This
essay sets out to discuss the extent to which a liberal democratic state is
responsible for the subversion -or protection- of human freedoms. It finds that
liberal democracy is a dichotomy; a dynamic model of state policy that allows
for both subversion and freedom to occur. Because dynamism (for example Marx
version of revolution) and individual human freedoms can exist at the same
time, but be overridden by the very principle that ensures freedoms, the
dictums of democracy will be found to be somewhat weak. It is the aim of this
essay to explain an ideological split in liberal democracy that allows this
weakness. It will find that liberal democracy is a normative and desirable
model of state to a greater extent.
The argument will be that
whilst the principles of democracy and liberalism should be able to produce an
exemplary form of human freedom; this, on occasion, may not happen. The
discussion will address moral principles and principles that may be amoral or
even immoral as the basis for why human freedoms in a liberal democracy are not
always what they should be; or indeed asserted to be. That liberalism allows
for various ideological paradigms and institutions that support them. And that
democracy allows for the populace to embrace these through numerical support,
either via popular vote or with state embraced support (via ‘the system’). Because of this then,
there exists the foundation for a potential democratic imbalance. The question
of whom or what holds responsibility for this imbalance will be answered in a
manner that will show the liberal democratic state to be a friend, but also a
potential foe of human freedoms.
Whilst education is held to
be the key to a liberal democratic state, is it really so; for any form of
education is surely better than none. And then, what to educate? Should
middle-east theology be taught, or middle-age superstitions, or perhaps an all
consuming market based education is the answer. All of these have the potential
to be great, the question of what type of greatness, can only be answered once
greatness has been achieved. For example, a middle-east theology may be great
in that it produces liberal social ties that other cultures may only dream
about, but leaves the masses poor under the doctrine. Or, the Europeans in the
middle ages were mostly all equal in their poverty; but the market professors
of today are more equal in their belief of a liberal, free, all consuming
market economy that assumes that might is right. Soros joins this criticism, he
says: ‘economists have gone out of their way to avoid introducing value
judgements…that no better social outcomes than those available under market
competition can ever be achieved’.
MacPherson in 1977 said:
Those who start
from the tacit assumption that whatever is, is right, are apt to deny that they
are making a value judgement. Those who start from the tacit assumption that
whatever is, is wrong, give great weight to their ethical case…
In so doing, their ethical
cases establish the dichotomy of liberal democracy. In the first, are those who
fail to realise they may be harbouring an imbalance; and the latter are assured
by their bias that all around them is wrong and needs changing. From this
analogy, it is possible to realise that liberal democracy can be a polarised
ideology and perhaps not in the best interest of governed human freedoms.
MacPherson finds that: ‘It
is a system by which people can be governed,
that is, made to do things they would not other-wise do, and made to refrain
from doing things they otherwise might do’. He explains that this allows for a
certain kind of society, one that has rights and social powers. But he also
finds that democracy and capitalism are wedded together; and while the former
can exist without the latter, the latter cannot function without the former.
Therefore, democracy allows the capitalising activities of the market to
function, the function which has a potential to be inequitable with human
freedoms within the state.
MacPherson says of this inequity problem: ‘There was
necessarily, great inequality’. The imbalance produced by the market works
against human freedoms: ‘this involves inequality in freedom of choice: all are
free but some are freer than others’. The restriction of purchase power can, in
the right circumstances, be self-perpetuating, and so guaranteeing little or no
freedoms apart from a freedom to want more than dreams of financial freedom.
When an individual or a society is caught-up in this ungratifying situation,
the debasement that can follow may be oppressive or alter a functioning social
paradigm entirely. MacPherson argues: ‘the
debased are, by definition, incapable of reforming themselves en masse’. What this means for a liberal
democracy is that it has the onerous position of being responsible for
liberally and freely allowing egalitarian principles to flourish in a state,
thus allowing a potential compromise to liberal human freedoms.
An open liberal democratic
state, in principle, guarantees freedoms and human rights under treaty; but in
practice, egalitarian capitalism merely makes freedom purchasable from the
state. This is an inherent weakness in a capitalist environment. The fact that
for it to survive, ways must be constantly sought to find fiscal turnover –even
if it means purchasing obscure rights and passage. The drivers licence is a
classic example of this. However, were it not for a liberal democracy, many
desired goods and services would not be purchasable by the populace.
