The present article was published in “Transactions. Royal Asiatic Society. Korea Branch”. Vol. 76-2001, pp. 31-43.
P.G. FON MOELLENDORFF’S “PRO-RUSSIAN” ACTIVITIES IN KOREA (1882-1885): OPINIONS OF RUSSIAN HISTORIOGRAPHERS
International Center for Korean Studies
Moscow State University
German Oriental studies scholar and diplomat baron Paul George von Moellendorff (1847-1901, Korean name Mok Rin-dok) was the first in Korean history European, who was invited by this country for official service. From the end of 1882 till summer of 1885 he worked there in different high ranks from that of Inspector-General of the Customs up to vice foreign minister (ch’amp’an) and actively participated in the most important political events, connected with the opening of Korea to the outer world and its search of a new place in the system of international relations. In the South Korean and Western historiography he is usually estimated as a “pro-Russian” politician because his activities were aimed at making Russia the new “elder brother” of Korea instead of crumbling China in order to protect Korean sovereignty and security. This idea came to him after the military mutiny of the Imo year (1882), as he was greatly indignant of the severe conditions (Inch’on Treaty), which Japan forced on Korea after the suppression of the mutiny. He consistently followed the policy of strengthening Korean-Russian relations till he was dismissed in 1885. Nevertheless Russian historians do not consider Moellendorff’s activities as “pro-Russian”. The author shares their opinion. At the same time almost every Russian historian, who wrote on this subject, usually gives his/her own interpretation of Moellendorff’s role in Korea. In the following article the author presents the specter of opinions of Russian historians and explains the reasons for her own conviction that Mok champ’an was not “pro-Russian”, relying on the latest research of South Korean historians and the book by Lee Yur-Bok “West Goes East”.
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Russian historiography of the Soviet period mentioned P.G. von Moellendorff rarely and usually negatively. From one side, it can be explained by Marxist theory of the role of individuals in history, which prevailed at that time. According to this theory mass of people play the main role in the historical process while the role of individuals is insignificant. On the other side, it was a reflection of the typical for the Soviet period suspiciousness towards foreigners, especially to such “ideologically alien elements” as barons from imperialist countries.
P.G. von Moellendorff’s name appeared in a Russian historical work for the first time in 1947. It was Mikhail Pak’s candidate dissertation “Sketches of the Korean history in the second half of the 19th century”. It was not published and remained known only to a narrow circle of Oriental scholars.
In 1956 A.L.Narochnitsky introduced Moellendorff’s activities in Korea to Russian readers in his ample book “Colonial Policy of the Capitalist Countries in the Far East. 1860-1895”. He thoroughly described the German diplomat’s contacts with Russian officials in the Far East from August 1884 till July 1885 relying on the materials from Russian archives. Those Russian officials were: Military agent in Peking colonel Shneur (August 1884, Peking), the Chief of fleet in the Far East, counter-admiral M.Crown (August 1884, Chefu); Consul in Nagasaki (December 1884); Secretary of the diplomatic mission in Tokyo A.Shpeer (January 1885, Seoul); the head of the same mission Davydov (March 1885, Tokyo).
Narochnitsky presented in brief and in a chronological order the reports of the abovementioned officials about their meetings with Moellendorff and thus showed the development of the latter’s concept of the future Russian-Korean alliance: from the adoption of Korea under a joint protectorate of Russia, Britain and other European states to creation of the bilateral Russian-Korean alliance and invitation of Russian officers for training the Korean army.
Most of historians usually presume that Moellendorff sought Russian protectorate over Korea. It seems appropriate to analyze if it was really so not only from a political and historical point of view, but also from a cross-cultural perspective. Moellendorff was the first high-ranking Korean official who ever got in contact with Russian officials. It was him who started the dialogue of two completely different cultures (that is Korea and Russia), which had no any notion of each other and a very small experience of communication. The scarce literature, which had been written in Korea about Russia and in Russia about Korea by 1880-es provided too few knowledge. Russian diplomatic documents prove that Moellendorff’s first contacts with Russian officials took them by surprise and made Russian Foreign Ministry send their representative to Seoul to get some knowledge about Korea and the political situation in this country. For Russian officials in the Far East P.G. von Moellendorff was a messenger from a completely unknown world, who tried to express the realities of that world by means of European languages (he contacted with Russian counterparts mainly in German and sometimes in English and French), in which those realities had no definition.
