ISLAMISM: POLITICAL IDEOLOGY AND MOVEMENT
Beginning with the invasion of EEgypt by the armies of Napoleon in 1798,
which began the modern involvement of the West in the Arab world, until the
present, Arab-Islamic nationalism has assumed three successive, though somewhat
overlapping, forms: liberal nationalism, Arab socialism, and Islamism.[i]
Liberal nationalism as a politiccal movement was epitomized by the
statist, national-development regime of Muhammed Ali in Egypt, with its goal of
overturning "Oriental feudalism," and its (ultimately failed) project
of modernization, and capitalization. Ideologically, this liberal nationalism
sought, in the writings of Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, to unite the Muslim nation,
the umma, to resist Western imperialism by reconciling Islam and modern
rationalism, through which a powerful Muslim nation could be forged; a vision
elaborated by Muhammed `Abduh who believed that reason and (Islamic)
revelation, Islam and modern science, were reconcilable, though this required
the dismantling of the traditional social, economic, and political institutions
of the Muslim world, which were -- in his view -- perversions of Islam. (It is
worth noting that `Abduh's disciples, like Qasim Amin, championed the
emancipation of women, with his claim that the Shari`a provided a basis
for the equality of women, which he viewed as crucial to the progress of human
society.) What is significant about these ideologies and political projects is
that they were integrally linked to the process of capitalization which had
spread from Europe to the Islamic world; that they were inseparable from the
project of bourgeois revolution, anti-feudalism and national economic
development, that was the hallmark of ascendant capitalism. Perhaps the last gasp
of this liberal nationalism in the Islamic world can be seen in political
movements such as the Wafd in Egypt, and its leader Sa`d Zaghlul. As the heir
to `Abduh, Zaghlul and the Wafd also sought to create the conditions for a
modern, democratic and bourgeois state in Egypt. But, while Muhammed Ali in the
early nineteenth century was prepared to directly challenge Western
imperialism, which mobilized to crush him, the Wafd in the 1930's compromised
with British imperialism. That compromise demonstrated that the project of
capitalization and industrialization in predominantly agrarian societies, like
those of the Islamic world, would henceforth break with the liberalism of the
Arab-Islamic nationalists of the ascendant phase of capitalism.
The precursors of Arab socialismm were those political movements in the
1930's that modeled themselves on Italian fascism and German Nazism. Movements
such as the Green Shirts of Young Egypt, or Antun Sa`ada's Parti Popular Syrien
were determined to break with the dominant British and French imperialisms in
the Middle East, and to embark on a statist project to promote capitalist
industrialization. The failure of German imperialism to overcome its
Anglo-Saxon rival, led nationalists like Michel Aflak and his Ba`ath party in Syria
and Iraq, and Gamal Abdel Nasser and the Free Officers in Egypt to embrace
"socialism" as the route to industrialization and modernity, and to
align themselves with Stalinist Russia in its conflict with the West. All these
movements were resolutely secular in their ideology, often with Christians,
like Sa`ada and Aflak, providing the leadership. The Arab nation, not the
Muslim umma, provided the social base which these movements sought to
mobilize in the interests of the statist-developmentalist model that they
instantiated. Nasser's Arab socialism, and its alliance with Russia, epitomizes
this futile project. It yielded neither national economic development, nor the
elimination of Western imperialism from the Arab-Islamic world. Sadat's bold
transfer of Egypt from the Russian to the American camp, the peace treaty with
Israel, and Cairo's subordination to the World Bank, IMF, and the other
institutions of American global hegemony, signified the failure of Arab
socialism to accomplish what Muhammed Ali had failed to accomplish more than a
century earlier. Into the void created by the bankruptcy of Arab socialism
there stepped a new political ideology and movement: Islamism.
