BRUNEI:
A Lubricated Monarchy.
ABSTRACT
As British decolonisation swept through the
Southeast Asian region after the Second World War, Bruneian Sultan Omar
(Hassanal’s father) decided against joining the Malayan federation in 1963. He
instead launched into a political campaign on an anti-Malay federation,
anti-British platform. He continued his dynamic rule until 1967, where-upon he
passed on the throne to his son Hassanal. However, he continued to rule by
proxy, even up until his death in 1986. Bruneian independence was achieved in
January 1984 and has subsequently thrived under an umbrella of oil, Islam,
fluid politics and democracy by proxy. This essay explains the Bruneian
political economy.
So what then maintains the elevated level of
the Bruneian national status; is it the potential supremacy of the Islamic
religion, or perhaps an emerging pattern of secular humanism, or is it more to
do with how the monarchy spectacularly presents the national wealth derived
from immense oil reserves? These propositions will be canvassed in this essay
as it develops an argument that concludes that the ‘Islamic disneyland’
appearance of Brunei is actually floated on an amalgam of oil wealth,
psuedo-democracy, Islam, nationalism and ethnicity; an amalgam that drives
‘Islamocracy’ and a secular type of oil welfare.
Because the Malayan monarchy is no new player
to the international scene; and because the subject country of concern is not
necessarily weak under the Islamic version of monarchy, it would be impossible
to conclude that the political dynamics are finite. Nor indeed the country
itself; Higginson believes ‘If
it wanted to, Brunei could set itself up as the Monaco of the region, Asia
Pacifics’s tax-free playground’. And ‘It could also, if it wished, run its
economy solely off the earnings from its foreign exchange reserves’ Higginson. Therefore,
this paper will concentrate on what the political dynamics are that makes an
‘Islamocratic’ nation such as Brunei so successful.
INTRODUCTION
Maxwell found that there were three-hundred and thirty-one thousand, seven
hundred people living in Brunei in 1999. Of these, thirty-eight per-cent were
Chinese and other nationalities, of which made up eleven minority groups. The
majority of the population consists of ethnic Malay’s. He realises ‘A person who is a citizen of modern Brunei enjoys
privileges and economic advantages a non-citizen does not’. And ‘Further, a
person who is both a citizen and a Malay enjoys advantages a non-citizen and
non-Malay does not’. National citizenry empowerment in Brunei is
established with, and anchored by, the traditional historical Malayan identity.
If the concept of malayu citizenship is negated in any
modern discourse, an understanding of the true practical application of
political dynamics is thus unattainable. The question of just who is Malay thus
has a definitive bearing on Bruneian political dynamics. He states ‘there are
two general principles on which citizenship may be anchored, jus sanguinis and jus soli, and that the basis of modern citizenship in Brunei is jus sanguinis. Maxwells’ explanation
develops and asserts the fact that the traditional malayu identity applies to Malay’s as Muslims. This has been
established since the seventh century (and entered into the English conscience
and language in the same period), and is thus the linguistic basis of ethnic
identity for these peoples today.
The principles now, of
Brunei citizenship, are gained from the developed sense of urang malayu. This is the fifth polysemous branch of the title malayu; the Malay legal perspective of
the term. ‘it would be known to anyone familiar with the language of the Brunei
Constitution, or with routine government activities dealing with nationality
and citizenship’, says Maxwell. Bruneian Islam and urang malayu are thus
and therefore, embedded in the state constitution.
Jus sanguinis is the basis of citizenship; ‘this distinctively Bruneian approach to
the determination of citizenship, utilising the principle of jus sanguinis rather than the principle
of jus soli, means that there will be
other persons born in Brunei who are not citizens’. Jus soli entails that people born in a country inherit citizenship
in that land; whilst jus sanguinis
dictates that persons inherit original heritage, wherever they are born. They
will embrace their original inheritance; Malay in this case. All other persons
in Brunei therefore, are essentially stateless.
