The FBI's frustration over its inability to get
material witnesses to talk has raised a disturbing question rarely debated
in this country: When, if ever, is it justified to resort to
unconventional techniques such as truth serum, moderate physical pressure
and outright torture?
The constitutional answer to this question
may surprise people who are not familiar with the current U.S. Supreme
Court interpretation of the 5th Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination: Any interrogation technique, including the use of
truth serum or even torture, is not prohibited. All that is prohibited is
the introduction into evidence of the fruits of such techniques in a
criminal trial against the person on whom the techniques were used. But
the evidence could be used against that suspect in a non-criminal
case--such as a deportation hearing--or against someone else.
If a
suspect is given "use immunity"--a judicial decree announcing in advance
that nothing the defendant says (or its fruits) can be used against him in
a criminal case--he can be compelled to answer all proper questions. The
issue then becomes what sorts of pressures can constitutionally be used to
implement that compulsion. We know that he can be imprisoned until he
talks. But what if imprisonment is insufficient to compel him to do what
he has a legal obligation to do? Can other techniques of compulsion be
attempted?
Let's start with truth serum. What right would be
violated if an immunized suspect who refused to comply with his legal
obligation to answer questions truthfully were compelled to submit to an
injection that made him do so?
Not his privilege against
self-incrimination, since he has no such privilege now that he has been
given immunity.
What about his right of bodily integrity? The
involuntariness of the injection itself does not pose a constitutional
barrier. No less a civil libertarian than Justice William J. Brennan
rendered a decision that permitted an allegedly drunken driver to be
involuntarily injected to remove blood for alcohol testing. Certainly
there can be no constitutional distinction between an injection that
removes a liquid and one that injects a liquid.
What about the
nature of the substance injected? If it is relatively benign and creates
no significant health risk, the only issue would be that it compels the
recipient to do something he doesn't want to do. But he has a legal
obligation to do precisely what the serum compels him to do: answer all
questions truthfully.
What if the truth serum doesn't work? Could
the judge issue a "torture warrant," authorizing the FBI to employ
specified forms of non-lethal physical pressure to compel the immunized
suspect to talk?
Here we run into another provision of the
Constitution--the due process clause, which may include a general "shock
the conscience" test. And torture in general certainly shocks the
conscience of most civilized nations.
But what if it were limited
to the rare "ticking bomb" case--the situation in which a captured
terrorist who knows of an imminent large-scale threat refuses to disclose
it?
Would torturing one guilty terrorist to prevent the deaths of a
thousand innocent civilians shock the conscience of all decent
people?
To prove that it would not, consider a situation in which a
kidnapped child had been buried in a box with two hours of oxygen. The
kidnapper refuses to disclose its location. Should we not consider torture
in that situation?
All of that said, the argument for allowing
torture as an approved technique, even in a narrowly specified range of
cases, is very troubling.
We know from experience that law
enforcement personnel who are given limited authority to torture will
expand its use. The cases that have generated the current debate over
torture illustrate this problem. And, concerning the arrests made
following the Sept. 11 attacks, there is no reason to believe that the
detainees know about specific future terrorist targets. Yet there have
been calls to torture these detainees.
I have no doubt that if an
actual ticking bomb situation were to arise, our law enforcement
authorities would torture. The real debate is whether such torture should
take place outside of our legal system or within it. The answer to this
seems clear: If we are to have torture, it should be authorized by the
law.
Judges should have to issue a "torture warrant" in each case.
Thus we would not be winking an eye of quiet approval at torture while
publicly condemning it.
Democracy requires accountability and
transparency, especially when extraordinary steps are taken. Most
important, it requires compliance with the rule of law. And such
compliance is impossible when an extraordinary technique, such as torture,
operates outside of the law.







