IRAQ War in History – now and LATER.

October 2003.

Iraq War, theocracy, historians, views, coalitions, intelligence, outcomes and protests; Saddam and Osama.

Historicism in Iraq has been altered irrevocably by the Bush/Coalition crusade within the country. The theocratic principles and the oligarchs that drove them and governed the country have been dismantled, futuristically altering the political and social landscape. This essay will discuss how historians everywhere will asses the European responses to the war in Iraq in a period of time generally from about October 2002 through the present; given that the fighting is ongoing and that there is no government in place.

In January 2002, American President George Bush gave an assessment of the state of the nation after the 9/11 attacks; he labelled Iran, Iraq and North Korea as an evil axis. On the 10^th of October 2002, the United States Senate authorized war against Iraq. By the 20^th of March 2003 the opening stages of a war had begun. By the 9^th April, the regime had generally collapsed and on the 11^th, the coalition dealt a new hand of cards in the war, they published a list of fifty-five wanted Iraqi political players; some were in the Baath party. On the 2^nd of May, America announces the cessation of the military assault. Mass graves are found and estimates place the number of people executed at 300,000 or more, Civil organizations place this number even higher.

At present, the coalition has received reports of more than 80 mass gravesites, and has confirmed the existence of more than 20. Traditionalist historians in Europe, as well as the general population, will be mindful of past slaughters in history. Suspected chemical weapons plants are found, but as yet there is no proof of stockpiles or even an operational WMD (Weapons of Mass Destruction) program. Policing and civilian processes begin to take place as resistance fighters create a campaign of Jihad activities; the coalition attempts to move forward on a road to peace. The United Nations (UN) appoints De Mello as the operational director of the organisation in Iraq on May 27 2003. Much of the efforts, inspections and operations as well as resolutions handed down (including the last and vaunted resolution 1441) by the UN had generally been met with indifference from both the Axis of Iraqi supporters and the Coalition; both willing to nullify or obstruct the peaceful processes with threats and counter-claims.

France had signalled its intention to veto 1441 on its ratification; Shawcross holds the belief that this was intentional and surprising considering they ‘co-wrote every single word’. The inspection process had begun in June 1991 and was observed to be obstructed by Hussein through to 1998. From November 2002 through to the commencement of hostilities, conclusions were drawn, accusations made from all sides, and no ‘smoking gun’; the provable evidence of a working weapons program, was found by the UN. The UN were back in Iraq by November, withdrew for the war, and then returned again. Sergio de Mello, now the head of operations in Iraq since May 27 2003, was to leave his UN Human-Rights post permanently. In August; due to errors of judgement and an urge not to make large and offending presences, security forces were ordered away. A fatal error, as the truck-bomb that was left behind a building killed the top UN envoy for Iraq; he was among at least 17 people killed including both international and Iraqi staff at UN headquarters in Baghdad. Historians will certainly seek the intricate details of this ‘appalling’ event.

WAR AND HISTORY

British Tony Blair, under the immense negative pressure of anti-war sentiment, announced on July 17^th 2003 that history would vindicate the victors. In a press conference he says:

If our critics are wrong, if we are right -- as I believe with every fibre of instinct and conviction I have that we are -- and we do not act, then we will have hesitated in the face of this menace when we should have given leadership; that is something history will not forgive

However, historians will not investigate the deeper history of the intelligence surrounding the war.

In Europe, speculation was rife that Iraq was just the first in a line of places to be overthrown in the Middle-East; that the ‘neo-conservatives’ had to, or could, “solve” the problems in the region. Israeli Prime Minister Sharon said, in an interview a year earlier, that Iran should be next. One view from Europe is that they and the United States (US) are oceans apart because of the Iraqi crisis. For example, the UN veto used by Germany, France and Belgium was –in a way- perceived as a weakness and a lack of solidarity; yet the counter-argument sees a reaffirmation of the EU, and that NATO cannot operate against public opinion. Here is the historical continental difference; against Iraq, the coalition willingly chose to ignore the calls from the populace, and acted contrary to UN wishes, whilst most of Europe would not act without sanction.

The Aljazeerah network has their own interpretation of how the French see the crisis. They cite a French pro-American publication by Le Figaro:

American neoconservatives, described with Gallic precision as “a powerful lobby of ideologues,” believe that ‘’the best of all possible worlds is the one where America uses its power to impose its views and its model of social organization, whatever the other nations may think.” But in following that logic, this lobby has made three errors, according to Le Figaro. First, the neocons ‘’faked” the danger from Iraq, thereby reducing Washington’s ability to deal with ‘’the real menaces,” Iran and North Korea. Second, the neocons thought that they could ‘’nation-build” a democracy in Iraq; instead, “the Americans are now realizing that political surgery on a foreign body is an art much more difficult than they imagined.

