Korean Courtiers Observation Mission's Views on Meiji Japan and Projects of Modern State Building

 

Huh Donghyun (Kyunghee University)

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1. Foreword:

 

So far as the Korean Courtiers Observation Mission thought to reflect their Japanese experiences in Korea, its trip to Japan can be considered an epoch-making event in the history of Korean modernization. The Mission - 12 middle-ranked officials, 27 attendants (students included), 12 translators (among them 2 Japanese), and 13 lackeys, 64 persons in total - stayed in Japan for 4 month in 1881, making a detailed observation of its modern structures. That was the first serious attempt to introduce Western institutions, using Japan as a model, in Korean history.

The tasks of the Mission members included, for example, detailed reporting on such special things as training of Japanese infantry or work of Japanese customs.

Asa result, the Mission members produced more than 80 books of reports, which concentrated what they learned on Meiji industry, politics, economy, society, culture, and education. As the delegation of specialists who could systematically understand and appreciate Japanese modernization, the Mission can be rightfully compared with Japan's Iwakura Embassy (1871). Iwakura Embassy's scribe, Kumi Kunitake (18391931), published his <Account of Travel to America and Europe> (<Beio kairan jikki>) in 5 volumes in 1876, thus making the Embassy travel an important occasion in the story of introducing Western modernity by Japanese government and populace[1]. As the reports made by the members of Korean Mission were not published, they certainly were not as influential as Kumi's <Account...>. However, their reports, with all these detailed accounts about thing Western they contained, were devoured by the "progressives" interested in introducing Western ideas and institutions, and were important for breaking down traditional pejorative views of West and Westernized Japan, held by Confucian conservatives. So, the reports were the primary materials used by Korean authorities in their quest for "self-strengthening" and "opening" in the 1880s, when they needed to assess Japan's posture on Westernization.

The aim of the present paper is to understand what were the characteristics of the modernity the members of the Mission encountered in Japan, and how their experiences were reflected in the process of Korea's own reforms. So, the first subject of analysis in the present paper is what were the differences between Meiji's symbol of modernity, "kokumin kokka", and its models, the nation-states of Europe. Then, the present author will attempt to show how various images of modernity encountered by the Mission's members in Japan, influenced their worldviews and thinking patterns. In the end, the present author will try to find the reasons of Korea's failure to build modern state independently in the differences of modern experiences of Korean Mission and Iwakura Embassy.

 

2. The Symbol of Modern Japan - Japanese-styled Nation-State ("kokumin kokka"):

Japan the members of Korean Mission could look at in 1881, was enthusiastically immersed in "bunmei kaika" ("civilization and progress") - implanting the structures that emerged in Europe after French Revolution. For example, infantry was built on French model, Navy - on British, education - on American, Imperial House - on British, and Constitution - on German, all these models being re-fashioned in accordance with Japan's circumstances. The dictionary definition of "bunmei kaika" is "the atmosphere of Westernization in Early Meiji Period"[2]. But Japanese modernity symbolized by "bunmei kaika" was not simply implanting of Western institutions: it was also a restoration of Japan's own ancient Imperial system. It was characterized by a kind of "symbiosis" between Western modernity and Japanese antiquity. In a way, it was an "antithesis" to Western modernity in many aspects, Western texts being misread and misunderstood, Japan's "West" being based on misinterpretations[3]. In any case, by 1881 when the Mission came to Japan, the archetypes of Japanese modernity were more or less complete, Japanese "kokumin kokka" being their symbol.

The modernity Meiji Japanese struggled to build was visualized in the form of "kokumin kokka" - Japanese form of nation-state. Nation-state, a product of European modernity, was designed as a mechanism of "human liberation" by French revolutionaries, and was an aim to quest about and to implement for Meiji Japanese. For the Koreans of the reform period in late 19th C., it was an aim they failed to accomplish, and it remains an "unfinished project" for South Koreans today[4]. We can summarize latest theories on the character of the nation-states in non-Western regions in the following points[5]:

First, in a nation-state, be it politically republican or monarchical, authoritarian or democratic, the subject of the statehood is the nation. The judgment on whether the given state conforms to the criteria for being a nation-state, is left to the peer states, the degree of 밹ivilization read Westernization being the implied criterion.젨젨젨젨젨젨

Second, for unifying the populace into a 뱊ation, the state needs a range of institutional mechanisms, beginning with the organs of dominance and oppression army, police, government, parliament, etc. and ending with print capital, educational system, and such ideological instruments as religion or family values. To have a strong ideology of 뱊ational unity is a prerequisite.

Third, nation-state exists only as a part and parcel of the international network of nation-states. It must secure its own position in the international system of nation-states, and, even while claiming to be 밹ulturally original, has to emulate its foreign peers.

As an 밿magined community, the nation-state had to unite its nation/citizens economically (unification of land ownership relationship, transport system, monetary system, and weights and measures), politically (by constitution, parliament, and conscript army), symbolically/intellectually (national population register, national political parties, museums, schools, newspapers), and culturally (national flag, anthem, pledge, literary canon, and history). In a word, be it democratic or not, the nation-state in non-Western regions is primarily an 밿magined community, using 뱊ation as its single unit.

 

1)      The Establishment of State-Unification Mechanisms:

 

The state-unification mechanisms of Meiji state witnessed by the Korean Mission in 1881 were based on the following pattern. Meiji Restoration centralized the political power in Japan, and it certainly did not mean a bona fide restoration of ancient imperial institutions: using the Emperor as a symbol of state unity, the 밹lan clique legitimized the powers it obtained[6]. The administrative mechanisms of the new government were an attempt into Japanization 뱑e-invention of sorts of modern Western institutions, rather than a return to old, T뭓ng Dynasty-inspired Imperial structures[7]. In 1881 when the Korean Mission came to Japan, the central government in reality monopolized all powers, although on the surface, the formalities of Western division of powers were duly observed[8]. Outside of the government, active 밣eople뭩 rights movement advocating constitutional government, was enthusiastically campaigning for an elected assembly. Having already established the basis for modern conscript army, Japan of 1881 was actively preparing an independent judiciary system and 뱈odern Penal Code.

In fact, the Japanese-styled undemocratic nation-unifying institutions the members of Korean Mission could witness, were not sufficient for building a modern pluralist civil society in the conditions of underdeveloped 뱓hird estate. As the later historical developments have shown us, undemocratic governmental institutions of early Meiji period were 뱎regnant with militaristic potential from the very beginning. But, despite all this, Japan of that time was heading towards constitutional government, had formal division of powers, and at least, on the surface, - looked as developing politically in the modern direction. Japanese governmental structures were the closest possible model for Korea, which also did not possess a developed 뱓hird estate.

 

2)      Capitalism-oriented Unification of Economy:

 

Japan visited by the Korean Mission already had its space 밹ivilized enough to encourage free movement of products, as well as people, information, and knowledge. Meiji government was keen to ensure the balanced development of the country by building roads and railroads, introducing modern postal and telegraph systems, and also encouraging the growth of modern sea transportations in a word, by modernizing and unifying transport and communications. The impression of 뱈odernity and 밹omfort was strongly given by city roads, illuminated by the lamps at nights, full of rickshaws and carriages. This type of 밹ivilization of space was impressive enough to captivate the Mission members[9].

