Winnning Labor

A Chequered Experience

INTRODUCTION

In August 2001 an opposition party came into power in the Northern Territory (NT); for the first time in twenty-seven years the Country Liberal Party (CLP) had been beaten as the dominating political structure and party. This essay will first give an account of the final statistics that gave Labor the Government, analyse these and then try to project the trend into the coming 2005 election. Next will be a general discussion about the negative and positive points of the two major parties, before and since the elections. Further on it will look at the reasons for political cleavage and some intelligence exchanges that took place prior to and since the 2001 election. It then concludes with a light analysis of the general political environment in the Northern Territory in the 2001 greater election period. The aim is to disclose the underlying network of manoeuvring that led to the result that has been produced. The effort is to account for the Labor win, and to determine if it will survive at the next election. It must be noted that at this time, there are no consistent statistics available for the 2001 elections, and whilst there are many sources, the only one used here is.

ELECTIONS

Now the Northern Territory Labor party had finally managed to break the hold on power that the CLP held over the state electorates as well as the Legislative Assembly. In the first state elections in 1974 the CLP came to power with seventeen of the nineteen seats that were available in the assembly. Labor had won none. In the 1977 elections, the CLP had dropped back to twelve seats with the Labor party coming into opposition with six seats. The 1980 elections saw the CLP drop another seat to eleven whilst Labor gained one to have seven seats in the assembly. Four years after gaining self-government, the seats available in the assembly were increased to twenty-five. Now, in the December 1983 elections the CLP gained an impressive eight seats to hold nineteen whilst Labor was steady with six seats. 1987 saw the CLP with sixteen seats and Labor six.

And, in the 1990 elections Labor held nine seats and the CLP had fourteen. In the June 1994 elections Labor won seven seats and the CLP seventeen; and in the 1997 state elections, again Labor held seven seats whilst the CLP gained one seat to reach eighteen seats. What the seat exchanges indicate for the two parties is this; that the CLP experienced four periods of gain and four periods of seat loss. For the Labor party it was a more stable arrangement; they experienced three gainful periods, two periods of seat loss and two periods of equilibrium.

The percentages for the same period indicate that in 1974, the Labor party had thirty point five per-cent of the vote and the CLP had forty nine per-cent. In 1977, Labor had thirty eight point two per-cent of the vote and the CLP had forty point one per-cent. In 1980, Labor had thirty nine and a half per-cent whilst the CLP share was fifty per-cent of the vote. After the expansion of the Legislative assembly, Labor’s percentage in the 1983 elections had dropped to thirty five point six per-cent and the CLP experienced a leap to fifty eight point two per-cent. In the 1987 elections, the percentage for Labor was thirty six per-cent and the CLP had experienced a slump to thirty nine point four per-cent with the competition of the Nationals. And in the 1990 elections Labor had about thirty six point six per-cent of the vote and the CLP had forty eight point eight per-cent. By the 1994 elections Labor was on forty one point four per-cent and the CLP was fifty one point nine per-cent. And in 1997 Labor had dropped to thirty eight point five percent whilst the CLP was on fifty four point seven per-cent of the vote.

What the percentages indicate about the two parties is this; that the CLP had three weak statistical periods. They occurred in the second, fifth and seventh years of the reign. Whereas for the Labor opposition it meant three high periods, three low periods and then another three high statistical periods.

The percentage trends indicate that for the next state elections in 2005, Labor will obtain about thirty seven per-cent of the primary vote; a loss of two per-cent. The CLP will also have about thirty seven per-cent of the primary vote but the loss for them will be even more severe at six per-cent. The trend for seats indicates that the CLP will lose another three seats and Labor will lose one and perhaps three.

DISCUSSIONS

However, ignoring the imperical data, a different conclusion may be drawn for the future 2005 election. The CLP days will, naturally, still be present in the collective memory of the region and will be reflected in political behaviour. This will lead to a cautious and considered vote in the electorates. The stable political socialisation of the new Martin government, coupled with a matriarchal following, will yield favour, but caution; they will gain one seat and as many as three. Labor will poll strongly and survive the next election. They will be returned on primary votes from the urban regions, and any remaining favourable votes will come through independents’ preferences. The results will reflect caution of the incumbent; and preference for independents will be a reflection of wariness against the CLP. The stable transparent leadership of the congenial Martin government will foster state cohesion and absorb many Aboriginal votes.