Some of the neo-conservative paranoia generated in Europe had led to a questioning of the war; this had stirred Donald Rumsfeld to label Europe as a divided and possibly part-irrelevant region. The concept of a recalcitrant and ‘old Europe’ was fuelled partly because of the split over oil; and partly because ‘Their inability to act seems to have led to an abhorrence of action’; argues Shawcross. Europe in turn viewed the US as a ‘house of war’, and anti-Americanism was rife. Historians will probably view this as a social movement consistent with ever-present European anti-war sentiment.

The threat from chemical, biological and nuclear weapons had long been held to be imminent; and in Britain the threat was alleged to be a scary forty-five minutes away. Europe was nonetheless concerned that the first sign of a smoking gun would be a mushroom cloud. Convinced they were by more than ten years of hide and seek in the sands of the desert land; the UN seeking all that they could, and Iraq concealing or distorting as much as they wanted. This; coupled with the blatant disregard of UN calls for Iraq to perform in a more complicit manner, had strained the patience of interested parties in Europe and it was this that had some power brokers on edge, ready to believe the ultimate assumptions of this Iraqi insolence. Consequently; not all historians will acknowledge the history of the ten-year inspection process that blanketed Iraq. The historical discourse will uphold the insolence over and above the extended inspection period.

In the US, Vice President Cheney and Paul Wolfowitz were attached to a new intelligence office called the OSP (Office Special Plans); the London Guardian suggests he ‘was at the shadow network’s sharp end’. In late 2001, rumours and intelligence hint at Iraq’s supposed attempt to buy uranium from Africa. IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) representative El Baradei announces the concept as a fake in March 2003.

By October, it had become clear that conclusions from the Iraq Survey Group (of the US army) were preliminary. The search would continue with the help of a further $600m. However, long before the group arrived in Iraq, it was the ‘most scrutinised country on the planet’; said the Guardian. David Kay and the group had completed their 2003 round of inspections and had reported, further agitating the anti-American sentiment in Europe with their conclusions. However, not all historians are likely to record these points, their intelligence forcing them to remain on the side of more sentimental, friendly historicism.

Despite the calls of ‘no war for oil’, Europe believed that the US and the neo-conservatives could not resist the spoils of war. Currently, the finance gained is about 12 Billion a year, and most of this is spent on the basic social maintenance of the country. About sixty per-cent in fact, leaving little at this stage to fund heavy state needs. The view in Europe is that allowing national oil revenue to fund the rebuilding is an accident waiting to happen to the afflicted society. Social schemes in the Economist include a trust fund set up to distribute interest bearing money to individuals, a type of oil welfare scheme. The French and Russians held the largest ‘food for oil’ contracts before the war, and Shawcross argues this may not be honoured in later periods.

After the Bush administration decided to bring the war on with the rhetoric of regime change, and twenty-one days after the fall of Baghdad, the fall of Hussein was imminent. History would see this quick victory and vanquished dictator as but one step in the task of routing the multiplicity of threats from the Arab states. So fierce and overwhelming was the force of the willing, that freedom was sure to endure Iraqi resistance. The shock and awe of the American presence had certainly backed up Rumsfelds’ rhetoric of changing the regime. In Britain, the London Observer suggests that after fifty years of tyranny, the people are free. They cite the arguments of brutal Saddam, the WMD threat and the known problems of the war. But also they argue that in spite of the so called liberation, there is still struggle ahead for the common citizen, now having to fight again to wrest the country from the clutches of the coalition. Yet: ‘For the first time in almost half a century, Iraq has no executions, no political prisoners, no torture and almost no limits on freedom of expression’. This will be an anchor point for journalistic historicists aiming to get the most recognition for their efforts in Europe; and Europe will respond gratifyingly.

As time passes, attacks on American forces increase, leading media entities in Europe to conclude that perhaps the resistance is coordinated. Fighters from Syria and Iran begin to appear. There is increasing evidence that Washington is misreading the nature of Iraqi resistance; that the battle to win the hearts and minds of ordinary Iraqis is not yet won. Excluded from the global discourse are the ordinary people working to stabilize and improve their country and the fledgling democracy; history is already discounting their independent existence.

British Independent on Sunday ran an article criticizing a Blair dossier on terrorist Osama bin Laden, saying it was: ‘conjecture, supposition and assertions of fact’ in October 2001. Milan Rai recounts that for months after 9/11, the Taliban were offering to extradite ‘bin Laden. One year later French President Chirac had said he knew of no relationship between ‘bin Laden and Iraq, and then warned that a war there could provoke terrorists to do more attacks. Chirac and Hussein had a relationship spanning nearly forty years. The intelligence report of Roberts’ suggests that there was a link in the training agenda of the Taliban and Iraqi dissidents; that the purpose was for chemical and biological group training to attack Europe. Europe was not to acknowledge this alleged connection. The smoking gun was not found, but the man responsible for the smoking towers in the US was found to be accused of either directly, or indirectly, agitating rebel fighters in Iraq. On this issue, as with many others in the war, historians will not seek the finer detail of the underground movements such as the Baath or Taliban groups. The mere detail of their alleged presence is all that will be recorded, along with their financial interests. Some would say that an Intifada is brewing in Iraq. Formed out of the former national guards and the Baath party, and probably ex-military and police personnel, a public announcement was- ‘It is time to show the world that you are real men’.