In Meiji period and after, Japan, under strong governmental guidance, was growing into a modern capitalist power, introducing modern company laws, unifying monetary system, reforming its tax statutes, and beginning the process of primitive accumulation of capital through disposition of samurai pensions and other measures. The first task for Meiji government was to build a central financial institute, as a prerequisite for a centralized state. In 1869, The Ministry of Finances, given rather wide jurisdiction also over internal policy questions, was established, and the Ministry of Industry, established in 1870, started to build governmental industries, with railroads and ship-building in focus, introducing capitals and know-how in telegraph communications, building industry, and shi-building, from Europe[10]. Internally, Japan was laying the foundation of economical unity on its way to modern capitalism, and in foreign policy, it was beginning to flex its muscles in the direction of imperialist colonial aggression, pursuing expansionist policies that included acquisition of Okinawa, aggression against Taiwan, and forcible 뱋pening of Korea.젨젨젨젨젨젨젨젨젨젨

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3)      Cultural Unification Aimed at Creating a 밡ation:

 

Meiji government뭩 밷unmei kaika strategy meant establishing centralized political regime through implanting European 밹ivilization, and then 밹ivilizing Japanese people in accordance with Western criteria. To create horizontally equal 뱊ation, Meiji government first abolished hereditary status system, and then established uniform household registration system for the whole populace. In 1872 the regulations on school were promulgated, 뱈odern schools were an important mechanism for creating uniform 뱊ationals. Also the trade in human beings was abolished and freedom of movement and employment guaranteed. In 1873, old lunar calendar was supplanted with Western solar (Gregorian), thus 뱒ynchronizing Japan뭩 time with that of Europe. At the same time, regulations on newspapers promulgated in 1871, harshly restricted criticism of government in media, making them largely establishment뭩 propagandist tools. Shinto was made into the state religion and used as a tool for unifying the populace, and old customs, like mixed bathing of both sexes, that Europeans perceived as 밷arbarian were prohibited in an attempt to make the country look 밹ivilized by Western standards[11]. So, the members of Korean Mission were to witness all the great changes in customs and mores, which followed the 밹ivilizing Westernizing policies.

 

3. Korean Mission뭩 Projects of Statehood:

 

1)      Two Viewpoints on Modernizing Japan:

 

The depth and breadth of a human뭩 perception of the world depend on his/her education and experiences, and Korean Mission뭩 members were no exception. They understood Japan뭩 new institutions on the base of their previous knowledge, and, to the extent they could approve of the novelties, were going to apply them for reforming Korea. They were judging new Japan on the basis of two different ideological viewpoints.

Such Mission members as Ŏ Yunjung (18481896) and Hong Yŏngsik (1855-1884), were influenced by an earlier 밇nlightenment thinker, Pak Kyusu (1807-1877), and befriended such reformers as Kim Hongjip (1842-1896), Pak Yŏnghyo (1861-1939), and Kim Okkyun (1851-1894), becoming eventually members of the reformist group. Even at the point of their appointment to the Mission they were free enough from the traditional Confucian ideas on insurmountable differences between 밷arbarism and (Chinese Confucian) 밹ivilization, and Korea뭩 밾onored status as 뱇ittle China to be able to look at Japan objectively. But the rest of the Mission was still judging the world by old Confucian standards.

It can be well seen from an anecdote told to its readers by <Chōya Sinbun> (May 20th, 1881)[12] in an article rendering what happened between the Mission members when they visited Japanese Consulate in Pusan before boarding steamer for Japan:

밯hen Consul Kondo met the Mission members in Pusan, ch뭓mūi Sim Sanghak put a hand over his eyes. The Consul asked him whether he had an eye disease and might need doctor뭩 assistance, but at that moment Ŏ Yunjung, a progressive, went ahead and said: 멣im뭩 eye disease is to be washed away by Japanese air and water. Sim, a conservative, was angry at the remark and urged Ŏ to explain himself, and Ŏ said: 멮our eyes, gentlemen, are more than healthy, but you are nothing more than blind men with open eyes, for you do not know how to look at the things properly. Now, as we will go to Japan to witness its civilization, and will get a chance to wash away [Confucian conservatism] from the hearts, we will open our eyes in the way that we will not have to worry even if our actual eyesight will become very poor. A heated discussion followed that remark.

We can find two interesting things from that dialogue. First, we can know that, in Ŏ뭩 eyes, such of his fellow Mission members as Sim Sanghak (1845-?) were just 밷lind men with open eyes, object of 뱑e-education in 밹ivilization in the course of trip to Japan. Second, we fell that Ŏ prided himself on being able 뱓o look at things properly, using novel criteria. It was only natural that the yardstick used for judging Japan, was different in the cases of Ŏ or Hong Yŏngsik, who already had such new frame of reference as 밹ivilization and reforms, on the one hand, and other, more conservative Mission members, on the other hand. Therefore, there were great differences in the width and breadth of their understanding of Meiji nation-state, and their plans for reforming Korea with use of Japanese precedents[13].

For Ŏ or Hong, already liberated from Confucian dogmatism, the observations in Japan were a chance to finalize their own blueprints for Korean reforms[14]. Especially important for them were meetings with such eminent 뱒tatist (kokukenron) thinkers as Fukuzawa Yukichi (1835-1901), and observations over 밹ivilization reforms implemented by the Meiji government, which convinced them in necessity of centralized state-promoted reforms, in other words, 뱑eforms from above through enlightenment of people[15]. As the following personal report to Kojong on the occasion of return from Japan shows, they felt positive about Japan뭩 development, and regarded its 뱑ich state, strong army policies as well-suited for the given situation[16]:젨젨젨젨젨젨

 

밙ojong: People say that Japan뭩 system is great and policies are strong. And what did you observe?

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Hong Yŏngsik: The system there is really well built, but it is composed of many different things. Many different projects are being promoted simultaneously, and the result is chronic financial deficit. I cannot say that their military policies are not strong. But they are promoted by diligent, constant labor, daily and nightly. It was not that difficult to achieve what Japan has achieved, given the scale of the efforts.

 

Kojong: Is it the same as in the Warring States period in ancient China, when only enrichment and strengthening were sought after?

 

Ŏ Yunjung: That is really the case. Compared with today뭩 great Warring States period, that in ancient Chinese history was just a small Warring States period. All countries are competing with each other by their intellect. (). In such situation, only enrichment and strengthening will keep the country safe, and the rulers should unite with the ruled in the self-strengthening efforts.

 

Ŏ and Hong can be called 밶dvocates of the establishment of Japan-like modern nation-state, for they dreamt of reviving Japanese Meiji experience they witnessed on the spot, at home[17].

But, for the most of the rest of the delegation, 4-odd month of the sojourn in Japan were not enough to change the Confucian beliefs they were educated into from the childhood[18]. They were lamenting the fact that sacrifices to Confucius were discontinued in Japan, and mourned over the decay of Japanese Confucianist tradition[19]. Thus, they could not but use the Confucian yardstick for judging the appearance of 뱈odernizing Japan, and, quite naturally, were rather critical of it. They acknowledged that, 밻xternally, Japan did strengthened, but criticized its financial deficit, as well as 밻xcessive Westernization of everyday life. Pak Chŏngyang (1841-1905), on return to Korea, confessed his impressions to Kojong in the following way[20]:

 

밙ojong: What would you say on Japan뭩 strengths and weaknesses?