Questionable morality would stifle many of the freedoms that can be taken
advantage of. In his defence of just government Nelson says: ‘Morality
determines the limits of the permissible for systems of laws and institutions
as well as for individual conduct’. He finds that democracy generally sees
policy and law that is just. Not only that, but he suggests that because of the
human way: ‘democracy will automatically tend to produce morally acceptable
results’; within states. The reason for this is that liberal democracy embraces
the rule of law under which all persons can be held accountable for their
actions. Consequently, laws are formulated that can prevent or minimise an
infringement of freedom rights by rogue persons, entities, or states. Only a
liberal society can formulate policy either in quantity or quality (or both)
that will enshrine the responsibility of positive perpetuation of human
freedoms without external influence of the principles from other states.
Nelson finds: ‘Consensus on
principles can be more or less perfect, and institutions can vary in the degree
to which they satisfy the conditions layed down in the shared moral
principles’. Even though in a liberal democracy the majority rules -or at least
voices a shared consensus- the potential for negative outcome is ever-present.
Nelson says of liberal democratic states: ‘Majority rule is justified only
because it distributes power fairly and equally’.
Thompson finds that the
opposite of this power rule is also possible, that the potential for a liberal
democratic government to become conceited, and assured of the position it holds
is real. ‘Sinister interests’ he claims can lead political powers to ignore
political participation of the citizenry: ‘This function refers to a deliberate
disregard of most citizens’ interests, not to well-intentioned mistakes’.
However, he does not acknowledge that political participation and knowledge do
stand as checks and balances in support of human freedoms.
JS Mill (in Alexander) takes
an unusual stand in the early development of liberalism and state democratic
theory; he holds that the citizen owes the state a living. Whilst the citizen
had no choice in being born, the person is now obliged by the state (according
to Mill) to capitulate certain freedoms and abilities over to the state in
return for protection from the state. He makes this pre-fabricated security
clause sound like this: ‘everyone who receives the protection of society owes a
return for the benefit’. In practicality, what this means is that any newborn
person is given no choice in entering into a social contract (just like
Rosseau’s social contract) with the state, which is fundamentally contradictory
to the very essence of the contemporary conception of liberal democratic human
freedoms.
This ancient conception of
human obligation is still present in social discourse today, and is literally
argued by those who express attitudes and beliefs about people whom they think
are bludging on society. They implore a belief that these (the bludgers) think
in fact that the world, inversely, owes them a living. This is in fact true,
but the correct interpretation is missed; a liberal democratic state does in
fact owe people the ability and right to make a living –by its own admission.
Gould acknowledges: ‘the classical theories of the 18th- and 19th-century
liberalism-have proven to be inadequate to the demands for greater freedom and
equality in the twentieth century’. The indication is that some of the
foundations of democracy and liberalism could benefit from some compelling
investigation and upgrading, if not replacement.
Another irresponsible
foundation of the state is that of compulsion. The idea that an individual
needs regular coercion in order to make possible the ideals of the state.
Ideals like achieving common good (Benthams’ Utility model) or collective security. Whilst the principle of
these notions may be perceived as honourable or worthwhile, it is the manner in
which the state of a liberal democracy takes upon itself to achieve this
perceived need for coercion that is questionable. For example, in the current
privatisation climate, it is managerialist practices and community leaderships
that have it upon their shoulders that they be the coercers; for the good of
the state. Generally, they are not elected into managerialist positions of
coercion and intimidation, and thus the social justice is illegitimate, yet
state sanctioned. The coerced have no democratic say in who or where from the
coercion comes; thus they are not free from, nor are they able to free
themselves from, illegitimate state sanctioned suppressions of human freedoms
by leadership.
Further, a person who has
attained a leadership status within the state, may or may not act in the
interest of freedom nor state. And secondly, the leadership does not, nor may
have ever experienced the forms of state coercion which they may claim need to
be sprayed around the state at all opportune moments. Plamenatz has this to say
about that: ‘But they often cannot act at all unless they are prepared to act
upon their fellow men, and sometimes to act upon them in such a way as to
interfere with their freedom’. What this means is that the self appointing
social justice theorems are illegitimate, and further, that they are
undesirable and even unrequired in a contemporary liberal democracy that is
normative and promotes freedom as a foundation. ‘It is, therefore, in duty
bound not to coerce others, except in cases where the good to be obtained … is
greater than the evil which is involved in the actual coercion’; in Plamenatz.