Agitating European anti-war protestors did their best to discourage the race to war, organising mass protests and demonstrations; official estimates put a British crowd at an estimated 150,000 in September 2002. Organisers from the Stop the War Coalition said 400,000 people took part, calling it the biggest peace demonstration ever in Britain, but police put the figure at around 150,000. In Florence in November, 300,000 protestors hit the streets and amid such success, they pressed on with plans to have Europe-Wide protests to shake the continent. Bush declared that the mass demonstrations were irrelevant.

A weekend of worldwide anti-war demonstrations throughout Europe in February 2003 had brought millions of people out onto the streets to try to encourage a peaceful solution to the crisis between Iraq and the United States. Between six and 10 million people are thought to have marched in up to 60 countries, the largest demonstrations of their kind since the Vietnam War. Later on in October, there were more demonstrations throughout Europe and the Middle-East that saw 190,000 come out in support of a full force withdrawal from the devastated region and its capital, Baghdad. These will be easy for historians to assess, following the lines of practiced disciplinal sympathies and continental similarities.

Money, and the cost of capitalism and democracy as ever play a crucial role in the modern world. Iraq will be no exception in the historical record. As regime change was part of the impetus for war, so too was democracy in the form of an interim government for Iraq. It will be crucial in the reconstruction, which must be financed by a new Iraqi commerce. From June 21^st to the 23^rd, America led the drive to convince the Arab Middle East of a need for a free trade arrangement; the MEFTA (Middle-East Free Trade Agreement). At this point, 2.4 Billion has been committed for the reconstruction. Initial estimates place the cost of reconstruction in Iraq to be anywhere between $10 billion to $60 billion over the next five years. The potential costs including a military presence in Iraq during reconstruction could be anywhere between $100 billion and $500 billion. To date, the US has committed one-hundred and twenty billion to the region.

Different from say Europe or Asia, the task here will begin almost entirely from scratch, creating governmental infrastructure where there was none. Where is the legitimacy of the new state to come from; Europe has had states throughout history, and foresees the conflict of ideals in building one for Iraq; and European historians will find this sector an easy process to cover as the responses will be pro-state and well defined. Traditional disciplinary’s will piece together the finer points of economy and infrastructure with ease; and Europe itself will be at ease with the knowledge that the State is being re-constructed.

CONCLUSION

However, first a state model must be found, then implemented. There are two possibilities that will emerge; either a pre-Saddam theo-historical model, or a modern self-determining state. The latter will be the one to propel the nation into the future. Europe currently views Iraq differently from Afghanistan where the international community participated in the destruction of the Taliban. With Iraq, France and Germany opted out of military operations, preferring to wait for the opportunity to enter on the side of reconstruction. The US would not be happy because again they will be financing this; whereas the strategy of late entry by Europeans allows them to capitalize on contracts offered for reconstruction. Shawcross argues that this capitalisation causes a split in the NATO alliance, isolates Europe from the EU, and was of such a nature that Prime Minister Blair spoke of a future problem in NATO because of the split; this likely sparking the interest of conservative historians. He suggests that Europe under the blanket of NATO is weak and recalcitrant.

However, recalcitrant Europe did notice general resistance before; and even during the war, coming from Military generals of both the US and British commands. The so-called ‘hawks’ and the ‘doves’ were ruffling each other’s feathers over the country of Iraq, airing their views both publicly and within government. British generals quoted in journals seemed uncertain of the full justification for war.

Recalcitrant and nihilist left-wing historians will likely give a minimalist account of the peripheral issues, and seek to focus on pristine points-scoring issues such as State construction, human costs, the terror of the individual, cultural destruction and women’s worries. These proponents will ignore the deeper issues of the Middle-East; problems such as embedded religious division, the neo-conservative push to divide and conquer the Pan-Arab Islamic intent; that which is to destroy the alleged Israeli intent.

European historians will record an Iraq whose attitude was one of disregard for diplomacy and democracy. There will be no theo-historical account, even though the war lasted a biblical forty days and was loaded with religious overtones and the consequent dispersal of Islamic terrorism by Jihad groups. Theo-geopolitical aspects of Iraq will be denied their larger place in European historical discourse; historians of the contemporary and traditional types will seek to record the known facts that exist in the European public record only. These are the things that will play out in the end-game for Iraq.

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