The precursor of contemporary Isslamism was Hassan el-Banna's Muslim
Brotherhood in Egypt (founded in 1928), which, unlike the liberal nationalists
who sought to reconcile Islam and modernity, or the Arab socialists who were
resolutely secular, was determined to reject modernity and restore the rule of
Islamic virtue. Yet Islamism first came to state power not through the Sunni
Muslim Brotherhood (decapitated first by the Wafdist regime, and the British,
and then by the Nasserist), but in the rule of the Shi`ite Ayatollah Khomeini
in Iran. While Khomeini sought to rally the Shia of the Arab world to his
cause, the fact that the Shia were a minority, scorned and hated in the
(majority) Sunni world of Islam, severely limited the success of Khomeini and
the Iranians. New, Sunni, versions of Islamism, would prove more successful in
mobilizing masses of Muslims in both the Arab world and in Central and South
Asia: The Armed Islamic Group in Algeria, Islamic Jihad and al-Gama
al-Islamiyya in Egypt, Hamas in Palestine, the Taliban in Afghanistan, and
Oslama bin Laden's al-Qaeda network. While Islamism appears to be an
ideology and political movement that is adamently opposed to modernity, and
which seeks to reinvigorate traditional Islamic beliefs and institutions, it is
very much the product of the destruction of the pre-capitalist Arab-Islamic world,
and both as ideology and political project is irretrievably stamped with the
imprint of modernity and capitalism. (In this respect, Islamism has much in
common with Nazism, with its ideological recourse to a pre-capitalist Gemeinschaft,
and Aryan religion, even while it instantiated the most brutal realities of
capitalism and imperialism in its social relations and political project.)
This integral connection betweenn Islamism and capitalism can be seen in
the two dimensions of Islamism as ideology and political project. Despite its
appeals to Islamic tradition, Islamism constitutes a form of proto-state or
state racism. Here, we are not speaking of racism in the ordinary
language sense, where it is a matter of color (blacks, whites, etc.), but rather
as any ideology predicated on a bifurcation, a cut, in the social fabric based
on birth, on biology, genetics, as qualities of one's very being, as opposed to
cuts in the social fabric based on beliefs, world views, or -- as in Marxism --
the social relations of production (class), which is the antithesis of the biologization
of cuts in the social fabric of humanity upon which Islamism is based. The
misogynistic vision of women as biologically inferior, integral to the ideology
of the Taliban and al Qaeda (and which has no basis in traditional Islam), the
yellow badge that the Taliban regime imposed on the Hindu minority in
Afghanistan, the reconceptualization of the umma on genetico-biological
bases, as opposed to a community of belief, which is integral to the world view
of bin Laden and Islamism, all attest to a racialization of Islam at the core
of this ideology. State racism and the biologization of social relations are
integral to the obsession with "purification" that animates Islamism
-- not the purification of the individuaal's soul, but the purification of the
social fabric itself. The discourses of purification which characterize
Islamism, are themselves the ante-chamber to ethnic cleansing and genocide. The
fate of Hindus in Taliban Afghanistan (a minority of only several hundred), or
the Shi`ite Hazaras facing ethnic cleansing, foreshadows the catastrophe that
would await the Copts of Egypt (a minority of six million, itself an ominous
figure) were the Islamic Jihad to take power there. This state racism, and
biologization of social relations, are features of one dimension of capitalist
modernity, its dark side, epitomized by Auschwitz, Babi Yar, Dresden and
Hiroshima, all the quintessential products of high capitalist civilization, and
inseparable from it. The development of Islamism attests to the spread to the
Arab-Islamic world of the same capitalist social relations and ideologies,
albeit in historically and culturally specific forms, that have shaped the
capitalist world in its phase of decadence (or permanent crisis).
Despite its claim that its polittical project is simply to effect the
withdrawal of the West from the soil of the "Muslim nation" (now
re-conceived biologically), and its subsequent purification, Islamism can only
hope to achieve that goal (futile though it is) by attempting to compete with
its Western enemy economically and militarily. Such a project means not the
halt to the capitalization of the Islamic world, but its completion, its
apotheosis, by Islamist regimes themselves. Thus the Khomeini regime in Iran,
after the overthrow of the Shah, has developed the oil industry, integrally
linked to the global capitalist economy, and necessitating a brutal regime of
exploitation of the proletariat, and developed industries and scientific
institutes for the production of weapons of mass destruction to elevate it to
the staus of a major regional imperialist power. The Ayotollahs have taken the
path of capitalist scientific, technological, economic and military
development, which, despite their protests of Islamic purity, will complete the
destruction of the traditional Islamic world of the Iranian past. The same
imperatives are at work in the Sunni branch of Islamism represented by al-Qaeda
-- though it is still only a proto-statee. Bin Laden's project to eliminate
Western imperialism from the soil of the Muslim nation seems to entail two
short term goals: using the Taliban regime in Afghanistan as a beach-head to
destabilize and overthrow the secular Pakistani regime, assume state power in
Pakistan, and with it a nuclear capability on the basis of which to project
"Islamic" power; overturning the Saudi regime, dependent as it is on
the US, and thereby control of much of the world's oil supply.[ii]
The question is not the probabilty of the success of this project (probably
minimal), but rather its inherently capitalist nature or class content.
