Vykintas Pugačiauskas, 2001

Introduction

While political extremism in general and radical political parties in particular are not new phenomena, they have attracted heightened attention after recent well-publicised successes of some of West European right-wing parties. In contrast, extremism in the Central and Eastern Europe has not received sufficient scholarly treatment. It might be argued that, somewhat paradoxically given the level of popular disappointment with the political reforms, extremism is not widely-spread in the political systems that are generally still preoccupied with more “materialist” issues. Yet, as the example of Lithuania indicates, extremism is more widespread in some regions than in others, which is shown both by the local election results and the relatively frequent street activities of the radical organisations.

This paper will seek to explain why extremism is concentrated in a few local “islands”, namely, the cities and regions of Kaunas and Šiauliai. It will be demonstrated that the pattern of extremist political participation follows the pattern of the (localist) organisation of the radical right-wing parties, and in this sense might be regarded as “manufactured” from above. This is not to deny the explanatory power of other variables such as economic and structural peculiarities of the regions discussed. However, what discriminates Kaunas and Šiauliai from other cities and regions with roughly the same economic indicators has been the appeal of “local” radical political leaders. In other words, extremist political parties, generally weak across Lithuania, are strong only in the regions their leaders come from. This, however, raises another and more important question, namely, whether current level of indifference towards the political system disguises “dormant” anti-system resources that might be employed by the talented political entrepreneurs with well-developed party organisations. It will be addressed in the concluding part of this paper.

In attempting to answer these questions, a somewhat loose theoretical framework will be followed. It will combine both the notions of “exit, voice, and loyalty” as introduced by Albert Hirschman, and David Arter’s concept of “anti-party system” which regards the party system not as “patterned interactions” among the parties, but as a function of indifferent or extremist electorates. While the former concepts point to structural variables, the latter brings the organisational factors to the front. This paper will thus discuss two aspects of political participation, namely voting (or non-voting) and street-level activities. Concepts of extremism and radicalism will be used here interchangeably, although it must be admitted that there are different connotations to these words.¹

Parties that are defined here as “extremist” are those that have engaged in riots or violent street (or, in some cases, highway) demonstrations.² Thus two parties (or, strictly speaking, party-like organisations) are the focus of this paper: the Freedom Union (Laisvės Sąjunga), led by Vytautas Šustauskas, and the Mindaugas Murza’s Lithuanian Nationalsocialist Party (Lietuvos nacionalsocialistinė partija), which, after repeated (nine) unsuccessful attempts to have itself registered, has for the local elections joined the already established, yet irrelevant Lithuanian Independence Party (Lietuvos nepriklausomybės partija) and afterwards merged with the Lithuanian Party for the Logic of Life (Lietuvos gyvenimo logikos partija). The origins of these organisations are rather different, but eventually they have become regional parties with Kaunas as the main base of the Freedom Union and Šiauliai as the self-proclaimed launch-pad for the nationalsocialists. There are other radical political organisations, to be sure, such as Lithuanian Republican Party (Lietuvos respublikonų partija), Lithuanian Freedom League (Lietuvos laisvės lyga), and various short-lived “people’s movements”, but their activities, apart from formal participation in the elections, are almost non-existent. If the former two parties are to some extent influential in at least some parts of the country, the latter are weak everywhere. There are also questions about the radicalism and “anti-systemness” of the Lithuanian Peasant Party (Lietuvos valstiečių partija) due to the form of its protest actions, yet it might be regarded as a single issue party which sometimes employs radical methods of protest.

1. “Exit”: “Voice” without “Loyalty”

State is not a perfect test-ground for the Hirschman’s notion of exit which he defines as leaving the organisation that provides deteriorating services. Hirschman himself concedes that exit is the impersonation of economics while voice is “political action par excellence”³. True, it would be the extreme case of exit to renounce one’s citizenship, yet, slightly modified, the notion of exit would also be relevant as a political concept. Defined more broadly, “exit” would include not only the self-imposed exclusion from the system but also various kinds of anti-system behaviour, be it (in the context of this paper) voting for the protest or extremist parties, participating in street riots or, rather simply, abstaining from any active participation in politics. Apart from this latter option, exit would thus display the features of voice: it would no longer remain a dichotomous variable but could be graduated according to its intensity; it would be a public, not a private act; and it would be a directly observable act. Exit thus becomes not the opposite of voice but its most extreme form. However, the concept of exit does not loose its meaning since it still denotes the attempt to “escape from an objectionable state of affairs” rather than to “change it” using conventional means.

