The first Chechen war, in
1994-1996, ended in a Russian defeat, and the de facto withdrawal of Russian
troops from Chechnya. The second Chechen war, unleashed by Moscow, has now
brought the Chechen capital, Grozny, under the tentative control of the Russian
army. Throughout the siege of Grozny perhaps thirty thousand civilians huddled
in basements, while the Russian army pounded the city into rubble. With the
decision of the "boeviki," as the Russians term the Chechen forces,
to abandon the city in April, Grozny's surviving inhabitants, now swelled by
the arrival of twenty to thirty thousand refugees fleeing the depredations of
the Russian army as it destroys Chechen villages in the mountains to the south
of the capital, now face the risks of disease and starvation, as well as death
or tortue at the hands of the occupying forces.
Despite
the extravagant claims by the Putin regime that the war is over, it is likely
that the boeviki will mount a furious resistance in the mountains of Chechnya,
that they will infiltrate the shattered city of Grozny, waging guerilla war
against the Russians, and that they will even carry the war into Russia itself
with daring attacks against civilians. Meanwhile, even if the terror unleashed
by Russian tanks, artillery, and aircraft, against the villages of Chechnya is
successful, and order reigns in Grozny, it is quite likely that any Russian
military victory will be accompanied by a vicious ethnic cleansing, reminiscent
of the decision of Stalin to deport the Chechens en masse in 1944. There are already voices in military circles in
Moscow (from which thousands of Chechens, and other members of ethnic groups
from the Caucasus, have been deported since late October 1999, in a veritable
orgy of xenophobia) to the effect that it would be dangerous to ever rebuild
Grozny, or turn over local authority to Chechens, whether it be the de facto
Chechen president, Maskhadov (whose authority was flouted by the boeviki), or
even leaders handpicked by Moscow, such as the Chechen Mufti Akhmed Kadourev.
Moreover, tensions between the Russian military in Grozny and the local
pro-Russian Chechen militia have already led to confrontations. While
"liberals" in Moscow favor negotiations with Maskhadov, and some kind
of local autonomy, the nationalists (and this may include Putin himself) have
concluded that any compromise will weaken the authority of the Russian state,
raise the spectre of demands for de facto or even de jure independence from
other ethnic minorities, and reduce the chances that Russia can regain control
of the now economically vital region of the Transcaucasus, through which the
oil pipelines from the Caspian Sea will pass. Thus, the reduction of Grozny to
a pile of rubble, beneath which the corpses of thousands lie buried, may only
be the prelude to a campaign of ethnic cleansing and genocide.
The
village of Komsomolskoe, to the south of Grozny, in the foothills of the
Caucasus mountains, to which the boeviki fled from Grozny, bears witness to
that gruesome prospect. For almost a
week in April, the village was systematically bombarded by Russian tanks,
artillery, and aircraft, until every last building was razed. In the aftermath
of the slaughter, six hundred and forty two bodies have been discovered, with
countless others probably in the forests surrounding the village. According to
the Associated Press, Russians on the scene have acknowledged that more than a
hundred of the corpses had been decapitated, mutilated, or been executed with a
bullet to the head -- this latter the technique by which hundreds of thousands
of Jews were murdered in the forests of Poland and Byelorussia by the Nazi Einsatzgruppen, or the thousands of
Poles executed at Katyn by the NKVD, the very organization which transmogrified
into the KGB, and now, in democratic Russia, into the FSB, which was on the
scene in Komsomolskoe.
The
scenes from Grozny and Komsomolskoe may at first glance remind one of the
campaigns waged by Tsarist Russia in the same region in the nineteenth century,
in particular the brutal war waged against the Chechens and their leader
Shamil, the most skillful of the Caucasian leaders to resist the Russian
advance. Yet while Russian troops are again burning and looting Chechen
villages, and the boeviki fight in the name of Shamil, the present war is as
different from its nineteenth century counterpart as ascendant capitalism is
from decadent capitalism. The war waged by Tsarist Russia against Shamil in the
1840's and 1850's was structurally the same as the wars against the Indians in
North America (or Argentina and Chile) in the same period. Shamil, like the
Sioux leader Sitting Bull, led a struggle of a pre-capitalist, tribal,
community, against the advance of a rapacious capitalist state seeking to open
up a vast area for settlement and capitalist development. The war waged by
Tsarist Russia in the Caucasus in the nineteenth century, like its North
American counterpart on the Great Plains, was integrally linked to the
primitive accumulation of capital. The present war in the Caucasus, is linked
to the danger of the disagregation of a mature Russian capitalist state, and
its effort to confront the challenge of the globalization of capital. Because
of the ecomomic and political weakness of Russian capital, the ruling classes
of entities like Chechnya, which had been loyal to Moscow throughout the
existence of the Soviet Union can now mobilize their own population, which is
no longer pre-capitalist, but like the inhabitants of rural communities
throughout the capitalist world depends on the remittances of proletarians
employed in distant industrial centers, in a bid for independence. The
existence of natural resources, or the strategic control of vital areas (in the
case of Chechnya, the locus of oil and gas pipelines) permits these local
ruling classes to advance their own interests by seeking the support of other
imperialist states or enterprises on the cutting edge of global capital. Given
the inability of Russia to compete economically or financially with its rivals,
this leaves military power as its only recourse. If Russia is not to lose
control of the Caucasus, and Transcaucasus, to give up any hope of controlling
the oil and gas wealth of the region, upon which the hopes for its own economic
rejuvenation depend, it must assert its military power, and prevent the further
disagregation of its territorial space. Lacking the power to control the
financial circuits of capital, Russia can only respond to the economic power of
its rivals (and in the first place, the US) by the control of land, of
territory. Again, given the extreme weakness of Russian capital, the exercise
of that control can neither be economic nor indirect (as is the case for the
US), but rather military and brutal. Hence the recourse to the horrors of
modern warfare, and ethnic cleansing.
What
adds to the pressure on Moscow to unleash ethnic cleansing and even genocide in
the Caucasus, is that the xenophobia which fuels it is -- in the absence of a
growing economy -- the only means to win popular support for the Russian state.
The designation of the racial "Other," in the form of the Chechen or
the Muslim, as a danger to holy mother Russia; the identification of the
Chechens with terrorism, which provided Moscow with the pretext for unleashing
the second Chechen war, and the hunt for Caucasians [la chasse aux Caucasiens]
orchestrated by the Kremlin, which led to the ejection of thousands of people
from Russia's cities and industrial centers, have created an atmosphere of fear
and hatred among masses of Russians, which not only helped assure the election
of Putin as president, and widespread approval for the Chechen war, but provide
a basis for popular acceptance of the ethnic cleansing upon which the Russian
military has now embarked.
To the
nationalism with which segments of the Chechen ruling class seeks to inflame
its population against Russia and Russians, must be added the xenophobia with
which the Russian ruling class seeks to mobilize its population. Whether
Chechnya becomes another Afghanistan for Russia, or a mass grave for the people
of Chechnya, we are witness to the inexorable tendency of decadent capitalism
to turn the earth into a slaugterhouse.
[This text first published in Internationalist
Perspective #37, fall 2000]