Argument for the
Freedom of the Will
And His
Treatment of the Fall of Man
By Adam Parker
10-27-03
At a Ligonier conference several years ago, I sat in the audience and listened attentively as R.C. Sproul was asked by an audience member, “If you could ask God one question, what would you ask Him?” He almost immediately replied, “I would ask Him how it was possible for Adam to fall.” Dumbfounded, the high school student that I was, I didn’t see any problem with this question: “It is because of free-will!” I said to myself. Though Calvinistic, I believed that at the very least, Adam had free will before the Fall.
He then gave an explanation of Jonathan Edwards’ teaching that “a person always acts according to their strongest desire at the given moment.” Coupled with this teaching, he showed the immense problem, which arises when we consider how the Fall of man could have even happened in the first place.
When one begins to consider the Fall of man and the many issues which are brought up because of it, the very complexity of it can at time be frustrating. However, if one is willing to forego the easy road in favor of an educated and philosophically rewarding journey, this study can draw the reader/theologian into other aspects of the theology of Edwards which one never considered important.
My own study on this issue caused me to consider many things, including: the nature of sin, necessity and its relation to judgments of vice or virtue, the overpowering sovereignty of God, and also God’s desire for His own glory. Such issues are complex, but not impossible to conceive of. If the scriptures were given to us, and they are accurate, then they can take us far deeper than the greatest philosopher would ever dare to go. When you couple theology with a good philosopher, the density and weight of this subject can be dealt with in an understandable and conceptual way.
When taking a tour of say, a factory, you may find out more about your guide than you might about the place which you are being shown. I think this is definitely the case with Jonathan Edwards and this aspect of his theology. What we find is a man who is not content to let sleeping dogs lie, or to simply allow the mystery to remain so. Instead we find a philosopher and theologian who definitely believed in the possibility of knowing truth. In some cases however, such daring can prove to be more hindrance than help.
It is to this fascinating issue and also to the absolutely brilliant mind of Jonathan Edwards that we turn our attention as we seek to understand Edwards’ view of the will and also how that relates to the Fall of man and God’s sovereignty.
Edwards was extraordinary. By many estimates, he was the most acute early American
philosopher and the most brilliant of all American theologians. At least three of his many works – Religious
Affections, Freedom of the Will, and The Nature of True Virtue – stand as
masterpieces in the larger history of Christian literature. The appeal of his thought endures. Every year several books and scores of
academic articles, reviews, and dissertations appear about him.[1]
Thus begins George Marsden’s biography of Edwards. It has been said by some that Jonathan Edwards’ book The Freedom of the Will is the greatest philosophical writing in all of American history. Others have declared that this philosophical writing alone prevented the growth of Armenianism in the American colonies by a hundred years. Edwards himself was so confident of the truth and success of his writings that he declared at the end of the book that he had conclusively shown the Armenian position on free will and its necessity for moral agency, virtue and vice, reward and punishment, praise and blame was inconsistent and thus, illogical to hold to.[2] In years following, (to my knowledge) no one was able to successfully refute the arguments contained in Edwards’ treatise. Marsden says “its power…was a significant factor in the intellectual resilience and influence of Calvinism in America well into the nineteenth century.”[3]
Edwards’ goal in writing the book was to prove that it is inconsistent for free will as the Armenians defined it to be necessary in order for humans to be held responsible for the decisions they make. The Armenian position on the will was that the will is free if it is able to choose A and also B (“A” being to please God; “B” being to please self). In this schema, the desires may be towards sin, but the will is not ruled by the desires, thus, a person, though bent towards sin, may still be able to choose to not sin. The will is seen as neutral or unbiased.[4] Edwards stressed that according to the Armenian scheme this is the only way that a person can be held responsible for their sin or rewarded for their good. Refuting this teaching prompted Edwards to make the complete title of his book A Careful and Strict Inquiry into the Modern Prevailing Notions of that Freedom of Will, Which is Supposed to be Essential to Moral Agency, Virtue and Vice, Reward and Punishment, Praise and Blame. In this book, to use the language of the previous statements, Edwards argues that given a choice between A and B, a person is free if he is never prevented from choosing whichever of the two he so desires.
