36th Ulster Division Up and Over The Green Fields of France Words & Music: Eric Bogle. Well how do you do young Willie McBride, Do you mind if I sit here down by your graveside, And rest for a while, neath the warm summer sun ? I've been working all day, and I'm nearly done. I see by your gravestone you were only nineteen When you joined the great fallen in 1916. I hope you died well, and I hope you died clean, Or, young Willie McBride, was it slow and obscene ? Did they beat the drum slowly, did they play the fife lowly ? Did they sound the Dead March as they lowered you down ? And did the band play The Last Post and chorus ? Did the pipes play the Flowers of the Forest ? And did you leave a wife or sweetheart behind, In some faithful heart is your memory enshrined ? Although you died back in 1916, In that faithful heart are you forever nineteen ? Or are you a stranger without even a name, Enclosed and forever behind the glass frame In an old photograph, torn and battered and stained, And faded to yellow in an old leather frame ? Did they beat the drum slowly, did they play the fife lowly ? Did they sound the Dead March as they lowered you down ? And did the band play The Last Post and chorus ? Did the pipes play the Flowers of the Forest ? The sun now it shines on the green fields of France, There's a warm summer breeze, it makes the red poppies dance. And look now the sun shines from under the clouds, There's no gas, no barbed-wire, there's no guns firing now. But here in this graveyard it's still no-man's-land, The countless white crosses stand mute in the sand, To man's blind indifference to his fellow man, To a whole generation that were butchered and damned. Did they beat the drum slowly, did they play the fife lowly ? Did they sound the Dead March as they lowered you down ? And did the band play The Last Post and chorus ? Did the pipes play the Flowers of the Forest ? Now young Willie McBride, I can't help but wonder why. Do all those who lie here, know why they died ? And did they believe when they answered the cause, Did they really believe that this war would end wars ? Well the sorrows, the suffering, the glory, the pain, The killing and dying, was all done in vain. For Willie McBride, it all happened again, And again, and again, and again, and again. Did they beat the drum slowly, did they play the fife lowly ? Did they sound the Dead March as they lowered you down ? And did the band play The Last Post and chorus ? Did the pipes play the Flowers of the Forest ? Major John George Brew, 9th Battalion Royal Irish Fusiliers, France, 1914-18 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Only weeks after the outbreak of World War 1, the founding of the 36th Ulster Division was announced in Belfast, to be made up of 3 infantry brigades of each 4 battalions, a pioneer battalion, three companies of Royal Engineers, a signal company, and a Royal Army Medical Corps, placed under the command of Major General C. Herbert Powell who had seen service as an officer in the Indian Army. Recruiting began in earnest and men rushed forward to sign up. By 7 September the first recruits had already departed for the training camp at Ballykinler. Originally called 1, 2, and 3 Brigades, the Division was officially authorised on 28 October, and the brigades renumbered to 107, 108, and 109 on 2 November. The 107th was formed by volunteers from Belfast, the 108th by men from the Counties of Antrim, Armagh, Cavan, Down, and Monoghan, and the 109th from Donegal, Fermanagh, Londonderry, Tyrone, and a battalion from Belfast. The pioneers were taken mostly from the Lurgan area of County Down, while the 121st and 122nd Engineers and the Signal Company were recruited mainly from Belfast's shipyards. In Ulster's southern province, the Armagh Volunteers were organised under their commanding officer, Colonel Stewart W. Blacker, a well respected figure in the community, and became the 9th Battalion Royal Irish Fusiliers. They were soon nicknamed "Blacker's Boys". The 9th Battalion was made up partially of farmers from rural Armagh, where, owing to responsibilities on the farm, recruiting volunteers was harder and took much longer. On Tuesday, 15 September 1914, less than two weeks after the announcement of the formation of the 36th Ulster Division, John George Brew jnr. answered the call for volunteers and enlisted in Portadown, County Armagh, for the duration of the First World War. His enlistment papers show a 35 year old protestant "Ship Master" of 5ft. 8in., 133lbs, of "sallow" complexion, with brown eyes and dark hair, and a chest measurement of 37 inches. His distinctive marks are described as "Tattoo 2 Hearts Right Fore Arm Anchor Left Hand". Recruited as a Private, No. 13975, he was posted to his local battalion, the 9th Battalion Royal Irish Fusiliers, in the Ulster Division's 108th Brigade, but was commissioned a 2nd Lieutenant 77 days later on 1 December 1914. Many of the existing barracks in Ireland were in the south and already occupied by the previously formed Irish 10th and 16th Divisions. This lead to a general shortage of army accommodation, so new barracks needed to be found or built for the 36th Division. Camps were quickly prepared at Ballykinler for the 107th, and at Finner for the 109th, while new recruits in the 108th Brigade were taken to the Town Hall in Belfast to complete formalities and were sent off to their training camp at Clandeboye. Soon after their arrival at Clandeboye, the weather took a turn for the worse and the wet and cold autumn weather soon made living in the hastily erected and inadequate tents extremely uncomfortable. Under the feet of so many men, the ground quickly became a muddy bog, which, unbeknown to them at the time, was a foretaste of what they would experience in France. There was much illness as a result of the poor conditions, in some cases resulting in meningitis. Despite the troops' relatively good spirits, it was recognised that the accommodations were completely unsatisfactory and most men were promptly billeted in and around