This then allows external Malay’s to populate
Brunei without restriction, whereas the jus
soli principle -if it were used- would inhibit the immigration of
political, commercial or business elites who are Malay nationals. Jus soli does apply in Malaysia,
however. This ensures that Malay’s, and hence the Malay Bruneian monarchy,
retain a monopoly on the use of power.
The Sultanate of Brunei can trace its
heritage back to 1363 AD, when prophet Mohammad Shah was alive. A descendant of
the prophet, Sultan Sharif Ali built the first mosque during his reign from
1425 to 1432. Since then, Brunei Malays and other Malays have been a part of
the Islamic centre of court power. And now, whilst the state has a legal system
based on British common law, the traditional Islamic law generally overshadows
the British system of justice.
Despite being an
absolute monarch, Sultan
Hassanal occupies a sensitive void
between conservative and liberal forces, both in religious and economic
matters. The Sultan is the head of state and has full executive
authority. He is assisted by five councils which he has appointed. The cabinet
(Council of Ministers) consists of eleven ministers that advise the Sultan on
daily affairs. The Sultan is Prime Minister over the cabinet. Based on British
common law and with an independent judiciary, there are written laws,
judgements, statutes, and legislations enacted by the Prime Minister. There are
also the advisory Privy Council, the Religious Council and the Succession
Council which deals with the changeover of sultans.
The international political powers of the
country are buoyed by membership in some of the more globally influential NGOs
(Non Government Organisations) such as APEC (Asia Pacific Forum), ASEAN
(Association Southeast Asian Nations) and the OIC (Organisation of Islamic
Council). Of course, the prime strength of Brunei would be its viscous
relationship with OPEC (Organisation Petroleum Exporting Countries). Brunei subscribes
participation in over twenty-seven international NGOs.
AN ISLAMIC DISNEYLAND
The Sultan of Brunei remains the sole
possessor of executive political power. Brunei has been described as a
quasi-Islamic Disneyland; and it is lubricated by a drop of Western democratic
process. As an absolute monarch, the Sultan controls the Police, the armed
services, the oil administration, as well as broadcasting and information
services. He is the King, Prime Minister, the Finance Minister; and at the top
of the Muslim pillar, he is the head of Islam in Brunei. Currently, there is
only one legal political party in the country, PPKB (Brunei Solidarity National
Party). Other informal parties include the PRB (Brunei People’s Party) and the
Brunei National Democratic Party,
Since the controversial spending behaviours
of Prince Jefri (the Sultans brother), tensions are perceived to have surfaced
in the royal lineage leading some to postulate that there may be a fracturing
of Bruneian society. A brother of Jefri, Prince Mohamed accused Jefri of
spending billions from the secretive Brunei Investment Agency; perhaps
divesting half of the countries reserves. It was alleged he was spending
seven-hundred and forty seven thousand dollars a day. With the outrageous
spending of Jefri, comes the wrangle between conservative and liberal Muslim
forces, and various court proceedings had followed, although these matters have now been mostly settled. This left some to
speculate wether the trouble was superficial, or perhaps welling from a deeper
source.
Following this line of inquiry, historian
Ranjit Singh argued (as had Leake in 1989) the apparent alienation of
the younger generations, coupled with the Jefri affairs, is leading people to
question the longevity of the monarchy. He held the analysis that the
alienating trends were predating the Jefri events. And that this may in time
lead to a weakening of respect for the position of future sultanism, and hence
the monarchy. With Brunei’s economy still dependant on the spoils of oil; and
with the expectation that reserves will begin to dwindle in the next twenty
years or so. Prince Jefri’s excessive spending whilst he was Finance Minister
up until 1988, has caused some conservatives to become concerned. Jefri’s
private company Amadeo Corporation was said to have sustained losses or debts
averaging ten-billion dollars (US) by 1998. He was expelled by the Sultan in
1998, and by the year 2000, his assets were frozen because he was alleged to be
making ‘improper withdrawals’.