Edwards’ overall position essentially says that even though human beings are necessarily determined towards evil and wickedness (because of the Fall), they are still free to perform those evil actions, which necessarily follow from their evil nature. In fact, Edwards was emphatic to say that man truly is free, for nothing prevents him from doing what he wills to do at any given moment! Whereas Luther’s own treatment of the subject was more negative in nature, bearing the title Bondage of the Will, Edwards chose a positive assertion for his title, Freedom of the Will.
First, Edwards defined the will as “That by which the mind chooses any thing. The faculty of the Will is that power, or principle of mind, by which it is capable of choosing: an act of the Will is the same as an act of choosing or choice.”[5]
Second, it is important that we observe Edwards’ definition of necessity. Edwards actually devotes two whole sections of Freedom to the discussion of necessity, impossibility, inability, and contingence. Because of this extensive discussion, and for the sake of the simplicity to which I aim in this paper, we will define necessity by Edwards’ simple statement that, “A thing is said to be necessary, when we cannot help it, let us do what we will.”[6]
Finally (for the purposes of this writing), Edwards defined determination of the will. He says, “It is that motive, which as it stands in the view of the mind, is the strongest, that determines the Will.”[7] He clarifies this further on the next page when he says, “The Will always is, as the greatest apparent good is.” Or, as he states elsewhere, “A man never, in any instance, wills any thing contrary to his desires, or desires anything contrary to his will.”[8] In other words, man always acts according to his strongest motives or desires. In many respects, this sentence, found in the first section of his book, is the “grand doctrine” of his writing on the will.
The one objection which is commonly raised in discussions on this argument of Edwards’ is the example of a robber. If a robber puts a loaded gun to an individual’s head, it may be argued that that person’s giving his money to the robber is against his desires. This argument is fallible, however, because if the example is considered, the person’s options are limited to two: either (1) surrender his money to the robber, or (2) be shot and killed. Though the person’s options are not desirable, the person will pick whichever of the two options he finds most desirable, from the choices available. This is why Edwards says a person always chooses what he finds most desirable at the given moment.
This argument is also the center of his assertion that man indeed has free will, in that he is never prevented from doing as his desires dictate. Certainly, even God’s own will is a free will in this sense, because, Edwards argued, if God had free will in the sense that Armenians asserted it was necessary for virtue or vice, then it would be possible for God to sin. He argued that God’s will is not “indifferent” or “neutral” as the Armenians argued it must be, but that God’s will is indeed righteous, good, and holy, and that necessarily. Here is the crux of the problem for the Armenians: if the Armenian say, “well God is not necessarily good,” then they are no longer speaking of the God of the Bible. On the contrary, they must believe that God is necessarily good. If this is the case that God is necessarily good, then may we even regard Him as righteous and holy, since he has not decided to be so of an indifferent or neutral will?[9] The same question may be leveled at the Armenian with regard to Jesus Christ in his humanity. Since he was necessarily good, ought we to still worship him as perfect Lord and savior since he was (and is) morally unable to be evil?[10] All that Edwards is showing here is that it is totally reasonable to consider a being to be good or evil, even if that being’s desires are of necessity one or the other. Moral inability in a human being does not excuse the human from judgment for his sin. The conclusion of this matter is that human beings are in fact, totally depraved, and yet, they are free to be depraved.
These two arguments in and of themselves ought to be enough to show that a necessity of sin does not excuse the sinner in the same way that God’s perfect nature does not prevent us from regarding Him as perfect and holy, even though He is not neutral. Quite effectively, Edwards argues that no one can be neutral, because a neutral will does not make decisions.[11] A car in neutral never moves, and a will in neutral has ceased to make decisions. The other crucial point, which we need to see Edwards is deriving from this, is that no event can happen without a cause. “What is not necessary in itself, must have a Cause.”[12] By Edwards’ estimation, this law must apply just as much to the will as it does to science:
It is indeed repugnant to reason, to suppose that an act of the Will
should come into existence without a Cause, as to suppose the human soul, or an
angel, or the globe of the earth, or the whole universe, should come into
existence without a cause. And if we
allow that such a sort of effect as Volition may come to pass without a Cause,
how do we know but that many other sorts of effects may do so too?[13]
So now, we see from Edwards’ arguments that everything has a cause, and the will is no different than every other observed thing in the universe in this respect. If we make an exception with the will and maintain that it is unaffected from without, that it is neutral, then we call into question other instances where the law of cause-and-effect is utilized. The importance of cause-and-effect to Edwards’ argument is this: our wills must be moved by something within us, some kind of motivation or desire, which is open to outside influence as well. This is always the case. Since it is a fact that the will cannot make decisions completely free of the desires or motives, then to argue that the will is free in a neutral sense is preposterous. Indeed, the will is always at the mercy of the individual and that individual’s desires. Therefore, free will as the Armenians define it is not necessary to someone being judged virtuous or evil. In fact, Edwards has shown that such a belief is impossible for any being who is to make decisions. Such a view is inconsistent with itself.