Belfast, Hollywood and Lisburn. Eventually huts were built, and, though they proved to be cold inside, they were dry and the men were able to return to the camp. Major General Powell, having done service with the Ghurkhas and been a mountain climber in the Himalayas, stressed the importance of physical fitness and route marches soon became an integral part of their training. Lack of full equipment was the major problem facing the Division during this time, and, not having yet received their full equipment, the men carried rucksacks on their backs full of stones. Attacks and advances were practised in the hills and forests against an imaginary enemy. Some training consisted of mundane tasks such as marching, drill, and PT, though there were more 'fun' things such as fighting with bayonets, charging sand-filled figures, and tossing hand grenades. They had only drill rifles, so limited shooting practice was done on old Mauser rifles borrowed from the UVF on UVF ranges. A programme had been introduced soon after the outbreak of war which detailed the training requirements and expectations of the newly raised armies. The six month syllabus covered everything from basic recruit training, through drill, discipline, hygiene, to battalion, brigade and divisional exercises. Every aspect of a soldier's training was covered, but the 36th Division was never able to complete it. As recruiting continued and numbers grew, Clandeboye soon became too small for the entire 108th Brigade so in early December the 9th Irish Fusiliers were moved to neighbouring Newtownards with the 12th Battalion Royal Irish Rifles, where they occupied new huts at the Ards Recreation Society grounds, where they continued their training. By the Spring of 1915, the 12 Battalions of the Ulster Division were finally prepared for service in France. The 9th, 'Blacker's Boys', was described as "being the best battalion in the division" and the Division as the "best equipped, best drilled and most professional unit in the United Kingdom". As the 36th readied for departure, local women in 'Comfort Committees' organised sock, mitten and warm clothing collections. Concerned for the men's' spiritual needs, 'mission services' were held for the two battalions at Newtownards over the period of a week at the end of May, which around 70 men attended each evening. The culmination of the preparations for departure was a Divisional parade through the streets of Belfast on 8 May 1915, a day after the Lusitania was sunk. Relatives and families of the men travelled extra to Belfast from outlying regions of north Ireland to see their boys off, and gave them a rousing farewell. The march through Belfast was preceded by an inspection of the Division's 17,000 troops by Major General Sir Hugh McCalmont in Malone, from where they marched for the centre of Belfast and on past the Mayor and Mayoress at City Hall. It took over one-and-a-half hours for the entire Division to pass by! Newspapers were filled with stories of the parade during the following week, proudly praising their young men, and retelling the story of the emotions of the celebrated farewell. In June the Division was sent to Seaford, Sussex, to complete training before their embarkation to France. The troops travelled by train to Dublin where they boarded a ship bound for Holyhead in Wales. Here they entrained for Seaford, and took a leisurely route through Wales and southern England. The war was getting closer, but the mood of the troops remained good. Seaford was for most troops a pleasant place to be in; the weather was good, and when off duty many took the opportunity to visit Brighton and bathe in the English Channel. Some even travelled to London to see the great city and ride the underground. But there were constant reminders in this part of England of the war they had come to fight; it is said that on a calm evening, when the breeze was just right, one could hear the distant guns in France. Some airships hung in the air, tethered to the ground, and aeroplanes often passed overhead while the men continued their training over the rolling South Downs. On 27 July, Lord Kitchener came to inspect the troops. Unfortunately for the men, he didn't stay long, and many were disappointed for all the preparation they had made for his visit. Despite the shortness of his visit, he was apparently nonetheless impressed as he is on record as having said that it was the finest division of his army which he yet seen. The one main outcome of the Kitchener visit was, however, the realisation that due to a lack of weapons and ammunition, there had been alarmingly little training either on rifles or machine guns. The Division was moved from Seaford to Bordon and Bramshott, outside Aldershot, at the beginning of September, where they were given the opportunity to learn. Despite efforts, it seemed the training was too little too late. On 23 September, during the final days before their departure for the Continent, General Powell was replaced by the more experienced Major General Oliver Nugent, who had already seen service in South Africa and France. It was felt that only general officers with experience in France should command divisions deployed there. To appease him, General Powell was given the K.C.B. with the official reason that it was in recognition of his services in the training of the Division. Just a week later King George V came to review and inspect the Division with Lord Kitchener. He congratulated General Nugent, remarking what a fine division the 36th was. A few days later, the Ulstermen marched out of Aldershot and crossed the Channel to France. An advance party of 1000 of the Division's Engineers went over first followed by the infantry, the first of which were the 15th Battalion Royal Irish Rifles, who embarked on 3 October trailed closely by the rest of the troops on consecutive days. The ships seemed crammed with equipment and overflowing with men. Smoking was forbidden and the crossings were made in complete darkness. The 9th Royal Irish Fusiliers were landed in Le Havre at 06:30 