A nuclear capability (an Islamic bomb), and control of oil, require the very
capitalist technology, science, and social relations, against which the Islamists
verbally rail, but which is inseparable from Islamism as a political movement
and project.
In analyzing Islamism as a polittical phenomenon it is necessary to
focus on three distinct, but inter-related elements: The socio-economic
conditions that provide the fertile soil within which such an ideology and
political movement can take hold and win popular support; the social classes
and strata that are the bearers of this ideology and the cadre and leadership
of this movement; the class content of this socio-political phenomenon. The
socio-economic conditions that breed Islamism are the impoverishment and
desperation of masses of people uprooted from a pre-capitalist or village and
artisanal existence by the development of capitalism, even as this latter is
incapable of providing employment for a newly urbanized and rapidly growing
population condemned to inhabit the shanty-towns around the sprawling
capitalist metropoli -- a mass of people lacking the education without which a
life of quasi-permanent unemployment and marginalization is all they have to
look forward to. This is the outcome of the trajectory of capitalism in the
Third World in general, and the Arab-Islamic world in particular, and it
provides the socio-economic conditions for the spread of Islamism. The classes
and strata that provide the cadre and leadership of Islamist movements are the
petty-bourgeoisie and the intelligentsia. It is not a coincidence if the
ideologue and organizer of al-Qaeda (bin Laden's chief lieutenant) Ayman al
Zawahiri, was a prominent surgeon, a child of a leading family of the Egyptian
intelligentsia. While the popular support for Islamism comes from the very
poor, the leadership and cadre of this movement is highly educated, a product
of the secular world of medicine and engineering, for example.[iii]
Yet the class provenance of the cadre or leadership of a political movement
does not determine its class content. That most crucial element for an
analysis of Islamism, as we have argued above, is capitalist in its class nature;
an expression or manifestation of capitalism in determinate historical and
cultural conditions: the Arab-Islamic world in the epoch of globalized capital
and American hegemony. Islamism is the violent and brutal reaction to that
hegemony, one that portends mass death or brutal oppression for the populations
of that world, an outcome that can only be averted by a class struggle to
overthrow the very capitalist social relations that have generated it and of
which Islamism is the current local manifestation.
MAC
INTOSH (October 2001)
[i]. All three of these forms of Araab-Islamic nations are integrally linked
to the trajectory of capitalism, as it subjects the world to the imperatives of
value production: liberal nationalism to the ascendant phase of capitalism;
Arab socialism to the Fordist phase of capitalist production; and Islam to the
impact of post-Fordism and globalization that now reigns supreme. One question
worth pursuing, despite or, perhaps, because of the Communist left's principled
opposition to nationalism is whether a subalten nationalism, a nationalism of
the exploited classes, was ever possible; whether a nationalism not integrally
bound to the project of capitalism was ever possible. For example, how does one
view the Indian rebellion of 1857, the war waged by Shamil and the Chechens
against Tsarist Russia in the 19th century, to take but two examples? Were
these manifestations of the subalten classes? Did they not lie outside the
ambit of capital? Were they "progressive" or reactionary? Marx
himself seems to have changed his views towards the end of his life, in his
correspondance with Vera Zasulich. It is an issue worth examining, though it
does not change the fact that the successive forms of modern Arab-Islamic
nationalism which we are here considering are all manifestations of capital.
;
[ii]. This is also the case with the states on Afghanistan's northern
border, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan, all of which are near the
oil-rich Caspian sea, and all of which have their own Islamist movements with
close ties to al-Qaeda.
[iii]. It should be no surprise that tthe leader of Islamism in Jordan, Laith
Shubaylat, is a former head of the engineers syndicate. These are the classes
and strata from which the leadership and cadre of nationalist movements are
typically drawn -- when those movements were liberal, when they were secular,
and now when they are Islamist.