O N T H E S P A C E P R O G R A M

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––––––––––––John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson –––––––––––

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 20, 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR VICE PRESIDENT

In accordance with our conversation I would like for you as Chairman of the

Space Council to be in charge of making an overall survey of where we stand in

space.

1. Do we have a chance of beating the Soviets by putting a laboratory in

space, or by a trip round the moon, or by a rocket to land on the moon, or by a

rocket to go to the moon and back with a man. Is there any other space

program which promises dramatic results in which we could win?

2. How much additional would it cost?

3. Are we working 24 hours a day on existing programs. If not, why not? If

not, will you make recommendations to me as to how work can be speeded up.

4. In building large boosters should we put our emphasis on nuclear,

chemical or liquid fuel, or a combination of these three?

5. Are we making maximum effort? Are we achieving necessary results?

I have asked Jim Webb, Dr. Wiesner, Secretary McNamara and other

responsible officials to cooperate with you fully. I would appreciate a report on

this at the earliest possible moment.

[signed]

John F. Kennedy

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT

WASHINGTON, D.C.

April 28, 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR PRESIDENT

Subject: Evaluation of Space Program.

Reference is to your April 20 memorandum asking certain questions

regarding this country’s space program.

A detailed survey has not been completed in this time period. The

examination will continue. However, what we have obtained so far from

knowledgeable and responsible persons makes this summary reply possible.…

The following general conclusions can be reported:

a. Largely due to their concentrated efforts and their earlier emphasis upon

the development of large rocket engines, the Soviets are ahead of the United

States in world prestige attained through impressive technological

accomplishments in space.

b. The U.S. has greater resources than the USSR for attaining space leadership

but has failed to make the necessary hard decisions and to marshal those

resources to achieve such leadership.

c. This country should be realistic and recognize that other nations,

regardless of their appreciation of our idealistic values, will tend to align

themselves with the country which they believe will be the world leader—the

winner in the long run. Dramatic accomplishments in space are being

increasingly identified as a major indicator of world leadership.

d. The U.S. can, if it will, firm up its objectives and employ its resources with

a reasonable chance of attaining world leadership in space during this decade.

This will be difficult but can be made probable even recognizing the head start

of the Soviets and the likelihood that they will continue to move forward with

impressive successes. In certain areas, such as communications, navigation,

weather, and mapping, the U.S. can and should exploit its existing advance

position.

e. If we do not make the strong effort now, the time will soon be reached

when the margin of control over space and over men’s minds through space

accomplishments will have swung so far on the Russian side that we will not be

able to catch up, let alone assume leadership.

f. Even in those areas in which the Soviets already have the capability to be

first and are likely to improve upon such capability, the United States should

make aggressive efforts as the technological gains as well as the international

rewards are essential steps in eventually gaining leadership. The danger of long

lags or outright omissions by this country is substantial in view of the possibility

of great technological breakthroughs obtained from space exploration.

g. Manned exploration of the moon, for example, is not only an achievement

with great propaganda value, but it is essential as an objective whether or not

we are first in its accomplishment—and we may be able to be first. We cannot

leapfrog such accomplishments, as they are essential sources of knowledge and

experience for even greater successes in space. We cannot expect the Russians

to transfer the benefits of their experiences or the advantages of their

capabilities to us. We must do these things ourselves.

h. The American public should be given the facts as to how we stand in the

space race, told of our determination to lead in that race, and advised of the

importance of such leadership to our future.

i. More resources and more effort need to be put into our space program as

soon as possible. We should move forward with a bold program, while at the

same time taking every practical precaution for the safety of the persons actively

participating in space flights.

As for the specific questions posed in your memorandum, the following brief

answers develop from the studies made during the past few days. These

conclusions are subject to expansion and more detailed examination as our

survey continues.

Q.1- Do we have a chance of beating the Soviets by putting a laboratory in

space, or by a trip around the moon, or by a rocket to land on the

moon, or by a rocket to go to the moon and back with a man. Is there

any other space program which promises dramatic results in which we

could win?

A.1- The Soviets now have a rocket capability for putting a multi-manned

laboratory into space and have already crash-landed a rocket on the

moon. They also have the booster capability of making a soft landing

on the moon with a payload of instruments, although we do not know

how much preparation they have made for such a project. As for a

manned trip around the moon or a safe landing and return by a man to

the moon, neither the U.S. nor the USSR has such capability at this

time, so far as we know. The Russians have had more experience with

large boosters and with flights of dogs and man. Hence they might be

conceded a time advantage in circumnavigation of the moon and also in

a manned trip to the moon. However, with a strong effort, the United

States could conceivably be first in those two accomplishments by

1966 or 1967.

There are a number of programs which the United States could

pursue immediately and which promise significant world-wide

advantage over the Soviets. Among these are communications satellites,

and navigation and mapping satellites. These are all areas in which we

have already developed some competence. We have such programs and

believe that the Soviets do not. Moreover, they are programs which

could be made operational and effective within reasonably short

periods of time and could, if properly programmed with the interests of

other nations, make useful strides toward world leadership.

Q.2- How much additional would it cost?

A.2- To start upon an accelerated program with the aforementioned

objectives clearly in mind, NASA has submitted an analysis indicating

that about $500 million would be needed for FY 1962 over and above

the amount currently requested of the Congress. A program based

upon NASA’s analysis would, over a ten-year period, average

approximately $1 billion a year above the current estimates of the

existing NASA program.…

Q.3- Are we working 24 hours a day on existing programs? If not, why not?

If not, will you make recommendations to me as to how work can be

speeded up?

A.3- There is not a 24-hour-a-day work schedule on existing NASA space

programs except for selected areas in Project Mercury, the Saturn C-1

booster, the Centaur engines and the final launching phases of most

flight missions. They advise that their schedules have been geared to the

availability of facilities and financial resources, and that hence their

overtime and 3-shift arrangements exist only in those activities in which

there are particular bottlenecks or which are holding up operations in

other parts of the programs. For example, they have a 3-shift 7-day-aweek

operation in certain work at Cape Canaveral; the contractor for

Project Mercury has averaged a 54-hour week and employs two or

three shifts in some areas; Saturn C-1 at Huntsville is working around

the clock during critical test periods while the remaining work on this

project averages a 47-hour week; the Centaur hydrogen engine is on a

3-shift basis in some portions of the contractor’s plants.

This work can be speeded up through firm decisions to go ahead

faster if accompanied by additional funds needed for the acceleration.

Q.4- In building large boosters should we put our emphasis on nuclear,

chemical or liquid fuel, or a combination of these three?

A.4- It was the consensus that liquid, solid and nuclear boosters should all

be accelerated. This conclusion is based not only upon the necessity for

back-up methods, but also because of the advantages of the different

types of boosters for different missions. A program of such emphasis

would meet both so-called civilian needs and defense requirements.

Q.5- Are we making maximum effort? Are we achieving necessary results?

A.5- We are neither making maximum effort nor achieving results necessary

if this country is to reach a position of leadership.

[signed]

Lyndon B. Johnson

Source: NASA: A History of the U.S. Civil Space Program by Roger D. Launius

(Malabar, Florida: Krieger Publishing Company, 1994), pp. 173–180.