on 4 October 1915 and marched to a rest camp in the vicinity for the day. Battalion strength stood at 30 officers and 995 other ranks. It is impossible to know what was going on in the men's minds on this, their first day in France; some were surely thrilled by the notion of adventure, but the reality which lay before them was in stark contrast to the previous year's training, and as this became obvious, it is certain that the hearts of many were filled with fear. On their second day in France, the 9th Irish Fusiliers entrained at 17:30 with other battalions of the Division for Longueau, south-east of Amiens, in the Somme area of France's Picardy region. It was a long and slow trip, and although the Officers travelled in a first class wagon, the rest of the troops were astonished to realise they were travelling in wagons made for the carriage of horses. Their arrival at 05:30 the next morning was followed by a 15km march via Amiens to the village of Rainneville where they were billeted. As they neared the front, they soon came into contact with the realities of war, shocked to see the steady flow of casualties being conveyed to hospitals in the rear. The 9th Irish Fusiliers were billeted with 13th Royal Irish Rifles in the same village, but soon found it much too small to accommodate two entire Battalions. The 9th Battalion's War Diary noted, "Battalion settled down in billets. Accommodation scanty. Village too small to hold 2 battalions for more than one day. Majority of barns out of repair. Water supply very limited." Accompanied by the unfamiliar sound of thundering artillery in the distance, they found places to sleep on hay and out of the weather in the village's barns. A few days later, the 13th Rifles were moved to the village of St. Gratien, making Rainneville much more comfortable both for the inhabitants and the 9th Irish Fusiliers, who were redistributed throughout the village. Further training was the main priority and the battalion's War Diary over the ensuing ten days, for example, show the men involved in drill, parades and inspections, field exercises and route marches, demonstrations and lectures, and shooting and bombing practice. Here, they also made their first experiences with gas. On the afternoon of 12 October there was a "Gas demonstration and lecture by an officer from G.H.Q. All ranks passed through a room filled with chlorine gas." Soon after midday on 17 October, the Irish Fusiliers were marched to new billets for the night in the village of Puchevillers, 8km to the north-east, where they rejoined the 13th Irish Rifles. The following morning, the march was continued a further 15km in the same direction to Couin, where they camped in tents in the park surrounding a castle. Part of their training consisted of being attached to experienced units on the front for first-hand training in trench warfare and survival. Each of the Division's brigades was attached to either the 4th Irish or 48th South Midland Divisions for a five day period. The Irish Fusiliers, for their part, were attached to the 144th Brigade of the 48th Division and marched from Couin and via Sailly-au-Bois to Hébuterne on 19 October to join them. Each of the battalion's four companies was further attached to one of the Brigade's battalions : 'A' Company was attached to the 1/4 Gloucester's, 'B' Company to the 1/6 Gloucester's, 'C' Company to the 1/8 Worcesters, and 'D' Company to the 1/7 Worcester's. Over the next five days, the 9th Fusiliers got their first real taste of life in the trenches. They were fired upon and shelled, and had their first direct contact with the enemy. On the evening of 21 October, a patrol of Fusiliers from 'B' Company, under instruction from, and accompanied by men of the 1/6 Gloucester's, came face to face with a German patrol approximately 200 yards in front of British wire. Bombs were thrown at each other, but those of the Gloucester's and Fusiliers failed to explode. They then opened up with machine gun fire and were able to retire without suffering a casualty, while claiming several enemy killed. The patrol arrived back in British lines carrying a dead German who was later identified as being from the 169th Bavarian Regiment. Then, on 23 October, the Battalion suffered it's first casualty of the war when Private Wilson of 'C' Company was wounded in the arm. The following evening the last of the Battalion's troops retired from their first assignment in the trenches at 17:00 and spent the night behind lines in Hébuterne. Up early next morning, the Fusiliers left for Couin again at 06:30, marching via Sailly-au-Bois where they took a break to take much welcome hot baths, and marched on to billets in Beaval the following day. But the relative comfort of billets in village barns would all too soon be left behind as the time came for the Division to finally move up to take their allotted place in the front line trenches, next to more experienced units. Only a few days later, the 9th Irish Fusiliers took over their new positions near the village of Hamel, north of the nearest large town, Albert, and on the western side of the Ancre River. This would be their 'home territory' for many months to come. The trenches were in reality not a pleasant place to be. They afforded little shelter from the elements, except for small dugouts and holes burrowed out of trench walls. They were cold, muddy and infested by rats, fleas and lice. The walls were lined with wicker, the ground with duck-boards, and the rim strengthened with sandbags and barbed wire. Rains filled communication trenches with water and became impassable. In some trenches, some men sunk so deep in mud, they had to be dug out. Then, between German and British lines there was what was known as 'No Man's Land', a barren and deadly zone sometimes only yards wide. Besides the daily artillery duels, sniping was an additional and lethal reality to reckon with; there was a high price to pay for a head protruding over the rim of a trench, but it would still be 1916 before helmets were issued. On 22 November, the