Claire Martins initial leadership in the Labor party had contributed to the cohesion of it. Particularly on her entry in to the party in the 1990s when she ‘told the pre-selection panel….she was joining a party not a faction’. She also perceived the need to alter the Territory Labors’ individual stance to one with federal affiliation, acknowledging the greater powers and thus enhancing the appearance of authenticity and realism of the party. The new Labor party style is in stark contrast to the raucous days of the CLP leadership, particularly in the lead-up to the election. Many campaign mistakes were made by the CLP which contributed to their defeat. For example, on the 24^th of July Chief Minister Burke was found guilty of contempt of court in a federal hearing. He received a ten thousand dollar fine for remarks given at a press conference on June 6 2001 in which he had said the appointment of Hugh Bradley as a chief magistrate was ‘a waste of time’. Justice Wilcox was reported as saying that: ‘Burkes remarks could interfere with the course of Justice’; NT News. Bradley had been appointed by then Chief Minister Stone in February 1998, in a secret contract arranged by the CLP network. Michael Jones of the North Australian Aboriginal Legal Aid Service branded the appointment ‘dangerous’, fearing that the separation of powers between State Parliament and the Judiciary could be undermined by Bradley under the CLP; on the 7.30 Report.

Another mistake the CLP had made was placing the One Nation party ahead of Labor on the vote cards of five seats, this had upset multiculturalism in the Darwin electorates. The One Nation party platform was perceived as racist. Also contributing to the downfall was the issue of internal funding as well as a flat economy. The effect of this said Frank Alcorta was: ‘that a flat economy denied the CLP an opportunity to claim sound economic management when all the evidence was to the contrary’; in Carment. The Northern Territory budget is dependant upon funding from the Commonwealth for a greater portion of its finance. The state budget worked against the CLP administration at the elections. Loveday found that forty six point one per-cent of a fifty five point nine million dollar Commonwealth health grant in 1998-99, had been diverted by the CLP for the purpose of ‘on costs’. And again in 1999 forty five per-cent had been siphoned off, said the Commonwealth Grants Commission. A 1998 report by the Audit Committee found that:

‘The reality is that audits of section 96 grants to the States are impossible without the co-operation of State Auditors-General. For too long it appears that some Commonwealth agencies have taken the cooperation of State Auditors-General for granted…it also appears the State government agencies in receipt of Commonwealth funds have not always been conscious of the implications for their Auditors-General of agreements they sign.

The committee therefore came to a conclusion in the report that States are responsible for auditing commonwealth finances, the report stated: ‘State Auditors-General are responsible for auditing the operations of state agencies administering State government activities. Their mandate is set down in the audit legislation of their respective States and Territories. They are not subject to control or direction by the Commonwealth Government’; Audit Committee 1998. It also states that local governments are responsible to parliament for the accountability of public funds. Nonetheless, the CLP seemed to have squandered Special Purpose Payments from the Commonwealth and this is where Alcorta finds a budgetary weakness in the CLP future.

Thus, in an effort to take responsibility for the state budget and to try and liberate the NT from the clutches of cronyism, Chief Minister Martins government has since announced new laws. As of April 14 2003, approximately four hundred executive level public servants will be scrutinised about their business interests and registered. Thus, they will have to make a choice between remaining in the Public Service or being fully involved in private business interests. This stipulation has been made under the NT Public Service Code of Conduct which is designed to prevent a conflict of interest in the Northern Territory Government. Martin is seeking the transparency and accountability of government which had been lacking in the previous governance. The decision to implement the plan was a result of the Health Department assistant secretary S Moo having been found to be in a ‘conflict of interest’ by a government investigation, NT News. These laws are likely to further disperse the social capital network of the CLP and enhance Labor’s authenticity as a legitimate state government.

The question of statehood and its consequent rejection would also have injured the reputation of the CLP. In the 1997 elections, the CLP received fifty four point seven per-cent of the vote, their second highest position since 1974. This high percentage may indicate the level of support for the CLP because of the establishment and lead-up to the 1998 statehood convention. They had received in 1987, written authority from the Federal Government saying: ‘I have now received legal advice confirming that the Northern Territory has executive authority…to support the establishment of this convention’. Paul Everingham later proceeded overseas to investigate statehood on foreign soil, evidence that the Territory government was seeking an independent platform separate from the Federal government.

So with much hope and hype, the NT government came to host a statehood convention. However, there were allegations of little public consultation and rumours that the convention committee was selected by Shane Stone with a bias toward CLP monopoly. The second and final draft of resolutions for a state constitution was a minimalist document that could have been open to broad interpretation by an incumbent government. Following Ian Tuxworth and then Shane Stones’ efforts to protract an arrangement between the Commonwealth, the Northern Territory citizenry and the reigning state government, Territorians voted against statehood; it failed 44,702 to 48,241. Prime Minister Howard had agreed to an inauguration date of January 1 2001, for statehood. The CLP was rebuked at the convention because: ‘it was inappropriate for a State to “go it alone” on what was truly a national issue’. The failure to approve statehood in 1998 had further weakened the perceptions of Territorians about the CLP.

