.

[EDITOR: WHAT RIOT CONTROL AGENTS? WE CANT USE CS TEAR GAS ANYMORE THANKS TO BUSH I.]

"Substitution of tracked carriers for wheeled vehicles provides an increased potential for battlefield mobility"

[EDITOR: AMEN. NOT TO MENTION BETTER ARMOR PROTECTION.]

"Light aircraft may be used to drop messages and to relay radio messages."

The crisis in Iraq demands we get a manned observation aircraft now; be it O-2s from the boneyard, borrowed T-6As from the USAF fitted with ordnance hard poiints, new purchase Army T-6Bs (OV-6Bs?) or retiring USAF T-37s or A-37s from the boneyard or open market. The Pilatus TurboPorter (PC-6) has ESTOL capabilities in use by the Army's Golden Knights parachute demonstration team and armed is known as the AU-23. We could buy these aircraft for Iraq.

When our military was CAN-DO, not can't do: armed TurboPorters

One intruiging option to get a manned eye-in-the-sky, is to do as LTC Wilcox suggests, buy some Cessna 182s for Iraq and modify them with Wren/Robinson STOL devices to take-off and land from football field sized runways like TurboPorters and Bird Dogs. One conversion kit is done by Peterson called the 260SE.

www.260se.com/performance.html

History of the 260SE

In the late 1950's, Jim Robertson designed a STOL aircraft named the "Skyshark." It featured many STOL devices not seen before. Although the aircraft was a technical success, it was too expensive to produce.

Some of the best features of the Skyshark were then applied to the proven Cessna 182 airframe to produce the Wren 460. The Wren featured full span, double slotted flaps, movable spoilers called "wren's teeth" to assist in roll control, and a very innovative idea for its day, a movable high lift canard.

The Wren achieved a worldwide reputation for being the only safe STOL airplane ever built. It achieved this by not relying on dangerous high angles of attack, and operation behind the power curve to achieve it's safe STOL performance. The Wren's safe, slow flight characteristics saw the Wren being used in many different roles.

After Todd Peterson had built numerous Wrens in the early 1980s, he decided to certify a new airplane that would replace the Wren.

Based upon customer input, the new airplane would be faster, carry more weight, have a higher service ceiling and have improved handling characteristics. All this was to be done without giving up short field ability, its safe, flat attitude at low speeds, or its stall resistance. Thus, the 260SE/STOL was produced in 1986 after two years of FAA certification.

260SE Performance

The 260SE takes off and lands short and displays the same safe flat attitude after liftoff. No unsafe high angles of attack here even with a 4,500 foot density altitude. Most all pilots would agree that the high angle of attack, and "hang-on-the-prop" type of performance is absolutely dangerous. If a power failure or wind sheer should occur during operation in the STOL mode it would be disastrous. This is the trade-off for other STOL aircraft. Only the 260SE can fly safely while in the STOL mode.

The 260SE has the ability to safely execute a forced landing during a STOL takeoff. Compare this to the fatalities that would surely result from this happening to a conventional STOL aircraft that hangs on the prop.

With only idle power, the 260SE will loiter at slow speeds in a safe flat attitude with outstanding stall resistance and fantastic over the nose visibility. The loiter speed is only 50 knots.

The 260SE has outstanding maneuverability after takeoff. Steep turns may be made either direction immediately after take off.

Performance

www.260se.com/images/specs.gif

Bushmaster $81,803*

Designed to work in the back country with unimproved landing areas. Incorporates oversized tires, heavy duty nose fork, heavy duty axles and brakes, along with the time-proven leaf spring landing gear. Takeoff and landing distances are 385 ft. at gross weight and cruise speed is 140 knots. All other performance figures are the same as our 260SE/STOL. This airplane is the perfect utility airplane, or perfect for traveling to all those out-of-the-way spots. Price based on using the Cessna 182N airframe. If a wing leading edge cuff is desired, add $3,800.

