2001
Statehood, Northern Territory, Conventions, Politics and
the powers that be in Australia’s Northern Territory.
This essay is in
reply to the question of wether or not the Northern Territory should be granted
Statehood. It discusses some of the political issues that have surrounded the
statehood debate in the Northern Territory, with reference to events in the
past twenty-five years or so. Also, some key political players are identified
along with associated groups. Some elements of the debate are analysed and put
forward as the defining issues that have surrounded the debate and; in,
particular the proceedings of the 1998 Statehood Convention held in Darwin.
Particular reference is made to events that have been recorded by AJ Heatley;
they are used in this discussion. The Commonwealth Governments’ apparent
willingness to accept statehood for the Territory is the underling theme.
The ‘Territories
Powers Act’, referred to by Heatley; while certainly a tool that can be used by
the Commonwealth to overrule any policy that may be created by the Territory
government, is not necessarily a tool that might be used by the Commonwealth to
withhold Statehood.
‘Other sections
of the act’; referred to by Heatley, seemingly gave other States different
powers. This is highly likely and to be expected given that each State is sure
to have specific needs that can only be addressed by State orientated policy.
This fact could well be used to the advantage of the Territory government in
formulating their efforts to achieve Statehood.
Heatley points
out that the Territory appeared as a “quasi-State”. Subordinate to the
Commonwealth, and with its powers delegated. However, the Territory government
should not be deterred by this position. In fact, using it to their advantage,
they could pressure the Commonwealth to aid them in obtaining a negotiated
Statehood arrangement
An example of
the Commonwealth’s preparedness to yield to the pressures’ from the Territory
to become a State is given in Heatley’s assessment of Constitutional
development for the Territory. He points out on that Paul Everingham was
successful with: ‘his success up to 1983 in convincing the Fraser Federal
Government to transfer additional State-type powers to his government’, thus
obtaining some State authority. And again, at the 1985 Premiers conference:
‘the Commonwealth’s intention of treating the Territory, for funding purposes,
as if it were a State by 1998’, was announced.
Obviously, it is an achievable goal for the Territory Government to gain
Statehood (given the Commonwealths’ occasional expressed interest), albeit on a
somewhat slow time-scale. The issues of Constitutional development and
Statehood have been on the administrative agenda for the Northern Territory
since 1947; since the time of the forming of the Territory Legislative Council.
As can be seen by the progression of events the Commonwealth has been in no
great hurry to grant the Northern Territory a Statehood. Possibly, this has
something to do with the population statistics; for the entire Territory has
enough people to fill a large eastern (or southern) State town. For this reason
too, it is likely that the Federal government perceives that two State senators
for the Territory are enough to represent the constituency; the population of
the Northern Territory.
Realistically though, the reluctance to hand over control of a State to
such a small population is self evident and perhaps even justifiable.
Another key factor in the Statehood debate is State funding. The Federal
government gives over a large amount of funding for the Territory. In (Jaensch
and Marshal p20), figures for the 1979-1980 Northern Territory financial year
are cited. These figures indicate that the Territory is not unlike a welfare
state, receiving subsidies from the Commonwealth to the value of 84.4% of the
total fiscal funding for that year. These figures clearly display that the
Northern Territory does not have the infrastructure (including fiscal
infrastructure) to support itself independently of the Commonwealth.
Nonetheless, given that the Territory is already a ‘dependent’ of the
Commonwealth, there is no reason why Statehood should not be granted under this
condition. Possibly, with the granting of Statehood it might be an incentive to
throw off the financial restrictions that come with being welfare dependent;
and so the new ‘State’ could develop infrastructure that would suit, and, be
needed by it.
As MB Perron said in 1992:
“There is no legal, administrative, financial or
Constitutional reason why all remaining State type powers could not be
transferred to us. The reasons are purely political”.
This Statement is particularly valid now given that the parliamentary
infrastructure, personnel and fiscal practices have been in the equivalent of
State-type operation since 1978, when self-government was granted. All the
necessary requirements for a ‘State’ (including a Parliament house) would
already be in existence. If this were not the case, it would not be difficult to
make arrangements with the Federal Government to assist in establishing the as
yet un-established components of Statehood infrastructure and finance.