My purpose in outlining Edwards’ Freedom of the Will is to provide an accurate background for the reader, as Edwards’ view of the Fall is linked very closely with the previous arguments. What I have presented above is not an exhaustive view of Edwards’ argument. In fact, I have chosen to omit much of his arguments and also the extensions of his arguments with regard to God’s sovereignty and its relation to the will.
Many in Edwards’ time taught that Original Sin could not be true, because if we inherited the sinful nature, yet had not acted to bring that sinful nature upon ourselves, then humans could not be held responsible for their actions since it was the actions of another, namely Adam, which in actuality have caused us to do as we do.
In a sense, Edwards responded to this objection in two parts. The first part was his Freedom of the Will which was published in 1754. Four years later, he released his next book which was closely tied to this, Original Sin. In this book, Edwards implements the doctrines which he proves in Freedom to show that though God is sovereign, He is not the author of sin.[14] Fascinatingly, Edwards asserts the absolute truth and perfections of his Freedom of the Will to such a degree that he actually said that if the scriptures did not teach what his book said, he would call their validity into question.[15] This is how convinced he was of the truths of Freedom of the Will. On the other hand, Original Sin was seen on Edwards’ part as a quite humble attempt to offer an explanation of the challenges presented by the doctrine, subject to his readers’ approval.[16]
Upon an examination of Original Sin, we find in Part IV, Edwards devotes all of Chapter II to the objection “against the doctrine of Native corruption, that to suppose men receive their first existence in sin, is to make Him who is the Author of their being, the author of their depravity.”[17]
First, Edwards says, his opponent makes the assumption that if Edwards is correct, then God is the author of sin in a positive sense. To this, Edwards offers his reply:
In order to account for a
sinful corruption of nature, yea , a total native depravity of the heart of
man, there is not the least need of supposing any evil quality, infused,
implanted, or wrought into the nature of man, by any positive
cause, or influence whatsoever, either from God, or the creature.[18]
Edwards is about to enter into a defense based upon this statement right here. Everything that follows is an effort to support his (indeed Biblical) assertion that God cannot be seen as the author of sin.
When God made man at first,
he implanted in him two kinds of principles.
There was an inferior kind, which may be called natural, being
the principles of mere human nature; such as self-love, with those natural
appetites and passions, which belong to the nature of man, in which his love to
his own liberty, honour, and pleasure, were exercised: these, when alone, and
left to themselves, are what the Scriptures sometimes call flesh.[19]
Edwards’ concept first states that this principle or ability inhabited unfallen man. To some readers this may not be at all different from Augustine’s posse peccare. Although I am tempted to elaborate and speak more on this principle, I will complete Edwards’ argument, first.
Besides these, there were superior
principles that were spiritual, holy, and divine, summarily comprehended in
divine love; wherein consisted the spiritual image of God, and man’s
righteousness and true holiness; which are called in Scripture the divine
nature.
Now we see the second half of the principles which Edwards proposes God placed into man as initially created. These two principles, according to Edwards, were inseparably connected with mere human nature; thus, Spirit and Flesh were both present within man at the beginning of creation.
These principles may, in
some sense, be called supernatural, being such as are above those
principles that are essentially implied in, or necessarily resulting from, and
inseparably connected with, mere human nature; and being such as
immediately depend on man’s union and communion with God, or divine
communications and influence of God’s Spirit: which though withdrawn, and man’s
nature forsaken of these principles, human nature would be human nature
still… These [spiritual] principles
were given to possess the throne, and maintain an absolute dominion in the
heart; the [flesh] to be wholly subordinate and subservient. And while things continued thus, all was in
excellent order, peace, and beautiful harmony, and in a proper and perfect
state.
