Adam Parker
Introduction: Why Take Edwards
Seriously?
As we discuss and dialogue regarding the ethical theories of various writers and philosophers, we may find within ourselves a tendency to look with a less serious demeanor upon those who are considered Christian or who are among the great heritage of the philosophers of the church. In some cases, such skepticism is justified, but in the case of Jonathan Edwards, to ignore his ethical theory is to dismiss a serious contender amongst the various ethical theories of the nineteenth century. Consider this quote from John Piper:
Edwards
is a giant intellectually and worked as hard as anyone has, probably, to solve
some of the hardest theological problems. To make it your aim to understand
Jonathan Edwards is to set one of the highest and most fruitful theological
goals possible. I have plodded along in pursuit of this goal for years and the
effort has been rewarded one hundred-fold in profundity of theological,
ethical, psychological insight. But more than that, Edwards has ushered me
closer into the presence of God than any other writer has. He has done this by
depicting God in a way so authentic and so powerful that to read and understand
is to experience the Reality beyond the description. Edwards has been there
where few of us ever get to go in this life and he has sought and found words
that, for me at least, not only inform but transport. Penetrating logic and
spiritual responses of the affections mingle in Edwards like branch and fruit,
fire and heat, pain and weeping.
There was far more to Edwards’ writings than simply the hellfire and brimstone of “Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God.” He was also a philosopher, (yes) a pastor, an ethicist, and an incredible theologian. Because of this, we would be sorely amiss to ignore Edwards’ own contribution to Ethics, namely The Nature of True Virtue. Given the time constraints allotted for lecture and discussion, we will only be able to scratch the surface of Edwards’ thought. Since I think it is important to understand the basis, or foundation of Edwards’ ethic, we will briefly explore Edwards’ reasoning in the first two chapters of his writing.
I think it would be fair to characterize the Edwardsian ethic as an “ethic of beauty.” This concept of beauty is not only present in his ethics, but in his philosophy, and it is worthwhile to attempt to know what he means by beauty. He gives beauty a definition in two parts: particular beauty, and general beauty. Particular beauty is “that by which a thing appears beautiful when considered only with regard to its connexion with, and tendency to, some particular things within a limited, and as it were a private sphere.” General beauty is “that by which a thing appears beautiful when viewed most perfectly, comprehensively, and universally, with regard to all its tendencies, and its connexion with everything to which it stands related” (122).
He begins by immediately stating the doctrine he is about to prove: “True virtue essentially consists in benevolence to being in general” (122). Edwards always begins his writing by defining his terms. These terms are important because they are the foundation of the foundation of Edwards’ ethic. In the definition, he defines the two parts of his definition of true virtue: benevolence and being in general. Benevolence is a disposition of love, and being in general is “the great system of universal existence.” In Edwards’ thinking, a love for particular beings does not necessarily mean that one has true virtue, but if one has true virtue, then they will necessarily have love for particular beings.
Edwards then sets forth two types of ways in which love may manifest itself: Love of benevolence is “that affection or propensity of the heart to any being, which causes it to incline to its well being, or disposes it to desire and take pleasure in its happiness.” This is a love which is motivated only by a desire to dispense happiness to the chosen object of affection. Love of complacencies is a “delight in a being for its beauty.” Though the love of benevolence is not motivated, necessarily, by anything beautiful in the object of affection, the love of complacence specifically delights in a thing for its beauty. I can never love my wife entirely from benevolence, for there are things about here which I love and delight in. They motivate me to give her happiness, and thus, I exercise a love of benevolence, but that benevolence is motivated by my love of complacence.
Edwards ends this section of definitions by stating that God’s love is one of benevolence, because his delight in us has love is its first motive. Furthermore, there is nothing lovely in us for God to take delight in which He has not first placed there, and that action itself is even motivated, not by our beauty, but by His benevolence. Thus, God is benevolently loving and non-complacent.
Why does virtue not consist in gratitude? Because gratitude, by its definition, “supposes a benevolence prior to gratitude, which is the cause of gratitude. The first benevolence cannot be gratitude.” Now that these definitions have been thus reached, Edwards pauses, looks back on what he has shown so far, and offers a modification of his definition of true virtue. He now says that “true virtue consists, not in love to any particular beings, because of their virtue or beauty, nor in gratitude, because they love us; but in a propensity and union of heart to being simply considered; exciting absolute benevolence to being in general.” For Edwards, true virtue has two aspects: being and benevolence. From this, Edwards makes a crucial statement: “When anyone under the influence of general benevolence, sees another being possessed of the like general benevolence, this attaches his heart to him, and draws forth greater love to him.” If I am possessed of true benevolence and meet another who is also possessed of true benevolence, I will unavoidably be drawn to that purely loving individual who is truly virtuous. “He that has a simple and pure will…must love that temper in others” (124). This means that where I find maximum benevolence, and maximum being, there I will find true virtue.
The opposite of this is also true. A being who is destitute of virtue will also love and long for that which is the opposite of virtuous and, by definition, evil. Why is this? “For a being, destitute of benevolence, should love benevolence to being in general, it would prize and seek that for which it had no value.” Edwards reminds us before proceeding that “it is impossible that anyone should truly relish this beauty…if he has not this temper himself.”
Chapter
II: Showing how love, wherein true virtue consists, respects the Divine Being
and created beings.
Edwards gives us an immediate application of this teaching. This next conclusion he presents does not usurp or supercede the previously stated definition of true virtue as “benevolence toward being in general” but instead clarifies (or more properly, offers us an insight into the implications of the previously constructed argument).
