Korean
Courtiers Observation Mission's Views on Meiji Japan and Projects of Modern
State Building
Huh Donghyun (Kyunghee University)
Translation: V.Tikhonov (Oslo Univ.)
1. Foreword:
So far as the Korean Courtiers Observation
Mission thought to reflect their Japanese experiences in Korea, its trip to Japan
can be considered an epoch-making event in the history of Korean modernization.
The Mission - 12 middle-ranked officials, 27 attendants (students included), 12
translators (among them 2 Japanese), and 13 lackeys, 64 persons in total -
stayed in Japan for 4 month in 1881, making a detailed observation of its
modern structures. That was the first serious attempt to introduce Western
institutions, using Japan as a model, in Korean history.
The tasks of the Mission members
included, for example, detailed reporting on such special things as training of
Japanese infantry or work of Japanese customs.
Asa result, the Mission members
produced more than 80 books of reports, which concentrated what they learned on
Meiji industry, politics, economy, society, culture, and education. As the
delegation of specialists who could systematically understand and appreciate
Japanese modernization, the Mission can be rightfully compared with Japan's
Iwakura Embassy (1871). Iwakura Embassy's scribe, Kumi Kunitake (1839∼1931), published his <Account of
Travel to America and Europe> (<Beio kairan jikki>) in 5 volumes in
1876, thus making the Embassy travel an important occasion in the story of
introducing Western modernity by Japanese government and populace[1].
As the reports made by the members of Korean Mission were not published, they
certainly were not as influential as Kumi's <Account...>. However, their reports, with all these
detailed accounts about thing Western they contained, were devoured by the
"progressives" interested in introducing Western ideas and
institutions, and were important for breaking down traditional pejorative views
of West and Westernized Japan, held by Confucian conservatives. So, the reports
were the primary materials used by Korean authorities in their quest for
"self-strengthening" and "opening" in the 1880s, when they
needed to assess Japan's posture on Westernization.
The aim of the present paper is to
understand what were the characteristics of the modernity the members of the
Mission encountered in Japan, and how their experiences were reflected in the
process of Korea's own reforms. So, the first subject of analysis in the
present paper is what were the differences between Meiji's symbol of modernity,
"kokumin kokka", and its models, the nation-states of Europe. Then,
the present author will attempt to show how various images of modernity
encountered by the Mission's members in Japan, influenced their worldviews and
thinking patterns. In the end, the present author will try to find the reasons
of Korea's failure to build modern state independently in the differences of
modern experiences of Korean Mission and Iwakura Embassy.
2. The Symbol of Modern Japan -
Japanese-styled Nation-State ("kokumin kokka"):
Japan the
members of Korean Mission could look at in 1881, was enthusiastically immersed
in "bunmei kaika" ("civilization and progress") -
implanting the structures that emerged in Europe after French Revolution. For
example, infantry was built on French model, Navy - on British, education - on
American, Imperial House - on British, and Constitution - on German, all these
models being re-fashioned in accordance with Japan's circumstances. The
dictionary definition of "bunmei kaika" is "the atmosphere of
Westernization in Early Meiji Period"[2].
But Japanese modernity symbolized by "bunmei kaika" was not simply
implanting of Western institutions: it was also a restoration of Japan's own
ancient Imperial system. It was characterized by a kind of
"symbiosis" between Western modernity and Japanese antiquity. In a
way, it was an "antithesis" to Western modernity in many aspects,
Western texts being misread and misunderstood, Japan's "West" being
based on misinterpretations[3].
In any case, by 1881 when the Mission came to Japan, the archetypes of Japanese
modernity were more or less complete, Japanese "kokumin kokka" being
their symbol.
The modernity Meiji Japanese struggled
to build was visualized in the form of "kokumin kokka" - Japanese
form of nation-state. Nation-state, a product of European modernity, was
designed as a mechanism of "human liberation" by French
revolutionaries, and was an aim to quest about and to implement for Meiji
Japanese. For the Koreans of the reform period in late 19th C., it was an aim
they failed to accomplish, and it remains an "unfinished project" for
South Koreans today[4]. We can
summarize latest theories on the character of the nation-states in non-Western
regions in the following points[5]:
First, in a nation-state, be it
politically republican or monarchical, authoritarian or democratic, the subject
of the statehood is the nation. The judgment on whether the given state conforms
to the criteria for being a nation-state, is left to the peer states, the
degree of “civilization” – read Westernization – being the implied criterion.
Second, for unifying the populace into
a “nation”, the state needs a range of institutional mechanisms, beginning with
the organs of dominance and oppression – army, police, government, parliament,
etc. – and ending with print capital, educational system, and such ideological
instruments as religion or family values. To have a strong ideology of “national
unity” is a prerequisite.
Third, nation-state exists only as a
part and parcel of the international network of nation-states. It must secure
its own position in the international system of nation-states, and, even while
claiming to be “culturally original”, has to emulate its foreign peers.
As an “imagined community”, the
nation-state had to unite its nation/citizens economically (unification of land
ownership relationship, transport system, monetary system, and weights and
measures), politically (by constitution, parliament, and conscript army),
symbolically/intellectually (national population register, national political
parties, museums, schools, newspapers), and culturally (national flag, anthem,
pledge, literary canon, and history). In a word, be it democratic or not, the
nation-state in non-Western regions is primarily an “imagined community”, using
“nation” as its single unit.
1)
The Establishment of State-Unification Mechanisms:
The state-unification mechanisms of
Meiji state witnessed by the Korean Mission in 1881 were based on the following
pattern. Meiji Restoration centralized the political power in Japan, and it certainly
did not mean a bona fide restoration of ancient imperial institutions: using
the Emperor as a symbol of state unity, the “clan clique” legitimized the
powers it obtained[6]. The administrative
mechanisms of the new government were an attempt into Japanization – “re-invention”
of sorts – of modern Western institutions, rather than a return to old, T’ang
Dynasty-inspired Imperial structures[7].
In 1881 when the Korean Mission came to Japan, the central government in
reality monopolized all powers, although on the surface, the formalities of
Western division of powers were duly observed[8].
Outside of the government, active “People’s rights” movement advocating
constitutional government, was enthusiastically campaigning for an elected assembly.
Having already established the basis for modern conscript army, Japan of 1881
was actively preparing an independent judiciary system and “modern” Penal Code.
In fact, the Japanese-styled
undemocratic nation-unifying institutions the members of Korean Mission could
witness, were not sufficient for building a modern pluralist civil society in
the conditions of underdeveloped “third estate”. As the later historical
developments have shown us, undemocratic governmental institutions of early
Meiji period were “pregnant” with militaristic potential from the very
beginning. But, despite all this, Japan of that time was heading towards
constitutional government, had formal division of powers, and – at least, on
the surface, - looked as developing politically in the modern direction.
Japanese governmental structures were the closest possible model for Korea,
which also did not possess a developed “third estate”.
2)
Capitalism-oriented Unification of Economy:
Japan visited by the Korean Mission
already had its space “civilized” enough to encourage free movement of
products, as well as people, information, and knowledge. Meiji government was
keen to ensure the balanced development of the country by building roads and
railroads, introducing modern postal and telegraph systems, and also
encouraging the growth of modern sea transportations – in a word, by
modernizing and unifying transport and communications. The impression of “modernity”
and “comfort” was strongly given by city roads, illuminated by the lamps at
nights, full of rickshaws and carriages. This type of “civilization of space”
was impressive enough to captivate the Mission members[9].
