This story is incomplete.
With the maiden, 20-minute flight of the first Technology Demonstrator of the
Light Combat Aircraft on January 4, 2001, one could say it was halfway through.
Even at this point of time, it is of enormous interest to nations in the far
corners of the world. India has two priorities One, improve the quality of life
of a third of its population. Two keep inviolate its borders, shores and skies.
The latter requires military might.
The geo- politics of the
region (South Asia and surrounds) is of such a complexity that, despite good
intentions of all, major conflicts have erupted; border skirmishes and cross-
border terrorism continue. In fact, right from Day 1 (August 15, 1947) India has
faced a military threat; because of this, there is a compulsion to achieve
self-reliance in design, development and production of weapon systems e.g. the
LCA. It may be noted that some Asian countries, with great economic wealth and
technical know why/know how, do not have such a compulsion Further, success of
the LCA program is a must for continuation and enhancement of India's aircraft
industry. For these reasons, 33 R&D establishments 60 major industries and
11 academic institutions participate in the program. Unfortunately, there has
been a great deal of hype by the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO)
as to its capabilities, contemporariness and when it will enter service. This
has led to, not unwarranted, cynicism.
Background Information
An important recommendation of the Aeronautics Committee, which was accepted by
Government in 1969, was that Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL) should design and
develop an advanced technology fighter aircraft around a proven engine. Based on
IAF 'air staff target' papers, HAL finally completed design studies for a
Tactical Air support Aircraft in 1975 and it appeared that HAL would, after a
lapse of twenty years, get down to developing a fighter. However, he selected
proven engine' from abroad, could not be procured; the project fell through.
HAL's design and development capability started to de-cline. The IAF' s
requirement, for an air superiority fighter (primary role) with air
support/interdiction capability (secondary role) in the tactical battle area,
continued.
The DRDO obtained feasibility studies from three leading aircraft companies
(British, French and German). Use was made of these studies in presenting a case
to Government for design and development of an LCA. In an unusual step, a
Society was set up to over-see the LCA development program. At its apex is a
15-member General Body, whose president is the Defence Minister. The next rung
is a 10-member Governing Body, whose Chairman is the SA to the Defence Minister
and Secretary DRDO. The third rung is a 10-member Technical Committee, headed by
the DG Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA); the latter post has been vacant
ever since the first DG resigned in 1986. ADA manages the development program
while HAL is the principal partner. The initial projection for completion of the
program was totally erroneous and is largely attributable to lack of knowledge
and experience. Projections were: first flight in 1990, production to commence
in 1994.
Delay in commencement of Project Definition (PD) gave ADA time to marshal
national resources (80 work centers spread over the country); to construct
buildings, recruit personnel and create infra-structure; and to get a clearer
perspective of the advanced technologies that could be indigenously developed
and those that would need to be imported. The IAF's Air Staff Requirement,
finalized in October 1985 is the base document for development. Requirements of
flight performance, systems performance, reliability, maintainability criteria,
stores carnage, etc. are spelt out. Concessions or a higher standard of
requirements have to be mutually agreed upon by the IAF (customer) and ADA
(constructor). Having a Society and Committees is, perhaps, the quickest way to
bring about agreement.
The Program
Project definition (PD) commenced in October 1987 and was completed in
September I988. The consultant, chosen from four contenders, was Dassault
Aviation, France. Engineers, connected with design and development of aircraft
know how vital it is to get the 'definition' correct. From this flows detail
de-sign, construction and eventually maintenance costs.
After examining the PD documents, the IAF felt that the risks were too high
(likely shortfalls in performance, inordinate delay, Cost over-run, price
escalations) to proceed further. A Review Committee was formed in May 1989.
Experts from outside the aviation industry were included. The general view was
that infrastructure, facilities and technology had advanced in most areas to
undertake the project. As a precaution, Full Scale Engineering Development would
proceed in two phases. Phase 1: design, construction and flight test of two
Technology Demonstrator aircraft (TDI & 2); construction of a Structural
Test Specimen; construction of two Prototype Vehicles (PVI &2); creation of
infrastructure and test facilities. Phase 2: construction of three more PV '5,
the last PV5, being a trainer; construction of a Fatigue Test Specimen; creation
of facilities at various work centres. Cost of Phase I - Rs.2188 crores, of
Phase II - Rs. 2,340 crores. Phase I commenced in 1990. However, due to a
financial crunch, sanction was accorded in April 1993 and was marked by an
upsurge in work. The critical path in this program has been the design,
fabrication and testing of its fly-by-wire flight control system FCS). An
electronic FCS is a must for an aircraft with relaxed static stability.