Perhaps too, the situation of the transient population
could be alleviated because the non-locals would have to be relied upon for
both their financial outlays and their work effort. Their previous redundancy
status would then be replaced by the need to retain people as consumers in the
new self-reliant State environment. In this way a reasonable population growth
and stability might be achieved. The “State” economy would become linked with
the stronger federal base. Inter-State and International trade links could be
fostered. These factors and others would lead to a stronger, fiscally active
State environment that has been sought by the Northern Territory for many
years.
A suggestion that the Territory as a whole is perhaps
a willing welfare State; or at least is able to recognise the reliance on
Commonwealth fiscal arrangements, is reflected in two surveys that were
produced. One in 1985, and the second in 1986. The figures from these surveys
showed that in 1985 19 per-cent of the Territory population thought the
Territory would be financially better as a State, while 44 per-cent believed it
would not. One year later the second survey (after some kind of bipartisan
campaign) showed that now 18 per-cent of the polity thought they would be
better off as a State, while 49 per-cent dis-believed in any financial benefit.
An increase of 5 per-cent. Although this is not a true indicator of Statehood
support, it is probably a strong representation; but it is by no means any
reason not to become a State.
It might also be suggested however that these figures
had been influenced, or to be more precise; that the polity had been in someway
manipulated or influenced to in order create a negative response. Heatley
describes how Territory politicians engaged in the method of "Canberra
bashing". This was an accepted local belief system that was used with
great effect throughout the Territory electorates. It was in fact used to sway
voter sympathy’s, and Paul Everingham was said to be particularly good at using
this ‘system’ when he was representing ‘Territory’ interests. Ian Tuxworth -as
Everingham’s successor- was also a user of this method, though he was not as
good at channelling it effectively.
Realistically, the efforts of trying to sway the
Federal Government to come into line with Territory voters’ demands were
unnecessary. Soon after Self-Government was granted, the Federal Government
made it clear that: ‘it would consider matters pertaining to Statehood only as
a result of Territory government initiative’. This commitment was occasionally
reaffirmed by: ‘its commitment to Statehood…as soon as it (was) reasonably
attainable’, Heatley. There is no doubt that the Federal Government is prepared
to allow the Territory Statehood. Seemingly, all that prevents this from
happening is a lack of fiscal independence and the placement of Constitutional
powers.
Despite this, Everingham believed that Statehood would
come when Territorians wanted it. He made it quite clear that pre-Statehood
issues should contain Territory specific topics. He believed that Territorians
should draft the ‘State Constitution’ and that the powers, responsibility’s and
representation should be equal to that of Tasmania; and: ‘not imposed upon it
by the Commonwealth’. He was unaccepting of anything less than ‘equal status’.
This seemingly is akin to forming some type of independent nation-State; and
may explain the Federal government’s hesitation at granting Statehood.
Moreover, when in 1988 John Reeves advocated a national referendum for the
issue, Everingham attacked the suggestion as if it were indeed an
un-Constitutional approach, Heatley. This attack might be interpreted as
evidence that the Territory Government was perhaps seeking some type of
independent platform.
This coupled together with various overseas trips by
Everingham to investigate foreign Statehood achievement, leads to a question of
the authenticity of the rhetoric for the move to Statehood. Whilst it is no
doubt acceptable to consult within Australian national borders for the purpose
of formulating a State Constitution, it could be said that any international
consultation is suspect and perhaps inappropriate.
Perhaps another reason that the attempts at Statehood
fail is in the field of interpreting the current Federal Constitution. Take for
example the Northern Territory Select Committee on Constitutional Development;
Information Paper No1. In it, on page 3, Section 121 and 123 are cited, which
are said to be; as they believe, two options for a granting of Statehood. On
page 10, the relevant sections from the Australian Constitution are given. Now,
Section 121 is self explanatory and clear: ‘the Parliament may admit to the
Commonwealth or establish new States’.