 

Pak Chŏngyang: Judging from Japan뭩 outward appearance, it looks rather rich and strong. It is not that its territory isn뭪 vast, and it isn뭪 that its army isn뭪 strong. Its buildings and machines look outwardly luxurious and well made. But, if you look deeper beyond the surface, there are plenty of weaker points as well. After beginning its intercourses with the West, Japan was just fond of cleverish things without a thought about the deficiency of its finances. Every time a new machine is being installed, enormous debts to other countries are incurred. The profits from usage of those machines hardly can offset the debts if the interests are to be calculated together too. In the meanwhile, the Westerners are poking their noses into everything, making the Japanese feel very constrained. Everything is thus being aped after the West, beginning with the policies and customs above, and ending with clothes and food below.

 

Kojong: The Japs (waein) like the customs of other countries, and even changed their clothes in accordance with the Western ways. They could not find the golden mean. That is their loss.젨젨

 

Not only Pak was so critical. Cho Junyŏng (1833-1886) lamented that, aside from the land and its populace, nothing traditional can be found in 뱑eformed Japan, and Kang Munhyŏng (1831-?) commented that to 뱒hamelessly emulate West meant more losses than gains in the long run[21].

At the same time, many of the Mission members, like Cho Junyŏng, seemingly thought that 뱓heir military system, armaments, machines, and agricultural practices, so far as they strengthen the state and enrich the people, are worth taking example from[22]. In a word, they acknowledged that outwardly Japan had been strengthened, but criticized the Westernization of life and customs, as well as financial debacle. We can say that they advocated selective introduction of the industrial, agricultural, and military technologies needed for guaranteeing state뭩 survival and people뭩 economic well being, so far as basic traditional values were not touched upon. As supporters of importation of these Japanese 뱈odern systems that did not severely clash with Confucian values, they should much greater flexibility than the Confucian conservatives who advocated 뱓he defense of orthodoxy and expunction of heterodoxy (wijŏngchŏksa). It seems that the elements of Japan뭩 new 뱈odern institutions witnessed by them, impressed them greatly and led to certain changes in their Confucian values in the long run.

Sim Sanghak and others, whom Ŏ Yunjung characterized as 뱋pen-eyed blind men, did not divest themselves of their Confucian mentality, but they could be called advocates of 밇astern morality and Western skills (tongdosŏgi), for they did agree to the selective introduction of 뱈odern institutions.

 

2)      밆ouble-headed Carriage of Korean Reforms:

 

a) The Prototype of the State Kapsin Coup Leaders Dreamt of: Discussion on Building a 밡ation-State:

 

For Ŏ Yunjung and other advocates of the establishment of a nation-state, the modern state institutions witnessed in Japan, were an important model. They considered Japanese type of a modern state a viable model for putting into practice in Korea. It is clear when we look at the project of the modernization of statehood, authored by Ŏ Yunjung[23].

Ŏ Yunjung wanted to introduce to Korea the mechanisms for unifying the populace witnessed in Japan. Seemingly, Japanese example in mind, he thought about a future modern Korean state with rather symbolic monarch, an emblem of 뱎eople뭩 unity, and real power in the hands of modernizing reformist elite, working through central governmental institutions. He believed that constitutionalism was to be delayed until the moment the people re-made into a modern 뱊ation through strengthening of state뭩 power and prestige and creating a strong army, would be capable of participating in the government. For making such 뱑eforms from above a success, building an effective bureaucracy was the key. The way of making bureaucracy into a subject of governance capable of effectively managing resources and leading the populace proposed by Ŏ Yunjung, envisioned discontinuation of traditional Confucian state exams (kwagŏ), more meritocratical system of official promotions, and permission for bureaucrats to engage in commercial activities. He also sought the establishment of 뱈odern judiciary, as the prerequisite for acquiring truly independent position in the international relationship and developing commerce, and was especially preoccupied with abolishing these cruel 밼eudal punishments that became a pretext for concluding unequal treaties. He was also an active advocate of building a modern army.

Then, his vision of economic unification emphasized building of modern transport and communicational infrastructure as a prerequisite for more intensive intellectual, commercial, and human exchanges. After it, modern industry was, just like in Japan, to be built through the state뭩 encouragement and under the state뭩 active protection. As to the ways of financing industrialization, he thought of more centralized financial system and modernization of taxes, and also proposed to concentrate capitals by creating bigger companies in the manner of Japanese zaibatsu, return to Korea its tariff autonomy and actively use money coming from custom duties, and introduce foreign investment. He may be considered the first in Korea to propose centralized foreign borrowing by the government and come up with a plan of state-led economic development.

Lastly, as to the unification of nation and its culture, he found the reason for Korea뭩 delayed progress in the veneration of Confucianism, and considered Western ideology and Christianity a possible ideological alternative useful for substituting Confucianism in the process of the 뱑eforms from above. He also proposed several social reforms aimed into creating modern 뱊ation, including educational reform and abolition of hereditary status system. He thought about sending students to the West and active adoption of new culture directly from there as well.

Such radical proposals were similar to the ideas of such reformers as Kim Okkyun, Hong Yŏngsik, and Pak Yŏnghyo, and indeed formed a prototype of their program proclaimed during the 1884 abortive Kapsin coup. In the letter sent to Fukuzawa Yukichi on December 20, 1881, Ŏ Yunjung characterizes Kim Okkyun, Pak Yŏnghyo, and Sŏ Gwangbŏm as his 밿ntimate friends, and asks to 뱑ender assistance to them during their upcoming trip to Japan[24]. The anecdote telling us that during his visit to Japan Kim Okkyun always carried with him Ŏ Yunjung뭩 travelogue, <Chungdonggi>, and the phrase from Pak Yŏnghyo뭩 memoirs that the 1882 mission to Japan provided an important momentum for the preparations for 1884 aborted coup, all show how strong was Ŏ Yunjung뭩 influence on the radical reformers.

b) The Theory of 밇astern Morality and Western Skills: Great Influence among Confucian Literati:

 

It is clear that for the rest of the Mission members reformist-minded Ŏ and Hong excluded 4 month-long sojourns in Japan was an opportunity to take a fresh look at Korea뭩 future. But it was not enough to come to the negation of deeply inbred Confucian ideas. The result was the theory of compromising 밯estern Skills new things useful for strengthening the state and helping the populace with 밇astern morality traditional culture and governmental institutions. Main points of the vision of statehood based on that theory are[25]:

First, the proponents of that theory were deeply interested in Japanese 뱑estoration of ancient imperial institutions, centralized government, division of power, and effective administrative and bureaucratic organization, but were negative on the idea of enhancing 뱎eople뭩 rights. In reality, the object of their primary interest was Japanese judiciary, police, and army.

Second, having been reared in the traditional virtues of 밻conomizing the resources and 뱇oving the commoners, they, their high esteem for Meiji Japan뭩 outward efflorescence notwithstanding, were seriously worried by it financial deficiency and the dire straits the poor had been finding themselves in. Unlike Ŏ, they were in favor of only selective adoption of Meiji industrial policies, being specially interested in financially profitable transport and communicational infrastructure, modern mining technologies and equipment, technical education, museums and industrial fairs - and their educational role, as well as promotion of novel agricultural techniques and education.