Next, we see how Edwards conceptualizes the spiritual house of the unfallen human. Essentially, Edwards sees the man’s heart as a throne, with either Spirit or Flesh ruling. In unfallen man, the Spirit ruled and all was at peace. Here, Edwards offers us no bridge between this last sentence and the next:
When man sinned and broke
God’s covenant, and fell under his curse, these superior principles left his
heart: for indeed God then left him; that communion with God on which these
principles depended, entirely ceased; the Holy Spirit, that divine inhabitant,
forsook the house.
So we see that in Original Sin, Edwards understood man in the way that was thus described, but now a storm of questions rolls forth: Did God abandon Adam and thus bring about the fall? How could Adam, a man with God on the throne, of himself, dethrone God? If God created Adam with the flesh in his heart, would that place the blame squarely on God for Adam’s Fall? These questions which we have for Edwards will all be answered in due time, but it is important for us first to listen to the things Edwards says about this subject elsewhere first, so that we can have a complete picture of what is going on in the conception he is drawing for us.
Adam Needed God’s Grace
In Miscellany 501, Edwards offers this thought, with regard to the Fall of Man:
Adam had sufficient
assistance of God always present with him, to have enabled him to have obeyed,
if he had used his natural abilities in endeavoring it; though the assistance
was not such as it would have been after his confirmation, to render it
impossible for him to sin. Man might be
deceived, so that he should not be disposed to use his endeavors to persevere;
but if he did use his endeavors, there was sufficient assistance always with
him to persevere.[20]
The aspect of Edwards’ statement here which bears the need for examination is his teaching that Adam always had “sufficient grace.” In other words, Adam’s original composition of Flesh subservient to Spirit, which was on the throne, was always dependent upon God’s grace to keep the Spiritual aspect upon the throne. Upon consideration, however, we see that if in fact, this grace from God was sufficient as Edwards claims, then Adam should never have fallen.
Edwards’ theology does, in one respect, consider God the Author of sin, but only in a negative sense. This teaching that God can be seen as the negative cause of sin in fallen man is still within the bounds of Calvinist orthodoxy, and many do hold such a view. In this respect, such a teaching is not abnormal. What he means by “negative cause” is that in fallen man, sin is so prevalent that whenever human beings do “good” or things that are non-self centered, that those good things come from God. In order for God to be considered the negative cause of sin, all He has to do is remove His gracious restraints and then the person will sin, completely separate from the positive influence of God. This is seen as an act of justice on God’s part, since the person, when good, is good only by God’s grace, and when they sin, they are doing what they would have done in the first place. Observe in one of Edwards’ unpublished sermons:
All the corruption has the
same spring and therefore if there be in the heart of men the spring of one
sort of wickedness there must be of all.
The cause of corruption is negative.
It is the absence or removal of the grace of God or of a spirit of love
to God leaving natural principles to themselves… There is no love to God at all
in the heart of man, and therefore it will follow that there is all the
corruption in the heart of man that the absence of this principle can be the
cause of natural principles of self love, a love of pleasure and honor and
hatred of pain, etc. are the same in all.[21]
Natural principles, by nature, are inherent. An inherent principle in unfallen man of natural and sinful desires means that man as created – by Edwards’ own statement – was self-loving. As Gerstner points out, when Edwards refers to “the imperfection which properly belongs to a creature, as such,”[22] the fatalism is inescapable.[23]
Whereas Augustine taught that Adam was created posse peccare (with a potential to sin) and posse non peccare(a potential to not sin), Edwards is saying that man was created unable to stand on his own moral two feet. Thus, Edwards’ Adam is only posse peccare. Now, Edwards has shown that God must overcome this imperfection, but if God does overcome this inherent imperfection in Adam, and God’s sufficient grace is sufficient, then if God continued to provided this grace, then the Fall never should have occurred.
But, should it nevertheless be said, that if God,
when he had made man, might so order his circumstances, that from these,
together with his withholding further assistance and divine influence,
his sin would infallibly follow, why might not God as well have made man with a
fixed prevailing principle of sin in his heart?[24]
It is in response to this question that Edwards states that if sin did come into the world, “it should arise from the imperfection which properly belongs to a creature, as such, and should appear so to do, that it might appear not to be from God as the efficient or fountain.” Edwards does not say that God is the positive cause of Adam’s Fall, but as the reader can now see, he does teach that God negatively caused the Fall by the just withdrawl of His Spirit.