Nonetheless, these dynamics will serve to
give signal to Brunei that it ought not remain complacent. Whilst some ventures
into diversification have been experimental, the attempts have drained
considerable wealth without eqitable return. Other investments have proved more
succcesful, and this in time will lead Brunei to consider a future without oil.
Tourism will be a project that may light the economy into the future, argue Mitton and Mellor. An Islamic model of
banking is another prospect that liberals are hoping will transform the
economic landscape.
The international
repercussions of the Jefri inspired foreign debt, is an issue that has
reflected badly on the political dynamics. As there was a spending freeze, and
as creditors sought to hunt down what was owed to them, Brunei had become less
likely to attract foreign investors; even at present, argues Mellor. He points
to an obstruction of the legal-political dynamics in that ‘the line between
what belongs to a royal and what belongs to the government has certainly become
blurred’ argues Mellor . This in turn, has so far meant that international
debtors have found it quite difficult to retrieve the fiscal returns owed from
Jefri’s over-crediting exploits.
FLUID DYNAMICS
Saunders finds that although Brunei is perhaps already
accepted in to the shell of the Islamic world, the style of its 1984 launch
into the international diplomatic arena signalled an overall preference for it
to remain so. The support given for the United Nations charter, coupled with
the support for Palestine ‘was based on a desire to be identified with the
Muslim world, and membership of the OIC gave Brunei another circle of friends
and supporters’.
The main pipelines however, for the fledgling
Bruneian independent political economy were, in 1984, the Arab states in the
Middle-East. Oman, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates and others all funnelled
their political views to Brunei. In this, Brunei was ‘wary of Islamic
fundamentalism and of Shiite Iran’; and ‘fundamentalism is seen as challenging
the established order’. Despite the caution, the government today supports the
ritual hadj, and assists two-thousand nationals a year to make the
all-expenses paid pilgrimage to Mecca and Madina; this is closely monitored to
prevent political and religious radicalism entering into the local dynamics. Candidates
are selected from a national draw, and persons are only selected once for this
government run scheme. Leake
explained in 1989 that religious issues anywhere can inflame discontent, and
that Brunei might in time be no exception. Because, he says, the complacency of
the then burgeoning leisured youth, coupled with the extinguishing oil reserves
may catch the bureaucracy off guard. He saw then that there was friction
between the radical and the conservative Islamists. That the sultanate would
‘continue to promote Islam but not to the extent of severely alienating any
other major group’. And that the politics of the Chinese would secretly oppose
this Islamic escalation.
Kingsbury postulates Brunei is a political anomaly
because it chose to stay out of the Malay federation; thus becoming an Islamic
bi-pillar sultanate founded on a state constitution and traditional Malay monarchy.
Now whilst these two facts might ultimately allow an autocracy to emerge from
the state, Kingsbury finds the constitution to be the regulator of Bruneian
politics. Because the state constitution has been suspended for some time -and
indefinitely- the Sultan rules by decree. Yet it (the constitution) exists, and
is deferred to on occasion. What follows is ‘its (Brunei’s) adherence to the
rule of law, the system of which is primarily based on English common law, and
the independence of the judiciary’. Different political dynamics of the Eastern
compared with the Western world, are contrasted here in the principals of state
governing laws. Rule by decree today is the extra-judiciary model of Bruneian
governance by the Sultan, based on the British rule of law and monarchal
principle. It can also be argued that Islamic principles are imbeded in the
monarchal rule.
‘In
this sense, Brunei is one of the worlds few remaining monarchical states, with
its sultan being the twenty-ninth in one of the oldest constitutional monarchical
lines in the world’. The keen blending by the Islamic state of the European
model of governance brings to light the comparative similarity between the
Western rule of law and the Eastern rule of the fatwa and religious decree.
Whilst the West issues its laws as legislation’s,
these overseen by high courts and administered by judges. The Islamic world (it
can be said), rules by a religious version of socio-ethical instructions via
the Koran, these delivered by fatwa through their model of the
judiciary, the state mufti. Whilst
the structural and applicational processes differ greatly, the prime features
and applications of both models –in a political sense- are not dissimilar.