Third, they were mainly very critical about the changes in Japanese society and customs. Of course, they understood that, for the sake of promoting industry, the changes in traditional hereditary status system and professional hierarchy are inevitable. From the viewpoint of 밅onfucian utilitarianism (iyong husaeng), they were positive about newspapers as promoters of public enlightenment, and such institutions as blind and dumb schools, or Western medical facilities. But, in the end, they, with all their positive attitudes towards modern Western technology, could not understand that the driving forces of 밷unmei kaiwa were Western ideas, and that these ideas were exactly the soil, which made the technical civilization blossom. Their 뱒trategy for state뭩 survival was basically a makeshift plan centered on the introduction of Western technology and arms and not conducive to the establishment of a nation-state, as traditional values remained sacrosanct.

At the same time, the idea of 뱒electively introducing things Western soon gained certain popularity among Confucian intelligentsia and provided momentum for the movement of memorializing the court in favor of 밹ivilization. It was re-maid into a state policy by the following declaration of Kojong issued after Imo Soldiers Mutiny, on August 5, 1882[26]:

 

밪ome of the discussants are worried that the intercourses with the West may lead to being infected with the [Christian] heterodoxy, and this worry reflects a deep concern for our [Confucian] literacy and correct mores. But the intercourses and the ban against [Christian] religion may coexist simultaneously, and the treaties and trade just follow the international law. If the dissemination of the [Christian] heterodoxy in the inland will be prohibited from the very beginning, how can the commoners, reared in the teachings of Confucius and Mencius and imbued with orthodox rituals and etiquette, turn backs on the good and begin following the evil suddenly on one morning? () As their religion is evil, it should be kept at distance, just as voluptuous songs or prettied-up women, but, if their technologies are useful, why should they be avoided in such spheres as agriculture, sericulture, medicine, military, ship-building, or transport? We should simultaneously reject their religion and accept their skills. Moreover, as actual discrepancy in strength [between us and them] is already big, how will we defend ourselves from their insults and slights, if not through accepting their skills?

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After 1882 Imo Soldiers Mutiny, when Chinese policies towards Korea became overtly imperialistic, and the anti-Western mood penetrated even the commoners society, the program of 밇astern Morality and Western Skills, quite similar to China뭩 own contemporary attempts at 뱒elf-strengthening through 밯estern affairs (yangwu), seemingly was the only practical course Korean court could afford itself to take.

 

 

4. What the Korean Mission뭩 Experience Lacked: Comparison with Iwakura Mission:

 

The dispatch of the 1881 Mission to Japan is a momentous event in the history of Korea뭩 reception of Western institutions. It was a chance for the Mission members to feel the necessity of either to build a nation-state in Korea or, at least, accept Western technology and arms, and afterwards their statehood projects influenced Korean society and politics greatly. Mission뭩 trip to Japan was also an important landmark in the history of Korean-Japanese contacts: for the first time, the traditional roles of 밻xporter and 밿mporter of the advanced culture were traded. And it was also the first time Japan was designated as the 밺evelopment model Korea had to follow. For the first time in history, as many as 12 high-ranked officials traveled all around Japan, learned manifold aspects of its life first-hand, attempted to utilize their Japanese experiences in Korea뭩 own reforms, and were going to send students to Japan afterwards to learn more in details. If we look at the Mission뭩 achievements inside the framework of Korean history, comparing them with the much less tangible attainments of, for example, 1881 Mission to China (yŏngsŏnsa) or 1883 Mission to the USA and Europe (pobingsa) both did not leave any meaningful records they seem truly outstanding.

But, once the object of comparison would be the Missions sent to Europe from Japan in bakumatsu period or Iwakura Mission, sent already after the Meiji restoration, the weaknesses of the 1881 Korean Mission are more visible. Through this kind of comparison, we can understand the limitations of traditional Korea뭩 efforts in introducing Western patterns.

Japan뭩 Westernizing efforts were epitomized by sending abroad both diplomatic missions and students. There were, all in all, 6 diplomatic missions sent by the bakufu to the West before the restoration: in 1860, 80-strong mission went to the USA, in 1862, 38-strong mission toured various European states, etc. Students were sent to the Netherlands and Russia (1862 and 1865 respectively), and the would-be main protagonists of the restoration, Satsuma and Chosu, also sent students to Britain secretly.

Those missions, sent for clarifying Europe뭩 educational, political, and military systems, explored almost all thinkable achievements of Western civilization, beginning with parliamentary politics, armies, state monopolies and social security institutions, and including medicine, hospital management, schools, telegraph, post, building industry, ports, and even bonded warehouses. Especially in the case of 1862 mission, the explorations were highly well organized: the lower ranked mission members daily reported on their observations to their superiors, and the latter compiled detailed reports on each single country observed: Britain, France, Russia, etc[27].

Most outstanding seemed to be the activity of one of the mission members named Fukuzawa Yukichi. He was struck with admiration when he and his fellow mission members took a train for the first time, and recorded in his diary even the size of the train, its speed, size of the rails, etc. He was also interested in the railroad management, banking system, and the divided management of Egyptian railroads by France and Britain. On the basis of those experiences, he could afterwards describe the structure of modern Western states systematically in his famous treatise, <The Situation in the West>, which also contained a vision for Japan뭩 new statehood. The book which became a 150-200 thousand copies-selling bestseller effectively implanted into the Japanese minds the dream of establishment of a modern nation-state the product of Western modernity.

Fukuzawa was not the only one who dreamt of realizing western modernity in Japan. These dreams were common for those Japanese who got a chance to 밷reathe foreign air in the bakumatsu days. Ikeda Chohatsu, the head of the 3rd mission to Europe, who was sent there under the pressure of jōi isolationists to negotiate the closure of Yokohama, recognized the unfeasibility of his mission, and, braving death, came back and proposed several measures to the bakufu. The proposals he risked his life for, were mostly based on his personal experiences in Europe, and included sending permanent embassies to all European countries, concluding treaties of friendship with all independent foreign states, sending students to France, exchanging information with European newspapers, allowing Japanese to travel abroad for commercial and academic purposes, and so on. Kodai Tomoatsu, who lad the delegation of Satsuma students to Europe, came to admire the commercial and industrial blossoming of London and other major European cities. He promised European traders to establish trading companies in Japan, and also made contracts for building telegraph and railway lines between Kyoto and Osaka, as well as shipbuilding and armament-making facilities. Kurimoto Zyoun, sent to France in 1867, came back with the Napoleonic Code translated into Japanese. Then he published a sort of introduction to the new Western civilization - <Additional Records from the Dawn Window> (1869). There all kinds of Western things Kurimoto could not but admire and envy Napoleonic Code, city planning, railways, parliaments, public loans, armies, intensive agriculture, educational systems, and so on were described[28].

Although in the chaos of bakumatsu days the Europe-related information collected by the diplomats and students was not fully used, it was utilized in the process of building Japanese nation-state after the Meiji Restoration. Those who went to Europe during the bakumatsu days then made use of their experience, accompanying Iwakura Mission as secretaries.젨젨젨

Iwakura Mission, a large-scale governmental delegation, was sent to Europe and America 10 years before the Korean Mission came to Japan. Iwakura, given the title of the Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, was accompanied by 4 deputies State Counselor Kido Takayoshi, Financial Minister Okubo Toshimichi, Senior Counselor to the Ministry of Industry Ito Hirobumi, and Junior Counselor to the Foreign Ministry Yamaguchi Naoyoshi, - as well as 41 middle-ranked bureaucrats from various governmental institutions, 18 aids, and 43 students. Just 4 months after traditional feudal 밺omains were abolished and substituted by 뱎refectures (ken), the new-born Meiji government, which made its first steps to the creation of a nation-state, afforded itself to send abroad half of its leaders, together with the key managers of various governmental agencies and the participants of diplomatic missions of bakumatsu days, in a 100-odd strong delegation[29].