In Meiji period and after, Japan,
under strong governmental guidance, was growing into a modern capitalist power,
introducing modern company laws, unifying monetary system, reforming its tax
statutes, and beginning the process of primitive accumulation of capital
through disposition of samurai pensions and other measures. The first
task for Meiji government was to build a central financial institute, as a
prerequisite for a centralized state. In 1869, The Ministry of Finances, given
rather wide jurisdiction also over internal policy questions, was established,
and the Ministry of Industry, established in 1870, started to build
governmental industries, with railroads and ship-building in focus, introducing
capitals and know-how in telegraph communications, building industry, and
shi-building, from Europe[10].
Internally, Japan was laying the foundation of economical unity on its way to
modern capitalism, and in foreign policy, it was beginning to flex its muscles
in the direction of imperialist colonial aggression, pursuing expansionist
policies that included acquisition of Okinawa, aggression against Taiwan, and
forcible “opening” of Korea.
3)
Cultural Unification Aimed at Creating a “Nation”:
Meiji government’s “bunmei kaika”
strategy meant establishing centralized political regime through implanting
European “civilization”, and then “civilizing” Japanese people in accordance
with Western criteria. To create horizontally equal “nation”, Meiji government
first abolished hereditary status system, and then established uniform
household registration system for the whole populace. In 1872 the regulations
on school were promulgated, “modern” schools were an important mechanism for
creating uniform “nationals”. Also the trade in human beings was abolished and
freedom of movement and employment guaranteed. In 1873, old lunar calendar was supplanted
with Western solar (Gregorian), thus “synchronizing” Japan’s time with that of
Europe. At the same time, regulations on newspapers promulgated in 1871,
harshly restricted criticism of government in media, making them largely
establishment’s propagandist tools. Shinto was made into the state religion and
used as a tool for unifying the populace, and old customs, like mixed bathing
of both sexes, that Europeans perceived as “barbarian” were prohibited in an
attempt to make the country look “civilized” by Western standards[11].
So, the members of Korean Mission were to witness all the great changes in
customs and mores, which followed the “civilizing” Westernizing policies.
3. Korean Mission’s Projects of Statehood:
1) Two Viewpoints on Modernizing Japan:
The depth and breadth of a human’s perception of the
world depend on his/her education and experiences, and Korean Mission’s members
were no exception. They understood Japan’s new institutions on the base of
their previous knowledge, and, to the extent they could approve of the
novelties, were going to apply them for reforming Korea. They were judging new
Japan on the basis of two different ideological viewpoints.
Such Mission members as Ŏ Yunjung (1848∼1896) and Hong Yŏngsik
(1855-1884), were influenced by an earlier “Enlightenment” thinker, Pak Kyusu
(1807-1877), and befriended such reformers as Kim Hongjip (1842-1896), Pak Yŏnghyo (1861-1939), and Kim Okkyun (1851-1894),
becoming eventually members of the reformist group. Even at the point of their
appointment to the Mission they were free enough from the traditional Confucian
ideas on insurmountable differences between “barbarism” and (Chinese Confucian)
“civilization”, and Korea’s “honored” status as “little China” to be able to
look at Japan objectively. But the rest of the Mission was still judging the
world by old Confucian standards.
It can be well seen from an anecdote told to its
readers by <Chōya Sinbun>
(May 20th, 1881)[12] in an
article rendering what happened between the Mission members when they visited
Japanese Consulate in Pusan before boarding steamer for Japan:
“When Consul Kondo met the Mission members in Pusan, ch’amūi
Sim Sanghak put a hand over his eyes. The Consul asked him whether he had an
eye disease and might need doctor’s assistance, but at that moment Ŏ Yunjung, a progressive, went ahead and said: ‘Sim’s
eye disease is to be washed away by Japanese air and water’. Sim, a conservative,
was angry at the remark and urged Ŏ to explain himself, and Ŏ said: ‘Your eyes, gentlemen, are more than healthy, but you are nothing
more than blind men with open eyes, for you do not know how to look at the
things properly. Now, as we will go to Japan to witness its civilization, and
will get a chance to wash away [Confucian conservatism] from the hearts, we
will open our eyes in the way that we will not have to worry even if our actual
eyesight will become very poor’. A heated discussion followed that remark”.
We can find two interesting things from that dialogue.
First, we can know that, in Ŏ’s eyes, such of his fellow Mission members as Sim Sanghak (1845-?) were
just “blind men with open eyes”, object of “re-education” in “civilization” in
the course of trip to Japan. Second, we fell that Ŏ prided himself on being able “to look at things properly”, using novel
criteria. It was only natural that the yardstick used for judging Japan, was
different in the cases of Ŏ or Hong Yŏngsik, who
already had such new frame of reference as “civilization and reforms”, on the
one hand, and other, more conservative Mission members, on the other hand.
Therefore, there were great differences in the width and breadth of their
understanding of Meiji nation-state, and their plans for reforming Korea with
use of Japanese precedents[13].
For Ŏ or Hong, already liberated from Confucian dogmatism, the observations
in Japan were a chance to finalize their own blueprints for Korean reforms[14].
Especially important for them were meetings with such eminent “statist” (kokukenron)
thinkers as Fukuzawa Yukichi (1835-1901), and observations over “civilization
reforms” implemented by the Meiji government, which convinced them in necessity
of centralized state-promoted reforms, in other words, “reforms from above
through enlightenment of people”[15].
As the following personal report to Kojong on the occasion of return from Japan
shows, they felt positive about Japan’s development, and regarded its “rich
state, strong army” policies as well-suited for the given situation[16]:
“Kojong: People say that
Japan’s system is great and policies are strong. And what did you observe?
Hong Yŏngsik: The system there is really well built, but it
is composed of many different things. Many different projects are being
promoted simultaneously, and the result is chronic financial deficit. I cannot
say that their military policies are not strong. But they are promoted by
diligent, constant labor, daily and nightly. It was not that difficult to achieve
what Japan has achieved, given the scale of the efforts.
Kojong: Is it the same
as in the Warring States period in ancient China, when only enrichment and
strengthening were sought after?
Ŏ Yunjung: That is really the case. Compared with today’s great Warring
States period, that in ancient Chinese history was just a small Warring States
period. All countries are competing with each other by their intellect. (…). In
such situation, only enrichment and strengthening will keep the country safe,
and the rulers should unite with the ruled in the self-strengthening efforts.”
Ŏ and Hong can be
called “advocates of the establishment of Japan-like modern nation-state”, for
they dreamt of reviving Japanese Meiji experience they witnessed on the spot,
at home[17].
But, for the most of the rest of the delegation, 4-odd
month of the sojourn in Japan were not enough to change the Confucian beliefs
they were educated into from the childhood[18].
They were lamenting the fact that sacrifices to Confucius were discontinued in
Japan, and mourned over the decay of Japanese Confucianist tradition[19].
Thus, they could not but use the Confucian yardstick for judging the appearance
of “modernizing” Japan, and, quite naturally, were rather critical of it. They
acknowledged that, “externally”, Japan did strengthened, but criticized its
financial deficit, as well as “excessive” Westernization of everyday life. Pak
Chŏngyang (1841-1905), on
return to Korea, confessed his impressions to Kojong in the following way[20]:
“Kojong: What would you say on Japan’s strengths and
weaknesses?
Pak Chŏngyang: Judging from Japan’s outward appearance, it
looks rather rich and strong. It is not that its territory isn’t vast, and it
isn’t that its army isn’t strong. Its buildings and machines look outwardly
luxurious and well made. But, if you look deeper beyond the surface, there are
plenty of weaker points as well. After beginning its intercourses with the
West, Japan was just fond of cleverish things without a thought about the
deficiency of its finances. Every time a new machine is being installed, enormous
debts to other countries are incurred. The profits from usage of those machines
hardly can offset the debts if the interests are to be calculated together too.