Division's first death in action was reported, that of soldier from the 12th Royal Irish Rifles, soon followed by others, some of whom fell victim to German snipers, and others to the daily artillery bombardments. But, compared to other sectors, theirs was a relatively quiet one, and casualties remained comparatively low. As Winter settled in and Christmas approached, life in the trenches grew more uncomfortable. But there was no lack of action, and a stint in the front line trenches would last around 7-10 days and include daily artillery bombardment and nightly patrolling in No Man's Land. Some of the more sinister weapons the Division was to come in contact with were 'mining' and gas. Mining consisted of burrowing tunnels forward to enemy lines, and detonating explosives under the Germans' feet, which the Ulstermen practiced around Beaumont-Hamel. Gas was a completely different matter. First used by the Germans at Ypres in April 1915, it was certainly no new weapon, but it struck fear into the hearts of all. Although training had been conducted, gas masks were still very primitive; indeed the first gas masks afforded little protection at all. Gas could cause a painful and choking death, but to the survivor it meant irreparable damage to the respiratory system. The first sign of gas was to be reported by the loud and clear shout "Gas!", followed by the wild chiming of gongs made of empty shell cases which would be the sign to don gas-masks. Chlorine gas was in use throughout 1915, but in December that year a new, more deadly gas was introduced : phosgene - much more powerful and completely invisible. Understandably, the extremely painful retching and ensuing death brought by this new form of gas wrought horror in the ranks. Living conditions were to become even harsher with the arrival of snow and ice. A heavy snow would sometimes prevent supplies getting to the front, and the men lacked hot food just when they needed it most. Drinking water became scarce so many sucked on ice, but that only gave them stomach cramps. The weather meant damp and cold clothing, and mud stuck to everything and froze. Illnesses took there toll on the Division too, during Winter, and many men spent time in field hospitals recovering from bouts of fever and flu; 'trench foot', known as 'foot rot' by the Ulstermen, was rampant, brought on by constantly damp feet. Sometimes, however, small luxuries arrived from home. Once, the 9th Irish Fusiliers received 1000 handkerchiefs from the Queen Alexandra Field Force Fund, much to their amusement. When Christmas arrived, however, nights on the front took on a more placid air. Sometimes the men would sing carols and their counterparts in the German trenches opposite them would recite them too. One story is told of a German soldier who the men would hear playing 'Silent Night' on his cornet each night. Christmas dinner consisted of turkeys, geese and hams which were supplied by the officers and supplemented by packages sent from home, while some of the more cunning soldiers managed to arrange other treats, such as candy or a bottle of French brandy. Many had seriously believed they would be home by Christmas, but the day's arrival brought with it the realisation that they were still a long way from home, both in distance and in time. Their families back in Ireland would be celebrating Christmas without them and although the very essence of the Pals Battalions meant the men were in France with friends and relatives, they all missed home and loved ones. Despite the loneliness, they had no choice but to make the best of it. The centre of activity of the war had been on the Western Front throughout 1914, but had swung to the Eastern Front in 1915, while a solid deadlock remained between the Allied and German the trenches of the Western Front. Towards the end of 1915 plans began to take form for a united Allied effort to break the stalemate, when the commanders of the Belgian, British, French and Italian armies met at a conference at French General Joffe's headquarters, with representatives of the Japanese and Russian armies in attendance. Although a plan of simultaneous British, French, Italian and Russian attack was adopted, it was realised that much preparation would be necessary and the commencement of any such offensive not realisable before the summer of 1916. Russia would need time to re-build her military machine, having been battered on the Eastern Front, and Britain required time to train new troops. Although the British forces in France had reached an impressive 38 Divisions purely through voluntary enlistment, Britain had deemed it necessary to introduce a system of conscription, which was instituted in January 1916. She was in a position to bring extra strength to the battlefield, but needed the time to prepare it. Meanwhile the German commanders were making their own plans. The German Chief of General Staff, General von Falkenhayn, was vigorously pushing for a German offensive on the Western Front, but intended to do it in such a way that a mass breakthrough would be unnecessary. Instead, he planned to bleed France through simple attrition, by using up her entire manpower at one position of attack, "for the retention of which the French command would be compelled to throw in every man they have". Two possible locations were selected for the attack: Belfort and Verdun. Verdun was chosen as it was the site more likely to most adversely affect French morale if it were to fall. The commencement of the German offensive was marked by the opening of a bombardment on French positions at Verdun across a 15 mile front at 07:15 on 21 February 1916. Within days, France's allies on the Western Front came to her aide by taking over the Arras Front, enabling the French Tenth Army to withdraw from there and move to Verdun to strengthen their besieged colleagues. British and Commonwealth troops now held the entire front between the Yser and Somme Rivers. In effect, von Falkenhayn's assault did succeed in that it drained French forces from other fronts and