The character and aims of the Iwakura Mission were made clear in the farewell speech by Sanjo Sanetomi, then head of the State Council[30]:

 

밇xchanges with foreign countries are decisive for the stability or crisis of the state, and the abilities of the envoys are decisive for either glorifying or disgracing the state. Now, after the Restoration, we are going to achieve an equal place among the countries of the world, and this duty is to be discharged by you ten thousand li away from the homeland. The success of our foreign and domestic policies, the great enterprise of tomorrow all depend, in fact, on your departure and your ability to fulfill your duties. The Ambassador is an elder, who has a record of meritorious service for the Restoration. You, his deputies, are all the props and stays of the state, and your, attendants, are also outstanding people of the generation. You should cooperate in the spirit of faithful respect to this great aim, to ensure that your duty will be fulfilled. I know that your wishes will be realized in the near future. Go! Changing steamers in the sea, changing trains on the land, go, and win a reputation all over the world, and come back safely.

 

Iwakura Mission, which departed in November 1871 with such a strong sense of 밽reat duty, spent following year and ten month touring officially the 밶dvanced countries of the Western world: USA, Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, Russia, Denmark, Sweden, Switzerland, Italy, Austria, etc. On the way back, it also had a chance to observe the state of things in the less developed parts of the world, namely Middle East and South Asia[31].

As Sanjo mentioned in his speech, Ambassador Iwakura and his deputies Okubo and Kido were among the major figures of the Restoration, to come to the heights of power after their return home. On basis of the knowledge and information obtained during the trip abroad, Okubo presented his <Opinion on the Constitutional System of government>, and Kido his <Proposal to Formulate the Constitution>. So, they were able to begin to realize their project of building a nation-state along the European model they witnessed, just after their return home[32].

Having painfully realized that West뭩 modern successes were not achieved overnight, they understood that, for overcoming its backwardness and entering the ranks of modern states, Japan had to simultaneously develop industry, judiciary, education, military, and all other spheres. That was the context of their rejection of Saigo뭩 plan to 밹onquer Korea on their return home. In Okubo뭩 refutation of that plan he wrote: 밨ecently, the government is raising various industries in its quest for the wealth and strength. In most cases, successes can be expected only in a few years. Fleet and army, education, judiciary, industrial schools, wasteland reclamation all these things do not give results overnight.[33]

Middle-ranked bureaucrats and students that accompanied the Mission also contributed in the formation of Japan-styled nation-state, distinguishing themselves in various spheres. Moreover, the results of the Mission뭩 trip were all included into the <Account of Travel to America and Europe> compiled by Kumi Kunitake, and became a part of public informational domain. As Kumi himself wrote, he 밻dited and published the results of the Mission뭩 trip for the sake of development of the general public knowledge. It means that he perceived the Mission as a representative of Japanese 뱊ation, not of the Emperor, and, on the basis of such understanding, shared Mission뭩 results with the nation[34].

Korean missions that went abroad to 뱇earn modernity, were, unlike their Japanese counterparts, unofficial. It can be said that this difference reflects the different posture of the two governments in the matter of accepting modern institutions. Although 12 Korean courtiers and their assistants diligently discharged their mission of observing things Japanese for 4 months, from the very beginning their experience was not to be fully utilized in the process of Korea뭩 modernization. First of all, they came to Japan with Kojong뭩 secret orders as private individuals, and it hardly could have been other way: the atmosphere of dogmatic Confucian dominance was too strong in Korea. Also they had, in comparison with Japan뭩 missions of bakumatsu and early Meiji times, the following limitations:

First, Koreans witnessed Japan뭩 modernization efforts 20 years after Meiji reforms had begun, and their acquaintance with modernity was virtually limited to the experience of only one of its variations the experience of Japan뭩 Meiji project. Korean diplomats or students stayed in Japan for the periods ranging from 4 months to 1 year the period of time insufficient for digesting of the achievements of Japan-styled nation-state or Europe뭩 modern intellect. There was high possibility that they would take the modernity 뱓ranslated or, in many cases, rather 뱈isread and 뱈isinterpreted by the Meiji intellectuals in place of its European original. As a result, they could not but roam in the labyrinth of 뱓riple-translated modernity, created in the process of interactions between West and Japan, suffering from much worse intellectual chaos than their Japanese contemporaries[35]. The 1881 Korean Mission members, who were first ever Koreans to encounter the Meiji-coined logographical words used for translating borrowed western terms, experienced enormous difficulties in understanding the meanings behind these new combinations of Chinese characters[36].

Second, as Fukuzawa stressed, Meiji missions were strongly conscious about their aim of comprehending the main points of West뭩 intellectual and material achievements for the sake of obtaining an equal place in the 밹ommunity of the nations, and were mostly staffed with the energetic individuals who were in the positions of power. On the other side, the members of the 1881 Korean Mission, being, of course, a group of outstandingly able courtiers, were with the exception of Ŏ Yunjung and Hong Yŏngsik hardly more than King뭩 뱕assals who, living in the world of feudal notions, simply followed King뭩 order and participated in the Mission regardless of their personal intentions. The Mission뭩 attendants were mostly chosen on the basis of their personal relationship with the individual courtiers, and, - except Yun Ch뭝ho (1865-1945) and Yu Giljun (1856-1914) who were scheduled to remain in Japan for further studies, - lacked both in bureaucratic experience and professionalism. The rest of the 1881 Mission more than 20 lackeys and interpreters of traditional yŏkkwan background were also hardly aware of the issues of modernity enough to help the courtiers to understand modern things better.

Third, Japanese missions considered it important to publish their experiences, thus sharing them with the nation, but Korean courtiers were not interested in such things. On return to Korea, they spent on average around two months, writing their 밨eports and 밢bservations in the traditional style with the help of petty officials good at calligraphy, to show the King how well they fulfilled his secret orders. These 밨eports and 밢bservations, hand-written and bound with silk, were presented to Kojong and used then by the King or higher officials in the process of decision-making as reference materials, but hardly exerted any influence in the larger community[37].젨젨젨

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5. Conclusion:

 

The 1881 Korean Mission members were able to relate the shock they felt in the encounter with Japan뭩 밷unmei kaiwa, to Korea뭩 rulers, contributed in changing their value system, and influenced their decision-making process. In this respect, we can say that their Japanese experiences were socially not only personally meaningful. Their trip also signified the 뱓rading of roles in the history of Korean-Japanese cultural exchanges. The ideas of either establishing a nation-state or reforming existing structures (밇astern morality) on the basis of 밯estern skills that the Mission members came to in the result of their trip became two most important sources of inspiration for Korea뭩 reforms of the 1880-1890s. We can say that at that period, Korea could follow either Chinese moderate way of 밇astern morality, Western skills-type reforms, or Japanese way of building a nation-state. From our today positions, the latter seems to be more desirable. The former, which acknowledged only Western technical superiority and did not recognize the importance of its basis, modern Western ideas, was, in fact, rather an anachronism.