Achievement of Russian-Korean military cooperation was the most important part of Moellendorff’s efforts, aimed at preserving Korean independence. In modern diplomacy such notions as “military cooperation” and “independence” are incompatible with the notion of “protectorate”. Russian military representatives supported this idea, as it can be seen from Colonel Shneur’s report (See the attachment). Russia did not have any intention of interfering in Korean affairs, not speaking about ‘protectorate’. In 1854 Russian Foreign Ministry elaborated an instruction, which envisaged the direction of the Russian policy towards Korea for the future when relations with it would be established. The main content of that policy was preserving “status-quo”, that is China’s suzerainty over Korea, which was considered by Russian policy-makers as the guarantee of stability of Russian borders in the Far East. This policy was implemented since 1860, when Russia got a common border with Korea, and was consistently followed by Russia till the end of the war between China and Japan in 1895.
King Kojong had little knowledge of the realities of European policy and searched for a new “elder brother” in accordance with sadae – the traditional policy of revering elder (that is China), which embodied his notion of relations with a stronger neighbor. His main aim was to preserve the status quo – that is the position of the country as it had existed for many centuries. Thus, it is sure that King Kojong could not ask for ‘protectorate’, which meant loss of Korean sovereignty and limitation of his absolute power. Moellendorff knew the difference of approach of the negotiating sides and had many difficulties while translating. It can be seen from the full text of his letter to the Russian envoy in Tokyo Davydov (dated March 1885), published by Narochnitsky. In this letter Moellendorff, while avoiding the word “protectorate”, wrote, that the Korean state “could normally develop only in case if a third state – stronger than China and Japan – would take it under the protection”. “It is difficult to formulate the suggestions from the Korean side, - wrote Moellendorff. – That is why the Russian government should define the contents of its relations with Korea and elaborate an agreement, which would guarantee the neutrality and integrity of Korea”. “In any case it would be useful to increase Russian influence in Korea”, he added.
Narochnitsky presumed that Moellendorff’s activities in 1885 showed sympathies towards Russia of King Kojong, Queen Min and a part of close to the throne representatives of the Min clan. “This court and Kojong hoped that tsarist Russia would be able to protect Korea from English and Japanese encroachments and also from China’s attempts to put the Korean court under its complete control. English diplomacy and press tried to use Moellendorff’s intentions to use Russian support as a counterbalance to England for involving the Ch’ing government and Japan into a controversy with Russia and for diverting their attention from Great Britain’s aggressive policy”, Narochnitsky resumed.
Two-volume “History of Korea” (1974) mentioned Moellendorff only once, in connection with the steps of the Chinese government after the Imo military mutiny (1882). The book described Moellendorff as a Chinese protégé, who was sent to Korea along with Chinese officers and officials to strengthen the Chinese political and economic influence.
Boris D.Pak who is considered the main specialist in the history of Russian-Korean relations in the 19th century, did not mention Moellendorff’s name even once in that part of his famous book “Russia and Korea” (1979), where he described the conclusion of the Russian-Korean Treaty of 1884. Moellendorff appeared in the part of that book, which was devoted to king Kojong’s attempts to regulate the complications, which arose after the coup-de-tat of 1884 (Kapsin chŏngbyŏng). “As China and Japan were increasing their military presence in Korea Kojong and his court decided to ask Russian protection in order to preserve independence of the country through the services of a German P.G.Moellendorff, who was a foreign advisor of the Korean government”, B.D.Pak wrote. According to him, in general Moellendorff intrigued against Russia and protected not the Korean interests but mostly that of Germany. “Proposing to the Korean king to turn for protection to Russia, Moellendorff decided to counterpose tsarist Russia to Japan, China, England and the USA and to give an opportunity to Germany to give services to Russia and thus to share rights for Korea with it”, B.D.Pak argued.