There are two models of Islamic state decree. There is the radical Sunni based
edict that can take on extremely judgemental characteristics; and there is the
otherwise conservative Shiite model of law, more of an opinion and not
necessarily binding. The Malay adat (customary law) is the guiding
principle in the region. Brunei today, has a crude but thoroughly effective mix
of Eastern and Western guiding principles fuelling state stability and wealth.
With the Sultan being in full possession of
executive British type powers, as well as being supreme leader of Islam in
Brunei, he has at his disposal many forms of judiciary and Koran based law and order. The dynamics are such that he holds a
kind of Democratic-Islamic monopoly of power in the region. Were it not for
royal ascendancy, Brunei might today be a federalist Islamocratic country.
Also, if Brunei were not forced today to be engaged in experimenting with
sustainable diversification; it might be better disposed to further experiment
with ‘Islamocracy’; as might other nations. During the 1980s, ‘The government
continually stresses the need to adhere to Islamic values in public and private
life – a campaign which is partly aimed at keeping the people away from
politics’ states Leake.
For example, the Chinese of Brunei remain
non-citizens and are kept proxy-political; a perceived threat to the Malay,
they are recognised for their immense productive capacity, wealth creation and
keen business intellect. Their stateless status was not resolved at Brunei’s
declaration of independence in January 1984. Consequently, this could be a
problem in as far as the potential loss of social capital is concerned. Leake sees a problem with the
psuedo-zenophic position of Brunei. For if Islam became intolerable to the
Chinese, then perhaps there would be a Chinese exodus threatening the economy.
Saunders argues that the Chinese could
justifiably be said to be discriminated against. Although they rise to high
positions, this does not stop typical Malay xenophobia from exerting pressure.
Education and celebrations are restricted, nationalism plays its part and there
is a measure of immigration. Nonetheless, Malay’s dominate the upper echelons
of the workforce, and the Chinese are, as always, in demand to fill the more
mundane and generalised positions. The contemporary results of these
dynamics dictate that secular concerns and pragmatic issues demand an Islamic
conservative status-quo. This in turn cements the monarchy in favour of the
Islamic model of state, with the ethnic Malay cultural base remaining as the
dominant socio-political group.
For some, Pakistan and Saudi-Arabia offered a
salient example of the ideal Islamic state, as they are governed according to
the Koran. Yet this is countered by oil based national interests that
require the government to paint a more moderate picture of Brunei. As well,
radical anti-capitalist Muslims would in fact be counterproductive to Brunei’s
wealth. ‘it could threaten the whole fabric of Brunei society if it took an aggressively
fundamentalist tack’. The dialectic of this, suggests Leake, is ‘secular law
along British lines’.
The secular law applies to everyone in
Brunei. It is derived from, or copied from the British and subsequent Malay
law. Increasing secular practices throughout the eighties were paralleled by
stronger Islamic laws. Although Leake then judged these dynamics not as a rise
in radical Islam, but rather as a display of Brunei aligning itself with
regional conditions. The Islamic law only applies to Muslims, and is administered
by the Religious Affairs Department. The law is policed by plain-clothed
officers.
CONCLUSIONS
Brunei thrives on a
solid base of culturally relative political dynamics. Political stability had been obtained during
the 1990s, and it has, since then, been maintained and lubricated by extensive
oil profits. With the coming of
the Jefri spending spree in 1996-1998, and his subsequent banishment, the
predictions of an increasingly more irrelevant monarchy begin to appear. Yet
Leake did not believe this was because of a weakening of the oligarch and thus
the monarchic rule. He realised that despite the need for a shift to practical
politics demanded by the inevitable waning of finite resources, ‘ultimate power
would probably continue to lie with the Sultan, with elections held primarily
not to reduce any burdens but to maintain popular support for the established
system and to burnish Brunei’s international image’.