In the meanwhile, the Westerners are poking their noses into everything, making
the Japanese feel very constrained. Everything is thus being aped after the
West, beginning with the policies and customs above, and ending with clothes and
food below.
Kojong: The Japs (waein)
like the customs of other countries, and even changed their clothes in
accordance with the Western ways. They could not find the golden mean. That is
their loss.”
Not only Pak was so critical. Cho Junyŏng (1833-1886) lamented that, aside from the land and
its populace, nothing traditional can be found in “reformed” Japan, and Kang
Munhyŏng (1831-?)
commented that to “shamelessly emulate West” meant more losses than gains in
the long run[21].
At the same time, many of the Mission members, like
Cho Junyŏng, seemingly thought
that “their military system, armaments, machines, and agricultural practices,
so far as they strengthen the state and enrich the people, are worth taking
example from”[22]. In a word,
they acknowledged that outwardly Japan had been strengthened, but criticized
the Westernization of life and customs, as well as financial debacle. We can
say that they advocated selective introduction of the industrial, agricultural,
and military technologies needed for guaranteeing state’s survival and people’s
economic well being, so far as basic traditional values were not touched upon.
As supporters of importation of these Japanese “modern” systems that did not
severely clash with Confucian values, they should much greater flexibility than
the Confucian conservatives who advocated “the defense of orthodoxy and
expunction of heterodoxy” (wijŏngch’ŏksa). It seems that the elements of Japan’s new “modern” institutions
witnessed by them, impressed them greatly and led to certain changes in their
Confucian values in the long run.
Sim Sanghak and others, whom Ŏ Yunjung characterized as “open-eyed blind men”, did not divest
themselves of their Confucian mentality, but they could be called advocates of “Eastern
morality and Western skills” (tongdosŏgi), for they did agree to the selective introduction of
“modern” institutions.
2) “Double-headed Carriage” of Korean Reforms:
a) The Prototype of the State Kapsin Coup Leaders Dreamt of:
Discussion on Building a “Nation-State”:
For Ŏ Yunjung and other advocates of the
establishment of a nation-state, the modern state institutions witnessed in
Japan, were an important model. They considered Japanese type of a modern state
a viable model for putting into practice in Korea. It is clear when we look at
the project of the modernization of statehood, authored by Ŏ Yunjung[23].
Ŏ Yunjung wanted to introduce to Korea the
mechanisms for unifying the populace witnessed in Japan. Seemingly, Japanese
example in mind, he thought about a future modern Korean state with rather
symbolic monarch, an emblem of “people’s unity”, and real power in the hands of
modernizing reformist elite, working through central governmental institutions.
He believed that constitutionalism was to be delayed until the moment the
people re-made into a modern “nation” through strengthening of state’s power
and prestige and creating a strong army, would be capable of participating in
the government. For making such “reforms from above” a success, building an
effective bureaucracy was the key. The way of making bureaucracy into a subject
of governance capable of effectively managing resources and leading the
populace proposed by Ŏ Yunjung, envisioned discontinuation of traditional
Confucian state exams (kwagŏ), more meritocratical system of official promotions, and permission for
bureaucrats to engage in commercial activities. He also sought the
establishment of “modern” judiciary, as the prerequisite for acquiring truly
independent position in the international relationship and developing commerce,
and was especially preoccupied with abolishing these cruel “feudal” punishments
that became a pretext for concluding unequal treaties. He was also an active
advocate of building a modern army.
Then, his vision of economic unification emphasized
building of modern transport and communicational infrastructure as a
prerequisite for more intensive intellectual, commercial, and human exchanges.
After it, modern industry was, just like in Japan, to be built through the
state’s encouragement and under the state’s active protection. As to the ways
of financing industrialization, he thought of more centralized financial system
and modernization of taxes, and also proposed to concentrate capitals by
creating bigger companies in the manner of Japanese zaibatsu, return to
Korea its tariff autonomy and actively use money coming from custom duties, and
introduce foreign investment. He may be considered the first in Korea to
propose centralized foreign borrowing by the government and come up with a plan
of state-led economic development.
Lastly, as to the unification of nation and its
culture, he found the reason for Korea’s delayed progress in the veneration of
Confucianism, and considered Western ideology and Christianity a possible
ideological alternative useful for substituting Confucianism in the process of
the “reforms from above”. He also proposed several social reforms aimed into
creating modern “nation”, including educational reform and abolition of hereditary
status system. He thought about sending students to the West and active
adoption of new culture directly from there as well.
Such radical proposals were similar to the ideas of
such reformers as Kim Okkyun, Hong Yŏngsik, and Pak Yŏnghyo, and indeed formed a prototype of their program proclaimed during
the 1884 abortive Kapsin coup. In the letter sent to Fukuzawa Yukichi on
December 20, 1881, Ŏ Yunjung characterizes
Kim Okkyun, Pak Yŏnghyo, and Sŏ Gwangbŏm as his “intimate friends”, and asks to “render assistance” to them
during their upcoming trip to Japan[24].
The anecdote telling us that during his visit to Japan Kim Okkyun always
carried with him Ŏ Yunjung’s travelogue,
<Chungdonggi>, and the phrase from Pak Yŏnghyo’s memoirs that the 1882 mission to Japan provided an important
momentum for the preparations for 1884 aborted coup, all show how strong was Ŏ Yunjung’s influence on the radical reformers.
b) The
Theory of “Eastern Morality and Western Skills”: Great Influence among
Confucian Literati:
It is clear that for the rest of the Mission members –
reformist-minded Ŏ and Hong
excluded – 4 month-long sojourns in Japan was an opportunity to take a fresh
look at Korea’s future. But it was not enough to come to the negation of deeply
inbred Confucian ideas. The result was the theory of compromising “Western
Skills” – new things useful for strengthening the state and helping the
populace – with “Eastern morality” – traditional culture and governmental
institutions. Main points of the vision of statehood based on that theory are[25]:
First, the proponents of that theory were deeply
interested in Japanese “restoration” of ancient imperial institutions,
centralized government, division of power, and effective administrative and
bureaucratic organization, but were negative on the idea of enhancing “people’s
rights”. In reality, the object of their primary interest was Japanese
judiciary, police, and army.
Second, having been reared in the traditional virtues
of “economizing the resources” and “loving the commoners”, they, their high esteem
for Meiji Japan’s outward efflorescence notwithstanding, were seriously worried
by it financial deficiency and the dire straits the poor had been finding
themselves in. Unlike Ŏ, they were in favor of only selective adoption of Meiji industrial
policies, being specially interested in financially profitable transport and
communicational infrastructure, modern mining technologies and equipment,
technical education, museums and industrial fairs - and their educational role,
as well as promotion of novel agricultural techniques and education.
Third, they were mainly very critical about the
changes in Japanese society and customs. Of course, they understood that, for
the sake of promoting industry, the changes in traditional hereditary status
system and professional hierarchy are inevitable. From the viewpoint of “Confucian
utilitarianism” (iyong husaeng), they were positive about newspapers as
promoters of public enlightenment, and such institutions as blind and dumb
schools, or Western medical facilities. But, in the end, they, with all their
positive attitudes towards modern Western technology, could not understand that
the driving forces of “bunmei kaiwa” were Western ideas, and that these ideas
were exactly the soil, which made the technical civilization blossom. Their “strategy
for state’s survival” was basically a makeshift plan centered on the
introduction of Western technology and arms and not conducive to the
establishment of a nation-state, as traditional values remained sacrosanct.
