1
If we take the idea of metaphysics in the Kantian sense, that the empirical world which we experience only exists in our heads, and try to come to terms with the world 'a priori' or to try to understand 'real objects' or 'objects in themselves', the only sensible conclusion we can arrive at is that it is pointless. Many a day have I wandered about in crisis looking about myself frantically, quite literally 'knocking on wood', exclaiming, 'none of this is real!'
Trying to understand objects as they exist in the 'real world' and not in the human experience of them is no more worth while than a cat, whom nature commandeth to be colour blind, trying to come to terms with the proposition ' red' or 'green'. It is outside of the catsrange of experience and quite rightly the cat sits idly by continuing its existence undetered by such foolishness.
But humans by our very nature are foolish...
If I can be forgiven for being Shopies lackey as I mockingly call myself, it is important that we understand that all forms of knowledge that we possess are merely representational. It is a complexed physiological occurence in our brains, the things we see every day are merely how our eyes translate that information to our brains. The out come is our conciousness of a picture/ image where the object in question is situated in reality. So we can only understand the world outside of ourselves in a very indirect way.
As Wittgenstein stated 'the world is all that is the case' and it is to this that we look for guidence if we are to understand in the simpelest intelligible way that which we experience. We must find a way to distinguish between, as Schopenhauer said, the ideal and the real.
When knowledge becomes intelligible we call it thinking but not all thinking is intelligible. When we aquire intuition we are more fully in touch with the world a priori than when we directly experience the world
a posteriori.
Universal concepts, for instance are generally taken to be taken as concepts a priori, these concepts however are abstracted by processes in the interior of the brain.
All concepts of this manner take their meaning from the representation of our perceptions. Primary knowledge it seems is the only way therefore of distinguising between Schopenhauers ideal and the real.It is also important to distinguise between illusion and representation.
The idea of metaphysics in this context is not a form of solipsism. Solipsism is the idea that nothing exists outside of the individual/ individuals. With our present head ache it is merely the representation of the world which is in question, which does not exist outside of the individual.
For all we know we all may perceive the world in completely different ways. If I return to the colour analogy already discust how do we know that what I percieve as green is to another what I percieve to be red? It is impossible to know as it is with the words we learn to signify these colours that we learn to understand and identify them. Once something has been designated red or green it matters little to the individual how that colour looks. (and some people cannot tell the difference between red and green). The same dilema applies to dark and light etc.
Some may push the argument to that of right/ wrong, good/ bad, but that has its place elsewhere.
With this I have only explored the difference of how we percieve colours. Imagine if the rest of reality where applicable to this idea? Who knows with the variety of psycological states of human beings the difference between our representations could be immense. These representations of the world are only loosly connected through the words we use to define them.
There is no logical connection, for instance, between the word 'black' and the colour of this text, it is all merely semantical.
Even the words we use to represent our perceptions are prey to how we hear them. How can we be sure? In this sense all of our senses are prey to suspicion. How do I know that the letter 'W' which I hear phonetically as 'wur' is the same sound picked up by others? it will still be the same letter to others in relation to all other letters but how can we know the variations between various peoples perceptions?
We can only ever be sure of an objects shape, proportions and internal properties. Otherwise we can only postulate on what real objects are like and how individuals percieve them.
We can understand their properties internal/ external to gain further insight but this still leads to a mere passing familirity. Therefore:
Being in itself- subjective. Representation- objective.
In other words my representations are never the same as the object outside of me.
Try to explain any of this to business minded people who never shut up about 'the real world'!
2
We have previously considered the concept of god in this way, as a metaphysical concept. But don't all problem theorys that cannot be left alone end up being defined as metaphysical?
For instance if supernatural theories cannot be proven a posteriori then they either end up discredited or the theorist will have the insight to place the whole argument in the realm of metaphysics.
This is what generally occurs with the concept of god. It becomes a propsition a priori and supposedly means that we can know god through non empirical knowledge.
Many writers have tried to prove this. When it was finally admitted that there is no empirical evidence of god (i.e. in nature), it was then proposed that it could be explained by several philosophers through mathematics, which as Kant stated is a non empirical form of knowledge. This is a sound theory as several paranormal, supposedly non empirical phenomenon have been explained through mathematics. But to date no 'formula' for god has held out.
We have so far failed to explain god in both physics and metaphysics. So instead of casting off this problem child (or should I say 'father') of the centuries let us move this concept to yet another realm (I resist here the urge to say 'demote'), the realm of pataphysics.
Pataphysics is that to metaphyics what metaphysics is to physics. The pataphysicians job is to work out the physics behind non-existent objects and in doing so bring them into existence, and as a byproduct end their state of pataphysicality. This sounds exactly like what was attemped with the formulas for god. We therefore have: objects knowable in empirical experience- physics. Objects knowable through non empirical experience- metaphysics, and now we have objects which are not knowable and which no not exist- pataphysics.
So it seems that the concept of god is truly pataphysical. It is contradictory and it makes beautiful sense.