"This world system is not reformable; it cannot be transformed gradually via trade unionism or bourgeois democracy. It must be overturned from top to bottom."

So reads the second criterion for participation in our discussion network, as spelled out in our Text of Presentation. But what does it mean to say that capitalism is not "reformable". Does it mean merely that there is no possiblity of a peaceful evolution from capitalism to communism? That could be true, and yet capitalism could still be capable of granting numerous reforms to (at least some sections of) the working class. There is a clear suggestion in the second criterion that struggles by way of trade unionism and bourgeois democracy -- in a word, reformist struggles -- have had their day, historically speaking; that they have no future, and that only revolutionary struggle is any longer viable. And yet, the working class continues, day after day, to carry on with its reformist struggles and tactics. If we really believe that reform struggles have no future, and that only revolutionary struggle is viable, we need to be able to offer a theoretical explanation for this. The following text attempts to take up this concern, with reference to debates which took place a while ago in the Francophone wing of the network. I post it now with the hope of stimulating further theoretical contributions and discussions in the English-speaking wing.

ON THE DEBATE ABOUT 'CLASS LINES'

What are these 'class lines' or 'class frontiers' previously much debated in the French-speaking wing of the Internationalists Discussion Network? They are supposed to be those fundamental tactical positions which separate in practice the work of genuine revolutionary communist organizations (or, alternatively, pro-revolutionary minorities) from that of the various organizations and tendencies of the capitalist political left (e.g. social democracy, Stalinism, Trotskyism, anarchism).

The fundamental positions include:

1) opposition to any form of parliamentarism or democratic electoralism (i.e. participation in the charade of the capitalist state's electoral and parliamentary/congressional circuses);

2) opposition to trade unionism, understood as participation in the operation or administration of trade unions (whether in their existing form or after having ‘reformed’ them);

3) opposition to all movements of national liberation, understood as struggles of imperialistically oppressed nationalist forces (including participation from all of the nation's social classes together, but invariably under the leadership of the bourgeoisie) against their imperialist oppressors.

All discussions thus far have referred to these three positions. But there were originally -- that is, in the early 1920s, when the various components of the international communist left were establishing themselves as currents distinct from the others within the then-new Communist International (CI) -- a few other fundamental positions which were to become 'class lines'. These were:

4) opposition to the tactic of the united front (as well as the so-called "workers' government"), since such a tactic involved openly collaborating with the same social democratic organizations (parties and unions) which had not only openly supported the mass slaughter of the First World War (thereby definitively demonstrating their irredemiably capitalist character), but had taken the lead in repressing the revolutionary workers' uprisings in Germany and elsewhere following the war's termination;

5) opposition to the conception of the mass party as inherited from the Second International, that is, social democracy. The conception of the mass Communist Party was pushed by the dominant Bolshevik (or Leninist) tendency within the CI, from 1920 on, requiring parties of genuine communists – who were everywhere a small minoritarian force compared to the mass parties of social democracy, including those 'radical' or 'leftist' parties which communists at that time labelled 'centrist' – to enter into, and recruit from, these same social democratic and 'centrist' parties in order to bolster their ranks into the realm of the mass party. (I will ignore this “line” from here on, as it is not specifically a tactical position like the other four.)

From its inception in 1975, the International Communist Current (ICC) did much to popularize this conception of 'class lines' within the emerging proletarian political milieu, primarily in western Europe and North America. The ICC was able to make (some of) these 'class lines' criteria for participation in the International Conferences of the Communist Left, initiated in the late 1970s by the Internationalist Communist Party of Italy (publishers of Battaglia Comunista). Thus, this conception of 'class lines' has been well known within the international proletarian political milieu for at least the past quarter century. Further, a number of the groups and elements of today's (pro-)revolutionary milieu came out of the ICC, continuing to adhere to this conception of 'class lines'.