The fact that those Mission members who were in favor of Japanese way, were in minority, suggested that the ensuing process of Korean modernization would not be smooth. But, in a broader prospective, it may be also argued that the modern experiences in Japan also could have seriously changed the views of those 밇astern morality, Western skills advocates who were still more flexible towards Western institutions than traditional Confucian conservatives, and imbued them with the awareness of the necessity of building a nation-state in Korea. In fact, even Fukuzawa Yukichi, when he was touring Europe in 1862, could not understand how a product of Western modernity democracy worked in practice[38]. But then, on the basis of his observations in the West, he grew into a modern 밻nlightenment thinker. It is sure that the information on Western modernity he obtained on the spot could not been understood by him immediately at that moment, but influenced his worldview in the longer prospective nevertheless. In the same way, some of those Mission members who first stood on the 밇astern morality, Western skills positions, became, in 10 years, leading actors of the radical Kabo Reforms (1894-1895), aimed at the establishment of modern nation-state. Pak Chŏngyang became Education Minister and Prime Minister, Yi Hŏnyŏng Minister of Internal Affairs, Ŏm Seyŏng Minister of Agriculture and Industry in the reform governments. The main organ of the Kabo reforms The State Deliberative Council on Civil and Military Affairs (kun뭛uk kimuchŏ) had the system of 밹ollective leadership not dissimilar with Meiji Institutions, which were positively, appreciated by the 밇astern morality, Western skills advocates. The system of elective local assemblies (hyanghwe) the reformers wanted to implant in Korea was also largely modeled after Meiji system of local self-rule, highly acclaimed by the erstwhile 밇astern morality, Western skills partisans. Judging from these features of their reformist agenda, they also seem likely to have understood the necessity to build a nation-state in the long term. But why the ideas of Ŏ Yunjung, who advocated the establishment of a nation-state, were doomed to failure? There were many reasons, and one of them was the ill-starred Kapsin 1884 coup ironically, masterminded by Ŏ Yunjung뭩 closest fellow thinkers. The other was Chinese interference and conservative Confucian reaction that only intensified after the coup뭩 failure.

Ŏ Yunjung, Yu Giljun, Yun Ch뭝ho, and other former Mission members or attendants, who were accused of 뱒ympathies to the masterminds of the 1884 Kapsin coup and either sent out to petty official posts or repressed, could return on the political stage and put their new statehood projects into practice only during the 1894 Kabo Reforms. They were thinking about Cabinet-centered constitutional monarchy able to unify the country, introduction of limited popular representation, creation of police system, modernization of laws, and raising a standing army. As to the methods of economical unification, they considered increasing state income through regularizing royal finances, improvement of tax collection, developing new tax income sources, and government-led promotion of private industrial enterprise. These plans were to be financed by loans from Japan. As to the national unification, they advocated creating a nation through abolishment of hereditary status system and building of a modern educational system. To assert Korea뭩 sovereignty and independence internationally, tributary relationship with China was to be abolished.

As, not unlike the radical masterminds of the Kapsin coup, they planned to establish a nation-state with Japanese assistance, and as in reality their nation-making efforts aided, to some degree, Japan뭩 imperialist aggression, they hardly can be absolved from the charges of 뱑eformist collaboration with the Japanese imperialism. The lack of independent self-consciousness so conspicuous in their projects remains a common inherent weakness of all Korean governments from the 1884 coup times up to our days. Ŏ Yunjung뭩 plans of Japan-modeled nation-building were the prototype of the nation-creating programs of almost all Korean reformist movements, from 1884 up to the time of the so-called 뱎atriotic enlightenment movement (the 1910s). The reason was the visible viability of the Japanese model, although it distorted the ideals of Great French Revolution popular sovereignty, equality, and freedom.

Lack of any consideration of human rights in the government models developed by Koreans themselves in the time of the modernizing reforms attempts in the 1880-1900s, makes these models similar to the authoritarian systems established in post-colonial South and North Korea, especially to the South Korean military dictatorships after 1961. Especially interesting is the fact that the plans for centralized government-led modern state-building and foreign loans-financed economical development worked out by Ŏ Yunjung뭩, look like a prototype of the state-building and developmental strategies implemented by the military governments after the coup on May 16, 1961. Time and spatial differences notwithstanding, both could not overcome the Meiji nation-building model characteristically non-democratic, unrelated to the universalistic ideals of modernity.

In the end, we should emphasize that the forces that stood behind the Meiji project of nation making, preferred to differentiate themselves for the imagined 밯est, made into Japan뭩 밢ther, and went by the course of reviving Japan뭩 ancient 뱓raditions, a far cry from Western universalism. For one example, they used the barely preserved Shinto and Imperial institutes for the cultural unification, in place of Western Christianity. But, while Meiji Japanese authorities wanted the carefully revived, protected, and nurtured Shinto to be a counterweight to Christianity, Ŏ Yunjung as well as Kim Okkyun and other Kapsin coup organizers considered Christianity a good substitute for Confucianism, an instrument for achieving 뱒trength and wealth and 밹ivilizing the people. I wish to note that this opinion difference in the question of the reception of Christianity was afterwards reflected in very different patterns of accepting Christianity in Japan and Korea.젨젨젨젨젨젨젨젨젨젨젨젨젨젨젨젨

 

 

 

 

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[1] Tanaka, Akira, <Iwakura shisetsudan : meiji ishin no naka no beio>, Kodansha gendai shinsho, 487, Tokyo, Kodansha, 1977, p. 48; <Iwakura shisetsudan beio kairan jikki>, Dojidai raiburarii, Tokyo, Iwanami Shoten, 1994, p. 46; <Beio kairan jikki no gakusaiteki kenkyu>, Sapporo, Hokkaido daigaku tosho kankokai, 1993, pp. 6-7.

 

[2] Shinmura, Izuru, <Kojien>, Tokyo, Iwanami Shoten, 1991 (fourth edition).

[3] Han Gyŏnggu, Hyŏndae Ilbon-ŭi naebu Orientallijŭm-gwa Oksidentallijŭm, - <Hanguk munhwa illyu hakhwe che 33 cha chŏnguk taehwe> (texts of the presentations), 2001. Although the roots of the Japanese nation-state (kokumin kokka) lie in the West, this Western model underwent changes in the process of interaction with the Japanese forms. The concept of Occidentalism which is used for analysis of the misreadings and misinterpretations of the Western modernity, seems to be very useful for the research on such phenomena. See: Chen Xiao Mei (translated into Korean by Chŏng Chinbae, Kim Chŏnga), <Occidentalism>, Kang Publishers, Seoul, 2001.

[4] Nation-state looks as a fruit of imagination, a product of the quest for personal eternity inside the fold of a state or nation that began after the decline of the universal religions of the Middle Ages. The definition of a nation as an imagined political community was given by Benedict Andersen in his book, <Imagined Communities>. After his research, mostly based on South East Asian and South American not the traditional European material, and clearly pointing out to the imagined nature of the national ideas, appeared in print, the direction of the debates of nations was greatly changed. Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and spread of Nationalism, LondonNew York: Verso, 1983; Revised Edition 1991. Korean renditions: Trans. by Yun Hyŏngsuk, <Minjokchuŭi kiwŏn-gwa chŏnp뭓>, Nanam Publishers, 1991; Ch뭥e Sŏgyŏng, <Minjok Ŭisig-ŭi yŏksa illyuhak>, Sŏgyŏng munhwasa Publishers, 1995.