Bella B.Pak, a recognized specialist in the history of Russian diplomacy in Korea in the 19th C., completely shares his opinion.
The abovementioned opinion seems ill-founded if we take into consideration baron von Moellendorff’s attitude to the question of inviting foreign military instructors. Although the Chinese expressed the wish that Korea hired German military instructors to train the Korean army, Moellendorff himself never recommended it to Kojong. As Lee Yur-bok points out, “Moellendorff thought that whatever country provided military instructors to Korea should also be the one that would play a dominant role in the diplomatic and political matters of Korea. In his opinion, that country should be nearby Russia, not far-away Germany”.
Boris Pak stresses that Moellendorff was, in the first place, the executor of king Kojong’s schemes and that the frame of his official duties limited the degree of his independence in actions. The Russian scientists refutes the opinion of some South Korean historians, who insist that during the stay in Seoul of Alexey Shpeer, the secretary of the Russian diplomatic mission in Tokyo in January 1885, Moellendorff tried to persuade the Korean government to conclude a treaty with Russia and to cede 10 districts of the Hamgyong province to it in exchange for Russia’s obligation to protect Korean ports with its fleet. Dr. Pak relies on Shpeer’s detailed reports about his visit to Korea. There is not even a hint of such a treaty in there.
Dr.L.V.Zabrovskaya, specializing in the history of China of the new period, considers Moellendorff a mercenary, who had no intentions of protecting Korean interests. She insists that he used his high position of King Kojong’s political advisor for his personal enrichment and secretly informed the representatives of foreign states in Seoul about plans of the Korean government concerning foreign policy and also about the projects of giving concessions to foreigners”. Dr. Zabrovskaya resumes, that Kojong dismissed Moellendorff because his activities “caused anger of all the states”, and this conclusion seems contradictive to her previous estimation of him as of paid secret agent of those foreign states.
In the post-Soviet period information on Moellendorff in Russian historiography became more detailed. In 1998 Bella B.Pak published (with insignificant reduction) the texts of the reports of Russian officials in China and Japan about their meetings with Moellendorff in 1884-1885. She published not only those documents, which were briefly introduced by A.L.Narochnitsky in 1956, but also presented the new ones, for example, a secret telegram of Governor-General of the Amur region baron von Korff dated May 30, 1885. In this telegram the latter reported the contents of Moellendorff’s letter, which he had received. In that letter the Korean vice-foreign minister proposed to send 4 officers and 16 sub-officers for training 2000 Korean soldiers. Also for the first time Bella Pak introduced the contents of the instruction, which was approved by the tsar on June 7,1885 and then given to the first Russian Charge d’Affairs in Korea Karl I.Waeber. In this instruction the Foreign Ministry expressed confidence that all Moellendorff’s proposal to the Russian government had been done by him under the order of the Korean king”.
In spite of detailed information on a variety of subjects, B.Pak does not inform that on October 16, 1885 Karl Waeber decorated P.G. von Moellendorff with one of high orders of the Russian Empire, namely with Order of St.Anna (2nd grade) for cooperation in conclusion of the Russian-Korean Treaty of 1884. This event seems very important. It proves that the Russian government of that time highly appreciated the German diplomat’s activities and considered him neither the Chinese marionette, nor German spy, nor a mercenary. I would be interesting to know who of Russian officials recommended Moellendorff for the decoration and what arguments he used. Unfortunately, the documents from the Russian archives concerning the matter are not published yet.
The presented above sketch of Russian historiography proves that in Russia Moellendorff is not considered as “pro-Russian” politician. It can be explained by the fact that the word “pro-Russian” in the Russian language is perceived mainly as “acting for Russian interests”. Russian historians reason that the German diplomat in his activities in the rank of Korean vice foreign minister acted for other than Russian interests – Korean, German or personal. Lee Yur-bok explains that Kojong and Moellendorff “were pro-Russian in that they all believed that Russia might be in a position to help Korea to become truly independent of China”.