The FCS also provides the
pilot 'care free handling'; flight limits cannot be exceeded, which at lower
speeds on aircraft like the MiG-23/27 or Jaguar, results in the loss of the
aircraft. The Aeronautical Development Establishment (ADE) is the nodal agency
for development of the FCS. One reason for delay of the first flight could have
been the Unexpectedly large effort required for coding control laws into the FCS
software, which were then checked out on Minibird and Ironbird test rigs at ADE
and HAL, respectively. The control laws were developed with the aid of real time
simulators at ADE and BAe, UK. As a point of interest, a second series of
inflight simulation tests of flight control software took place in July 1996 at
Calspan USA on an F-16D VISTA (variable inflight stability aircraft); 33 test
flights were carried out. Another reason for delay was the sanction imposed
after Pokhran II in May 1999. Scientists working at Lockheed Martin, USA were
sent hack; equipment, software and documents were impounded. Herculean efforts
brought the FCS software to a standard where the FCS performed flawlessly over
50 hours of testing on TD 1 by pilots, resulting in the aircraft being cleared
for flight in early 2001.
Space constraints prevent any meaningful description of materials, technology,
facilities, processes developed for execution of the project. Military aviation
enthusiasts may read a monograph on Aeronautical Technology that has attained
maturity through DRDO efforts; much of this technology finds application in the
LCA project. The monograph was brought out at Aero India 1998. The LCA is
tailless with a double-sweep delta wing. Its wing span is 8.2 m, length 13.2 m,
height 4.4 m. TOW clean 8.500 kg, MTOW 12500kg. It will be super-sonic at all
altitudes, max speed of M 1.5 at the tropopause. Specific excess power and
g-over load data has not been published. Maximum sustained rate of turn will be
17 deg per sec and maximum attainable 30 deg per sec. Funds have been sanctioned
for a Naval LCA. PD and studies in critical technology areas have commenced. The
aircraft will bee powered by a Kaveri engine (more information follows) and is
to operate from the Indian Navy's Air Defence Ship, under construction. Launch
speed over a 12 deg ramp is 100 kts; recovery speed during a no flare deck
landing, using arrester gear, is 120 kts. Take off mass 13 tonne, recovery mass
10 tonne. Most stringent requirements! The airframe will be modified: nose droop
to provide improved view during landing approach; wing leading edge vortexes (LEVCON)
to increase lift during approach and strengthened undercarriage. Nose wheel
steering will be powered for deck manoeuvrability.
During early flight development, the TD aircraft will be powered by a single GE
F404 F2J3 engine (7,250 kg reheat thrust). The indigenous Kaveri engine, under
development by the Gas Turbine Research Establishment (GTRE) is slated for
installation in a PV aircraft. Over 7,000 hours of ground testing of the core
engine (Kabini) and four prototype Kaveri engines, together with flights in a
Tu-16 test-bed aircraft would have been completed. Engine components have been
produced by several manufacturing units, including HAL, where the exclusive
Cellular Manufacturing Facility (CNC machining) was established in November
1988. A concurrent engineering approach has been followed to provide engines
early in the LCA's flight development. Salient engine features; 3 stage fan; 6
stage HP compressor with variable geometry IGV, I and II stators; annular
combustion chamber; cooled single stage HP and LP turbines; modulated
after-burner; fully variable, convergent-divergent nozzle; length 3490 mm; max
diameter 910 mm; dry thrust 52 kN; reheat thrust 81 kN; thrust weight ratio 7.8.
The 'Achilles heel; in the successful development of the LCA, in the opinion of
this author, is the Kaveri engine.