concentrated them at Verdun, thus diluting the density of British troop strength on the rest of the Somme front. But despite inflicting great damage on the French, some 90,000 casualties in the first six weeks, German gains were relatively small and the true goal was never fully realised. Then, in March, in an attempt to entice German troops off the Verdun offensive, the Russians launched an offensive on the Eastern Front at Lake Narocz. This had the desired effect, though at great cost to the Russians. Furthermore, it set back Russian preparations for the planned united Allied summer offensive, but at the same time eliminated any German chance of either achieving a decisive victory at Verdun or effecting any adequate counter-attack to the already obvious Allied preparations for their summer offensive on the Western Front. During a further conference of the Allied commanders which was held on 14 February, the date of the offensive's commencement was set for the end of June, and would involve some 14 British Army Divisions of each about 130,000 men along a 21 mile front, north of the Somme River between Gommécourt and Maricourt, plus an additional 5 French Divisions along an 8 mile front, south of the Somme River. The offensive would become known in history as "The First Battle of the Somme". This was the scene and developing situation facing John George Brew and the 9th Battalion in the months following their arrival on the Western Front in October 1915. Busy with preparations for the looming summer offensive, they began to settle into life in the trenches, though most of these remained knee-deep in water. During this time, the front around Hamel was a relatively quiet place, and it has been suggested the weather was for a time a larger problem than the enemy. Back at home, the women maintaining the 'Home Front' were busy knitting and sewing warm clothing such as mittens and socks, and concerned themselves with trying to make their boys' lives as comfortable as possible. In early February 1916, the Division's 107th and 108th Brigades moved into the front line again between the Ancre River and the Mailley-Maillet to Serre road, while the 109th remained in reserve. Later, when the troops were relieved and went back into reserve, Division shooting competitions were held involving teams from all three Brigades. During one competition, the 9th Irish Fusiliers' team was considered the best and it was a proud Colonel Blacker who stepped forward to accept a silver trophy from Brigadier General Hatchett-Pain on their behalf. Other forms of relaxation behind the lines included football games, sports days, card playing, reading, and even fishing in the Ancre River. Maybe there was the opportunity to visit a nearby village or a town, such as Albert, with it's damaged statue of the Virgin Mary high on the steeple of the église. Not much further away was the ancient town of Amiens, with it's restaurants and cinemas. It wasn't until March that the weather started to improve again, but it was accompanied by new, more intensive artillery bombardments by the Germans. A particularly heavy barrage in the early hours of 10 March was followed by an attack and breakthrough by German soldiers in the 10th Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers trenches around Thiepval Wood, resulting in 30 dead and a number of prisoners being taken. At the end of March, the Ulster Division front line was shortened slightly, and positioned astride the Ancre River. The river formed a natural border between two sub-sectors which became known as 'Hamel' and 'Thiepval Wood'. This was their territory and the Ulstermen began to name their trenches after Belfast streets, such as 'Great Victoria Street', and 'Royal Avenue'. In April 1916, John George Brew was promoted to Captain and became 2nd in command of the 9th Royal Irish Fusiliers' 'D' Company. A Captain at the time would usually be responsible for a company of 5 officers and 240 men, on a daily pay rate of 12s 6d. This almost quadrupled the amount of men for which John George was previously responsible, and increased his pay by 5s per day, around 70% more. In particular cases, an officer's daily pay was additionally supplemented by 2s 6d field allowance. By comparison, a private received a mere 1s per day. April and May brought fields of flowers to the Ancre Valley and alongside the business of war, many still managed to find time to bathe or fish in the river during pleasant weather. However, despite the appearance of calm, soldiers of all ranks were becoming aware of the magnitude of the coming offensive. The quiet time between the opposing foes had actually given both sides the opportunity to make extensive preparations and vastly improve fortifications along the entire front. The Germans knew the offensive was coming; they could see the preparations under way. They just didn't know when it would come. The month of June saw scaled-up preparations for the offensive, which had become known among the men as 'The Big Push'. It soon became apparent that the Ulster Division was to play a major roll in General Sir Douglas Haig's plan and the 9th Irish Fusiliers, in the Hamel Sector, was energetically preparing itself for the imminent assault, one of their first major attacks. Training ran at a feverish pace; mock attacks on dummy trenches were practiced behind the lines during the day, and 'live' practise raids were made on German trenches at night. Other work involved the building of light railways, improving roads, digging new trenches and dugouts, and building two causeways over the Ancre. Many obstructions in the river were also removed which reduced the level of flooding. The Ulster Division was lined up on a broad line below Thiepval Ridge, believed to be held in depth by troops of the German 10th Bavarian and 26th Reserve Divisions. The ridge was fortified by what were considered some of the strongest German defences on the Somme front, and included 'Schwaben Redoubt', a triangular system of trenches and deep bomb-proof underground bunkers, purported