What is the practical significance of the distinction between exit and voice? Hirschman’s model provides some testable propositions with regard to combination of voice and exit. Firstly, in case of disagreements with the mainstream, those most committed to policy would exit first while those loyal to the institutions would try to use voice. Secondly, voice will be used more often by those enjoying higher quality of life while outright exit would remain the choice for the less-privileged (since the elasticity of demand is lower). These propositions point to the need to explore the sociology of anti-system protest and the underlying social and economic conditions. However, when applied practically, this would only explain (ex post) why those that chose to exit have done so, but would not shed light on why others from the same social background have remained loyal. Thus, in addition to sociological and economic explanations, additional ones are necessary and these presumably should include the organisational and political action variables.

The model which includes organisational variables — and, implicitly, the political action ones — has been presented by Arter. His concept of “anti-party system ” accounts for the “exit” of voters through the popularity of “anti-party“ parties which (1) exploit the mistrust and low competence of voters and their political cynicism and are society- rather than state-oriented, (2) oppose the old, Communist-style elite, and (3) offer simplistic, sometimes draconian, measures to resolve complex problems, ideology playing an insignificant role.⁴ Implicitly, the influence of political entrepreneurs is high in such parties. The “anti-party system” has such parties as one of its defining criteria, the other two criteria being relative unimportance of the partisan allegiance of the candidates for the voters, and a low voter turnout during the elections.

In the absence of sociological surveys of those voting for the extremist parties and participating in their activities it would be difficult to test both of Hirschman’s propositions on the micro- (individual voter) level which is considered important by other scholars as well. However, it is possible to test his second proposition on the macro- (regional) level, using the data from the Lithuanian Department of Statistics. Thus the next part of this paper will be devoted to answer the question whether it is true that the less-privileged regions do indeed support those political organisations that favour “exit” over more traditional channels for “voice”. However, the overview of the similar research in Western Europe makes it rather clear that socio-structural processes can hardly explain the rise — and even less sudden breakthroughs — of the extremist parties.⁵ Thus the attention will later shift to the party and party-system factors and their interplay with voter motives for choosing the “anti-party”.

2. Extremism: Economic or political?

Both Lithuanian Nationalsocialist Party and Lithuanian Freedom Union are protest parties as defined both by their political style and political program.⁶ They also might be described as the parties of “extreme right” in Roger Eatwell’s sense:⁷ they are hostile to democracy (at least in their rhetoric), support the strong (and even party-less) state, and, to varying degrees, nurture nationalism.⁸ The forth criterion, racism, is uncontroversially applicable only to Nationalsocialists. Members of the Freedom Union might share some racist views as has been demonstrated by the anti-Semitic comments of Šustauskas to the Swedish television, yet they have not become the official party position. The two extremist parties analysed in this paper however differ more significantly in their political outlooks. The relative popularity of the Freedom Union has drawn on voter dissatisfaction with basic economic conditions, such as rising utility bills, while the Nationalsocialists have presented a more coherent and comprehensive radical right-wing program (or, rather, view of the world). Still, local political actions in Šiauliai are most often organised to make economic and social demands.

Both parties have engaged (or have threatened to engage) in violent or not sanctioned street actions. The Freedom Union has for instance staged a march from Kaunas to Vilnius temporarily blocking the traffic on the main highway, forced to abandon the Vilnius’ replica of Vienna’s dance ball and blockaded several Kaunas institutions while the Nationalsocialists have twice tried to storm the Šiauliai city hall to achieve the resignation of the mayor, Vida Savičiūnaitė. Both parties have also staged sanctioned protests with radical political demands and at least once their leaders have met publicly in Kaunas.

