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A R E P O R T O N T H E E M P L O Y M E N T

O F F E D E R A L T R O O P S

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––––––––––––––––– General Douglas MacArthur ––––––––––––––––

August 15, 1932

Dear Mr. Secretary,

On the afternoon of July 28, 1932, in response to your instructions, Federal

troops entered the District of Columbia for the purpose of assisting civil officials

in restoring order in certain sections of this city where considerable bodies of

persons had successfully defied police authority and were then engaged in

riotous activity.

Within a few hours this mission was substantially accomplished and with no

loss of life or serious casualty, after the arrival of the troops, among either the

civilian or military elements involved. By July 30th all Federal troops were

withdrawn to their proper stations and the local situation was under the

complete control of the civil authorities.

I am giving below a comprehensive account of this incident, to include the

sequence of events leading up to the employment of Federal forces, the

authority under which the troops acted, the principal troop movements

involved, and the results accomplished. Attached as appendices are copies of

official communications having an immediate bearing upon the incident: a

detailed report of Brigadier General Perry Miles, who was in direct command

of the Federal troops; a photographic record of particular phases of the

operation, and typical newspaper articles and editorials dealing with the affair.

The purpose of this report is to make of permanent record in the War

Department an accurate and complete description of a particular employment

of Federal troops on a type of activity in which elements of the Army have often

been engaged since the founding of the Republic.

G R O W T H A N D A C T I V I T I E S O F S O - C A L L E D B O N U S A R M Y

During late May, 1932, large groups of practically destitute World War

veterans, self-styled the “Bonus Army,” or “Bonus Marchers,” began arriving

in the City of Washington with the announced intention of conducting an

aggressive lobby in favor of the immediate payment of Veterans’ Adjusted

Compensation Certificates, commonly called the bonus.

With no normal means of support they established themselves, with the

consent of local authorities, in vacant areas and abandoned buildings,

principally governmentally-owned. Subsistence and supplies were obtained

through donations from local and outside sources and for the large majority the

only protection from the elements were rude huts constructed from scrap

material. The largest of these encampments was named CAMP MARKS, situated

on an alluvial flat on the left bank of the Anacostia River, northeast of the

Bolling Field area. In the same vicinity was CAMP BARTLETT, on privately owned

ground. A portion of the Bonus Army took possession of an area

southwest of the Capitol where demolition activities incident to the Federal

Government’s building program had already begun. Smaller detachments were

located in other parts of the city. The aggregate strength of the Bonus Army

gradually increased until it reached an estimated maximum of some ten to

twelve thousand persons, including in some cases families and dependents of

the veterans.

Speaking generally, all their early activities in the city were peaceably and

lawfully conducted. They organized themselves under leaders of their own

choosing, and these cooperated reasonably well with the civil authorities in the

preservation of order. Manifestly, however, in a large body recruited as was this

one, the inclusion of a lawless element was inevitable. As the Bonus Army’s

increasing size gave to the members thereof a growing consciousness of their

collective power and importance in the community, efforts to solve acute

problems of existence often went beyond the limits of legality. Individual

solicitation for material assistance was frequently couched in terms of demand

rather than of request. In some cases merchants and others, when called upon

for contributions, were confronted with covert threats which amounted to

nothing less than a system of extortion or forced levy. But the principal and

most weighty objection to the concentration of such a force in the District of

Columbia was occasioned by the deplorable conditions under which these

people were compelled to live, entailing an ever-present danger of disease and

epidemic.

Until the end of the Congressional session the marchers used every possible

influence to secure support for their project among members of Congress. Even

after the proposal was decisively defeated in the Senate on June 17th, these

efforts were continued, and recruits for their cause were sought throughout the

United States. Meanwhile the sanitary conditions under which they lived, with

the arrival of the summer heat and rains and the further crowding of the

occupied areas rapidly grew from bad to worse.

After it became apparent that Congress would not favorably consider the

bonus project there was of course no longer any legitimate excuse for the

marchers to continue endangering the health of the whole District population

by the continued occupation of these areas. From another viewpoint also the

concentration in one city of so many destitute persons normally residing in

other sections of the country was exceedingly unwise and undesirable. The

natural outlets through which they could benefit from the resources heretofore

made available for the care of the needy by the charitable instincts of the

American people were the local institutions of their respective communities. In

their own communities they and their relative needs were known or could be

investigated, and each could receive assistance accordingly. By coming to

Washington they deprived themselves individually of this assistance, while

collectively they presented to the charitable resources of the District a problem

of insurmountable proportions. But though the necessity for the dispersion of

the Bonus Marchers daily became more evident, its accomplishment was

plainly to be accompanied by many difficulties because of the destitute

circumstances of the great majority. In appreciation of this fact Congress, just

preceding its adjournment on July 16th, provided funds for transporting them

to their homes, and some fifty-five hundred took advantage of this provision of

law.

As this partial evacuation took place an influx of newcomers occurred, in

many instances later arrivals being of radical tendencies and intent upon

capitalizing the situation to embarrass the Government. Former leaders of the

Bonus Army lost, to a considerable degree, the authority they had so far

exercised over the mass, and the subversive element gradually gained in

influence.

During the whole period of its stay in the city the Bonus Marchers were

assisted in various ways by the local police force. Help rendered included the

collection of clothing, food, and utensils; permitting the use of vacant areas and

abandoned buildings; providing some medical service, and securing the loan of

tentage and rolling kitchens from the District National Guard. In this matter the

efforts of the police were humanitarian and more than praiseworthy. In the light

of later events, however, it is likely that a portion of the marchers interpreted

this attitude as an indication of timidity rather than of sympathy, and were ready

to take advantage of this supposed weakness whenever it might become

expedient to do so.