to be able to withstand anything but a direct hit. German troops also had the additional advantage that they had dominant views over a wide section of the Ulster front. The German and British lines were approximately 400 yards apart with a ravine of some 70 yards width about half way in between, the banks of which were steep and in part 15-20 feet high. It was a particularly well defended area with heavy machine gun pillboxes and makeshift fortifications in old ruins. One of the more formidable was 'St. Pierre Divion', 1500m north-west of Thiepval, which was so positioned that it could provide both frontal and flank fire on an Allied attack on the Schwaben Redoubt defences, on Beaucourt, and in the direction of Beaumont Hamel and the Ancre River. By this time, Thiepval itself was already in ruins, but most of the houses had cellars which the German 180th Wurtemburger Regiment had turned into strong defensive positions, making them extremely difficult to destroy. To the north-east of Thiepval there were also additional defences at 'Stuff Redoubt' and 'Goat Redoubt'. The Division's Commanding Officer, Major-General Nugent, was acutely aware of how difficult it would be for his men to overrun these strongholds. The Germans were well dug in and well prepared; they knew the offensive was coming and there was no effect of surprise. Moreover, the Division would be attacking them uphill and in a general easterly direction, which would mean into the rising sun. By the end of June, John George Brew was commanding the 9th Irish Fusiliers' 'D' Company and realised he would have an important part to play in the offensive's execution. The Battalion was positioned to the north of the Ancre River, on a line approximately 1000 yards long. They were given the objective of capturing the German 1st, 2nd and 3rd line trenches, the mill on the river, and thereafter Beaucourt Railway Station and the two houses behind it, with the support of two platoons of the 12th Battalion Royal Irish Rifles on their left flank, three companies on their right, and a further two platoons in support. The left boundary of their operation was the Divisional line of responsibility with the 29th Division, which ran at an angle to the Ancre, their right boundary, which made the shape of a triangle. On each side of the Ancre, the ground rose sharply; on the north side a gorge ran at a 90° angle to the river and continued through to the village of Beaumont Hamel. To the south of the Ancre, on a front of around 2000 yards width, the 11th and 13th Royal Irish Rifles were to attack the northern side of Schwaben Redoubt with the support of the 15th Royal Irish Rifles, while the entire 109th Brigade - the 9th, 10th and 11th Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers and the 14th Royal Irish Rifles - were to attack it's southern side. Grim reminders of the coming battle were to be seen in the preparations by the Medical Corps. First Aid stations were prepared in dugouts along the front, stocked with supplies, and each battalion was assigned 32 stretcher bearers. It was planned that the 9th Royal Irish Fusiliers and 12th Royal Irish Rifles, north of the Ancre River, would evacuate their casualties through a specially prepared trench running from Hamel to the road to Albert, where they could be transferred to other means of transport for a quicker evacuation to better equipped field hospitals either at Clairfaye Farm for the less serious wounded or Forceville for the stretcher cases. They were manned by the 110th Field Ambulance and the 108th Field Ambulance respectively. As the day grew near, a sombre, serious air began to take over the men, as they realised the enormity of what was coming. Many wrote final letters home, some wrote wills, and many sought out their Division's Chaplain, looking for solace and fearing the worst. It has been told that on the evening of 29 June, somewhere in the Ulster trenches, someone began to sing "Abide With Me", and it moved up and down the trench lines until everyone had solemnly joined in. The singing continued some 15 minutes in the quiet between artillery bombardments. On the morning of 1 July, the 9th Irish Fusiliers left Mesnil, in the rear, at 00:05 to take up their positions in the assembly trenches near the front, to the west of Hamel, where they occupied old trenches around 03:00. Advance bombardment of the German positions along the front by over 1,500 guns of the Allied Artillery was in progress, to cut wire and keep German troops in their trenches. The men of the 9th spent the rest of the night cowering sleeplessly in their muddy trenches, with their nerves taut in anxious excitement of the imminent fight. Anyone who did manage to fall asleep was awakened at 06:00 when the Germans, who had anticipated their attack, began concentrated shelling on the Division's positions. The barrage caused some 50 casualties alone in the Royal Irish Fusiliers' ranks. As if in retaliation, the British artillery opened up at 06:25 for a final hour's intensive bombardment, and continued until 07:30 when the early morning mist began to clear and reveal a warm, sunny morning. According to the 9th Irish Fusiliers' War Diary, the Battalion was deployed on a four company front; 'A' Company, on the right, under the command of Captain C. Ensor, 'B' Company, at right centre, under Major T. J. Atkinson, 'C' Company, at left centre, under Captain C. M. Johnston, and 'D' Company, on the left, under Captain J. G. Brew. Each company was to send it's platoons in 4 waves, the leading wave with Lewis guns, the second with 2 Stokes mortars and the third with 5 Vickers guns. "On the right of our division was the 32nd division making an attack on THIEPVAL village - on our left the 29th division attacking BEAUMONT HAMEL and BEAUCOURT villages. The general direction of the attack was up the right bank of the river ANCRE (a tributary of the river SOMME) from HAMEL Village to BEAUCOURT station. The Ulster division attacked astride the river ANCRE working up the left bank." At 07:00, 30 minutes before the