Heatley is uncertain about whether Territorians actually rejected statehood or were rather more wary of Shane Stones methods prior to, and at the October 1998 convention. He states however, that ‘statehood’ was a reactionary activity rather more than a concerted political effort backed with effective policy from the CLP. Lovedays’ 2002 analysis finds that the referendum was ‘lost in the bush’, where seventy three per-cent of the rural vote had sentenced it to a loss.

The state issue of mandatory sentencing was another factor that contributed to the downfall of the CLP. Mandatory sentencing was introduced in to the NT in August 1998 in order to combat a perceived increase in crime. However, statistics indicated that the policy did little to constrict the increase in crimes. The policy itself created great controversy in the NT as well as in the eastern states, and eventually overseas as the United Nations became involved in the campaign against it producing concern in Canberra.

A bill digest produced in 1999 by Federal Parliament found that demographic factors would cause young Aborigines to be impacted by mandatory sentencing. And, that for the previous ten years criminal diversion rates had remained stable, but since the introduction of mandatory sentencing detention rates had increased sharply in both Western Australia and the Northern Territory. Governments were reporting a reduction in crime but some analysts disagree with this reportage.

In early 2000 Koffi Annan visited the Northern Territory to analyse the mandatory sentencing debate. At some point during the early period of mandatory sentencing, some members of the NT judiciary ‘expressed their discomfort’ about mandatory sentencing, which subsequently offended Burke. This led him to accuse the judiciary of being: ‘totally corrupt’. He later held a press conference to retract the comments. The Senate Legal and Constitutional References Committee had made an investigation and reported in March 2000 a unanimous condemnation of mandatory sentencing by the committee.

Meanwhile, United Nations (UN) Human Rights commissioner Mary Robinson had been asked by Annan to investigate, and subsequently the UN prepared a report that was released in March 2000. The report: ‘seriously questioned the compatibility of these laws with State party’s obligations under the Convention and other international treaties on human rights’. Also, that the NT mandatory sentencing laws: ‘appeared to target offences that were committed disproportionately by indigenous Australians’. The UN also noted in the report ‘gauche behaviour’ by Australian politicians on the matter of mandatory sentencing, thus bringing two states (WA and the NT) as well as the Federal Government into disrepute with the UN on the matter. Late in March in an interview on the Today Show, Prime Minister Howard rejected the UN report saying it was flawed by way of disproportion. He also chose not to act federally to overturn the laws saying: ‘the criminal laws of this country have for decades been run by the states’, and: ‘I believe that these are matters that belong to the states and territories’. Therefore, effectively this left the sentencing laws and their consequences squarely in the hands of the CLP and Dennis Burke.

Nonetheless, despite this superior evidence and testimony, Burke was not dissuaded. Even though polls indicated he may have had at least one third of the state population against him and perhaps fifty per-cent of the national population against him on the matter. Peak international bodies were urging caution and national institutions were condemning the laws. Evidence of the conceited cronyism of the state leaders was noticeable in a statement made by Burke on the ABC Online (April 2000), he had said: ‘its widely supported in the Northern Territory in my opinion’. And, in June he assuredly professed that mandatory sentencing was one of his governments ‘most significant initiatives’. The stubbornness of Burke and the CLP has since played out in six electorates where the swing away from the CLP was an average of seventeen per-cent and as high as twenty seven per-cent in Arulen during the 2001 election. This record swing would deal a blow that would leave the CLP feeling sorry after the elections.

Burke said of the Labor plan to say ‘sorry’ (to Aborigines): ‘it’s a divisive indulgence, its wrong; I don’t support it’; NT News 2000. However, not to be deterred by opposition attacks, Labor went ahead with their plans to say sorry to the ‘stolen generation’ and the Aborigines in general. An editorial in the NT News 2001 quotes Claire Martin aiming for broad support: ‘the new “inclusive” Labor Government was seeking bi-partisan support for the first motion’. However, after sound rejection by both the opposition and members of the stolen generation, the motion was redrafted and put back through caucus where it passed thirteen to ten on party lines. This pledge of ‘heartfelt sympathy, sorrow and condolence’ will likely have a positive affect on the political socialisation and party identification of the Northern Territory, particularly among the aboriginal population. However, Democrats senator Ridgeway does not think so, he believes Labor ‘botched’ the opportunity; NT News.

Nonetheless, despite the criticisms of the Labor ‘sorry’ program, they forged ahead and the statement was announced on the 25^th October 2001. Following close behind by about a month to the day, the leader of one of the most powerful organisations on earth also announced ‘sorry’. The Pope; leader of the one billion strong Catholic organisation, made an announcement following the lead of Ms Martin. Apologising to the Aborigines for what it called ‘shameful injustices’ that may have been and were perpetrated by Catholicism against the Australian Aborigines. Part of the formal apology read: ‘Aware of the shameful injustices done to indigenous peoples in Oceania, the synod fathers apologised unreservedly for the part played in these by members of the church’. This apology by the Vatican after Martin had made hers, therefore, is no small event and something she could be proud of both personally and professionally. These events are indeed a precedent in political diplomacy and provided they were not a protraction by the Vatican, could be capitalised upon politically by Labor at the next election.