Western historiography usually represents Moellendorff’s position in Korea as independent enough and tends to exaggerate the degree of his influence on Kojong. Lee Yur-bok’s book “West Goes East” can be considered as an example. The author highly praises the efforts of the German diplomat to protect Korean sovereignty, but expresses the opinion, that his intention to rely on Russia was a misconception caused by lack of knowledge of Russian real intentions and opportunities and that it turned unfortunate for the future of the Korean people. Explaining the reasons, which made Kojong agree with Moellendorff’s secret proposal to make Russia the senior ally of Korea, Dr. Lee writes as follows: “ Kojong, deeply resentful of China’s unprecedented interference in his country, clearly disappointed with the Japanese behavior towards his country during and after the coup (Kapsin chǒngbyǒng, 1884), and grossly misinformed about Russia’s capability and willingness to become involved in Korean affairs, gave tacit but strong support to von Moellendorff’s pro-Russian policy”. Dr. Lee stresses, that “it was von Moellendorff who had been mainly responsible for causing King Kojong to become and remain pro-Russian”. According to his logic it can be concluded that Moellendorrf’s misconception and misinformation laid foundation for the Korean monarch’s pro-Russian sympathies, which (as it is widely known) were preserved by him for about 40 years (till his death in 1919).
In connection with the abovementioned Lee Yur-bok’s statements it seems necessary to consider 3 following questions: 1) what was the real degree of Moellendorff’s influence on the “alert, flexible and pragmatic” Kojon; 2) to what extent Moellendorff, and consequently Kojong, were misinformed about Russia’s capability and willingness to become involved in Korean affairs; 3) why the Kojong’s decision to rely on Russia, which was taken under Moellendorff’s influence, was “unfortunate” and “fatal” for Koreans.
Moellendorff was the first Westerner, with whom Kojong personally met. As the Korean traditional distrust of Westerners and their conservatism are widely known, it is difficult to believe that the proposals of one of them (even of such an outstanding person as Moellendorff) could make the Korean king within a very short period of time decisively change the line of his foreign policy and to confront not only its “elder brother” China, but also Western countries and many high Korean officials, who (by diverse reasons) opposed establishing close relations with Russia. We also should not forget that big, although short-timed, influence, which was caused on the Korean court and its foreign policy by the book by a Chinese diplomat Huang Tsun-hsien “Chao-hsien ts’e-lüeh (A Policy for Korea)” (1880), where Russia was described as the most dangerous and aggressive country. The recent research of South Korean historians give the idea that apart from Moellendorff’s influence there were other (more substantiated) reasons, which contributed to the Korean king’s and his closest advisors’ decision to rely on Russia in order to protect Korean independence and integrity.
The first literature, which touched upon Russia to some extent, appeared in Korea in the beginning of the 18th C. It were the works by Kim Gi-hong, Pae Si-hwang, Lee Ik, Sin Nyuk, Lee Guyn-ik, Chong Won-yong, Yi Gyu-gyong and others, devoted to the participation of the Korean detachments (413 soldiers all together) in Russian-Chinese military clashes on the Amur-river in 1654 and 1658 (nasǒn chǒngbǒl). Those literary works were mainly of anti-Manchurian orientation, but at the same time they contributed to the formation of the Koreans’ alert attitude towards Russia. The diaries of the Korean envoys to Peking, who regularly met Russians there in the period from the end of the 17 till the middle of the 19th C., reflected the same alert attitude.
In 1860 when a common border appeared between Russia and Korea and real contacts of the two countries started, that alert attitude changed into fear of Russia (conno uisik). According to a historian from Seoul National University Won Jae-yon, that transformation was stimulated by Western countries and Korean Catholics. The former (China should also be included) did not want Russia’s rapprochement with Korea as it could strengthen Russian influence on the Korean peninsular. The latter used the thesis of “Russian danger” to Korea in order to speed up the conclusion of treaties with the European countries, as they hoped that such treaties would provide freedom of religion for them.