Is the rise of these parties in some way connected with the relative economic decline of Kaunas and Šiauliai regions? As has been said, it is difficult to base the answer on individual voter’s motivations and even more so on his or her fears for the future. Comparative macroeconomic indicators offer a mixed picture but few allow the regions to be pictured as extreme underachievers.

Table 1. Basic macroeconomic indicators.

Regions	GDP per capita (thousand litas, 1999)	GDP per capita (per cent of average, 1999)	Investment per capita (thousand litas, 1999)*	FDI per capita (thousand litas, 2000)*
Kaunas	11.1	96.2	1.41	1.39
Šiauliai	8.8	76.9	0.75	0.36
Alytus	9.3	80.7	1.29	1.05
Klaipėda	12.5	108.4	1.71	2.56
Marijampolė	7.7	67.3	0.74	0.10
Panevėžys	9.8	84.9	1.24	1.20
Tauragė	7.0	60.7	0.25	0.17
Telšiai	10.0	86.9	2.67	0.88
Utena	10.3	89.2	1.35	0.48
Vilnius	15.8	137.5	2.79	5.72
Lithuania	11.5	100.0	1.71	2.24

* Counted by the author, rounded to two decimal points.

Source: Lithuanian Department of Statistics (http://www.std.lt).

Table 2. Social and demographic indicators.

Regions	Population growth per 1,000 inhabitants (1999)	Number of pensioners per 100 inhabitants (1999)*	Number of crimes per 10,000 inhabitants (1999)	Number of people employed in tertiary sector per 100 inhabitants (1999)*
Kaunas	-0.6	17.35	209	23.60
Šiauliai	-1.1	17.55	189	21.28
Alytus	-1.3	18.22	122	18.56
Klaipėda	-0.2	17.28	247	26.12
Marijampolė	-0.6	18.58	164	15.30
Panevėžys	-1.8	18.65	210	21.87
Tauragė	-1.3	16.49	156	15.72
Telšiai	0.8	15.69	171	17.22
Utena	-3.9	20.26	140	17.80
Vilnius	-1.0	16.63	236	32.10
Lithuania	-1.0	17.46	208	23.88

* Counted by the author, rounded to two decimal points.

Source: Lithuanian Department of Statistics (http://www.std.lt).

Table 3. Social and “quality of life” indicators.

Regions	Average monthly wages (1998)	Unemployment rate (per cent, 1998)	Number of phones per 100 inhabitants (1999)
Kaunas	865	4.6	27.3
Šiauliai	807	9.0	24.3
Alytus	844	8.6	24.5
Klaipėda	950	5.1	28.7
Marijampolė	755	8.0	24.1
Panevėžys	851	7.6	23.9
Tauragė	724	8.8	22.4
Telšiai	936	6.4	24.4
Utena	982	7.0	23.5
Vilnius	1061	5.7	26.9
Lithuania	930	6.4	25.9

Source: Lithuanian Department of Statistics (http://www.std.lt).

The only — and somewhat outdated — count on which either of the regions has been ranked worst is the unemployment rate in Šiauliai (highlighted in the table). This should be a significant finding to support the proposition of economic reasoning of “exit”. However, Kaunas displays just the opposite result. Nor can it be hypothesised that it is instead the older people who support the extremist (and more nationalist) parties since the number of pensioners is just about average in Kaunas. True, most indicators in Kaunas and Šiauliai are somewhat lower than the Lithuanian average but this does not discriminate them from most of the other regions. There are only two regions that are consistently above average, Vilnius and Klaipėda.

The economic explanations for “exit” are thus insufficient at best (when measured on a macro-scale — the micro-scale could have been more appropriate) and irrelevant at worst. This is not a surprising conclusion. Even if the majority of the protests by the extremist parties have been directed against the deteriorating quality of life in general (and only a few against “the others” or concrete ethnic groups⁹), there has been no tide of extremism in other equally disadvantaged regions. They have remained, in Hirschmanian terms, rather “loyal”, have not threatened to “exit” and have not even used “voice” (apart from Tauragė where there have been occasional signs of separate extremist incidents, usually by one single activist). The explanation must therefore be searched for somewhere else, and the factors of party organisation, party leadership and party system might turn out to be more relevant.

