Was Hitler's Directive No

Was Hitler's Directive No. 34, halting Army Group Centre, justified?

Background

In the middle of July 1941, Hitler issued his directive no. 34, ordering that Army Group Centre halt and divert its tanks to Army Group South and North. This has been viewed as a blunder in the eyes of the vast majority of historians. Or is it? We explore the age-old debate here.

• Yes

Ø Army Group Centre needed a rest

Army Group Centre, after advancing rapidly for the past few weeks, was exhausted and needed two weeks break. The troops were far away from the supply bases. Moreover, the tanks and the motorcycles needed repairing and servicing. That was why Operation Typhoon (Oct. 2) went so well in the first few days. Moscow would have fallen had the Germans not been unlucky (the Russian winter was early & extra cold)

Ø Moscow was a geographical expression and not the nerve centre of the USSR

Moscow, as Hitler correctly [BI.G.1] said[BI.G.2][1] , was just a geographical expression. After the city's capture, the Russians could have easily moved the capital deep into Kazakhstan or the Urals. Just like when Hitler took Paris in 1940, the French (and in this case the Russians) would continue to resist. The fall of the capital would make no difference.

Ø Army Group Centre was far ahead of Army Group South and North

Hitler's powerful Army Group Centre was far ahead of Army Group North and South. At the time of Directive 34, the front was long because of the bulge in Army Group Centre's lines. This would have made it less easy for the Germans to launch tactical operations because of the long front. After all, they were outnumbered but had the far superior technology. By halting Army Group Centre and diverting its armour to South and North, the Germans would shorten the front.

Ø The Ukraine and the Donets were needed by the Germans

The Ukraine and the Donets were both the breadbasket of the Soviet Union, even though both comprised only 3% of the USSR's total landmass. By taking this fertile land, Hitler would simultaneously capture its industries (together with the coal) while depriving the Soviet Union of its industrial strength. Also, his army would be at the very thresholds of the Caucasus. A simple strike in 1942 (or 1941, if time permitted) towards Astrakhan would sever all links between the Caucasus and the rest of Russia.

Ø There were at least twice as many Soviets as Germans

At this point of time, the ratio of Soviets to Germans were around 2:1. This was more than the bare numerical superiority they enjoyed at June 22 (1.1:1). By continuing the offensive, the German advance would have significantly slower. It was better for the units to be transferred, and then units originally from South and North to be transferred when their 1941 objectives were attained.

• No

v The Russian front was shattered and should not have been given the time to regroup

The Soviets were in a precarious situation after retreating for many weeks. Many units were at half strength due to the numerous encircling manoeuvres, which some units partially escaped. Giving time for the Russians to regroup would be disastrous and would only magnify the numerical disadvantage of the Germans. Advancing would show the world German technological power.

v Moscow was the nerve centre and not merely a geographical expression

As Hitler wrongly believed, the Soviet capital was the centre of all communications for the whole USSR. Its capture would likely lead to the Soviets seeking an armistice, or at least, cause severe demoralisation. It also would be good propaganda for the Germans.

v No definite target for A.G. South but there was Moscow for A.G. Centre

There was no definite target for Army Group South which would cause a major effect on the Russians. As Alan Clark puts it: Was it to halt on the Donets? On the Caucasus? Or on the Caspian Sea?

This was not so for the Germans. With the capture of the Soviet capital, it would cause big waves around the world (just like the fall of Paris did). Even if the Soviets moved their capital to the next major city of Kuibyshev (some 60km to the East) it would have fallen too.

v Stalin likely to stay in the capital

With the Germans at the doorstep of Stalin's lair, the Soviet leader would likely have remained in Moscow and die a 'glorious death' just like Hitler did in 1945. This also can be seen by the fact that Stalin chose to remain while most civilians fled Moscow in late November and early December 1941 despite the fact that German troops had already penetrated the outskirts of the city.

v Capture of Moscow cuts Leningrad's last rail line

The capture of Moscow would further the siege of Leningrad by cutting off its last railway line®the Leningrad-Tikhvin-Moscow railway. With the capture of the Soviet capital, the surrender of the 'cradle of the Revolution' would only have been weeks away.

v Moscow was nearer than Astrakhan or even Maikop

Compared to Astrakhan or even the Caucasus, Moscow was much nearer (see map)

Moscow was much more easy and practical a target than the immense plains of the Caucasus. This even Stalin knew. (Refer to the plans of early 1942)

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So, was Hitler's Directive No. 34, justified?

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