At the same time, the idea of “selectively introducing”
things Western soon gained certain popularity among Confucian intelligentsia
and provided momentum for the movement of memorializing the court in favor of “civilization”.
It was re-maid into a state policy by the following declaration of Kojong
issued after Imo Soldiers’ Mutiny, on August 5, 1882[26]:
“Some of the discussants are worried that the
intercourses with the West may lead to being infected with the [Christian]
heterodoxy, and this worry reflects a deep concern for our [Confucian] literacy
and correct mores. But the intercourses and the ban against [Christian]
religion may coexist simultaneously, and the treaties and trade just follow the
international law. If the dissemination of the [Christian] heterodoxy in the
inland will be prohibited from the very beginning, how can the commoners,
reared in the teachings of Confucius and Mencius and imbued with orthodox
rituals and etiquette, turn backs on the good and begin following the evil
suddenly on one morning? (…) As their religion is evil, it should be kept at distance,
just as voluptuous songs or prettied-up women, but, if their technologies are
useful, why should they be avoided in such spheres as agriculture, sericulture,
medicine, military, ship-building, or transport? We should simultaneously
reject their religion and accept their skills. Moreover, as actual discrepancy
in strength [between us and them] is already big, how will we defend ourselves
from their insults and slights, if not through accepting their skills?”
After 1882 Imo Soldiers’ Mutiny, when Chinese
policies towards Korea became overtly imperialistic, and the anti-Western mood penetrated
even the commoners’ society, the program of “Eastern Morality and Western
Skills”, quite similar to China’s own contemporary attempts at “self-strengthening”
through “Western affairs” (yangwu), seemingly was the only practical
course Korean court could afford itself to take.
4. What the Korean Mission’s Experience Lacked:
Comparison with Iwakura Mission:
The dispatch of the 1881 Mission to Japan is a
momentous event in the history of Korea’s reception of Western institutions. It
was a chance for the Mission members to feel the necessity of either to build a
nation-state in Korea or, at least, accept Western technology and arms, and
afterwards their statehood projects influenced Korean society and politics
greatly. Mission’s trip to Japan was also an important landmark in the history
of Korean-Japanese contacts: for the first time, the traditional roles of “exporter”
and “importer” of the advanced culture were traded. And it was also the first
time Japan was designated as the “development model” Korea had to follow. For
the first time in history, as many as 12 high-ranked officials traveled all
around Japan, learned manifold aspects of its life first-hand, attempted to
utilize their Japanese experiences in Korea’s own reforms, and were going to send
students to Japan afterwards to learn more in details. If we look at the
Mission’s achievements inside the framework of Korean history, comparing them
with the much less tangible attainments of, for example, 1881 Mission to China
(yŏngsŏnsa)
or 1883 Mission to the USA and Europe (pobingsa) – both did not leave
any meaningful records – they seem truly outstanding.
But, once the object of comparison would be the
Missions sent to Europe from Japan in bakumatsu period or Iwakura
Mission, sent already after the Meiji restoration, the weaknesses of the 1881
Korean Mission are more visible. Through this kind of comparison, we can
understand the limitations of traditional Korea’s efforts in introducing
Western patterns.
Japan’s Westernizing efforts were epitomized by
sending abroad both diplomatic missions and students. There were, all in all, 6
diplomatic missions sent by the bakufu to the West before the
restoration: in 1860, 80-strong mission went to the USA, in 1862, 38-strong
mission toured various European states, etc. Students were sent to the Netherlands
and Russia (1862 and 1865 respectively), and the would-be main protagonists of
the restoration, Satsuma and Chosu, also sent students to Britain secretly.
Those missions, sent for clarifying Europe’s educational,
political, and military systems, explored almost all thinkable achievements of Western
civilization, beginning with parliamentary politics, armies, state monopolies
and social security institutions, and including medicine, hospital management,
schools, telegraph, post, building industry, ports, and even bonded warehouses.
Especially in the case of 1862 mission, the explorations were highly well organized:
the lower ranked mission members daily reported on their observations to their
superiors, and the latter compiled detailed reports on each single country
observed: Britain, France, Russia, etc[27].
Most outstanding seemed to be the activity of one of
the mission members named Fukuzawa Yukichi. He was struck with admiration when
he and his fellow mission members took a train for the first time, and recorded
in his diary even the size of the train, its speed, size of the rails, etc. He
was also interested in the railroad management, banking system, and the divided
management of Egyptian railroads by France and Britain. On the basis of those
experiences, he could afterwards describe the structure of modern Western
states systematically in his famous treatise, <The Situation in the
West>, which also contained a vision for Japan’s new statehood. The book –
which became a 150-200 thousand copies-selling bestseller – effectively
implanted into the Japanese minds the dream of establishment of a modern
nation-state – the product of Western modernity.
Fukuzawa was not the only one who dreamt of realizing western
modernity in Japan. These dreams were common for those Japanese who got a
chance to “breathe foreign air” in the bakumatsu days. Ikeda Chohatsu,
the head of the 3rd mission to Europe, who was sent there under the pressure of
jōi isolationists to negotiate the closure of Yokohama, recognized the
unfeasibility of his mission, and, braving death, came back and proposed
several measures to the bakufu. The proposals he risked his life for,
were mostly based on his personal experiences in Europe, and included sending
permanent embassies to all European countries, concluding treaties of
friendship with all independent foreign states, sending students to France,
exchanging information with European newspapers, allowing Japanese to travel
abroad for commercial and academic purposes, and so on. Kodai Tomoatsu, who lad
the delegation of Satsuma students to Europe, came to admire the commercial and
industrial blossoming of London and other major European cities. He promised
European traders to establish trading companies in Japan, and also made contracts
for building telegraph and railway lines between Kyoto and Osaka, as well as shipbuilding
and armament-making facilities. Kurimoto Zyoun, sent to France in 1867, came
back with the Napoleonic Code translated into Japanese. Then he published a
sort of introduction to the new Western civilization - <Additional Records
from the Dawn Window> (1869). There all kinds of Western things Kurimoto
could not but admire and envy – Napoleonic Code, city planning, railways,
parliaments, public loans, armies, intensive agriculture, educational systems,
and so on – were described[28].
Although in the chaos of bakumatsu days the
Europe-related information collected by the diplomats and students was not
fully used, it was utilized in the process of building Japanese nation-state
after the Meiji Restoration. Those who went to Europe during the bakumatsu
days then made use of their experience, accompanying Iwakura Mission as
secretaries.
Iwakura Mission, a large-scale governmental
delegation, was sent to Europe and America 10 years before the Korean Mission
came to Japan. Iwakura, given the title of the Ambassador Extraordinary and
Plenipotentiary, was accompanied by 4 deputies – State Counselor Kido
Takayoshi, Financial Minister Okubo Toshimichi, Senior Counselor to the
Ministry of Industry Ito Hirobumi, and Junior Counselor to the Foreign Ministry
Yamaguchi Naoyoshi, - as well as 41 middle-ranked bureaucrats from various
governmental institutions, 18 aids, and 43 students. Just 4 months after
traditional feudal “domains” were abolished and substituted by “prefectures” (ken),
the new-born Meiji government, which made its first steps to the creation of a
nation-state, afforded itself to send abroad half of its leaders, together with
the key managers of various governmental agencies and the participants of
diplomatic missions of bakumatsu days, in a 100-odd strong delegation[29].