What makes the discussion of this matter of prime importance for today's (pro-) revolutionary milieu is that, outside of the ICC, the theoretical foundation the ICC provided for the defense of the 'class lines' has been widely rejected as untenable. That foundation has been the ICC's theory of the "decadence of capitalism", based on its interpretation of Rosa Luxemburg's theory presented in her book The Accumulation of Capital (1913) (actually based on an interpretation of Luxemburg’s work by someone else). The thread of the discussion which took place on the French-speaking wing of the network that I want to reply to involves the CDP (Paris Discussion Circle), starting from their critique of the ICC's theory of decadence in the former's pamphlet Que ne pas faire?, continuing with IP (Internationalist Perspective)'s response "It is not easy to know what not to do" (written by Sander and Mac Intosh), and then Robin Goodfellow's response to both the CDP and IP in their text "On the debate about 'class frontiers'" (written in March, 2002). It is to the text of Robin Goodfellow (RGF) that I particularly want to respond here. (In fact, an English translation, made by Adam Buick, of RGF's text can be found in the archives of the English-speaking wing of the network, in message #548. For those without access to the network's English language archive, it can also be found on RGF's website, at www.members.lycos.fr/rgood/classfront.html.)

***

To very briefly re-capitulate, the ICC's vision of "decadence" was/is that, from 1914 on, capitalism became incapable of further developing the productive forces (at least, at a rate demanded by the continued accumulation of capital) as a result of the "exhaustion of pre-capitalist markets". Being incapable of such further development, capital was thereby, for the ICC, also incapable of granting any further reforms to the working class. For the ICC, it is the alleged fact of the impossibility of further reforms since 1914 which provides the justification for placing the essentially "reformist" tactics of parliamentarism, trade unionism, frontism, and national liberationism outside of the "class lines" of proletarian practice.

Both the CDP and IP have developed serious critiques of the ICC’s vision of "decadence". The CDP, however, have taken their critique to the point of rejecting any conception of decadence (or permanent crisis) of capitalism from 1914 on, while IP has attempted to develop an alternative theory of decadence. Thus, for the CDP, rejecting the concept of decadence means that there was no movement of class lines around 1914 from inclusion to exclusion of the reformist tactics referred to above for the proletarian movement. Consequently, the CDP is forced to choose between the following alternative viewpoints: i) capitalism not being decadent, the reformist tactics are still valid for the proletarian movement; or ii) since the reformist tactics are not valid today, they must have never been valid, even in the 19th century, when Marx, Engels, and other communists (as opposed to some anarchists) supported them. RGF argue that the second viewpoint is essentially anarchist, so, if the CDP intend to remain faithful to Marxism, they must accept the first alternative (as, in fact, RGF themselves do). (I should point out here that while this characterization applies to the CDP pamphlet Que ne pas faire?, there is not unanimity within the CDP on these questions.)

It is RGF's critique of IP's perspective that I wish to focus on from here. RGF quote from Sander and Mac Intosh's text, IP's claim that:

"For our part, the class frontiers defended by Marxist revolutionaries since 1914 remain valid, but they must be detached from a vision of decadence based on the stopping or the slowing down of the growth of the productive forces, and detached equally from a vision of the capitalist mode of production from now on incapable of conceding improvements in the standard of living of the workers."

In reply, RGF argue that:

"What IP proposes here is neither more nor less than abandoning the whole materialist basis of revolutionary theory. If the political positions of the party of the proletariat and the proletariat's revolutionary tactics are no longer based on the analysis and evaluation of the material conditions of the society in which it struggles, then revolutionary theory is no more than a vulgar ideology, a pure 'vision of the world'."

In this argument, RGF suggests that, for proletarian tactics to be "based on the analysis and evaluation of the material conditions of the society in which it struggles", they must take into account whether or not capital is capable of conceding improvements in the standard of living of the workers. That is, RGF accepts the logic of the ICC: that parliamentarism, unionism and the rest are valid tactics for the proletarian movement if and only if capital is capable of offering further reforms to the working class.

IP reject this logic, since they agree that substantial improvements of their living standards have been granted to the working class since 1914, while rejecting as valid the tactics of parliamentarism, unionism, etc. RGF argue that such an approach is an abandonment of materialism. But, we need to ask ourselves, must the proletarian movement regard as valid the tactics of parliamentarism, trade unionism, frontism, and national liberationism (which is really a form of frontism) if capital still retains the capacity of offering further reforms? Or is IP right that a change of tactics around 1914 from "reformist" to revolutionary -- that is, autonomous class activity, extra-parliamentary 'direct' action, organized outside of the unions through self-directed strike (or action) committees, etc. -- was justified (in fact, required) even though capital was still capable of offering reforms to the working class. Is there a materialist basis for such a viewpoint?