attack was to begin, Allied trench mortars opened fire on the German front line and, under cover of the barrage, smoke and gas, the troops moved forward through the pre-cut British wire to position themselves for the 07:30 start time. All of a sudden, the long wait was over; it was time to go. To reach their start trenches, the Fusiliers' first wave crossed the parapet at 07:10 having relatively no difficulty getting through Allied wire, in which lanes had already been cut, although casualties increased during the advance to the ravine. The second wave, which crossed the parapet at 07:15, "suffered more severely crossing our wire, and also came under the M. G. fire from the flanks". The third wave went over the parapet at 07:20 and the fourth at 07:30 as the British artillery barrage lifted and whistles in the trenches marked the beginning of the offensive. "Men were falling before they reached their own wire and in front of them lay 600 metres of No Man's Land. The waves vanished under the withering fire from St. Pierre Divion and the Beaucourt Redoubt. "The Germans survived the bombing in their shelters, and, as the British barrage lifted, they had manned their guns and awaited the British offensive. "The Germans, ...numbed and dazed from the long barrage, left their dugouts and angrily mounted their machine guns. They could not believe the site before them, wave after wave of heavily laden infantry advancing as though on parade to the wire where they desperately tried to cut a way through. They were a perfect target for the German gunners...." The Allied bombardment of the German lines had not at all been as effective as was thought. "The majority of the Officers of the 2 left Companies [where Captain John George Brew was positioned] were casualties before reaching the Ravine, where the two leading waves were reorganised in one line and continued. The 3rd and 4th waves were caught by a severe M. G. fire both frontal and flanking, and also by an artillery barrage which the Germans had now placed between our wire and the Ravine, and were practically annihilated. Some 150 yards from the German line the assaulting line again came under heavy M. G. fire and suffered severely: notwithstanding this, small bodies of men of the Right and the two left Companies reached the German wire and charged the trenches, in places the Germans held up their hands to surrender, but realising there were no supporting troops resumed the contest till there were only a handful of our men left". Despite high casualties, the troops tried to continue advance, and became involved in much bloody hand-to-hand fighting. Then, as no gains were made by the 29th Division at Beaumont-Hamel, German troops there were able to be concentrate flanking fire upon the Fusiliers and 12th Irish Rifles assault, below and to the left of them. With German machine gun fire raining in on them from three sides, the air was thick with German bullets and men were falling everywhere, while attempting to scramble for cover behind anything which would afford it. One writer recollected that they could see bullets flying through the air like a shower of fine a hail, while another described it as being like a great spray of water from a hose with a perforated nozzle. Many were killed and many others were trapped by Germans who had infiltrated the rear of their advance. This in turn hindered Allied artillery firing on No Man's Land as the risk was too large of hitting British troops, but German artillery bombarded the British front line and prevented the advance of reserves and the re-supply of ammunition. "The men went forward in small groups and sometimes individually. Some men reached the enemy front line and here those who survived continued towards Beaucourt Station where nearly all became casualties." Another account records, "Owing to the intensity of fire only 1 Runner got through, he came from the Left Centre Company Commander [Capt. Johnston], from a spot about 30 yards short of the Ravine, with the message "Cannot advance without support". The Supporting platoon of 12th Royal Irish Regiment was sent out but was wiped out". Those around Beaucourt Station were now trapped behind German lines, and had to decide whether to surrender or fight their way back. Many had run out of ammunition and had to rely on covering fire from those behind them to scramble back to safety. During the remainder of the morning survivors, amongst them many wounded, limped back individually or in small groups, but it is said that only a quarter of them made it back alive. Many of those stranded behind the lines, often wounded, soon became Prisoners of War and were destined to spend the rest of the war in captivity. Elsewhere on the Division's front the battle was still raging. Owing to the additional failure of the 32nd Division's attack on Thiepval, the German guns in Thiepval turned their fire onto Thiepval Wood, where the 8th, 9th, and 10th Battalions of the Royal Irish Rifles were awaiting the order to advance. This caused many casualties and forced them to leave the wood soon after 09:00. Their objective, the Grand court Line, was only 600 metres away but many fell already in No Man's Land. Notwithstanding this, they were also hit by friendly fire when the British barrage caught up with them, causing heavy casualties. They were forced to lie in the grass without cover until the barrage moved on, which enabled the Germans time to man the lines at Beaucourt Redoubt and Grand court and open fire on them, causing even more casualties. Despite the seeming failure of the 9th Irish Fusiliers' advance, the Battalions south of the Ancre had, in fact, at great cost, formed a deep wedge into the German lines in their section of the front, between the 29th and 32nd Division, but it left them dangerously exposed to German attacks on their flanks. The Ulster Division would be the only division on the entire front to reach beyond the German 4th trench line, but by mid-morning the Germans had reorganised and began to counterattack in strength. The Ulstermen