However, Saunders’ interpretation of the Prince Jefri
expenditures are mixed. He alleges that some elites see the extravagance as a
reasonable neccesity as they brought a measure of ‘pride in the material changes and a sense that these might prove
of eventual benefit when the economic position improved’. In 1993, Higginson saw a country prone to
takeover from regional powers; he cited the then declining Chinese population
as a potential impetus for this. And whilst Brunei clung to Singapore because
of a sibling identification potential,
‘in a worst case scenario, with increasing geopolitical and trade
friction pitting neighbour against neighbour and without there being an
international framework to provide sanctions against excesses of territorial
aggrandisement, Brunei could be an easy takeover target’, Higginson.
Gunn begins his political description of Brunei dynamics like this;
there are ‘among the ministers and advisers those who tend to ideological or
Islamic solutions to the country’s development and those who come down on the
side of pragmatic accommodation with modernization and development’.
He compares Brunei with Kuwaiti politics,
argues a perception of rule by monarchal oligarchy, and suggests the two
countries parallel each-other in applied politics. There is however (in his
opinion) a difference in that Brunei’s democracy is operated rather more like
an automated ‘rubber stamp’. This
occurs because, coupled to the Islamised ideologues, the pragmatic technocrats
are being marginalised by regional, and indeed national, pan-Islamics; argues Gunn.
This has not escaped the attention of
the conservative poly-political Sultan. Gunn reinforces his assessment of the
Sultans wariness with the acknowledgement of the British Ghurkha regiment
stationed in the country.
The focus of Gunns’
point is what has been described as ‘rentier capitalism’, whereby a national
economy is dependant upon fiscal accrual derived from -in this case- the
politics of oil and gas resources. It is with this status, that Bruneian
political dynamics are centred on three posturings; those being Islam, oil and
democracy. Gunn elaborates on the challenges facing the finite resources of
Islomacratic Brunei: ‘In Brunei even development is mediated through the veil
of cultural rationalizations’. An argument is given that it is impossible to
give any safe conclusion for a country such as Brunei which is bound up in
oil-rentier capitalism. It would certainly be difficult to ‘steer a
transitional course’ ahead of any forced measures. Also ‘uncertainties surround
the prospects in Brunei for transition from authoritarianism to a more representative
form of government’.
Gunn goes on to
charge that Brunei has no apparent Marx type indicators to prove that Brunei
has the capacity to reform and move forward into an independent economy based
on industrial production, and the supposed imperative presence of the
middle-class. He argues that Brunei will fail because of this lacking, and that
he finds it more easier to discredit the current socio-cultural dynamics
because of the lack of Western Marx based socio-political indicators. The
assessment is supported by the belief that Brunei’s form of apartheid (against
the Chinese mainly) will inevitably lead to a troubled state. Distorted
demographics, labour divisions, migrant intakes and poorly managed skills
dissemination issues are all supposedly weaknesses in Bruneian state
functionality. ‘However, it is true that culture, ideology, and tradition might
become, under the auspices of the rentier state, a mask, a guide to action, and
rationalization of the political, economic, and social status quo’, says Gunn.
Overall, it is
arguable that the socio-political technocrats of Brunei have got it right. That
the amalgam of the Islamocratic state has a political dynamic that is
functional, though possibly over-reliant (on the petro-dollar); and that the urang
malayu identity married to jus sanguinis heritage is the prime
foundation for this stability. And that any socio-political friction is
dissolved through the poly-political benchmark of the monarchy; and the adat.
People of the state derive their
survival from the royalties of oil; these profits are poured out across the
country in a manner that gives a golden glow to the way in which oil is
consumed on a global basis. Brunei enjoys one of the highest standards of
living in the Asian region. Capital support in the form of subsidised food,
pensions, free medical and schooling, short working weeks, no taxation, and the
highest minimum wages in the region all contribute to an Islamic status-quo. That
which the local conservative thinking Muslim has long since become accustomed
to.
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