3. Local “Voice” in the Anti-party System

The extremist parties recognise that their strength is limited to only a few regions. Both the Freedom Union and the Nationalsocialists are explicitly regional parties. During local elections of 2000, the Independence Party had offered the Nationalsocialists to join its lists across Lithuania (except Vilnius) but the latter declined the offer, opting for Šiauliai only. In the same election, the Freedom Union has also presented only five candidate lists in selected localities. While there are no comparable data for the national election of 2000 for the Nationalsocialists (or the Party of for the Logic of Life, as it were), the Freedom Union, while putting up a national candidate list, has presented its candidates in the single-seat districts mainly in the Kaunas region (the only exceptions being Tauragė, the home town of the above mentioned lonely activist, and Lazdijai). The distribution of votes for the Freedom Union electoral list according to votes within the borders of the single-seat districts displays that top nine districts to vote for the Freedom Union list were those located in Kaunas and Kaunas region, the list being twice as popular in the ninth — Kaunas rural — district than in the tenth, located outside Kaunas. Nevertheless, this did not help the Freedom Union to achieve the national representation through the PR part of the electoral system, and the only candidate has achieved victory in the single-seat district.¹⁰

Thus the parties are not only local; in their localities, they also fare better in the local elections than in the national ones. This might be connected with the anti-party sentiment as well as with the organisational strength of the parties. Both local and national party systems resemble what has already been termed as the “anti-party system”. There is a noticeable — although declining — public sentiment for voting “for personalities, not for the parties” as has been evident in repeated attempts to impose a referendum to abandon the PR part of the electoral system.¹¹ Even though most voters (around 36 per cent according to various surveys¹²) declare that the main reason behind the party choice have been the party programs, only few actually read them (around 90 per cent read them seldom or never). Voting according to the personalities of party leaders is generally ranked second but there are much less ambiguities possible with it than with the first reason.

The turnout in the national and local elections has since 1993 never exceeded 59 per cent. For the period of 1995 to the 2000 local elections it has not been higher than 53 per cent. Thus the second criterion of the anti-party system might also be regarded as fulfilled. Finally, as has been evident from the preceding discussion, there are several anti-parties that have movemental characteristics, are opposed to political establishment and offer simplistic solutions. While Arter notes that the anti-party system is a transitional phenomenon on the way towards consolidated democracy, in Lithuania it has emerged only after two parliamentary elections.

How the anti-party system can explain the localised support the extremist parties draw on? It must be noted that the concept of the anti-party system is not so much a characteristic of the party system as that of a prevalent public mood towards the parties and political establishment. It demonstrates that no matter if the structure of party competition is in reality open or closed,¹³ the voters regard it as closed and attribute a negative meaning to this closure. Thus while there may be no institutionalised “cartels”, party competition is regarded by voters as irrelevant. Personal factors therefore become increasingly important. This situation is by no means peculiar to the Lithuanian extremist parties alone (leaders of several smaller parties were elected to the Seimas in the single-seat districts while their parties have failed to pass the 5 per cent threshold) but the personalities of the extremist leaders — in the words of one observer of Western European extremist parties, “many [of them] media-savvy, even charismatic, rabble-rousing populists with deeply reactionary goals and few scruples about the methods used to achieve them”¹⁴ — cater for the voter uncertainty especially well. Thus the anti-party system provides the “political opportunity structure” for the extremist parties.

There is, however, more to the personalities of extremist leaders than their electoral appeal. As has been noted by Peter Mair, the leadership of the postcommunist parties has been the cord of the party organisation.¹⁵ Specific position of the radical parties requires an even more visible leadership than that of the mainstream ones. In line with this prediction, much of intraparty struggle in the extremist parties has also proceeded along the personal lines. The Freedom Union was itself established after the split in the two-person leadership of the radical Lithuanian Freedom League while the Nationalsocialists have experienced some splits that were caused by personal conflicts among the party’s local leaders.¹⁶ In some rare instances, the extremist leaders have suffered from the radical appeal that has been depersonalised¹⁷.