However, Section 128 requires careful reading. It
talks about laws, the passing and voting (or veto) of laws, and procedures for
submitting laws. Therefore, Section 128 is a law and law making provision of
the Constitution and may have little or no valid ties to the issue of achieving
Statehood. Even though it is possible that Section 123 was misinterpreted by
Territory leaders, this would probably not be used as a reason to withhold
statehood.
Perhaps a more appropriate and explicit Provision of
the Constitution may have been used to assist in the move towards Statehood;
for example Section 106. This section provides that State Constitution shall
remain subject to the national Constitution and can only be altered as a State
Constitution in the manner described by that States’ Constitution. A provision
for transition to Statehood is provided for in this section.
More recently however, in the lead up to the 1998
Statehood Convention in the Territory, the new Coalition government reaffirmed
the Federal commitment to “facilitate” the transfer from a ‘Territory’ to a
‘Statehood’, (Law Review p158).
During the Convention of 1998, proposals for a change
to the electoral system were tabled. The proposal was to change electorates
from a single-party representation to multi-party representation. This and
other proposals were aimed at equalizing the balance of power held within electorates.
These proposals were rejected by the oligarchy of the CLP. The Bill of Rights
proposal (which was modelled on overseas Constitutions) was also rejected on
the grounds that: ‘it was inappropriate for a State to “go it alone” on what
was truly a national issue; that existing rights and freedoms were adequately
protected by current institutions’. (Law Review p158).
Also rejected
were the Judiciary amendments which may have added strength and impartiality in
the field of Law. Accountability clauses pertaining to sitting members were
either rejected or omitted and the State Governors powers were restricted to
less than the present abilities. Customary Aboriginal law which was included in
the final draft, was rejected during the course of the convention by the
conservatives. However, in the late stages it was re-negotiated and accepted.
The main
difference between the Federal model of the Constitution and the one presented
by the Territory government were cited as being: Aboriginal Customary Law; and
Aboriginal Law as a source of Law. These were accepted by the Territory Working
Group at the convention. The primary question which the Federal government
sought to have answered at the convention was, the volume of support for the
move to Statehood. As a proposal this was rejected during the ensuing dis-unity
of the conservative groups. They were responding to the Federal governments’
minimalist approach at the convention.
It is worth
noting that the Territory had written permission from the Commonwealth from as
early as 1987 to hold a Convention for the purposes of assessing Statehood.
This Authority thus giving the event the status of an “inquiry”, (Law Review
Pp156-159) This is yet another example of the Commonwealth Governments’
willingness to assist ratification of Statehood for the Northern Territory.
And so finally, the conclusion of this discussion is
that; despite a few indiscretions by the then reigning Territory Government,
there is no particular reason that will prevent the inception of Statehood for
the Northern Territory today. There is plenty of evidence to suggest that the
Commonwealth will accept the new State and even assist as much as is necessary
to achieve the result of creating a new State. After fifty-five years of
associated political activity, a great historical opportunity was missed in
1998 with the rejection of Statehood at the Referendum. Seemingly, all that is
required is for the ruling members of the Territory to capitulate to the
Commonwealth; to realize and accept their place and responsibility’s within the
Federal framework, and accept a majority vote as might be applied to the issue.
Statehood could be achieved in the future because the Commonwealth Government
has regularly made known the intention that it will allow this when the
conditions are right for the change-over.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
HEATLEY,
Alistair. Almost Australians: the
politics of the Northern
Territory
Self-Government.
HEATLEY,
Alistair. Going nowhere: Constitutional development in
the NT,1986-90.
JAENSCH,
Dean and Deborah Wade-Marshall. POINT OF
ORDER:
The Legislative Assembly of the Northern
Territory 1974-1994.
PUBLIC LAW REVIEW. Volume: 9. Number: 1.
THE
LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY OF THE NORTHERN TERRITTORY.
(Undated) SELECT COMMITTEE ON CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT.
INFORMATION
PAPER No.1