The character and aims of the Iwakura Mission were
made clear in the farewell speech by Sanjo Sanetomi, then head of the State Council[30]:
“Exchanges with foreign countries are decisive for the
stability or crisis of the state, and the abilities of the envoys are decisive
for either glorifying or disgracing the state. Now, after the Restoration, we
are going to achieve an equal place among the countries of the world, and this
duty is to be discharged by you ten thousand li away from the homeland.
The success of our foreign and domestic policies, the great enterprise of
tomorrow all depend, in fact, on your departure and your ability to fulfill
your duties. The Ambassador is an elder, who has a record of meritorious
service for the Restoration. You, his deputies, are all the props and stays of
the state, and your, attendants, are also outstanding people of the generation.
You should cooperate in the spirit of faithful respect to this great aim, to
ensure that your duty will be fulfilled. I know that your wishes will be
realized in the near future. Go! Changing steamers in the sea, changing trains
on the land, go, and win a reputation all over the world, and come back safely.”
Iwakura Mission, which departed in November 1871 with
such a strong sense of “great duty”, spent following year and ten month touring
officially the “advanced countries” of the Western world: USA, Britain, France,
Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, Russia, Denmark, Sweden, Switzerland, Italy,
Austria, etc. On the way back, it also had a chance to observe the state of
things in the less developed parts of the world, namely Middle East and South
Asia[31].
As Sanjo mentioned in his speech, Ambassador Iwakura
and his deputies Okubo and Kido were among the major figures of the
Restoration, to come to the heights of power after their return home. On basis
of the knowledge and information obtained during the trip abroad, Okubo
presented his <Opinion on the Constitutional System of government>, and
Kido – his <Proposal to Formulate the Constitution>. So, they were able
to begin to realize their project of building a nation-state along the European
model they witnessed, just after their return home[32].
Having painfully realized that West’s modern successes
were not achieved overnight, they understood that, for overcoming its backwardness
and entering the ranks of modern states, Japan had to simultaneously develop
industry, judiciary, education, military, and all other spheres. That was the
context of their rejection of Saigo’s plan to “conquer Korea” on their return
home. In Okubo’s refutation of that plan he wrote: “Recently, the government is
raising various industries in its quest for the wealth and strength. In most
cases, successes can be expected only in a few years. Fleet and army,
education, judiciary, industrial schools, wasteland reclamation – all these
things do not give results overnight.”[33]
Middle-ranked bureaucrats and students that
accompanied the Mission also contributed in the formation of Japan-styled
nation-state, distinguishing themselves in various spheres. Moreover, the
results of the Mission’s trip were all included into the <Account of Travel to America and
Europe> compiled by Kumi Kunitake, and became a part of
public informational domain. As Kumi himself wrote, he “edited and published
the results of the Mission’s trip for the sake of development of the general
public knowledge”. It means that he perceived the Mission as a representative
of Japanese “nation”, not of the Emperor, and, on the basis of such
understanding, shared Mission’s results with the nation[34].
Korean missions that went abroad to “learn modernity”,
were, unlike their Japanese counterparts, unofficial. It can be said that this
difference reflects the different posture of the two governments in the matter
of accepting modern institutions. Although 12 Korean courtiers and their
assistants diligently discharged their mission of observing things Japanese for
4 months, from the very beginning their experience was not to be fully utilized
in the process of Korea’s modernization. First of all, they came to Japan with
Kojong’s secret orders as private individuals, and it hardly could have been
other way: the atmosphere of dogmatic Confucian dominance was too strong in
Korea. Also they had, in comparison with Japan’s missions of bakumatsu
and early Meiji times, the following limitations:
First, Koreans witnessed Japan’s modernization efforts
20 years after Meiji reforms had begun, and their acquaintance with modernity
was virtually limited to the experience of only one of its variations – the
experience of Japan’s Meiji project. Korean diplomats or students stayed in
Japan for the periods ranging from 4 months to 1 year – the period of time insufficient
for digesting of the achievements of Japan-styled nation-state or Europe’s
modern intellect. There was high possibility that they would take the modernity
“translated” – or, in many cases, rather “misread” and “misinterpreted” by the
Meiji intellectuals – in place of its European original. As a result, they
could not but roam in the labyrinth of “triple-translated modernity”, created
in the process of interactions between West and Japan, suffering from much
worse intellectual chaos than their Japanese contemporaries[35].
The 1881 Korean Mission members, who were first ever Koreans to encounter the
Meiji-coined logographical words used for translating borrowed western terms,
experienced enormous difficulties in understanding the meanings behind these
new combinations of Chinese characters[36].
Second, as Fukuzawa stressed, Meiji missions were
strongly conscious about their aim of comprehending the main points of West’s
intellectual and material achievements for the sake of obtaining an equal place
in the “community of the nations”, and were mostly staffed with the energetic
individuals who were in the positions of power. On the other side, the members
of the 1881 Korean Mission, being, of course, a group of outstandingly able
courtiers, were – with the exception of Ŏ Yunjung and Hong Yŏngsik – hardly more than King’s “vassals” who, living in the world of
feudal notions, simply followed King’s order and participated in the Mission regardless
of their personal intentions. The Mission’s attendants were mostly chosen on
the basis of their personal relationship with the individual courtiers, and, -
except Yun Ch’iho (1865-1945) and Yu Giljun (1856-1914) who were scheduled to
remain in Japan for further studies, - lacked both in bureaucratic experience
and professionalism. The rest of the 1881 Mission – more than 20 lackeys and
interpreters of traditional yŏkkwan background – were also hardly aware
of the issues of modernity enough to help the courtiers to understand modern
things better.
Third, Japanese missions considered it important to
publish their experiences, thus sharing them with the nation, but Korean
courtiers were not interested in such things. On return to Korea, they spent on
average around two months, writing their “Reports” and “Observations” in the
traditional style with the help of petty officials good at calligraphy, to show
the King how well they fulfilled his secret orders. These “Reports” and “Observations”,
hand-written and bound with silk, were presented to Kojong and used then by the
King or higher officials in the process of decision-making as reference
materials, but hardly exerted any influence in the larger community[37].
5. Conclusion:
The 1881 Korean Mission members were able to relate
the shock they felt in the encounter with Japan’s “bunmei kaiwa”, to Korea’s
rulers, contributed in changing their value system, and influenced their
decision-making process. In this respect, we can say that their Japanese
experiences were socially – not only personally – meaningful. Their trip also
signified the “trading of roles” in the history of Korean-Japanese cultural
exchanges. The ideas of either establishing a nation-state or reforming
existing structures (“Eastern morality”) on the basis of “Western skills” that
the Mission members came to in the result of their trip became two most important
sources of inspiration for Korea’s reforms of the 1880-1890s. We can say that
at that period, Korea could follow either Chinese moderate way of “Eastern morality,
Western skills”-type reforms, or Japanese way of building a nation-state. From
our today positions, the latter seems to be more desirable. The former, which acknowledged
only Western technical superiority and did not recognize the importance of its
basis, modern Western ideas, was, in fact, rather an anachronism.
The fact that those Mission members who were in favor
of Japanese way, were in minority, suggested that the ensuing process of Korean
modernization would not be smooth. But, in a broader prospective, it may be
also argued that the modern experiences in Japan also could have seriously
changed the views of those “Eastern morality, Western skills” advocates who
were still more flexible towards Western institutions than traditional
Confucian conservatives, and imbued them with the awareness of the necessity of
building a nation-state in Korea. In fact, even Fukuzawa Yukichi, when he was
touring Europe in 1862, could not understand how a product of Western modernity
– democracy – worked in practice[38].