While the factor of leadership in the anti-party system might account for the popularity of the extremist parties in their selective regions, the question remains, why has it not “travelled” to other parts of Lithuania? Eatwell isolates three perceptions triggering the rise of extremism: that the extremist party is legitimate, that voting for it is efficacious and that political system is not working well. It will be shown below that the former two conditions are discouraged by the (self-)portrayal of the leaders of the extremist parties in the media while the remaining condition alone, that of the anti-party system, is not sufficient.

Organisational strength of the parties might provide one of the answers. There are no studies of the local party organisations in Lithuania available but the pattern should not be much different from other Central and East European countries where it has been found that local branches of the mainstream parties draw on the resources the membership in parliament provides.¹⁸ The extremist parties thus have to look for other material resources, usually from a limited number of personal connections of the party leaders, which inhibits the establishment of branches outside the major party strongholds. In general, extremist parties tend to operate on fewer resources than the mainstream ones.

Another answer might be provided by the fact that the “anti-party system” is not a system of anti-system parties. The extremist parties have other — national — contenders (which in turn have more material resources) that also draw on the voter disappointment and disapproval of the traditional establishment but do it in a more populist and less radical way which attracts significant portions of the electorate while also acting as a safety-valve. The success of the New Union (the Social-liberals) (Naujoji sąjunga (socialliberalai)) in the recent parliamentary poll in both Šiauliai and Kaunas that could be attributed to the factors of the anti-party system and personal leadership might attest to that. This might be summarised by the Eatwell’s observation that voters for the extremist parties may be protest voters, but this does not mean they are irrational and thus often would not support a party they see no chance of achieving at least limited success.¹⁹

Yet another explanation is purely situational. The leaders of the extremist parties have been portrayed by the mass media as the local political leaders and extremism as a local phenomenon²⁰. This kind of coverage has arguably been instrumental in depriving the extremist parties of two conditions for their popularity, namely, the belief that they are legitimate representatives of the whole population and that voting for them is in some way efficacious. While they might have nurtured national ambitions, the leaders themselves have chosen the image of the local “fighters for the truth”. In the case of Šustauskas, this was recently highlighted by his much-publicised doubts whether to abandon the post of the mayor of Kaunas to move to the Seimas while Murza has been engaged in the protests against local policies and officials, even though with national overtones. This could have appealed to the local electorates — and the “influence of community norms” should not be discounted. In any case, apart from the Freedom Union’s participation in the Seimas elections, they have given almost no chance for the dwellers of other regions to express their support or disapproval of their political platforms.

Conclusion: Prospects for the National Extremist Party?

There are many difficulties when analysing extremist parties, even more in the case of Lithuania where political extremism has been registered only on the small scale. Theoretical frameworks are not always precise, there are doubts about the possibility to generalise the conditions leading to the rise of the extremist parties, and there are problems with data, especially on the individual voter level. While the Hirschmanian concepts of “exit” and “voice” might after some fine-tuning be applied to the study of extremist political movements, the available aggregate-level data do not support the predictions that “exit” would be a more likely option for the less well-off voters. Yet his propositions, especially the ones concerning individual behaviour and loyalty might turn out to be true on the micro-level. Micro-level analysis seems more relevant when studying motives for participation in political actions and elections.

However, party, leadership and party system factors seem relevant as well. The rise in extremist political participation might be connected with the popular disappointment with the political establishment (as measured by the criteria of “anti-party system”) and the impact of extremist party leadership. In Lithuania, both factors contributed to the localisation of extremist politics. Party leaders have established themselves as local “fighters for the common people” (with some national aims, to be sure) and used their local bases to validate their opposition to the central elite. In the absence of wide-ranging party structures, well-recognisable leaders became important as the structuring factors (and sources of financial support) for the parties. While this might account for the rise of the extremist parties in their regions, it also inhibited the spread of party organisations to other parts of the country. In addition, disappointment with the existing political establishment and economic conditions was the source of electoral support not only for the extremist but also for less radical populist parties that have a wider national appeal. Thus the extremist parties have failed to take-off nationally — at least so far.

