The Role of the Luftwaffe in Barbarossa
It will be the task of the
air force, so far as possible, to damage and destroy the effectiveness of the
Russian air force, and to support the operations by the army at the points of
main effort, that is to say in the sectors of the central army group and in the
area where the southern army group will be making its main effort. The Russian
railways will either be destroyed, or, in the case of more important objectives
close to hand (i.e. railway bridges) will be captured by the bold use of
parachute and air-borne troops. In order that maximum forces may be available
for operations against the enemy air force and for direct support of the army,
the munitions industry will not be attacked while the major operation is in
progress. Only after the conclusion of the mobile operations will such attacks,
and in particular attacks against the industrial area of the Urals, be
considered...
-Barbarossa Directive #21, Dec. 18,
1940
The German
air force, the Luftwaffe, undoubtedly played a critical role in the Eastern
Front. Indeed, it is mentioned in every part of the campaign. What was this
role which was of such decisive importance, and why did it fail to achieve it?
The air
force was to rapidly destroy Soviet forward bases in the first few hours,
depriving the enemy the right to rise up for its bases. It was to aid the
Germans by capturing strategic points e.g. bridges or conducting recon jobs,
after which it would assume a largely defensive role throughout the rest of the
campaign.
However,
this dream was basically flawed because of three factors:
(a)
The
German air force, though modernised, was too small to handle a 2000-mile front
(b)
The
Soviets had a large Lebensraum (living space) in the vast expanse of
their country. When factories were constructed east of the Urals, Germany
simply could not bomb them.
(c)
The
Soviet Union had at least thrice as many planes as the Germans. Their
production rate was much higher too. The Russians used tactics similar, or even
better, to the British when their homeland was threatened.
Let’s take a look at the
failure of the Luftwaffe. In the 1st week of the Eastern Campaign,
many planes were destroyed on the ground in the apparent triumph of the German
Air Force. However, it is interesting to note that like on land, the battle was
not yet lost! Like Napoleon’s invasion into Russia years ago, the Russians had
two valuable resources that they could always rely on: space and men. Factories
were moved east of Moscow into the Urals. There are many accounts of factories
opening without roofs at minus forty degrees. The bravery of Soviet pilots is
also unquestioned. German generals often speak of the bravery of the Red Air
Force. Soviet pilots actually wanted to fly straight into combat after getting
their plane, and there were so many aspiring pilots that there were simply too
few crews to maintain them.
German
figures and interpretation.
Germany in
January 1941 had 1 aircraft for 1,183 square kilometres of territory under its
control. This was like having just one small fighter in Singapore. It was
obvious that despite gaining economic superiority (France was taken in June
1940) over Britain, German aircraft production was much lower than that of
Britain or even the United States. It became increasingly clear that to support
a long war, Germany had to produce more armaments—surely the Low Countries and
France could yield more than just a few dozen planes a month? Instead of rising
steadily, German aircraft production stagnated but peaked before the Balkan Campaign
before experiencing a downward trend. The Luftwaffe essentially lost the
‘war of steel’ (as termed by Churchill) because it failed to raise production
levels. It must be noted that Germany hardly mass-produced at that time.
German
losses speak for themselves. Despite the total annihilation of the Soviet Air
Force from the skies by the first week of July, German aircraft losses peaked
at 16.2% (this was especially high for the fighters). The Soviets knew that
their production was higher than that of the Germans, and thus were willing to
trade three, even five Soviet planes for one German. It was this eagerness to
fight that cost the Germans more planes than the Balkan campaign did, despite
involving the near-destruction of Belgrade.
German
planes, as it is widely known, had problems landing at the primitive Soviet
airstrips. Communications over the large expanse of country (the distance from
Brest-Litovsk to Moscow is equivalent to that of London to Prague) were hard to
maintain, even for the Luftwaffe. Thus, many inexperienced German pilots
crashed their planes. It is already clear to the reader why Moscow was hardly
bombed and why Leningrad, which was within striking distance of East Prussia,
was one of the hardest cities hit.
The terrible catastrophe—no
other word can describe it—of Stalingrad is attributed to the Luftwaffe as
usual. Goering’s overestimate (or rather, boast) that he could supply the
trapped Sixth Army with 700 tons of necessities daily had probably been because
of a successful supply operation throughout the whole of 1941 and his ability
to supply the Italians in Tunisia.
Why did the Sixth Army
receive so few supplies? It, as has been explained, was because of the need to
supply the Italians defending North Africa, which took up many supply planes.
Well, if German production had been as high as Britain’s or that of the Soviet
Union, then Germany certainly would not lack any transports. It all boiled to
one word: production. We all know why the Soviet Union gained air superiority
rapidly after that.
Figure 1--The Messerschmitt Bf 109. It was one of Germany’s most successful fighters.
Figure 2--
A Junker Ju 52. Widely used to supply army, including the Stalingrad defenders
Figure 3--German
Aircraft Strength
Figure 4--German
Air Losses
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