The Role of the Luftwaffe in Barbarossa

 

It will be the task of the air force, so far as possible, to damage and destroy the effectiveness of the Russian air force, and to support the operations by the army at the points of main effort, that is to say in the sectors of the central army group and in the area where the southern army group will be making its main effort. The Russian railways will either be destroyed, or, in the case of more important objectives close to hand (i.e. railway bridges) will be captured by the bold use of parachute and air-borne troops. In order that maximum forces may be available for operations against the enemy air force and for direct support of the army, the munitions industry will not be attacked while the major operation is in progress. Only after the conclusion of the mobile operations will such attacks, and in particular attacks against the industrial area of the Urals, be considered...

-Barbarossa Directive #21, Dec. 18, 1940

 

            The German air force, the Luftwaffe, undoubtedly played a critical role in the Eastern Front. Indeed, it is mentioned in every part of the campaign. What was this role which was of such decisive importance, and why did it fail to achieve it?

            The air force was to rapidly destroy Soviet forward bases in the first few hours, depriving the enemy the right to rise up for its bases. It was to aid the Germans by capturing strategic points e.g. bridges or conducting recon jobs, after which it would assume a largely defensive role throughout the rest of the campaign.

            However, this dream was basically flawed because of three factors:

(a)                The German air force, though modernised, was too small to handle a 2000-mile front

(b)               The Soviets had a large Lebensraum (living space) in the vast expanse of their country. When factories were constructed east of the Urals, Germany simply could not bomb them.

(c)                The Soviet Union had at least thrice as many planes as the Germans. Their production rate was much higher too. The Russians used tactics similar, or even better, to the British when their homeland was threatened.

 

Let’s take a look at the failure of the Luftwaffe. In the 1st week of the Eastern Campaign, many planes were destroyed on the ground in the apparent triumph of the German Air Force. However, it is interesting to note that like on land, the battle was not yet lost! Like Napoleon’s invasion into Russia years ago, the Russians had two valuable resources that they could always rely on: space and men. Factories were moved east of Moscow into the Urals. There are many accounts of factories opening without roofs at minus forty degrees. The bravery of Soviet pilots is also unquestioned. German generals often speak of the bravery of the Red Air Force. Soviet pilots actually wanted to fly straight into combat after getting their plane, and there were so many aspiring pilots that there were simply too few crews to maintain them.

German figures and interpretation.

            Germany in January 1941 had 1 aircraft for 1,183 square kilometres of territory under its control. This was like having just one small fighter in Singapore. It was obvious that despite gaining economic superiority (France was taken in June 1940) over Britain, German aircraft production was much lower than that of Britain or even the United States. It became increasingly clear that to support a long war, Germany had to produce more armaments—surely the Low Countries and France could yield more than just a few dozen planes a month? Instead of rising steadily, German aircraft production stagnated but peaked before the Balkan Campaign before experiencing a downward trend. The Luftwaffe essentially lost the ‘war of steel’ (as termed by Churchill) because it failed to raise production levels. It must be noted that Germany hardly mass-produced at that time.

            German losses speak for themselves. Despite the total annihilation of the Soviet Air Force from the skies by the first week of July, German aircraft losses peaked at 16.2% (this was especially high for the fighters). The Soviets knew that their production was higher than that of the Germans, and thus were willing to trade three, even five Soviet planes for one German. It was this eagerness to fight that cost the Germans more planes than the Balkan campaign did, despite involving the near-destruction of Belgrade.

Moscow and Leningrad

            German planes, as it is widely known, had problems landing at the primitive Soviet airstrips. Communications over the large expanse of country (the distance from Brest-Litovsk to Moscow is equivalent to that of London to Prague) were hard to maintain, even for the Luftwaffe. Thus, many inexperienced German pilots crashed their planes. It is already clear to the reader why Moscow was hardly bombed and why Leningrad, which was within striking distance of East Prussia, was one of the hardest cities hit.

The Stalingrad Catastrophe

The terrible catastrophe—no other word can describe it—of Stalingrad is attributed to the Luftwaffe as usual. Goering’s overestimate (or rather, boast) that he could supply the trapped Sixth Army with 700 tons of necessities daily had probably been because of a successful supply operation throughout the whole of 1941 and his ability to supply the Italians in Tunisia.

Why did the Sixth Army receive so few supplies? It, as has been explained, was because of the need to supply the Italians defending North Africa, which took up many supply planes. Well, if German production had been as high as Britain’s or that of the Soviet Union, then Germany certainly would not lack any transports. It all boiled to one word: production. We all know why the Soviet Union gained air superiority rapidly after that.


 

Figure 1--The Messerschmitt Bf 109. It was one of Germany’s most successful fighters.

Figure 2-- A Junker Ju 52. Widely used to supply army, including the Stalingrad defenders

Figure 3--German Aircraft Strength

Figure 4--German Air Losses

 

Sources:

  1. http://www.warbirdsresourcegroup.org/LRG/
  2. Murray, W. The Luftwaffe 1933-45: Strategy for Defeat (London, 1996) p.101