Will they be able to increase their influence on the national level? While it is difficult to tell whether it might come as a response if the living conditions (or at least the perception) will deteriorate further²¹, the concept of the anti-party system allows some alarming conclusions to be made. The anti-party system has emerged in Lithuania rather unexpectedly (at least not according to the original model which sees it as the extension of the democratic transition). It might be regarded as the outcome of unsuccessful party system consolidation. While recently there have been some renewed trends pointing at consolidation, the party system remains unpredictable in the medium term and this, at least theoretically, does not preclude any major crises which would be helpful for extremist parties to establish themselves nationally. What is even more important, the explanations why the existing radical parties have so far failed to extend their reach are based on situational, personal and internal structure factors. This might mean that the political and party systems have few levers to discourage the popularity of radical parties and extremist participation. The extremism is structured in separate “islands” now and should not be overrated — but neither should it be underestimated.

Notes

¹ See Eatwell R. The rebirth of the ‘extreme Right’ in Western Europe // Parliamentary affairs.— 2000.— Vol. 53.— No. 3.— P. 410—411.

² The reasoning therefore follows G. Bingham Powell’s definition of democratic stability according to the number of riots in the country. See, e. g., Powell G. B., Jr. Contemporary democracies: Participation, stability, and violence // Parliamentary versus presidential government / Ed. A. Lijphart.— Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992.— P. 223—235.

³ Hirschman A. Exit, voice, and loyalty: Responses to decline in firms, organizations, and states.— Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 1970.— P. 15.

⁴ Arter D. Parties and democracy in the Post-Soviet republics: The case of Estonia.— Aldershot, 1996.— P. 17—18.

⁵ See Eatwell R. Op. cit.— P. 418.

⁶ See Fennema M. Some conceptual issues and problems in the comparison of anti-immigrant parties in Western Europe // Party politics.— 1997.— Vol. 3.— No. 4.— P. 476—477.

⁷ See ibid.— P. 411.

⁸ Based on various newspaper articles and party programs. For a concentrated account of the policy stance of the Nationalsocialist Party, see Trainys V. Nacionalistai vėl prakalbo apie valdžią // Laikinoji sostinė.— 2000.— March 31. For the Freedom Union, see its election program (in Lithuanian) on http://www.lrs.lt/n/rinkimai/20011008/prog_lls.htm.

⁹ One of the few was a 200-strong anti-Semitic meeting on September 8, 2000 in Kaunas’ Laisvės Alėja, organised by the city branch of the Nationalsocialist party. Neither the participants nor the organizers could explain the timing and the reason for the meeting. It must be admitted however that after the key enterprises have been privatised by the foreign companies, some nationalistic overtones (directly related to the nationality of the heads of foreign companies) began to emerge in the rhetoric of the extremist meetings.

¹⁰ According to various election data on http://www.lrs.lt/rinkimai.

¹¹ See also Novagrockienė J. Lietuvos partinės sistemos raida // Seimo rinkimai ’96: trečiasis atmetimas / Sud. A. Krupavičius.— Vilnius: Tvermė, 1998.— P. 319—321.

¹² See Degutis M. Lietuvos rinkėjai: partijų pasirinkimo motyvai // Politologija.— 1997.— Nr. 1.— P. 142—157; Žeruolis D. Racionalūs rinkėjai: absenteizmo priežastys // Seimo rinkimai ’96: trečiasis atmetimas / Sud. A. Krupavičius.— Vilnius: Tvermė, 1998.— P. 246.

¹³ See Mair P. Party system change: Approaches and interpretations.— New York: Oxford University Press, 1997.— P. 191—192.