The real contacts between Russia and Korea, which started in 1860, were the wide-scaled immigration of Koreans to the Russian Maritime Province and the development of border trade. For the first 7 years those contacts were illegal and were severely suppressed by the Korean government. The attempts of the Russian border administration to regulate those contacts were rejected by the Korean side. The end of 1860-es – beginning of 1870-es was the peak of the isolationist policy, proclaimed by the Korean government in response to the direct aggression of Western countries in 1866-1867. In 1869 the Korean immigration to the Russian territories became extremely intensive: 6,543 Koreans crossed the border because of hunger and high taxes in the Hamgyong Province. Russian administration was not ready to accept so many hungry people without any means of existence and started measures to restrict the immigration. The decreasing number of their people worried Korean authorities too. As a result, the Korean authorities had to violate their own ban and for the first time in Korean history agree for negotiations with a Western country (Russia), namely with the administration of South Ussouri Region. The first official negotiations between the Russian and Korean border administrations were hold in top secret in a town of Kyonghun in the end of 1869 – beginning of 1870. Their result was that the Korean government in order to prevent people from en mass crossing the border undertook some measures for improvement of their material position and also for strengthening control of the border.
It should be mentioned that in 1869-70 Korea negotiated with Russia not through China but directly as the Chinese Tsungli Yamen (the Foreign Office) refused to negotiate with Russians on behalf of the Korean government. As Won Jae-yǒn points out, “the pragmatism, which the T’aewongun’s government showed when it began independent settlement of the emigration problem with Russia was a big achievement. Later king Kojong continued that independent policy (towards Russia – author) relying on the information from border officials. The T’aewongun’s Russian policy was kept in high secret as officially his government was against opening the country to the outer world and stood for preserving status quo and isolation. It was its main difference with the policy of Kojong, who sought the opening of the country”. A researcher from Kyujangak (the former Royal Library, now preserved at Seoul National University) Yǒn Gap-su concludes that the absence of clashes at the Korean-Russian border within more than 10 years after the negotiations in Kyonghun laid a firm foundation for the future development of Korean-Russian relations.
On the basis of the abovementioned conclusions of South Korean historians one can suppose that while planning his foreign policy in 1880-es Kojong relied on the positive experience of the negotiations of 1869 with Russia, which were held not because of military threat or political pressure but because of objective social and economical reasons. Kojong also relied on the more than 20-year long experience of peaceful relations with Russia at the border. It seems, that this positive experience was the main reason why Kojong agreed so quickly for Moellendorff’s proposal to conclude an alliance with Russia.
Lee Yur-bok insists that Moellendorff’s opinion that the alliance with Russia was the best way of preserving Korean independence was fatal and unfortunate for Koreans. While explaining why it was “unfortunate” and what about Kojong was “grossly misinformed” concerning Russia, Dr. Lee calls Russia “a paper tiger”.
P.G. von Moellendorff was a Prussian aristocrat. For many years his native country had traditionally been supporting close dynastic relations with the Russian Empire. Thus from his childhood he got enough notion about this state. Russia significantly fell behind England and other European countries, as its economic and social development was concerned, but the fact that its army was the biggest in the world proves that Russia was not “a paper tiger”. During the Crimea war (1853-1856) Russia alone fought at the three fronts against a coalition of European countries led by England and also against Turkey. At the Far East Russian military strength was insignificant. Nevertheless in 1858-1860 through the conclusion of Aihun and Peking Treaties with China it included the Amur and the South Ussuri regions into its possessions, and it was the biggest event of the Far Eastern history in the second half of the 19th century. An American historian G.Lensen wrote that Russia at that time was “a surprising conglomerate of might and weakness”.