Points of view
In the late eighties India's aircraft Industry was not as advanced as Sweden's;
and yet India follows a more arduous design/development route for its LCA,
compared to Sweden for its JAS-39 Gripen. The Gripen embodied a far higher
percentage of foreign, off-the-shelf technology, including its RM-12 engine
(improved GE F404). France (Dassault Aviation) built and exhaustively flew a
demonstrator aircraft (Rafale-A) before embarking on construction of Rafale
prototypes. Over 2,000 flights were completed by September 1994 when first
Flight of a production Rafale was still 20 months away. At that point of time,
Dassault Aviation had built or flown 93 prototypes, of which at least fifteen
went into production Sixteen years elapsed from ‘first-metal-cut' of the
Rafale demonstrator to entry into service. Current plans for the LCA is ten
years. And what of India's past record? Just a hand-full of trainer aircraft
designed and productionised. The story is similar for the Typhoon (earlier
Eurofighter 2000). It was seventeen years from 'first-metal-cut' (EAP) to
squadron entry in 2000. One more timeframe needs to be noted. It took Gripen six
and a half years from first flight (prototype) to entry into squadron. For the
LCA, four and a half years is the target! The quantum of test flying hours
required to attain Initial Operational Clearance (IOC) is about 2000 hours; an
impossible task in four and a half years. Concurrent production will shorten
service entry time, but this will not enable the present target to be reached.
The LCA remains a high-risk project. All too often glitches occur in development
of a fly-by-wire FCS. The Typhoon is an example; this, despite vast experimental
work for over a decade by leading aircraft manufacturers in the UK and Germany
(Jaguar, F-104, EAP). Engine development is the most complex of all activities.
There are sure to be problems during flight development of the Kaveri, GTRE's
first engine. Teething problems after service entry will occur; and major
reliability improvements will be required in the first decade of its
exploitation. Engines of the Russian fleet of fighters operated by the IAF
(MiG-21 BIS, MiG-23BN/27M MiG-29) have this in-service history. Proceeding from
this, four points emerge:
(a) India has its best designers, engineers, scientists, and academicians
working on/contributing to the project. In the main, they are devoted and
tireless in their efforts to success-fully complete the project. They need
support (not blind sup-port) of the polity, defence services and bureaucrats.
Public support will follow, provided there is honest transparency;
(b) Costs of the project will escalate. (checks and balance are necessary, but
let there be no inordinate delays, as have occurred in the past;
(c) The future of the aircraft industry, military and civil, depends on success
of the LCA (and ALH, Saras, HJT-36) project; and,
(d) It is unlikely that the LCA will attain initial operational clearance (IOC)
before 2010 When it is achieved, it will be an industrial success of magnificent
proportion, and is sure to receive the acclaim it deserves.
A few words on final operational clearance (FOC). The entire avionics and weapon
systems are con-figured around three 1553 B data bus. Mission oriented
computation/flight management is through a 32-bit computer. Information: from
sensors (e.g. multi-mode radar, IRST, radar/laser/missile launch-warning
receivers); from the inertial navigation System with embedded GPS; from
targeting pod (FLIR, laser designator) are presented to the pilot on a
head-up-display and head-down-displays. A helmet mounted target designator
steers radar and missile seekers for early target acquisition (during a
'close-in' air-to-air engagement with a Vympel R-73 missile, currently the best
dog-fight' missile in the world). Laser guided bombs and TV guided missiles,
require a pilot to initially 'zero-in' the laser designator or missile-mounted
TV camera, on the ground target. Considerable engineering effort and expertise
is necessary to achieve avionics-weapon integration and to prove the integration
by live trials. Success here means FOC. Depending on what is stated in the
(updated) ASR, it could take two years and around 1,500 hours of flight testing
to move from IOC to FOC.
There will he setbacks in the flight development phase. All major engineering
projects suffer them e.g. India's first two SLVs failed disastrously. The Prime
Minister was present at the first launch at Sriharikota; so was this author.
Disappointment was everywhere, but no recrimination; only determination to get
it right. Loss of a demonstrator aircraft or prototype could take place; lives
could be lost, leading to questions/debate. Therefore, let the recent
transparency in tile program continue, even intensify; let it be honest, 2010 is
not far, for a first' program of this magnitude and complexity.
The
LCA
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