These apologies are most likely to strengthen the Martin/Labor government greatly and are likely to bless the government with a substantial amount of political empowerment due to their uni-lateral efforts at reconciliation with the Northern Territory populace. Interestingly, the Popes apology and statement was the first sent by him to the public via the Internet on the 22^nd of November 2001. It speaks at length about the injustices inflicted on many indigenous peoples in the ‘Oceania’ region, as well as Australia. The Vatican had even addressed the Alice Springs region as early as 1987.

Martins’ campaign efforts in Alice Springs received heavy handed attacks and was outmanoeuvred by the campaign agenda of Elphernik. One briberous campaign trick that was used by the CLP members was the handing out of kangaroo tails by John Elphernik to the Aboriginal community. This would have been perceived by the Aboriginals as a fine and grand gesture, and thus would go a long way toward explaining why the CLP polled well in the ‘red centre’ -the Alice Springs region. For Sanders three explanations of the Labor victory seemed to be correct. He obtained the reasonings from Territorians and accepts that mandatory sentencing was a problem for the CLP members. And that putting One Nation ahead of Labor on the vote card was another. However, a less well known explanation of a third reasoning he also accepts. That in order to develop the railway project, funds for the state infrastructures and businesses would have to be diverted to the plan. A plan and utility that may yet prove to be unworthy of the effort and constraint that was arranged by the CLP.

Sanders in 2001 found that the CLP was deeply ‘intrenched’ whilst Labor was becoming ‘dispirited’. He argued that not all urban Territorians voted CLP and that not all rural Indigene’s voted Labor; however, the electoral record of the past reflected a ‘significant cleavage’ along the urban white, rural black social boundaries. In responding to the ABCs’ Fred McKew (2001), Burke, dismissed the idea of his newly passed Public Order and Anti-Social Conduct Act being racist; nor, he insisted, would the CLP ‘beat up on the blackfellas’ in the lead up to an election.

CONCLUSIONS

Much of the narrative about the Law and Order legislation and the CLP problems of the 2001 NT election period fail to discuss or address the inherent ‘right of passage’ that is part of the criminal network. This failure allows the cycle to remain unbroken and mandatory sentencing would surely have made the element and criminal socialisation stronger. Another factor that seems to exude itself from the commentaries of the CLP campaigns is that of their ‘experience’; and that the experience within the CLP foresaw ‘uncertain times’. They seemed to be suggesting more of the same CLP cronyism could be expected from their social network if it were re-elected.

On launching the July 2001 CLP bid for re-election, Dennis Burke made known his connection with people in high places. The reference was to none other than the soon to be American Vice-President, Dick Cheney. They had earlier been together looking out across the Darwin harbour at the proposed site for the development of the gas refinery; (Financial Review 2002). Carment and Wilson found that the CLP campaign was: ‘dogged by bad luck and ineptitude’. They had failed to play their cards right and thus found themselves prone to a reign change. The CLP was, however, noted for muzzling their ‘anti-aboriginal rhetoric’ of previous campaigns. Nonetheless, Burke himself realises some of his mistakes. In The Weekend Australian 2001 he is quoted: ‘The view of a number of people is I should have run strong on Kembi’ but ‘I refused to do it. I just don’t want to be part of the political agenda’.

The NT News argued that Labors’ election campaign was itself better than that of the CLP. It argued that CLP efforts ‘looked whingey’ and that Burke’s distain for federal Labor and ‘southerners in general’ left their campaign looking flat compared with Martins’ media experience campaign strategy. Sanders concludes that the 2001 Northern Territory election was a victory for two party democracy, one that will serve to better address the urban/outback cleavage. He believes the future of territory politics will be improved.

An editorial in The Australian openly castigates CLP politicians, saying that the talk in the Territory pubs on election eve was that of Martins’ Labor being ‘worth a try’. Citing Australia’s Northern Territory as being an economic frontier; with untapped tourism potential, an investment magnet and resource development dependant on normative stable government; the freshness of Labor would be welcome. That a change in government will not turn the territory in to a ‘black socialist enclave’ and that Burke himself sets a bad example, treating democracy and the Judiciary with contempt. He foresees an independents’ election and minority government, and although dangerous: ‘who is The Australian to argue with that’.

The Northern Territory Labor party will win the next election, the matriarchal following that will be gathered by Ms Martin will ensure a normative and stable governing period up to the 2005 election. Pressing Federal and International politics will serve to shroud the newness of the party and will allow a period of social stability and discourse that will be not much different from the previous governing era. On winning the 2005 election, the Martin government will bring changes on to the political agenda that will foster modernity in the Northern Territory.

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