When Moellendorff recommended to Kojong to turn for support to Russia, he proceeded from thorough calculation and balanced estimation of the international situation. He was sure that Russia being a neighbor and being interested in preserving stability and peace at its borders could become Korea’s new “elder brother” in international relations. Due to these calculations he actively participated in the conclusion of the Russian-Korean Treaty of 1884, to which China and England seriously opposed. In 1884- beginning of 1885 by the order of Kojong he sought the establishing a kind of Russia “protectorate” over Korea, which was envisaged as a modernized analogue of former Korean-Chinese relations. In 1885 he was dismissed from all his positions and had to leave Korea after the Kojong’s unsuccessful attempt to invite Russian military advisors for the modernization of the Korean army and thus creating the basis for military alliance of the two countries. Moellendorff’s forced dismissal was a personal failure of king Kojong, who did not possess enough power for pursuing independent foreign policy.
There is an opinion, that Russia only “encouraged von Moellendorrf by using highly obscure and diplomatic language” and thus created the basis for his own and king Kojong’s unjustified illusions. Was it really so? From 1860 till 1895 Russia consistently followed the course of non-interference into the Korean affairs. The meaning of that course was the preservation of status quo, that is of Chinese suzerainty. The tsarist government considered it to be an obstacle for subjugating Korea by other capitalist countries who could threaten Russian borders and interests at the Far East. The non-interference did not mean indifference. When the situation in Korea seriously aggravated after the coup-de-tat of 1884 and a danger of its occupation by foreign troops emerged, Russia mobilized its military ships in the Chinese Sea and the closest parts of the Pacific in order to demonstrate its readiness to protect Korean integrity. The tsar government did not want to violate the status quo on the Korean peninsular and several times rejected king Kojong’s proposal of the establishment of “protectorate” over Korea. At the same time it immediately agreed to send military instructors for training and modernizing the Korean army. One of those instructors, colonel Shneur, visited Seoul in July 1885, but had to leave at once because king Kojong had been forced to give up that plan by that time. These concrete steps of the Russian government refute the opinion, that Russia confined itself to no more than encouraging Koreans by language.
As in the beginning of 1880-es Korea turned into an arena of the political struggle of the biggest capitalist countries and China, and because of the variety of opinions among the leading Korean political figures about the future of the country, non of von Moellendorrf’s attempts to conclude a Korean-Russian alliance succeeded. That is why the opinion that “his wish to protect Korean sovereignty relying on Russia was his gross miscalculation unfortunate for the Korean people” can hardly be justified. The author presumes that it was more the failure of his projects that was fatal for Korea, than vice versa. The statement can be proved by the behavior of the Korean soldiers in Kyongbokkun Palace at the night when Queen Min was assassinated (September 8, 1895). It showed that the retired American officers who had been invited by the Korean government for training the Korean army failed to teach at least something to them.
P.G. von Moellendorff was a man of the world, representative of elite bureaucracy. He worked for Kojong honestly and dedicatedly, trying to do his best in the most difficult situations. He was a prominent Oriental studies scholar and an experienced diplomat, and his advice helped a lot to Kojong to adjust his political course to the constantly changing international circumstances. At the same time his influence in the Korean court should not be exaggerated. He served to an absolute monarch in an Eastern country. It is obvious that he could undertake steps only under the permission of the monarch. Making “fatal” decisions was not his prerogative.
P.G. von Moellendorrf is a tragic figure and did not receive due appreciation neither during his life nor after his death. He had plenty of enemies among the Chinese, Japanese, Korean high officials and Western and American diplomats. It was inevitable, as anybody of those people pursued his own interests, which differed from the interests for which von Moellendorrf stood. His enemies intrigued against him, lied and spread rumors about him, openly interfered and built obstacles for his work. Almost nobody believed in his sincerity, even those, to whom he tried to help. The variety of opinions about the Moellendorff’s political activities in Korea is reflected in documents and historiography, and it seems that they can hardly be reduced to a common denominator.