Clearly, the U.S. Army immediately needs a fixed-wing, MANNED observation/attack aircraft for Iraqi COIN operations. The reason is this; the primary Main Supply Route (MSR) for U.S. forces from east of Baghdad to Mosul is 350 kilometers long and only being cleared by Military Police (MPs). MPs are not up to the job of setting up night ambushes to get the poor Iraqis being paid to do Ba'athist party dirty work. The Combat Engineers who should be clearing the way of roadside bombs are helping the infantry in cities play wannabe Delta Force or are rebuilding Iraqi infrastructure destroyed during the "Shock and Awe" bombardment done to give the USAF fighter-bomber jocks something to do. We need air surveillance over this 350 km MSR 24/7/365 NOW. If this means buying Cessna 182s with Wren conversions to operate from football-sized dirt strips, then so be it.

And don't think for a minute just because General Franks, CENTCOM Commanding General insisted rightly on 60 x A-10 Warthogs for CAS that all is well when we are doing full-scale wars against nation-state armies. The marines are notorious for dragging their feet when it comes to marking their vehicles with thermal and other visual panels to avoid being shot by other U.S. forces. The USMC has chosen a bizarre camoulage uniform print to boost their egos after the Army got black berets and it appears at least one marine has died in Iraq because of this. Nevertheless, the A-10 needs to be upgraded with bigger engines and some need a second seat for an enlisted Airborne Forward Air Controller (AFAC) to be carried onboard to identify friend or foe (IFF) when not doing a tour of duty on the ground as a Ground FAC (GFAC). If the USAF will not properly respect and upgrade the outstanding A-10, then the Army needs its own two-seat OA-37B Dragonfly aircraft CAS force. And on top of whoever and whatever does the CAS attacking, we need an intermediary AFAC in a slower fixed-wing airplane like a Wren conversion Cessna 182 or a T-6B/OV-6B Texan II. Here is yet more proof that we need 2-seat OV-6Bs with an AFAC inside....also that single-seat A-10 pilots are too overworked to IFF properly...we need two-seat OA-10Bs.....better yet they need to be turned over to the U.S. Army since the USAF only uses them when there is a war, between the wars they shower their sexy fighter-bombers with make-overs and gadgets. The USAF keeps the A-10s around to do their dirty work to appease Congress then as soon as the crisis is over goes back to playing "Top Gun" with their sexy aircraft.

U.S. CAS ever since we retired OA-37s, O-2s, OV-1s and OV-10s has gone downhill...

The Asia Times - "Asia's most trusted news source for the Middle East" has posted the following article: "The not-so-friendly reality of U.S. casualties" by reporter David Isenberg:

www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/EJ22Ak01.html

But, in actuality, the total might be higher than the administration acknowledges. A recently released report, "Truth from These Podia" by retired air force colonel Sam Gardiner, recalls that during the course of the war, central command officials claimed that U.S. forces came under artillery fire after Iraqi soldiers surrendered under a white flag. The implication was that it was a ruse. But Gardiner thinks that the white flag stories were engineered to cover a very serious friendly fire event.

Gardiner writes: "A disheartening aspect of the white flag story is what is beginning to surface about what might have been the real cause of the marine casualties near An Nasiriyah on March 23. Marines are saying that nine of those killed may have been killed by an A-10 that made repeated passes attacking their position.

"We know from a 'Lessons Learned' report released early in October that the death of nine marines is under investigation as a friendly fire accident. From individual reports, we know that at least one of the marines killed on March 23, reported as having been caught in the ruse, was hit directly in the chest with a round from an A-10 gun."

Its time EVERY AVJ member to contact the two Representatives who sponsored the recent GAO report on CAS failings and ask them to sponsor legislation to achieve this:

GAO Report on CAS failings

Vic Snyder-Arkansas, 2nd District
www.house.gov/snyder/

Washington, D.C. Office
1330 Longworth House Office Bldg
Washington, D.C. 20515
Phone: 202-225-2506 Fax: 202-225-5903 2nd District

Office in Arkansas
3118 Federal Bldg, 700 W. Capitol Ave
Little Rock, AR 72201
Phone: 501-324-5941 Fax: 501-324-6029
E-mail: snyder.congress@mail.house.gov

Solomon Ortiz-Texas 27th District
www.house.gov/ortiz/bio/b_military.shtml

2470 Rayburn Building
Washington, DC 20515 --- (202) 225-7742

Air Assault!