But then, on the basis of his observations in the West, he grew into a modern “enlightenment”
thinker. It is sure that the information on Western modernity he obtained on
the spot could not been understood by him immediately at that moment, but
influenced his worldview in the longer prospective nevertheless. In the same
way, some of those Mission members who first stood on the “Eastern morality,
Western skills” positions, became, in 10 years, leading actors of the radical
Kabo Reforms (1894-1895), aimed at the establishment of modern nation-state.
Pak Chŏngyang became Education Minister and Prime Minister, Yi Hŏnyŏng – Minister of Internal Affairs, Ŏm Seyŏng – Minister of
Agriculture and Industry in the reform governments. The main organ of the Kabo
reforms – The State Deliberative Council on Civil and Military Affairs (kun’guk
kimuch’ŏ)
– had the system of “collective leadership” not dissimilar with Meiji Institutions,
which were positively, appreciated by the “Eastern morality, Western skills”
advocates. The system of elective local assemblies (hyanghwe) the
reformers wanted to implant in Korea was also largely modeled after Meiji
system of local self-rule, highly acclaimed by the erstwhile “Eastern morality,
Western skills” partisans. Judging from these features of their reformist
agenda, they also seem likely to have understood the necessity to build a
nation-state in the long term. But why the ideas of Ŏ Yunjung, who advocated the establishment of a nation-state, were doomed
to failure? There were many reasons, and one of them was the ill-starred Kapsin
1884 coup – ironically, masterminded by Ŏ Yunjung’s closest fellow thinkers. The other was Chinese interference
and conservative Confucian reaction that only intensified after the coup’s
failure.
Ŏ Yunjung, Yu
Giljun, Yun Ch’iho, and other former Mission members or attendants, who were
accused of “sympathies” to the masterminds of the 1884 Kapsin coup and either
sent out to petty official posts or repressed, could return on the political
stage and put their new statehood projects into practice only during the 1894 Kabo
Reforms. They were thinking about Cabinet-centered constitutional monarchy
able to unify the country, introduction of limited popular representation,
creation of police system, modernization of laws, and raising a standing army.
As to the methods of economical unification, they considered increasing state
income through regularizing royal finances, improvement of tax collection,
developing new tax income sources, and government-led promotion of private
industrial enterprise. These plans were to be financed by loans from Japan. As
to the national unification, they advocated creating a nation through
abolishment of hereditary status system and building of a modern educational
system. To assert Korea’s sovereignty and independence internationally,
tributary relationship with China was to be abolished.
As, not unlike the radical masterminds of the Kapsin
coup, they planned to establish a nation-state with Japanese assistance, and as
in reality their nation-making efforts aided, to some degree, Japan’s
imperialist aggression, they hardly can be absolved from the charges of “reformist”
collaboration with the Japanese imperialism. The lack of independent
self-consciousness so conspicuous in their projects remains a common inherent
weakness of all Korean governments from the 1884 coup times up to our days. Ŏ Yunjung’s plans of Japan-modeled nation-building were
the prototype of the nation-creating programs of almost all Korean reformist
movements, from 1884 up to the time of the so-called “patriotic enlightenment
movement” (the 1910s). The reason was the visible viability of the Japanese
model, although it distorted the ideals of Great French Revolution – popular
sovereignty, equality, and freedom.
Lack of any consideration of human rights in the
government models developed by Koreans themselves in the time of the
modernizing reforms attempts in the 1880-1900s, makes these models similar to
the authoritarian systems established in post-colonial South and North Korea,
especially to the South Korean military dictatorships after 1961. Especially
interesting is the fact that the plans for centralized government-led modern
state-building and foreign loans-financed economical development worked out by Ŏ Yunjung’s, look like a prototype of the
state-building and developmental strategies implemented by the military governments
after the coup on May 16, 1961. Time and spatial differences notwithstanding,
both could not overcome the Meiji nation-building model – characteristically
non-democratic, unrelated to the universalistic ideals of modernity.
In the end, we should emphasize that the forces that
stood behind the Meiji project of nation making, preferred to differentiate
themselves for the imagined “West”, made into Japan’s “Other”, and went by the
course of reviving Japan’s ancient “traditions”, a far cry from Western
universalism. For one example, they used the barely preserved Shinto and
Imperial institutes for the cultural unification, in place of Western
Christianity. But, while Meiji Japanese authorities wanted the carefully
revived, protected, and nurtured Shinto to be a counterweight to Christianity, Ŏ Yunjung – as well as Kim Okkyun and other Kapsin
coup organizers – considered Christianity a good substitute for Confucianism,
an instrument for achieving “strength and wealth” and “civilizing the people”.
I wish to note that this opinion difference in the question of the reception of
Christianity was afterwards reflected in very different patterns of accepting
Christianity in Japan and Korea.
[1] Tanaka, Akira, <Iwakura shisetsudan : meiji
ishin no naka no beio>, Kodansha gendai shinsho, 487, Tokyo, Kodansha, 1977,
p. 48; <Iwakura shisetsudan beio kairan jikki>, Dojidai raiburarii, Tokyo,
Iwanami Shoten, 1994, p. 46; <Beio kairan jikki no gakusaiteki kenkyu>, Sapporo,
Hokkaido daigaku tosho kankokai, 1993, pp. 6-7.
[2] Shinmura, Izuru, <Kojien>, Tokyo,
Iwanami Shoten, 1991 (fourth edition).
[3] Han Gyŏnggu, «Hyŏndae Ilbon-ŭi naebu Orient’allijŭm-gwa Oksident’allijŭm”, - <Han’guk munhwa
illyu hakhwe che 33 ch’a chŏn’guk taehwe> (texts of the presentations),
2001. Although the roots of the Japanese nation-state (kokumin kokka)
lie in the West, this Western model underwent changes in the process of
interaction with the Japanese forms. The concept of “Occidentalism” which is used for analysis of the “misreadings” and “misinterpretations” of the Western
modernity, seems to be very useful for the research on such phenomena. See:
Chen Xiao Mei (translated into Korean by Chŏng Chinbae, Kim Chŏnga), <Occidentalism>, Kang
Publishers, Seoul, 2001.
[4] Nation-state looks as a fruit of «imagination», a product of the quest for personal eternity
inside the fold of a state or nation that began after the decline of the
universal religions of the Middle Ages. The definition of a nation as an “imagined political community” was given by Benedict Andersen in
his book, <Imagined Communities>. After his research, mostly based on
South East Asian and South American – not the traditional European – material, and clearly pointing out to the “imagined’ nature of the “national” ideas,
appeared in print, the direction of the debates of “nations” was greatly changed. Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities:
Reflections on the Origin and spread of Nationalism, London·New
York: Verso, 1983; Revised Edition 1991. Korean renditions: Trans. by Yun
Hyŏngsuk, <Minjokchuŭi kiwŏn-gwa chŏnp’a>, Nanam
Publishers, 1991; Ch’oe Sŏgyŏng, <Minjok Ŭisig-ŭi
yŏksa illyuhak>, Sŏgyŏng munhwasa Publishers, 1995.
[5] Nishikawa, Nagao, “Nihongata kokumin kokka no keisei -- hikakushiteki kanten kara”, - Nishikawa Nagao, Matsumiya Hideharu (ed.), <Bakumatsu meijiki no
kokumin kokka keisei to bunka hen'yo>, Tokyo, Shin'yosha, 195, pp. 3-42.