Consider this: If God made man so that man needed God’s Spirit to be holy and yet God withdrew His Spirit (whether He did this sovereignly is of little consequence now), but then God harshly judges, curses, and condemns man to death and eternal suffering, then it seems that God would be unjust to judge man for an act of disobedience that could have been prevented, had God – the good and gracious God – continued to uphold Adam in a state of holiness. This is the crux and the hole, which Edwards has dug for himself.
Let’s summarize: As long as Adam used his natural abilities, God’s sufficient grace would always be sufficient. Adam naturally speaking was imperfect and always needed God’s assistance to keep from falling. However, Edwards says that God did not owe it to Adam the assistance He was providing, and so, sovereignly withdrew His Spirit from Adam, and thus the Fall infallibly followed God’s sovereign withdrawl. It would seem that Edwards’ mistake in all of this is that he presupposes fallen man, before the Fall. He presupposes that the way in which God relates to us, as fallen people must have been the same when he dealt with our parents, Adam and Eve. Instead, as we see in this next quote, Edwards’ statement which bears each reader’s own judgment is that a creature by virtue of his “creature-ness” is naturally imperfect.
It was meet, if sin did come into existence, and
appear in the world, it should arise from the imperfection which properly
belongs to a creature, as such, as should appear so to do, that it might appear
not to be from God as the efficient or fountain. But this could not have been, if man had been made at first with
sin in his heart; nor unless the abiding principle and habit of sin were first
introduced by an evil act of the creature, it would not have been so visible,
that it did not arise from God as the positive cause, and real source of it. –
But it would require room that can’t be here allowed fully to consider all the
difficulties which have been stated, concerning the first entrance of sin into
the world.[25]
Gerstner reminds us of Foster’s summary of this: “God is that author of the system, man of the sin.”[26] Gerstner, however, says, “In truth this view amounts to: ‘God is that author of the sinful man; sinful man is the author of sin.’”[27] Did Edwards understand the implications of the statements he was making? John Gerstner – according to R.C. Sproul the greatest Edwards scholar of the twentieth century – says that he did, but only in part. Gerstner writes:
When I first read this
paragraph many years ago it froze my blood.
I could not believe it; that is, I could not believe that Edwards meant
it or thought of its implications. By
now I have come to the sad but inescapable conclusion that he knew what he was
writing and meant it as stated. This I
conclude although I do not believe that Edwards ever recognized that this
doctrine implies the purest conceivable form of fatalism, and a total
abandonment of the Christian religion, as understood by almost the entire
catholic tradition, including himself, through all the ages of the
Church’s history, and in all the pages of Edwards’ most biblically oriented
writing![28]
IV.
An Analysis of the Problem of the Fall
How Did
the Reformers Handle It?
Many Biblical Christians have considered and faced down the implications of the Fall and the sovereignty of God. Those who are of the same school of thought as Edwards, so far as his conception of the freedom of the will and also of God’s sovereignty, may have been led to consider in their own minds the issues that Edwards tackled, but very few have ever chosen to tackle the problem so directly as he did.
When Calvin chose to comment on Genesis chapter three and its implications so far as the Fall and God’s decreeing the Fall, Calvin would go no farther than to say that it must have been God’s will that the Fall occur, or else it would not have occurred.[29] Anything beyond what we have been told, he said, is dangerous. Now, an Armenian who reads in Calvin’s commentary on the Fall that it indeed was God’s will for man to fall will not find his assessment conservative at all, but to someone with a working and comprehensive knowledge of reformed doctrine will see that Calvin’s own thoughts on the subject are quite standard.
Luther, likewise, took a very conservative and safe stance, compared to the daring of Edwards. “People who are not wary allow themselves to be drawn away from the Word into dangerous discussions. Because they are not satisfied with the Word, they ask: ‘Why and wherefore do these things happen thus?’”[30]
Beza went just as far as Calvin and taught that “the Fall was both wonderful and necessary.”[31] In his writings in this regard, Beza merely pointed out that since everything tends towards God’s glory, then even the Fall brought God glory, and more-so than if the Fall had not occurred. In many respects, what Edwards was doing was explaining how these things that Calvin and Beza taught (either explicitly or implicitly) could actually come to pass.