But if we leave politics alone and look at von Moellendorff’s activities from the humanitarian aspect, we should admit that his achievements in Korea were really enormous and can hardly be over-estimated. The study of his unique experience of successful adaptation to an unknown and alien culture seems interesting, challenging and extremely vital nowadays, when people intensively communicate and travel all over the globe and international contacts are constantly growing.
 Lee Yur-Bok. West Goes East. Paul Georg von Mollendorff and Great Power Imperialism in Late Yi Korea. Honolulu, 1988.
 Narochnitsky A.L. The Colonial Policy of the Capitalist Countries in the Far East. 1860-1895. Мoscow, 1956.
 Pak B.D. Russia and Korea. Moscow: The “Nauka” Publishers, 1979, p. 34-35.
 Davydov’s report from Tokyo dated March 8 (February, 24) 1885. Archive of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Empire, Main Archive 1-9, 1885, # 7, page 3 and attachment. Cit. by Narochnitsky A.L. Cit.op., p. 372-373.
 Narochnitsky A.L. Cit.op., p. 388-389.
 “History of Korea (from ancient time till modern days)”. In 2 vols. Moscow: The “Nauka” Publishers, 1974. Vol. 1, p. 339.
 Pak B.D. Cit.op, p. 81.
 Ibid, p. 256.
 Pak B.B. Russian Diplomacy and Korea (1860-1888). Book 1. Moscow-Irkutsk-St.Petersburg, 1998, p. 87-88.
 Lee Yur-bok. Cit.op., p. 93.
 Pak B.D. Cit.op., p. 91.
 Sohn Pow-key, Kim Chol-choon, Hong Yi-sup. The History of Korea. Seoul, 1970, p. 203.
 Pak B.D. Cit.op., p. 91.
 Zabrovskaya L.V. Ch’ing China’s Policy in Korea 1876-1910. Moscow: The “Nauka” Publishers, 1987.p. 35-36.
 Ibid, p. 42.
 Pak B.B. Cit.op., p. 130.
 Ibid, p. 152.
 Lee Yur-bok. Cit.op., p. 69.
 Ibid, p. 95.
 Ibid, p. 4.
 Ibid, p. 5.
 Ibid, p. 18.
 Pak T’ae-kun. Bibliographic comments in: Sin Nyu. “Diaries of Service in the Northern Lands, translated into Modern Korean”. Songnam, 1980, p. 27-47.
 Choe Muh-hyǒng. The Ground and Conditions for Establishing Diplomatic Relations between Korean and Russia // “One hundred years of the history of Korean-Russian Relations” (in Korean), p. 49-73.
 Won Jae-yǒn. The Perception of Russia in Korea in the 19th Century and the Theory of Opening the Country // “Hanguk munhwa (Korean Culture)”, vol. 23, 1999, p. 201.
 Pak B.D. Cit.op., p. 39. Pak B.B. Cit.op., p. 24-25.
 Ching Young Choe. The Rule of the Taewŏn’gun. 1864-1873: Restoration in Yi Korea. Harvard University Press, 1972, p.89-90.
 Lee Yur-bok. Cit.op., p. 12.
 Won Jae-yǒn. Cit.op., p. 204.
 Yǒn Gap-su. The Reply of the T’aewongun government (1863-1873) to the Challenge of the West and the strengthening of the Army. Ph.D.Paper (in Korean). Seoul National University, 1998.
 Lee Yur-bok. Cit.op., p. 95, 210.
 In the middle of 1880-es the Russian army at peace time consisted of 1 million 384 thousand people, while the French army consisted of 600 thousand and the German – of 620 thousand. Russian military budget was also the biggest in Europe (Brokhaus & Efron. New Encyclopaedic Dictionary. St.Petersburg, 1981, Vol. 3, p. 630).
 Lensen G.A. Balance of Intrigue. International Rivalry in Korea & Manchuria. 1884-1899, in 2 vol., University Press of Florida, 1983. Vol. 2, p. 5.
 Lee Yur-bok. Cit.op., p. 111.
 Pak B.D. Cit.op., p. 82-83.
 Ibid, p. 91.