Is Alvin Plantinga’s
“Possible World” our World?
Adam C. Parker
Alvin Plantinga’s concept of Transworld Depravity is considered by many to be the strongest leg of the so-called “Free-Will” theodicy. What I propose to do is provide a summary of his argument in common language so that the average reader can grasp the basics of what Plantinga is saying in his argument. I will then examine Plantinga’s “possible world” and beg the question, “Is the world we live in Plantinga’s possible world which he sets forth in God, Freedom, and Evil?
I. Summary of Transworld Depravity
Plantinga’s perspective on the problem of evil is that of a belief that God’s sovereignty and man’s own responsibility are mutually exclusive. He assumes an incompatiblism between God’s sovereignty and man’s responsibility in all of these things. This is my primary disagreement with Plantinga. This incompatiblism leads him to reject Leibniz’s belief that God could have created a perfect, free, and sinless world.
This leads Plantinga with the need to find a solution to this one problem: If God is omnipotent, then He should be able to do anything within His created order (aside from logical contradictions and violations of His own character and will). What Plantinga does to answer this challenge is he sets forth a possible world where human beings have a condition known as Transworld Depravity (TWD).
By way of explicit definition, Plantinga defines TWD as:
(33) A person P suffers from transworld depravity if and only if the following holds: for every world W such that P is significantly free in W and P does only what is right in W, there is an action A and a maximal world segment S’ such that
(1) S’ includes A’s being morally significant for P
(2) S’ includes P’s being free with respect to A
(3) S’ is included in W and includes neither P’s performing A nor P’s refraining from performing A
And
(4) If S’ were actual, P would go wrong with respect to A.[1]
In other words, Plantinga is telling us that it is possible (and merely possible at that) that there is a condition called transworld depravity. God knows all possible worlds. In these possible worlds which God conceives of, human beings may be free and sinless, but if a person with transworld depravity is in this possible world and God actualizes this world, (or if the world “obtains”) that person will go wrong with respect to their action. “It is possible that everybody suffers from it. And if this possibility were actual, then God, though omnipotent, could not have created any of the possible worlds containing…moral good but no moral evil.”[2]
If this argument holds, the mere fact that TWD could exist is enough to hold the cries of the atheist at bay, because TWD is something that is outside of God’s control, and thus, God cannot be blamed for the sin and evil and suffering that we see in our world today. If Plantinga’s Free Will Defense (FWD) holds, God is exonerated from any blame, because He just couldn’t help what was happening. This is essentially the summary of the goal of TWD: “God is omnipotent, and it was not within His power to create a world containing moral good but no moral evil.”
II. Is Plantinga’s God Really Omnipotent?
It would seem at first glance that this is in fact, a very strong argument, because if you think about it, even establishing that an answer to the atheist’s challenge is possible should be sufficient (even if all other answers are struck down completely) to still the arguments of enemies of the faith, because they will not be able to conclusively disprove the Christian’s belief.
The question, which is ultimately important in this discussion, is whether or not this possible world Plantinga presents to us is the actual world which we live in. I would argue that Plantinga’s argument may hold up in a Philosophical discussion, but since his world is only possible, then it is also possible that TWD is not an actual condition of human beings.
My biggest problem with the consideration of the reality of TWD is that if in fact, TWD exists and is a real condition which God cannot change or manipulate or prevent, then God is incapable of doing something within the created order. This means that with respect to creation, God’s hands are tied, and He is helpless to prevent evil if He so wills.
Plantinga’s God -
Look at this figure. It is a perfect illustration of the God Plantinga has presented to us. He is a God who always does his best, but he just has some things that he can’t overcome or prevent. This God is overwhelmed by TWD, and so we see in the created order that instead of God ordaining the Fall, God is dealing with the Fall in the best way that He can. Instead of ordering the comings-and-goings of human affairs and being sovereign King, He is subservient to the wills of human beings which he is simply unable to violate or interfere with, while maintaining their freedom and responsibility. If someone really believes in TWD and the human freedom Plantinga is defending, then the Cross was simply God trying to deal with these problems that were being thrown at Him, instead of dealing as He wills.
We see in this picture Plantinga shows us, not a sovereign God, who “orders all things after the counsel of His will,” but instead a God who is finite, a God who is weak, a God who is helpless, and who will always be trampled upon by the “immovable” problem of Transworld Depravity.
Those who argue the basic point of the FWD are well-meaning. They intend to do God a favor by exonerating Him from any involvement with the things that have gone wrong with this world. This is an error in three ways: 1) It perceives God as merely “dealing” with the human situation, 2) The problem of TWD, if it interfered in God’s “intended” Eden on earth, may reoccur in Heaven, and 3) We are left to wonder why God chose to create at all.
Consider the first point: The FWD puts God in the place of arranging creation around the outside interference of an unwanted, indeed, terrible evil outside of His own dominion, which intervenes in all of His creation. This TWD may not be sovereign over God in every sense, but it is certainly impossible for God to eliminate it, otherwise our world even right now, would still be perfect. God is also no longer free, because this outside force has interfered and thus, instead of ordering creation as He desires, He must now circumvent the problem of not only sin, but the recurrence of sin which TWD clearly requires.
The second problem with this “answer” to the problem of evil is this: if the scriptures say that no impure or evil thing may enter Heaven, and yet that the saints will be sinless in Heaven, then if TWD transcends God’s will, we have no promise that we will in fact, be free from sin in the afterlife, because when God actualizes Heaven, “P would go wrong with respect to A.”
The third and final problem which I see is that if TWD is so pervasive and absolutely will interfere with God’s creation, and sin and evil are not God’s will in any sense (because He could not prevent the Fall if He so desired), then a refusal to create would have actually prevented the evil in the universe. The answer to this from my own perspective, is that sin and evil must, in fact, be the will of God and well within the realm of God’s control. This answer would fit within what is commonly labeled the GE Moore Shift, which reasons as follows:
1) God exists.
2) If there is unnecessary suffering, then God does not exist.
So 3) There is not unnecessary suffering.
This is another argument entirely, whether or not the GE Moore shift is an appropriate answer to the problem, since this paper’s subject is a critique of Plantinga’s possible, but it is worth noting that a positive answer from my own position does exist. Curious readers may refer to my paper God Justified in Bringing About Terrible Tragedies.