¹⁴ Came B. Europe’s hard edge // Maclean’s.— 2000.— Vol. 113.— Issue 8.— P. 31.

¹⁵ See Mair P. Op. cit.— P. 187—188.

¹⁶ The most significant was the break-away of the Kaunas brach of the oparty. In one other anecdotal case, a local activist in Šiauliai has established after the conflict žith Murza his own extremist organisation with nine members, including his wife. This nevertheless has been reported in the national press.

¹⁷ After becoming a member of the Seimas, Šustauskas lost some of his support among the radical anti-establishment protesters. Some former followers of the Freedom Union have even staged minor protests against him.

¹⁸ See Szczerbiak Party models in East-Central Europe // Party politics.— 1999.— Vol. 5.— No. 4.— P. 52?—537 (incomplete reference).

¹⁹ See Eatwell R. Op. cit.— P. 419. Cf. the notion of “protest voters” (as opposed to strategic, that is, “rational” voters) by Meindert Fennema (Fennema M. Op. cit.— P. 475—476.).

²⁰ Of many press articles in recent years (where Murza has been almost invariably called “the leader of the Šiauliai nationalists”), see, e. g. Pocius S. Murzininkai turi interesų ir Kaune // Laikinoji sostinė.— 2000.— February 1; Gečas K. Nacionalsocialistai veržiasi į politiką: Lietuvių nacionalinės partijos kūrėjai ragina įvesti šalyje diktatūrą // Lietuvos rytas.— 2000.— March 22.

²¹ Algis Krupavičius argues that since there is a widespread trust in democratic institutions even in the conditions of economic downturn, there is no real danger that the Nationalsocialists could become a popular political force but that should not mean it is impossible in 3 to 4 years’ time. See Trainys V. Op. cit.

References

Arter D. Parties and democracy in the Post-Soviet republics: The case of Estonia.— Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1996.

Came B. Europe’s hard edge // Maclean’s.— 2000.— Vol. 113.— Issue 8.— P. 30—32.

Degutis M. Lietuvos rinkėjai: partijų pasirinkimo motyvai // Politologija.— 1997.— Nr. 1.— P. 142—157.

Eatwell R. The rebirth of the ‘extreme Right’ in Western Europe // Parliamentary affairs.— 2000.— Vol. 53.— No. 3.— P. 407—425.

Fennema M. Some conceptual issues and problems in the comparison of anti-immigrant parties in Western Europe // Party politics.— 1997.— Vol. 3.— No. 4.— P. 473—492.

Gečas K. Nacionalsocialistai veržiasi į politiką: Lietuvių nacionalinės partijos kūrėjai ragina įvesti šalyje diktatūrą // Lietuvos rytas.— 2000.— March 22.

Hirschman A. Exit, voice, and loyalty: Responses to decline in firms, organizations, and states.— Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 1970.

Mair P. Party system change: Approaches and interpretations.— New York: Oxford University Press, 1997.

Novagrockienė J. Lietuvos partinės sistemos raida // Seimo rinkimai ’96: trečiasis atmetimas / Sud. A. Krupavičius.— Vilnius: Tvermė, 1998.— P. 298—324.

Pocius S. Murzininkai turi interesų ir Kaune // Laikinoji sostinė.— 2000.— February 1.

Powell G. B., Jr. Contemporary democracies: Participation, stability, and violence // Parliamentary versus presidential government / Ed. A. Lijphart.— Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992.— P. 223—235.

Szczerbiak Party models in East-Central Europe // Party politics.— 1999.— Vol. 5.— No. 4.— P. 52?—537 (incomplete reference).

Trainys V. Nacionalistai vėl prakalbo apie valdžią // Laikinoji sostinė.— 2000.— March 31.

Žeruolis D. Racionalūs rinkėjai: absenteizmo priežastys // Seimo rinkimai ’96: trečiasis atmetimas / Sud. A. Krupavičius.— Vilnius: Tvermė, 1998.— P. 244—263.

http://www.lrs.lt/rinkimai.

http://www.std.lt.

El. paštas: laisve@hotmail.com

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