RGF's argument implies that capital's capacity (or incapacity) to offer reforms is the only materialist basis on which to determine whether reformist or revolutionary tactics are correct ones for the proletarian movement to employ. Again, on this matter (considered on its own), RGF is in agreement with the ICC. I am with IP in rejecting that viewpoint.

We need to ask: what are the possible materialist bases for determining whether reformist or revolutionary tactics and methods of struggle are the correct ones at any given point in the development of capitalist society? To think that the only relevant such bases are economic ones, in the narrow sense which separates an economic base from a social, cultural, ideological and political superstructure is to remain committed to a by now thoroughly discredited economic reductionism, a viewpoint which thinks it can explain every change at the superstructural level by reference to developments at the level of the economic base, a viewpoint which was central to the orthodox Marxism of both the Second and the Third Internationals.

Why wouldn't it be appropriate to decide on whether reformist or revolutionary tactics are correct at a given stage of development of capitalism on the basis of factors such as: the degree of development of the socialization of production, the proportion of the active population which has been integrated into the working class, the degree of development of the capitalist class itself (how divided that class is into antagonistic factions, or how united into one homogenous force), the level of overall social control exercised by the state, and, for that matter, the level of development of the class consciousness of the proletariat, or of the class struggle itself, looked at from a historical point of view? To me, these are all materialist factors (or material conditions) on which to base the choice of reformist or revolutionary tactics. And, for me, they are relevant to that determination. What they provide information for an analysis of is: the answer to the question of whether or not proletarian revolution has come onto the historical agenda.

In this debate, the one certainty for me is the enormous change that occurred within capitalist society and within the proletarian movement between 1914 and 1921. These historical facts cannot be denied. Capitalism turned some kind of corner during that time (even if it was already made inevitable by developments prior to 1914), forcing the proletarian movement to radically alter its course. The formation of the internationalist Zimmerwald Left during the course of WWI marked this (latter) change of direction. Capitalism had shown its true face: mass destruction in order to reproduce itself, barbarism threatening the whole of humanity and the biosphere itself. Furthermore, social democracy (including the trade unions) -- within which communist (pro-) revolutionaries had previously placed their activity -- had shown its true face, actively supporting capital's mass slaughter, acting as recruiting agents for imperialism, committed solely to capitalist legality and its democratic state form. Before 1914, none of this was clear within the proletarian political milieu. After 1918, it became increasingly clear to an increasingly radical (until 1921) international proletarian movement. The key factor in the movement to abandon the old reformist tactics and take up revolutionary tactics was the capitulation of social democracy, its failure to uphold the internationalist line it had claimed to defend prior to 1914, its open commitment to the capitalist nation and its state in the face of the impending menace of world imperialist war. And by the time the war was over -- thanks to autonomous proletarian activity opposed by social democracy -- when the real consequences of such war were clear to all, while social democracy was irrevocably lined up with the bourgeoisie against autonomous proletarian practice, what was clarified for this new movement was the necessity to not go back to the reformist practice of social democracy, the necessity to form new, independent, openly revolutionary communist organizations, committed above all to a revolutionary practice. At that point – with the formation of the Communist International -- communists needed to draw a class line between autonomous proletarian struggle and struggle on the terrain of capital, that is, struggle on capital's terms, within institutions and organizations under the control of the capitalist state, from which capital invariably emerges strengthened relative to the proletariat. The clearest communists of that time -- found within the Dutch, German, and Italian communist lefts -- attempted to draw such a line.

RGF is correct to point out that the line begins with the question of imperialist war: to oppose all such wars with a revolutionary defeatist position, or – with the bourgeoisie – to support one side in them with a nationalist, chauvinist position. (An important question, however, arises here for RGF: why was it that this issue became fundamental only with WWI? Why were Marx, Engels and others justified in supporting certain imperialist wars – in the sense that the power they supported was imperialist – in their time? What was it about capitalism’s evolving material conditions that fundamentally changed between the time of Marx’s death (1883) and 1914 such that opposition to all capitalist wars became the cornerstone of proletarian politics? )

But the line – the line of any proletarian political perspective – did, and still does, not stop with the attitude toward war. We do not need to wait until we know a political tendency's attitude towards a war before we can determine if they are reformist or revolutionary. If all of the tactics they employ or favour are of a reformist character, if they invariably attempt to orient all struggles in a reformist (legalist or statist) direction, if they invariably act against autonomous proletarian activity, then we are able to clearly place them on the other side of the class line.