I M M E D I A T E C A U S E O F R I O T S

In late July the evacuation of certain of the occupied areas in the vicinity of

the Capitol became necessary in order that the Government’s parking and

building program might proceed. On July 21st the Bonus leaders were formally

notified by the police of this situation and requested to make prompt

arrangements for the removal of occupants from the affected areas. Although

there still remained ample time for veterans to apply for Government

transportation to their homes, these requests were largely ignored. Prolonged

negotiations were productive of no real results.

Since the projected operations were part of the program for unemployment

relief they could not be indefinitely delayed, and finally the District

Commissioners directed the police to clear these areas, using force if necessary.

Accordingly, on the morning of July 28th a considerable body of police went to

the encampment near Pennsylvania Avenue and 4 1/2 Street and compelled the

trespassers to evacuate. Within a short time large groups of men arrived from

other camps, apparently under some pre-arranged plan, and a struggle for the

possession of the disputed territory ensued. The police were overwhelmingly

outnumbered and were quickly involved in a serious riot. The mob, composed

of veterans and others who had intermingled with them, was incited by radicals

and hot-heads to a free use of bricks, clubs, and similar weapons. Several

policemen were hurt, one most seriously, while another, in defending himself,

was forced to shoot and kill one of the Bonus Marchers. In the pictorial

supplement attached hereto are several photographs showing the desperate

nature of these encounters.

O P E R A T I O N S O F F E D E R A L T R O O P S

The situation rapidly assumed such a threatening aspect that the District

Commissioners reported to the President their inability longer to preserve law

and order in the area affected and requested immediate assistance of Federal

forces. They gave it as their opinion and that of the Superintendent of Police that

if such help failed to materialize, considerable bloodshed would ensue.…

The President promptly directed the Secretary of War to cooperate with the

civil authorities in restoring law and order in the District of Columbia. The issue

had now become a broader one than that of the simple expulsion of recalcitrant

persons from an illegally occupied area in which they were physically

interfering with essential Government activity. By their open and determined

defiance of the Metropolitan police the members of this mob, recruited from all

or most of the bonus camps in the city, had threatened the integrity of Federal

authority within the confines of the Federally-governed District of Columbia.

The dispersion and expulsion from the District of the force became thus the

only logical answer the Government could make to the mob’s action.

At 2:55 P.M., July 28, 1932, the following order was handed me by the

Secretary of War:

To: General Douglas MacArthur, Chief of Staff,

United States Army.

The President has just now informed me that the civil government of the

District of Columbia has reported to him that it is unable to maintain law

and order in the District.

You will have United States troops proceed immediately to the scene of

disorder. Cooperate fully with the District of Columbia police force which

is now in charge. Surround the affected area and clear it without delay.

Turn over all prisoners to the civil authorities.

In your orders insist that any women and children who may be in the

affected area be accorded every consideration and kindness. Use all

humanity consistent with the due execution of this order.

PATRICK J. HURLEY,

Secretary of War.

…Promptly at 4:30 P.M. the troops began moving east on Pennsylvania

Avenue, the Cavalry and Tanks leading; the Infantry following in extended

formation.

The march to the Capitol area was made without incident. Upon arrival

there, and while troops were taking up designated positions, repeated warnings

to disperse were given to a large crowd of spectators on the north side of the

Avenue. These people were in no sense law-breakers and their dispersion was

desired only to safeguard innocent bystanders from accident incident to

subsequent activity. These warnings were temporarily ignored, but later when it

became necessary to release tear bombs against the rioters, the prevailing wind

carried a light gas concentration into the crowd of spectators and the area was

quickly cleared.

T R O O P E M P L O Y M E N T

The rioting elements were immediately ordered to evacuate the area south of

the Avenue, which order they ignored. In line with my determination to give a

reasonable time to any and all groups to disperse, no troop movement was

initiated against them until 5:30 P.M. At that moment they were still apparently

determined to hold their ground.

It is to be remembered that for many weeks members of the Bonus Army had

seen all their wishes and desires, as far as the local situation was concerned,

acceded to by civil officials, and more recently they had successfully defied

constituted authority and withstood police efforts to evict them. It is doubtful,

therefore, that when the Regular troops were deployed in their front the rioters

really believed that the eviction order was to be definitely enforced. At least it is

a fact that as the troops started to move forward the mob showed a surly and

obstinate temper and gave no immediate signs of retreating. As the soldiers

approached more closely a few brickbats, stones, and clubs were thrown, and

it became apparent that some hint must be given of the determination

underlying the employment of Federal troops in this contingency. This hint was

given through the medium of harmless tear gas bombs. A number of these were

thrown by the soldiers among the foremost ranks of the rioters, and from that

moment little organized defiance was encountered.

Troop operations were strictly confined to evacuation of Governmentallyowned

tracts. A short distance south of Pennsylvania Avenue was a bonus

detachment reported by the police to be occupying leased property. These men

were not molested. For the same reason no action was taken against a small

group of bonus seekers on the 7th Street Wharves—a detachment brought to

my attention by General Glassford in person.

The program previously outlined for the day’s activities was carried out

expeditiously, albeit with a leisureliness that permitted every member of the

Bonus Army ample time to make his unhindered way, if he was so minded, out

of the path of the troops. I was particularly desirous that the drift of the

dispersed groups be toward the Anacostia encampment and away from the

principal business and residence sections of the city. This was accomplished

through appropriate dispositions and movements of the troops.

Source: The Bonus March: An Episode of the Great Depression by Roger

Daniels (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Publishing Corporation, 1971), pp.

291–300.