Emmonism
Though some readers may find it surprising, Edwards was not the most outspoken theologian on this matter, though many had implied what he taught. According to both Berkhof[32] and also Gerstner,[33] the only other theologian to speak so boldly with regard to the Fall was Nathanael Emmons. However, to put him in the same theological heritage may be fair but to say that their theologies agreed would be a vast overstatement. Emmons differed dramatically from Edwards by saying that sin was positively created in Adam. His somewhat Berkleyan influences fostered his rejection of original sin in favor of his belief that God produces sin in all people, whenever they sin. Emmons also taught that infants who die before becoming moral agents are annihilated. He also taught that “believers, at the time of their justification, are only partially and conditionally forgiven.” In its review of Emmons’ complete works, the Princeton Review commented, “Such is Emmonism To say that it is not Calvinism, is only to say that black is not white, or that preposterous and exorbitant absurdity is not scriptural wisdom.”[34] The Calvinist author of this article goes on to say that Emmons’ theology is “evil and only evil.”
Needless to say, whereas Edwards staunchly defended God’s holiness and inability to sin or to positively cause sin (which is dramatically different from negatively causing sin), Emmons produces unwarranted conclusions, and supports them by broad, unscriptural assertions. Whereas Edwards places the blame for our sinfulness squarely upon our own shoulders, Emmons never hesitated to say that we are at every moment volitionally determined by God in a positive sense. For Edwards, though he attempted to offer a most rational explanation for the Fall, logically following Biblical truths and sound reason, Emmons stripped the Fall of all mystery and laid open what for most has been nothing more than a sneaking suspicion.
So on one end of the spectrum, you have Emmons who was not afraid to be bold and accuse God of sin. On the other end of the spectrum, you have the classic Reformers who believed it dangerous to plum the depths of God’s secrets and mysteries. Indeed, they knew what the abyss they were looking into probably contained, but, constrained by Biblical wisdom, chose to keep their assertions within the realm of absolute truth and scripture. Emmons, however says that “[t]hey looked over the brink, but they beheld an abyss and they returned. They distrusted the sounding line, when its lead sank into the depths of divinity, and ceased to read off the fathoms…”[35] This heresy was utterly rejected by nearly all New England theologians, and now Emmonism is a practically extinct theology, leaving little behind, save the works of its somewhat eccentric creator.
The occurrence of Emmonism is in the least fascinating, however, because it showed indeed the darkness that plumbing the depths of God’s hidden nature could bring about. It seems that there was never a darker picture of God drawn than what we see in Emmons’ theology. If anyone so desires to go to the length that Emmons did, to assert that God positively causes sin, one may get drawn away “up, into God,” but in order to do so, they must release their hold on the scriptures, which prevent such things from happening. The Scriptures are our only safe foundation and anchor.
Concluding
Thoughts on Edwards’ Endeavor
Some may find it hard to understand the restless intellect of a brilliant theologian. I must confess that I myself have at times decided that I cannot fully comprehend many theological issues. The mystery of the trinity, the divine/human nature of Christ, and yes, the Fall, are just some of the issues that, though possible to understand, are extremely difficult to comprehend. And thus it is with many theologians who, when they look at the issue of the Fall, see immense difficulty. Once again: How could a righteous and holy Adam, who did not possess an indifferent will, but one that was necessarily good, come to rebel against God and against his better judgment? This is not a question that is unique to Calvinists, but is one that Armenians must answer as well. It does not, of necessity, represent a crux in the Calvinist worldview, for a worldview is not constructed upon conclusions, but upon evidence and facts. It would seem that the only way for this issue to in fact, not be an issue for the Armenian is if they can find a way to combat Edwards’ arguments against a neutral will. If such arguments cannot be answered, then the problem of the Fall is a problem for everyone.
It would seem that the question of the Fall represents something else. There are some things we can know about the Fall, for example, who was involved, were Adam and Eve righteous before the Fall, what was forbidden, what was the result of that disobedience, and whether or not the Fall was decreed by God. But there are also some things that elude us, as regards the mystery of the Fall, and it seems that such issues must be left where they are: issues we cannot understand, this side of Heaven. Certainly we can wrestle with the difficult questions, we can enjoy discussions and debates on such issues, but it would seem that if even the most brilliant Christian minds have found such discussion unfruitful, then how can we who stand upon their mighty shoulders, believe ourselves any better?