The responsibility for this evil conflagration must be within the
state as it sanctions (and even dares), with the backing of the state, to
endorse ungrounded freedom compromising activities such as managerially endorsed
social intimidation and coercion. Gould agrees:
…the limitation
of the power of the state with respect to interference in activities of
individuals is a good thing and that the protection against such interference,
which is ensured by civil and political rights, is of great importance.
The conflagration exists in
the previously stated dichotomy of liberal democracy and is an example of Hobbes’
Leviathan State in full flight. It is
not unlike the current condition of managerialist practices overriding liberal
democratic freedoms; that is, individualism. With belief’s that society really
does need micro-management to achieve a growth and protection of it, from some
other; wether it be some other Leviathan
or individual actor is irrelevant. Only the current state paradigm is right, as
long as it is part of the subjective liberal democracy. Whilst the Leviathan may have free reign in a
liberal democracy, this does not mean that the liberal democratic state is
responsible and blameworthy for subverting freedoms. On the contrary, whilst
the concepts of social justice play a part in allowing the Leviathan free range, equality before the law can serve to contain
such immoral monstrosities.
For Nelson it is a question
of morality -because the state paradigms: ‘while they are relevant to the moral
justification of the laws in question, they make no direct (his italics) reference to any moral
principle’. Therefore, this allows the managerialist leviathan an escape route;
for if the principle in question is sanctioned on the day, then it is
justifiable; but yet not legitimate. It is not legitimate because the morality
of the situation is not referenced within a framework of equality before the
law of the state, but has a liberal authority in state power instead.
Alexis de Tocqueville (in
Alexander 1999), commenting on
liberty had this to say: ‘but I think that liberty is endangered when this
power finds no obstacle which can retard its course and give it time to
moderate its own vehemence’. And: ‘that the causes that mitigate the government
there are to be found in the circumstances and the manners of the country than
its laws’. The seemingly unquestionable power and the righteousness of
contemporary states must in fact be questioned and on occasions found guilty of
crimes against human freedoms. This needs to be done not only by democratically
liberated individuals placing personal security at risk to tackle the Leviathan. But by the state itself, as
well as representatives of democracy, in order to preserve liberty and liberal
access to freedoms. It must be liberal democracy that is held responsible and
accountable, for only then is a liberal democratic state justified and
emancipatory. As it aims to be, through the models of political theorists like
JS Mill, J Roseau and human rights mandates such as those elevated by the
United Nations.
Nelson summarises Mill,
saying that the model democracy, because of its nature, is likely to produce
laws and policy that are normative and compatible with freedoms and
emancipatory morals. Questionable moralities can be constrained and an open
society can prevail. The conclusion is that liberal democracy can be both
freely subversive (using egalitarian principles), and subversively freeing
(using individual human rights under law). But that it is normative to a
greater extent. That the dichotomy between Liberalism
and Leviathanism can be restricted,
and that the Leviathan is the model
that should be regularly subjected to curtailment. Liberal democracy is the
preferred model of emancipatory principles and thus it should be aroused
regularly to ensure that human freedoms are not being compromised, or indeed
stifled. Liberal democracy to a greater extent will support human freedoms
through constitutions, equality before the law and with human rights treaties
and legislation.
REFERENCES
ALEXANDER,
Edward,.Ed. 1999. On Liberty John Stuart Mill.
Canada:
Broad View Press.
GOULD,
Carol, C,.1990. Rethinking Democracy
Freedom and social
cooperation in politics,
economy, and society. United States: Cambridge University Press.
MACPHERSON, G, B,.1977. The Life
and Times of Liberal
Democracy. London: Oxford University
Press.
MACPHERSON, G, B,.1966. The Real
World of Democracy.
New York: Oxford University Press.
NELSON,
William, N,.edited by Ted Honderich.1980. On Justifying
Democracy. London: Routledge &
Kegan Paul Ltd.
PLAMENATZ,
J, P,.1968. Consent, Freedom and
Political
Obligation. 2nd
edition. London:
Oxford University Press.
SOROS,
George,.1998. The Crisis Of Global
Capitalism open
Society endangered. Great Britain: Little, Brown
and Company.
THOMPSON,
Dennis, F,.1970. The Democratic Citizen.
London:
Cambridge
University Press.