[5] Nishikawa, Nagao, Nihongata kokumin kokka no keisei -- hikakushiteki kanten kara, - Nishikawa Nagao, Matsumiya Hideharu (ed.), <Bakumatsu meijiki no kokumin kokka keisei to bunka hen'yo>, Tokyo, Shin'yosha, 195, pp. 3-42.

[6] Oka, Yoshitake (transl. by Chang Insŏng), <Kŭndae Ilbon chŏngchisa>, Sohwa Publishers, Seoul, 1996, pp. 18, 31; Kim Yongdŏk, Kaehang-gwa chagang-ŭi mosaek, - Pak Yŏngjae (ed.), <19segi Ilbon-ŭi kŭndaehwa>, Seoul National University Publishing Department, 1996, pp. 122-128.

[7] Nishikawa, Nagao, Nihongata kokumin kokka no keisei -- hikakushiteki kanten kara, pp. 30-38; Yasumaru, Yoshio, <Senhappyakugoju--shichijunendai no nihon -- ishin henkaku>: Iwanami koza nihon tsushi : kindai 1, 16, Tokyo, Iwanami Shoten, 1994, pp. 40-43; Makihara, Norio, Bunmei kaikaron, Op. sit, pp. 259-264.

[8] The restoration of Imperial Institutions Korean envoys were to witness, was neither establishment of an Oriental autocracy nor a perfect rendition of a European constitutional monarchy. The common feature with the constitutional monarchy was the fact that the Emperor reigned, but not ruled, but, unlike European constitutional monarchies, the powers of the ruling clan cliques were not checked by a constitution or parliament. The ruling forces considered their main task to achieve strong army and rich state ideal as quickly as possible and to defend Japans independent existence against the advancement of the West. So, they put the Emperor on the faade as a symbol of national unification, and, oppressing the demands for civil freedom or equality from below, introduced Japanized Western institutes from above. I will call that undemocratic clan clique government the centralized government hereafter.

[9] Sasinami, Akiko, Kisen to doro, - Takamura, Naosuke (ed.), <Sangyo kakumei : kindai nihon no kiseki ; 8>, Tokyo, Yoshikawa Kobunkan, 1994, pp. 68-87; Kokaze, Hidemasa, Tetsudo no Jidai, - Op. sit, pp. 88-90; Kajinishi, Mitsuhaya, Kotsu tsushin gyo no hattatsu, - Shibusawa, Keizo (ed.), <Meiji bunkashi ; shakai keizai>: 11, Tokyo, Hara Shobo, 1979, pp. 407-421; Yasumaru, Yoshio, <Senhappyakugoju--shichijunendai no nihon -- ishin henkaku>, pp. 42-43; Nishikawa, Nagao, Nihongata kokumin kokka no keisei -- hikakushiteki kanten kara, pp. 31-33.

[10] Yamaguchi, Kazuo, <Nihon keizaishi keizaigaku zenshu: 12>, Tokyo, Chikuma Shobo, 1968, pp. 93-108; Oe, Shinobu, <Nihon no sangyo kakumei>, Tokyo, Iwanami Shoten, 1968, pp. 1-8, 49-73; Kamiyama, Tsuneo, 밙angyo kara mingyo he, - Takamura, Naosuke (ed.), <Sangyo kakumei: kindai nihon no kiseki: 8>, Tokyo, Yoshikawa Kobunkan, 1994, pp. 47-49; Ishijuka, Hiromichi, 밪hokusan kogyo seisaku no tenkai, - Kajinishi, Mitsuhaya (ed.), <Nihon keizaishi taikei. Kindai jo: 5>, Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1965, pp. 44-47.

[11] Okubo, Toshiaki, Bunmei kaika, - <(Iwanami koza) Nihon rekishi: Kindai 2>, 15, Tokyo, Iwanami Shoten, 1967, pp. 255-258; Hirota Masaki, Keimo siso to bunmei kaika, - <(Iwanami koza) Nihon rekishi: Kindai 1>, 14, Tokyo, Iwanami Shoten, 1975, pp. 338-339; Yasumaru, Yoshio, <Senhappyakugoju--shichijunendai no nihon -- ishin henkaku>, pp. 40-43; Makihara, Norio, Bunmei kaikaron, Op. sit, pp. 255.

[12] <Chōya shinbun>, 1881, May 20th.

[13] Hŏ Donghyŏn, 1881nyŏn Chosŏn chosa Ilbon sich'aldan-e kwanhan il yŏngu,-<Hanguk sa yŏngu>, Vol. 52, 1986, pp. 135-146; 1881nyŏn chosa sich뭓ldan-ŭi Myŏngch'i Ilbon chŏngch뭝 chedo ihae, - ,-<Hanguk sa yŏngu>, Vol. 86, 1994, pp. 136-137; 1881nyŏn chosa sich뭓ldan-ŭi Myŏngch뭝 Ilbon Sabŏp chedo ihae, - <Chindan hakpo>, Vol. 84, 1997, pp. 146-148; 1881nyŏn chosa sich뭓ldan-ŭi Myŏngch뭝 Ilbon kunjegwan yŏn뭛u, - <At뭓e yŏn뭛u>, Vol. 5, 1998, pp. 483-487; 1881nyŏn chosa sich뭓ldan-ŭi Myŏngch뭝 Ilbon sahwe p뭫ngsokkwan, - <Hanguk sa yŏngu>, Vol. 101, 1998, p. 148; 밒lbon sich뭓ldan-ŭi p뭓gyŏn, - <Han뭛uk sa>, Vol. 38, Kuksa p뭰ŏnch뭓n wiwŏnhwe, 1999, pp. 121-125.

 

[14] Ŏ Yunjung, Sumun rok, - <Charyojip>, Vol. 13, pp. 15, 25, 26: Our country reveres Confucian principle and admires weakness as wisdom, and, as a result, we have no brave-hearted people. So, if we wish to reform our customs, we should first to urge the people to change the old waysIf the Confucian exams for the state posts will be abolished, the crowds of public-spirited, enterprising people will find their way abroad, to learn skills and technologies, and come back. But, once the traditional Confucian exams will not be abolished, no talents will appear; the people will satisfy themselves with old learning and will not strive for progress in knowledge. All the ancients considered poverty comfortable and preached enjoyment of poverty, but that is really not right. Once the people are made to think that poverty is comfortable, they are not made to search for the ways of making better living; how will they sustain their mouths and bodies?

[15] Hŏ Donghyŏn, 1881nyŏn chosa Ŏ Yunjung-ŭi Ilbon kyŏngje chŏngchaek insik, - <Hanguk sa yŏngu>, Vol. 93, 1996, pp. 124-129.

[16] <Sŭngjŏngwŏn Ilgi>, 1881, September 1st; Ŏ Yunjung, Chongjŏng yŏnpyo, - Hŏ Donghyŏn (ed.), <Chosa sichaildan kwangye charyojip>, Vol. 13, Seoul, Kukhak charyowŏn, 2000, p. 194.젨젨젨젨젨젨젨젨젨젨젨젨젨젨젨

[17] Before, Ŏ Yunjung's reformist ideas were misunderstood as a typical example of moderate Eastern morality, Western skills ideology, on the basis of the Yi Hŏnyŏngs treatise entitled <Tongnae ŏsa sŏgye (tan)> that was wrongly ascribed to Ŏ. See: Cho Gyŏngdal, Chosen ni okeru taikokushugi to  shokokushugi no sokoku ― shoki kaikaha no shiso, - <Chosenshi kenkyukai ronbunshu>, Vol. 22, 1985, pp. 70-73; Ch뭥e Jinsik, Ŏ Yunjung-ŭi pugangnon yŏngu, - <Kuksagwan nonchong>, Vol. 41, 1993, pp. 58-60. See bibliographic explanations on <Tongnae ŏsa sŏgye (tan)> in: Hŏ Donghyŏn, 밅hosa sich뭓ldan-ŭi Ilbon kyŏnmun kirok ch뭥ngnam, - <Sach뭥ng>, Vol. 48, 1998, pp. 47-48.