[6] Oka, Yoshitake (transl. by Chang Insŏng), <Kŭndae Ilbon chŏngch’isa>, Sohwa Publishers,
Seoul, 1996, pp. 18, 31; Kim Yongdŏk, “Kaehang-gwa chagang-ŭi mosaek”, - Pak Yŏngjae
(ed.), <19segi Ilbon-ŭi kŭndaehwa>, Seoul National University
Publishing Department, 1996, pp. 122-128.
[7] Nishikawa, Nagao, “Nihongata kokumin kokka no keisei -- hikakushiteki kanten kara”, pp. 30-38; Yasumaru, Yoshio, <Senhappyakugoju--shichijunendai no
nihon -- ishin henkaku>: Iwanami koza nihon tsushi : kindai 1, 16, Tokyo, Iwanami
Shoten, 1994, pp. 40-43; Makihara, Norio, “Bunmei kaikaron”, Op. sit, pp. 259-264.
[8] The «restoration of Imperial Institutions» Korean envoys were to witness, was neither establishment of an Oriental
autocracy nor a perfect rendition of a European constitutional monarchy. The
common feature with the constitutional monarchy was the fact that the Emperor “reigned, but not ruled”, but, unlike European constitutional
monarchies, the powers of the ruling “clan cliques” were not
checked by a constitution or parliament. The ruling forces considered their
main task to achieve “strong army and rich state” ideal as quickly as possible and to defend Japan’s independent existence against the advancement of the West. So, they
put the Emperor on the façade as a symbol of national unification, and,
oppressing the demands for civil freedom or equality “from below”, introduced Japanized Western institutes “from above”. I will call that undemocratic “clan clique” government “the centralized government” hereafter.
[9] Sasinami, Akiko, «Kisen to doro», - Takamura, Naosuke (ed.), <Sangyo kakumei
: kindai nihon no kiseki ; 8>, Tokyo, Yoshikawa Kobunkan, 1994, pp. 68-87; Kokaze,
Hidemasa, “Tetsudo no Jidai”, - Op. sit,
pp. 88-90; Kajinishi, Mitsuhaya, “Kotsu tsushin gyo no hattatsu”, - Shibusawa, Keizo (ed.), <Meiji bunkashi ; shakai keizai>: 11, Tokyo,
Hara Shobo, 1979, pp. 407-421; Yasumaru, Yoshio, <Senhappyakugoju--shichijunendai
no nihon -- ishin henkaku>, pp. 42-43; Nishikawa, Nagao, “Nihongata kokumin kokka no keisei -- hikakushiteki kanten kara”, pp. 31-33.
[10] Yamaguchi, Kazuo, <Nihon keizaishi keizaigaku
zenshu: 12>, Tokyo, Chikuma Shobo, 1968,
pp. 93-108; Oe, Shinobu, <Nihon no sangyo kakumei>, Tokyo, Iwanami
Shoten, 1968, pp. 1-8, 49-73; Kamiyama, Tsuneo, “Kangyo kara mingyo he”, -
Takamura, Naosuke (ed.), <Sangyo kakumei: kindai nihon no kiseki: 8>,
Tokyo, Yoshikawa Kobunkan, 1994, pp. 47-49; Ishijuka, Hiromichi, “Shokusan
kogyo seisaku no tenkai”, - Kajinishi, Mitsuhaya (ed.), <Nihon keizaishi
taikei. Kindai jo: 5>, Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1965, pp. 44-47.
[11] Okubo, Toshiaki, “Bunmei kaika”, -
<(Iwanami koza) Nihon rekishi: Kindai 2>, 15, Tokyo, Iwanami Shoten,
1967, pp. 255-258; Hirota Masaki, “Keimo siso to bunmei kaika”, - <(Iwanami koza) Nihon rekishi: Kindai 1>, 14, Tokyo, Iwanami
Shoten, 1975, pp. 338-339; Yasumaru, Yoshio, <Senhappyakugoju--shichijunendai
no nihon -- ishin henkaku>, pp. 40-43; Makihara, Norio, “Bunmei kaikaron”, Op. sit, pp. 255.
[12] <Chōya shinbun>, 1881, May 20th.
[13] Hŏ Donghyŏn, «1881nyŏn Chosŏn chosa Ilbon sich'aldan-e kwanhan il yŏn’gu”,-<Han’guk sa yŏn’gu>, Vol.
52, 1986, pp. 135-146; “1881nyŏn chosa sich’aldan-ŭi Myŏngch'i
Ilbon chŏngch’i chedo ihae”, - ,-<Han’guk sa yŏn’gu>, Vol.
86, 1994, pp. 136-137; “1881nyŏn chosa sich’aldan-ŭi Myŏngch’i
Ilbon Sabŏp chedo ihae”, - <Chindan hakpo>, Vol. 84, 1997, pp.
146-148; “1881nyŏn chosa sich’aldan-ŭi Myŏngch’i Ilbon kunjegwan
yŏn’gu”, - <At’ae yŏn’gu>, Vol. 5, 1998, pp. 483-487; “1881nyŏn
chosa sich’aldan-ŭi Myŏngch’i Ilbon sahwe p’ungsokkwan”, - <Han’guk sa yŏn’gu>, Vol. 101,
1998, p. 148; “Ilbon sich’aldan-ŭi p’agyŏn”, - <Han’guk
sa>, Vol. 38, Kuksa p’yŏnch’an wiwŏnhwe, 1999, pp. 121-125.
[14] Ŏ Yunjung, «Sumun rok», - <Charyojip>, Vol. 13, pp. 15, 25, 26: “Our country
reveres Confucian principle and admires weakness as wisdom, and, as a result,
we have no brave-hearted people. So, if we wish to reform our customs, we
should first to urge the people to change the old ways…If the
Confucian exams for the state posts will be abolished, the crowds of
public-spirited, enterprising people will find their way abroad, to learn
skills and technologies, and come back. But, once the traditional Confucian
exams will not be abolished, no talents will appear; the people will satisfy
themselves with old learning and will not strive for progress in knowledge. All
the ancients considered poverty ‘comfortable’ and preached ‘enjoyment of poverty’, but that is really not right. Once the people
are made to think that poverty is ‘comfortable’, they are not
made to search for the ways of making better living; how will they sustain
their mouths and bodies?”
[15] Hŏ Donghyŏn, «1881nyŏn chosa Ŏ Yunjung-ŭi Ilbon kyŏngje chŏngch’aek insik”, - <Han’guk sa yŏn’gu>, Vol. 93, 1996, pp. 124-129.
[16] <Sŭngjŏngwŏn Ilgi>, 1881, September 1st; Ŏ Yunjung, “Chongjŏng yŏnp’yo”, - Hŏ Donghyŏn (ed.), <Chosa sich’aildan kwan’gye charyojip>,
Vol. 13, Seoul, Kukhak charyowŏn, 2000, p. 194.
[17] Before, Ŏ Yunjung's reformist ideas were
misunderstood as a typical example of moderate «Eastern
morality, Western skills» ideology, on the basis of the Yi Hŏnyŏng’s treatise
entitled <Tongnae ŏsa sŏgye (tan)> that was wrongly ascribed to Ŏ. See: Cho Gyŏngdal, “Chosen ni okeru
taikokushugi to shokokushugi no sokoku ― shoki kaikaha no shiso”, -
<Chosenshi kenkyukai ronbunshu>, Vol. 22, 1985, pp. 70-73; Ch’oe Jinsik, “Ŏ Yunjung-ŭi pugangnon yŏn’gu”, - <Kuksagwan nonch’ong>, Vol. 41, 1993, pp. 58-60. See
bibliographic explanations on <Tongnae ŏsa sŏgye (tan)> in: Hŏ
Donghyŏn, “Chosa sich’aldan-ŭi Ilbon kyŏnmun kirok ch’ongnam”, -
<Sach’ong>, Vol. 48, 1998, pp. 47-48.