“From what has been said, it is evident that the true virtue must chiefly consist in LOVE TO GOD; the Being of beings, infinitely the greatest and best” (125). As is Edwards’ style, he will now explain how he gets to this conclusion, followed by the implications of this implication.
First of all, we must remember that true virtue has two grounds: benevolence and being. First of all, God is maximally benevolent: “For God is infinitely the greatest Being, so he is allowed to be infinitely the most beautiful and excellent: and all the beauty to be found throughout the whole creation, is but the reflection of the diffused beams of that Being who has an infinite fullness of brightness and glory.” Here we see that God is the most benevolent of all beings.
Second of all, God possesses the most being: “God has infinitely the greatest share of existence. So that all other being, even the whole universe, is as nothing in comparison to the Divine Being.” Edwards’ conclusion of this implication is that
he that has true virtue must necessarily have a supreme love to God, both of benevolence and complacence. And all true virtue must radically and essentially consist in this. Because God is not only infinitely greater and more excellent than all other being, but he is the head of the universal system of existence; the foundation and fountain of all being and all beauty; from whom all is perfectly derived, and on whom all is most absolutely and perfectly dependent; of whom and through whom and to whom is all being and all perfection; and whose being and beauty are, as it were, the sum and comprehension of all existence and excellence: much more than the sun is the fountain and summary comprehension of all the light and brightness of the day.”
Edwards anticipates a possible objection: “We should love our fellow creatures and not God, because our goodness does not extend to God and we cannot be profitable to Him.” Edwards answers twofold: First, “If [God] be above any need of us…it will dispose us to rejoice in His prosperity.” This is a brilliant answer, as Edwards’ ethic as set forth thus far is really concerned with man and how he should act, not with how man may benefit God.
His second answer is that “Though we are not able to give anything to God, we may be the instruments of promoting his glory in which He takes true and proper delight.” Then, Edwards directs his readers to his writing entitled The End for Which God Created the World, where he proves from both philosophy and then heavily from Scripture that God’s own glory is the reason why He created the world. Here he also answers this argument by saying that God’s creation for His own glory does not represent a deficiency, but that rather, creation overflows from God’s abundance, just like water overflows from a fountain, not out of a lack but out of an abundance.
Criticism of the Ethics of his
Time:
Edwards finds an inconsistency in some of the modern ethicists, namely that “they do not wholly exclude a regard to the Deity out of their schemes of morality, but yet mention it so slightly, that they leave me room and reason to suspect they esteem it a less important and subordinate part of true morality; and insist on benevolence to the created system” (126). In other words, by his estimation, the philosophers of Edwards’ day paid mere lip-service to God and yet really made God no part of their ethical theory. He offers many criticisms, but for our purposes I will mention three of his criticisms:
1. Such a system of independence from general being sets one as an enemy against the public.
2. Such a system of independence from general being has a tendency to enmity against being in general.
3. Such a system would actually become an opposition to being in general, for to regard oneself as higher than (for example) one’s prince is to commit treason.
His conclusion of the criticisms he offers is that “no affection limited to any private system, not depending on nor subordinate to being in general, can be of the nature of true virtue.”
Implications
for God:
Edwards concludes that just as we, finite humans, must have a benevolent love for God, the greatest of all beings, so God must have himself as the supreme object of his affection. He states, “The virtue of the divine mind must consist primarily in love to himself, or in the mutual love and friendship which subsists eternally and necessarily between the several persons in the Godhead, or that infinitely strong propensity there is in these divine persons one to another” (127).
Now, here comes a statement that may shock some of us modern evangelicals who think that we are the center of God’s world: “It will also follow, from the foregoing things, that God’s goodness and love to created beings, is derived from and subordinate to his love to himself.” God naturally and properly must love himself and regard himself as more important than mortal men! So, we see, that not only do men have a virtue ethic, but that there is also a virtue ethic for God: love of self.
Next, Edwards states that God’s “supreme, governing, and ultimate end” is his own glory. This is the reason for which God created, and it is the goal in all events of history. Every event tends towards this goal. What does this “glory” consist of? His answer: “The expression of God’s perfections in their proper effects, - the manifestation of God’s glory to created understandings, - the communication of the infinite fullness of God to the creature, - the creature’s highest esteem of God, love to, and joy in him, - and in the proper exercise and expressions of these.”
Does this precedence of God’s glory have implications for us as humans? Does this mean that we are not important, that we are disposable, that we are only means to an end? Edwards does not think so. His answer is essentially that God, by seeking his own glory and his own love of Himself is actually seeking the good of us as his creatures, because to know and pursue God’s glory is the most pleasing and joyful thing that we can ever do. Thus, by Edwards’ estimate, God can seek his own glory as the end of creation and also give us our greatest and most fulfilling pleasures of having Him as well! (Christian Hedonism)
Conclusion
Edwards concludes chapter two of The Nature of True Virtue by commenting on the inadequacy of the modern secular ethic:
Those schemes of religion or moral philosophy, which have not a supreme regard to God, and love to him, laid as the foundation, are not true schemes of philosophy, but are fundamentally and essentially defective, and there is nothing of the nature of true virtue or religion in them. And it may be asserted in general, that nothing is of the nature of true virtue, in which God is not the first and the last; or which, with regard to their exercises in general, have not their first foundation and source in apprehensions of God’s supreme dignity and glory, and in answerable esteem and love of him, and have not respect to God as the supreme end.
For Jonathan Edwards, God is the most important person, the greatest person, the most beautiful person, and the most complete person. He is the only person who is worthy of our worship, and to do anything less (or to construct an ethic which does not hold a supreme regard to Him) is to act inconsistently with the nature of true virtue.