[18] Hŏ Donghyŏn, 1881nyŏn Chosŏn chosa Ilbon sich'aldan-e kwanhan il yŏngu, pp. 135-137; Hŏ Donghyŏn, 1881nyŏn chosa sich뭓ldan-ŭi Myŏngch뭝 Ilbon sahwe p뭫ngsokkwan, pp. 148.

[19] I could not but lament in my heart the competition between the profit-seeking countries of today's world, even before receiving instruction on it. If this will continue in such a fashion, where will the teaching of the Duke of Chou and Confucius, as well as rituals and music, be made clear in the end? That is more than a usual occasion for anxiety and lamentations, - Yi Hŏnyŏng, Ilsa chimnyak, - Hŏ Donghyŏn (ed.), <Charyojip>, Vol. 14, p. 46.

A look at the books newly printed after Meiji shows that eight or nine of every ten are the Western ones. 4-5 studying people sometimes come to the [Confucian] library, but there are no students. Some people say that it was impudent on the part of the high-placed persons to discontinue the Confucian sacrifices. How shameful and lamentable!, - Mun Chongmuk, Mungyŏn sagŏn, - Ibid, pp. 124-125.

[20] Pak Chŏngyang et al., 밫ongnae amhaeng ŏsa pongmyŏng ipsi si yŏnsŏl, - Han뭛ukhak munhŏn yŏn뭛uso (ed.), < Pak Chŏngyang chŏnjip>, Vol. 4, Asea munhwasa, 1984, p. 332.

[21] Ibid, pp. 338-340; Hŏ Donghyŏn, 1881nyŏn Chosŏn chosa Ilbon sich'aldan-e kwanhan il yŏngu, pp. 113.

[22] Cho Junyŏng, Mungyŏn sagŏn, - Hŏ Donghyŏn (ed.), <Charyojip>, Vol. 12, pp. 610-611.

[23] Hŏ Donghyŏn, Ŏ Yunjung (1848-1896)-ŭi kaehwa sasang yŏngu: 몂n뭛ŏn kaehwap뭓 naeji ch뭝nchŏng sadaep뭓 sŏr-e taehan pip뭓njŏk kŏmt뭥, - <Han뭛uk sasang sahak>, Vol. 17, 2001, pp. 442-467.

[24] Ŏ Yunjung뭩 Letter (Meiji, 14th Year, December 20th), - Keyo gijuku (ed.), <Fukuzawa Yukichi< zenshu>, Vol. 21, Tokyo, Iwanami Shoten, 1964, p. 374: 밙im Okkyun, Pak Yŏnghyo, and Sŏ Gwangbŏm from [our] humble country are [my] intimate friends. With this ship they will cross the sea to [your] precious state. As they have heard your esteemed name before, should not they pay you뭨e their humble greetings? I beg you to render them your assistance in various matters, so that there would be no reasons to worry about difficulties.

[25] Hŏ Donghyŏn, <Kŭndae Hanil kwangye sa yŏngu>, Seoul, Kukhak charyowŏn, 2000, pp. 97-126, 149-166, 186-207, 219-232.

[26] <Kojong sillok>, Vol. 19, Kojongs 19th year, August 5th; Kwŏn Oyŏng, Tongdosŏgiron-ŭi kujo-wa kŭ chŏn뭛ae, - <Han뭛uk sa simin kangchwa>, Vol. 7, 1990, pp. 84-96.

[27] Tanaka, Akira, <Kaikoku to tobaku: Nihon no rekishi, 15>, Tokyo, Shueisha, 1992, pp. 223-225; Haga, Toru (translated into Korean by Son Sunok), <Myŏngchi Yusin-gwa Ilbonin>, Seoul, Yeha Publishers, 1989, pp. 125-136.

[28] Haga Toru, Op. Sit, pp. 138-140.

[29] Tanaka, Akira, Iwakura shisetsudan, pp. 8-9; Iwakura shisetsudan beyo kairan jikki, pp. 2-3.

[30] Tanaka, Akira, ; Iwakura shisetsudan beio kairan jikki, pp. 44.

[31] Ibid, pp. 46-194.

[32] Ibid, pp. 210-212.

[33] Ibid, pp. 204-208.

[34] Ibid, p. 46; Matsumoto, Ken'ichi, <Nihon no kindai: Kaikoku Ishin>, 1, Tokyo, Chuo koronsha, 1998, pp. 347-355; Hukui Junko, Beio kairan jikki no seiritsu, - Nishikawa, Nagao, Matsumiya, Hideharu, <Beio kairan jikki o yomu>, Kyoto, Horitsu bunkasha, 1995, pp. 429-430.

[35] It is well-known, for example, that the term jiyu minken undo (freedom and peoples rights movement) used in early Meiji days, resulted from a mistranslation of the concept of individual rights by the generic term minken (peoples rights). Other famous episode is mistranslation of Herbert Spensers <Social Statics> (1851) into <Shakai Heikenron> (literally: social equal rights) instead of more exact shakai seigaku the mistranslation that made the book into a gospel of sorts for the freedom and peoples rights movement. See: Maruyama Masao, Kato Shuichi (Korean translation by Im Sŏngmo), <Pŏnyŏk-kwa Ilbon-ŭi kŭndae>, Seoul, Isan Publishers, 2000, pp. 54, 88-89, 107. On the term 뱓ranslated modernity, see: Lydia Liu, Translingual Practice: Literature, National Culture, and Translated Modernity-China, 1900-1937, Stanford University Press, 1995; Im Sŏngmo, Translators Postscript, - Maruyama Masao, Kato Shuichi, Op. sit, pp. 219-226.

[36] Akijuki, Nojomi, Suematsu Jiro-ŭi p뭝ldam-e nat뭓nan kŭndae: 1881nyŏn-ŭi 몊insa yuramdan-gwa-ŭi kyoryu-rŭl chungsim-ŭro, - <Kŭndae kyoryusa-wa sangho insik>, 1, Koryŏ Taehakkyo Asea munje yŏn뭛uso, 2001, pp. 25-34.

[37] Most of the Mission's reports were kept in Kojong's person collection, Chibokje: Yi Taejin, <Kojong sidaesa-ŭi chaejomyŏng>, Seoul, Taehaksa, 2000, pp. 300-303.

[38] Fukuzawa Yukichi, Fukuo jiden, - <Fukuzawa Yukichi zenshu>, 7, Tokyo, Iwanami Shoten, 1970, pp. 107-108: I could not understand at all what was the election law in the politics about. When I asked what kind of law is the election law, and what kind of office is parliament, my opposite numbers just laughed at me. It looked as if they understood what I was asking about It was also known that there were two groups called Conservative and Liberal parties, that fiercely struggled against each other, both unwilling to lose to the other side I could not understand why they are fighting each other in the politics in such a peaceful and prosperous time And, even being political enemies, they eat and drink together! I could not understand it at all.

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