***

Later, RGF provide a critique of IP's conception of decadence, although they radically simplify that conception.

"In the reply which Sander made to the report of the CDP discussion there is an attempt to base the concept of decadence outside any materialist basis. It is worth stopping a moment on the arguments employed.”

“We have already noted, with regard to IP, that to keep using the concept of 'decadence' while repudiating a materialist basis for it, is to base the concept on a moral or humanist notion. Sander explains here that it is war as a phenomenon of generalised destruction that characterises decadence. After 1914 capital became 'genocidal'. This is to forget that Marx already said in "Capital" (1867) that capitalism is based on the destruction, the exhausting of the two principal sources of wealth, 'the land and the worker'. It is to forget that, in the matter of genocide, the Indians of America, the aborigines of Australia, the Africans deported as slaves were among the first victims of a system which embraces no moral scruples in its infinite rush to exploitation."

Without wishing to reply on behalf of IP (or Sander), I would argue that there is a qualitative difference between the 'genocidal' character of capitalism prior to the 20th century and that since 1914. Certainly, capitalism came into being as a social force to be reckoned with "dripping blood and filth from every pore" (Marx), during its phase of primitive accumulation. However, what distinguishes modern capitalist barbarism in the era of the world wars is the level of technological development of the means of destruction at capital's disposal, the imperious necessity for every capitalist state to put as much of its resources as possible into the development of such means of destruction in order to remain competitive with the others, and the need to be prepared to use such "weapons of mass destruction" (to use a currently fashionable phrase) against hostile foreign powers, or, indeed, any social forces standing in the way of their pursuit of their "national interest".

Since 1914, capitalism has posed itself as a threat to the very continued existence of the human species and, indeed, all life forms on the planet, as a result of its development of the means of destruction at its disposal. This is the basis for Rosa Luxemburg's famous remark from that time, that the future of humanity had only two possible alternatives: socialism or barbarism. History since then has provided ample proof of the accuracy of Luxemburg's claim. Capitalism never for a moment shrank away from the horror it unleashed in 1914. That horror has only increased, as increasingly powerful means of destruction have been pursued by all of the most "advanced" capitalist states in their competitive fight for world domination. It is the threat of the use of these destructive forces against all of humanity, in the pursuit of the temporary alleviation of some of its contradictions by means of the actual use of these forces in war, rather than capital's inability to grant further reforms or economic improvements, that makes the communist revolution, revolutionary struggle, and, therefore, the employment of revolutionary tactics necessary for the proletarian movement since 1914. Capitalist barbarism can only be abolished by way of revolutionary struggle on the part of the international working class.

***

In reality, IP's conception of decadence -- personally, I prefer the term "permanent crisis" -- is thoroughly materialist. Quoting from IP's text "Towards a new theory of the decadence of capitalism" (in IP #34):

"Marx clearly pointed to two fundamental contradictions of capitalism which made its crisis ineluctable. First, the tendential fall in the rate of profit, which results from capitalist accumulation because of the growing weight of constant capital relative to variable capital in the production process .... Second, the widening gap between the enlargement of the scale of production and the enlargement of the market necessary to realize the exchange value contained in that production. That gap continues to grow not just because of the growth of the exchange value of the total production, but also because of the much more rapid growth of the quantity of use values constituting that production, this latter being the result of the increased productivity of labour." (pp.19-20)