[18] Hŏ Donghyŏn, «1881nyŏn Chosŏn chosa Ilbon sich'aldan-e kwanhan il yŏn’gu”, pp. 135-137; Hŏ Donghyŏn, “1881nyŏn chosa sich’aldan-ŭi Myŏngch’i Ilbon sahwe p’ungsokkwan”,
pp. 148.
[19] «I could not but
lament in my heart the competition between the profit-seeking countries of
today's world, even before receiving instruction on it. If this will continue
in such a fashion, where will the teaching of the Duke of Ch’ou and Confucius, as well as rituals and music, be made clear in the
end? That is more than a usual occasion for anxiety and lamentations”, - Yi Hŏnyŏng, “Ilsa chimnyak”, - Hŏ Donghyŏn (ed.), <Charyojip>, Vol. 14,
p. 46.
“A look at the books newly printed after Meiji
shows that eight or nine of every ten are the Western ones. 4-5 studying people
sometimes come to the [Confucian] library, but there are no students. Some
people say that it was impudent on the part of the high-placed persons to
discontinue the Confucian sacrifices. How shameful and lamentable!”, - Mun Chongmuk, “Mun’gyŏn sagŏn”, - Ibid, pp.
124-125.
[20] Pak
Chŏngyang et al., “Tongnae
amhaeng ŏsa pongmyŏng ipsi si yŏnsŏl”, - Han’gukhak
munhŏn yŏn’guso (ed.), < Pak Chŏngyang chŏnjip>, Vol. 4,
Asea munhwasa, 1984, p. 332.
[21] Ibid, pp. 338-340; Hŏ Donghyŏn, «1881nyŏn Chosŏn chosa Ilbon sich'aldan-e kwanhan
il yŏn’gu”, pp. 113.
[22] Cho
Junyŏng, “Mun’gyŏn sagŏn”, - Hŏ Donghyŏn (ed.), <Charyojip>, Vol. 12,
pp. 610-611.
[23] Hŏ Donghyŏn, “Ŏ
Yunjung (1848-1896)-ŭi kaehwa sasang yŏngu: ‘on’gŏn kaehwap’a naeji ch’inch’ŏng sadaep’a sŏr-e taehan pip’anjŏk kŏmt’o”, - <Han’guk sasang sahak>, Vol. 17, 2001, pp. 442-467.
[24] «Ŏ Yunjung’s Letter” (Meiji, 14th Year, December 20th),
- Keyo gijuku (ed.), <Fukuzawa Yukichi<
zenshu>, Vol. 21, Tokyo, Iwanami Shoten, 1964, p. 374: “Kim
Okkyun, Pak Yŏnghyo, and Sŏ Gwangbŏm from [our] humble country
are [my] intimate friends. With this ship they will cross the sea to [your]
precious state. As they have heard your esteemed name before, should not they
pay you’re their humble greetings? I beg you to render them your assistance in
various matters, so that there would be no reasons to worry about difficulties”.
[25] Hŏ Donghyŏn, <Kŭndae Hanil kwan’gye sa yŏn’gu>, Seoul,
Kukhak charyowŏn, 2000, pp. 97-126, 149-166, 186-207, 219-232.
[26] <Kojong sillok>, Vol. 19, Kojong’s 19th year, August 5th; Kwŏn Oyŏng, “Tongdosŏgiron-ŭi kujo-wa
kŭ chŏn’gae”, - <Han’guk sa simin kangchwa>, Vol. 7, 1990, pp.
84-96.
[27] Tanaka, Akira, <Kaikoku to tobaku: Nihon no
rekishi, 15>, Tokyo, Shueisha, 1992, pp. 223-225; Haga, Toru (translated
into Korean by Son Sunok), <Myŏngch’i Yusin-gwa Ilbonin>, Seoul, Yeha
Publishers, 1989, pp. 125-136.
[28] Haga Toru, Op. Sit, pp. 138-140.
[29] Tanaka, Akira, «Iwakura
shisetsudan», pp. 8-9; “Iwakura
shisetsudan beyo kairan jikki”, pp. 2-3.
[30] Tanaka, Akira, ; “Iwakura
shisetsudan beio kairan jikki”, pp. 44.
[31] Ibid, pp. 46-194.
[32] Ibid, pp. 210-212.
[33] Ibid, pp. 204-208.
[34] Ibid, p. 46; Matsumoto, Ken'ichi, <Nihon no kindai: Kaikoku Ishin>, 1, Tokyo, Chuo koronsha, 1998, pp. 347-355; Hukui Junko, “Beio kairan jikki no seiritsu”, - Nishikawa, Nagao, Matsumiya, Hideharu, <Beio kairan jikki o yomu>, Kyoto, Horitsu bunkasha, 1995, pp. 429-430.
[35] It is well-known, for example, that the term “jiyu minken undo” (“freedom and people’s rights movement”) used in early Meiji days, resulted from a
mistranslation of the concept of “individual rights” by the generic term “minken” (“people’s rights”). Other famous episode is mistranslation of Herbert
Spenser’s <Social Statics> (1851) into <Shakai Heikenron>
(literally: “social equal rights”) instead of
more exact “shakai seigaku” – the mistranslation that made the book into a “gospel” of sorts for the “freedom and people’s rights
movement”. See: Maruyama Masao, Kato Shuichi (Korean
translation by Im Sŏngmo), <Pŏnyŏk-kwa Ilbon-ŭi kŭndae>,
Seoul, Isan Publishers, 2000, pp. 54, 88-89, 107. On the term “translated
modernity”, see: Lydia Liu, Translingual Practice: Literature,
National Culture, and Translated Modernity-China, 1900-1937, Stanford
University Press, 1995; Im
Sŏngmo, “Translator’s Postscript”, - Maruyama
Masao, Kato Shuichi, Op. sit, pp. 219-226.
[36] Akijuki, Nojomi, «Suematsu Jiro-ŭi
p’ildam-e nat’anan kŭndae: 1881nyŏn-ŭi ‘sinsa yuramdan’-gwa-ŭi
kyoryu-rŭl chungsim-ŭro”, - <Kŭndae kyoryusa-wa sangho
insik>, 1, Koryŏ Taehakkyo Asea munje yŏn’guso, 2001, pp. 25-34.
[37] Most of the Mission's reports were kept in
Kojong's person collection, Chibokje: Yi T’aejin,
<Kojong sidaesa-ŭi chaejomyŏng>, Seoul, T’aehaksa, 2000, pp. 300-303.
[38] Fukuzawa Yukichi, «Fukuo jiden», - <Fukuzawa Yukichi zenshu>, 7, Tokyo, Iwanami Shoten, 1970, pp.
107-108: “I could not understand at all what was the
election law in the politics about. When I asked what kind of law is the
election law, and what kind of office is parliament, my opposite numbers just
laughed at me. It looked as if they understood what I was asking about… It was also known that there were two groups called ‘Conservative’ and ‘Liberal’ parties, that
fiercely struggled against each other, both unwilling to lose to the other side… I could not understand why they are fighting each other in the politics
in such a peaceful and prosperous time… And, even being political enemies,
they eat and drink together! I could not understand it at all.”