Our appreciation of Edwards’ writing in Freedom of the Will must be very great. It is brilliant, and, some have argued, one of the greatest apologies for the Calvinist view of the will ever composed. In addition, his companion work, Original Sin is a crucial writing in which Edwards defended (and perhaps still defends) the orthodox view of sin against the onslaught of rationalism over scripture in his own day.
I end with a quote from John Gerstner’s Mini Theology of Edwards, where he comments that the problem of the Fall became to Edwards an obsession which needed resolving.
As did Noah, Edwards became
“drunk” on one occasion in spite of a life of exceptional holiness. And just as in the case of Noah, there was
undoubtedly powerful temptation; so here the great intellectual theologian
became intoxicated with the greatest theological problem in the entire Word of
God.
If we ordinary Christians
have not been overcome, it is because we have not felt as keenly the most
irresistible temptation to solve the unsolvable. We have been spared not because we are better, but because it has
been easier for us to realize that the problem is beyond us.[36]
[1] Marsden, George M. Jonathan Edwards: A Life. (Yale University, 2003) Pg. 1
[2] Edwards, Jonathan. The Works of Jonathan Edwards (Banner of Truth Trust, 1976) Volume 1, Pg. 41
[3] Marsden Pg. 446
[4] Works Pg. 21
[5] Works Pg. 4
[6] Works Pg. 8
[7] Works Pg. 5
[8] Ibid.
[9] Works Pg. 41
[10] Works Pg. 42
[11] Works Pg. 15
[12] Works Pg. 16
[13] Works Pg. 17
[14] The reader may notice, if he is familiar with Edwards’ writings that I have described Edwards’ goal in Original Sin very acutely when in fact, Edwards had quite obtuse goals in his writing. These other goals included giving an actual defense for the doctrine of original sin, proving how sin can be imputed from Adam to his descendants, and also answering direct objections from Dr. John Taylor, a decidedly anti-Calvinist writer from England.
[15] Works Pg. 89. The historical context of this quote may be needed. Apparently, the Armenian writers of Edwards’ day were fond of speaking very strongly against Calvinism by saying that if the Bible was found to teach such theology, then it would call the power of the scriptures into question. Edwards did not truly call scripture into question, as much as he used a play on words to turn their own statement around on them.
[16] Works Pg. 233
[17] Works Pg. 217
[18] Ibid.
[19] Works Pg. 217-218
[20] Edwards, Jonathan The “Miscellanies” (Entry Nos. 501-832) Ed. Ava Chamberlain (Yale University Press, 2000). Pg. 51
[21] Unpublished MS sermon on Romans 7:14; Quoted in Gerstner, John H. The Rational and Biblical Theology of Jonathan Edwards 3 Vol. (Ligonier Ministries, 1992) Vol. 2, Pg. 313 [my emphasis]
[22] Works Pg. 81
[23] Gerstner Pg. 314
[24] Works Pg. 81
[25] Ibid.
[26] Foster, Genetic History of New England Theology, Pg. 79
[27] Gerstner Pg. 318
[28] Gerstner Pg. 321-322
[29] Calvin, John Institutes of the Christian Religion (Westminster Press. 1960) Pg. 956-957
[30] Luther, Martin Luther’s Works (Concordia Publishing House, St. Louis. 1958) Volume 1, Pg. 148
[31]
Beza,
Theodore “Supralapsarianism: The Fall was Both Wonderful and Necessary” Qućstionum
Et Responsionum Christianarum Libellus
(1570) Questions 190-194
[32] Berkhor, Louis The History of Christian Doctrine (Baker Book House, 1983) Pg. 156
[33] Gerstner Pg. 315
[34] Princeton Review Book Review of the works of Nathaniel Emmons (Princeton Review, October 1842) Pg. 1
[35] Emmons, Nathaniel Works Edited by Jacob Ide (Crocker & Brewster. 1842) as quoted in Princeton Review (October 1842). Pg. 3
[36] Gerstner, John H. Jonathan Edwards: A Mini-Theology. (Tyndale House Publishers, Inc. Wheaton, Illinois, 1987) Pg. 39-40