For capital, there is no escape from these tendencies. The need to unleash WWI, it could argued, arose from the relative saturation of existing markets under the control of the dominant, most developed capitals of that time, giving rise to their need to capture markets (not to mention natural resources and pools of cheap labour) under the control of their competitors, as there were no longer any new markets not under the control of one or another of these capitals for them to capture. (In fact, this would be a gross simplification of any adequate Marxist explanation of the occurrence of WWI. Rather, it could be argued that it is an essential component of such an explanation.) Such an argument would not rely in any way on Luxemburg's theory of the need for pre-capitalist markets to make possible the continued expansion of capital. The markets required can be either capitalist or non-capitalist, it makes no difference. The point is that a level had been reached (on a global scale) such that a barrier now stood in the way of the unhindered expansion of the market necessary to realize the full value of the global capitalist product, thus precipitating a fundamentally irresolvable crisis for global capital. Irresolvable, that is, without the elimination of a significant amount of existing capital, of existing value. Such a significant amount, in fact, that peaceful techniques of devalorization such as bankruptcy and forgiving of debts are not adequate to the purpose. The only “solution” within capitalism, and that being only temporary, is the actual physical destruction of a sufficient proportion of existing capital – in the form of fixed capital, machinery, buildings, etc., variable capital, that is, workers and their families, as well as other expendable commodities and natural resources – which is most efficiently accomplished by means of inter-imperialist war. This results in a new space for the capital that survives the war to once again grow unhindered until the markets become saturated again. (To forestall any objection to a supposedly static or fixed conception of markets, it can be pointed out that a dynamic view of the development of the capitalist market does not prevent the tendency for the increasing scale of capital’s productive capacity, due to its development of the productive forces – which simultaneously reduces the employment of labour power in such production, resulting in a reduction in the buying-power of the working class – outstripping the productive demand of its markets.)

***

Where does the much referred to "transition from the formal to the real domination of capital" fit into this conception? On the one hand, it can easily be demonstrated that that transition (being a long, drawn out process from the early 19th century, and still ongoing today) accelerated the two historical tendential developments invoked above as causal explanatory factors in the development of the permanent crisis of capitalism. The increasing extraction of relative surplus-value directly implies both "... the growing weight of constant capital relative to variable capital in the production process", leading to the tendential fall in the rate of profit; at the same, it also leads to "... the widening gap between the enlargement of the scale of production and the enlargement of the market necessary to realize the exchange value contained in that production." If such an account does not provide a materialist basis for the decadence of capitalism, I can't imagine what would.

But for IP (and myself), the transition from the formal to the real domination of capital explains far more than just the bases of the permanent crisis of capitalism. It also explains the increasing unification of the capitalist class in response to both the increasingly menacing crises afflicting capital as well as the growing threat of proletarian struggle, eliminating the possibility of frontism between the proletariat and "progressive" capitalist factions. This increasing unification of the capitalist class leads to the increasing control of the capitalist state over all political and social activity, leaving both parliamentary and trade union activity on the terrain of capital, eliminating the possibility of autonomous proletarian practice from both of these arenas of struggle. The issue of national liberation struggles is a little more complicated. No one ever argued that national liberation struggles were a terrain for class struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie; rather, they were supported (by Marx and Engels, for example) because they contributed to the necessary development of capitalism (and thereby also the formation of the modern working class) in opposition to the continued domination of pre-capitalist economic forms, without which communism would remain a utopian dream. However, by 1914, more or less every country in the world was under capitalist control -- even if many were still dominated by pre-capitalist economic forms -- and so wars of "national liberation" were from then on merely a matter of determining whether such control was held by the domestic bourgeoisie or one or another of the dominant imperialist countries. In reality, economic development in the 20th century in countries such as South Korea and China has shown that the domestic bourgeoisie – in the countries of the capitalist “periphery” – has been more capable than the imperialist "metropoles" of economic development in those countries, through the process of primitive accumulation, the elimination of pre-capitalist forms of production and corresponding classes, and so also of the formation of a modern working class. (This is not to deny that “metropolitan” capital had no role to play in the economic development of those countries, especially S. Korea. Furthermore, the development of these and other East Asian countries came at a specific moment in the evolution of global capital when the production of many commodities migrated from the “metropoles” to the periphery.) However, none of this has made communists any more sympathetic to such wars of "national liberation" in the periphery of global capitalism. The development of global capitalism having reached the stage where world proletarian revolution has been on the agenda since the early part of the 20th century, such national economic development resulting from successful "national liberation" struggles has not been something for communists to support, as it had been during the lifetimes of Marx and Engels. And this is not even to mention the poison of nationalist ideology employed in all such conflicts, which is used by the forces of "national liberation" to destroy the internationalist consciousness which all sections of the global proletariat are forced to develop if they are to push forward their autonomous class movement towards the abolition of capitalism.

Eric R.

October 2003