were driven back but had additional trouble retreating as the German artillery had again laid down a barrage in No Man's Land; before midday the Ulster advance was all over. When the extent of the casualties was realised, every available man was sent to hold the front line, while extra medical orderlies were sent up to try to deal with the wounded. "The Ulstermen had made a spectacular advance under terrible fire against the German positions. Surrounded by the enemy, almost out of ammunition and bombs, they clung desperately to their gains. It was all too clear that unless they could be supported to combat the inevitable German counter attacks, they could not hold." By 15:00, the Ulster Division was in a desperate position. Battalions of men had been fighting around eight hours and were becoming exhausted. Their numbers were dwindling under fire from three sides, and ammunition and water were running low. German troops were seen gathering behind their lines in preparation for a counter-attack and an urgent request for reinforcements was sent to Brigade Headquarters. German troops soon attacked and succeeded in driving the Ulstermen back from positions they had won earlier in the day. They was much delay in sending up reinforcements and it was not until around 19:30 that evening that companies of the 1/4 and 1/5 York's and Lancs. from the 148th Brigade of the 49th West Riding Division were sent forward to assist. It became obvious that the attack had become a complete disaster and at the end of the day, still under heavy attack by both infantry and artillery, the Ulstermen were ordered to retire to the German first line trenches, which the eight companies of the 1/4 and 1/5 York's and Lancs. had since occupied. Early on 2 July, the Ulster Division received orders to retire. Around 12:00, the 9th Irish Fusiliers handed their trenches over to the 29th Division's 87th Brigade and gladly withdrew to Martinsart, a few kilometres to the south west, reporting a 'ration strength' of just 281 men, including officers. The following day, at 14:00, they withdrew further to Forceville. The Division's remaining troops were shattered as their losses became apparent. "Our C.Q.M.S. had promised champagne to those who came back; sure enough when I got back the champagne was there. Every now and then another straggler came in and we got talking about those who had been hit. Many of us broke down and started howling, but some were ready to go back next day and look for the wounded." (L/Cpl. J.A. Henderson, 14th Irish Rifles) 15 Officers and 615 men of the 9th Irish Fusiliers had been sent into battle and "of these all the Officers are killed, wounded or "missing believed killed", and of the other ranks 520 are killed, wounded, missing believed killed, or missing believed wounded." Of the A, B, C, and D Company commanders, Captain Johnston was killed in action, Major Atkinson was missing believed killed, and Captains Ensor and John George Brew were wounded. The entire 36th Ulster Division suffered losses of 5104 men on 1 July. The heaviest losses within the Division were the 13th Battalion Royal Irish Rifles which reported 595 casualties, followed by the 11th Battalion Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers reporting 589, and then the 9th Battalion Royal Irish Fusiliers with 532. Total British losses for that day amounted to a horrific 19,240 dead, 35,493 wounded, 2152 missing, and 585 prisoners. It is purported to be the greatest ever British loss for any one single day during the war. Several details were sent out into No Man's Land to search for casualties on the nights of 2-3, 3-4 and 4-5 July. During a daylight search Captain Geoffrey St. George Cather, the 9th Irish Fusiliers Adjutant, brought in a wounded man who had been lying about 150 yards from German wire, but was killed when he returned to retrieve another. He was posthumously awarded the Victoria Cross, one of four earned by the Ulster Division during the offensive. As news of the slaughter reached home, the newspapers became filled with lists of casualties and the scale of the disaster became obvious. Small envelopes holding news of hope or horror began to be delivered to Ulster homes, and scarcely a family was left untouched. At the arrival of news, friends and neighbours gathered around to offer solace and the vicar became a regular visitor. On 5 July, John George's wife, Annie, also received an envelope which contained the following telegram, "To: Mrs. Brew, Rathlin Portadown Ireland. Regret to inform you that Capt. J. G. Brew Irish Fusiliers was wounded July 1st. Details sent when received. "And indeed, a week later, on 12 July, came a second telegram, "To Mrs. Brew Rathlin Portadown. Capt JG Brew Irish Fusiliers admitted 8 General Hospital Rouen 5 July with gunshot wound head slight." Flags were flown at half mast, and memorial services were held in the local churches. Annie's local paper reported, "Captain Brew, 9th Bn. R.I.F., is also wounded, but, we are glad to say, not seriously". Unfortunately, many people were too poor to afford to buy a newspaper so local newsagents began to hang casualty lists in their shop windows; onlookers would read the names out loud for those who could not. On 5 July, the Division retired to Rubempré and surrounding villages, followed by a further withdrawal to the Bernaville area five days later. On 14 July, the 9th Irish Fusiliers commander, Colonel Blacker, wrote to the 10th Irish Fusiliers commander, Colonel Fitzgerald, describing the recent events. His invaluable narration of the episode and depth of feeling warrants its full reproduction: "Dear Fitzgerald It is with a heavy heart I take up my pen to tell of the doings and losses of the Battalion on July 1. After being five days in the trenches during the preliminary bombardment, we came out for two days rest, then went on at midnight on June 30, and took up our positions ready for the assault which was for 7.30 am, July 1. The Battalion was on a four company front, each company being in a platoon front, thus being in four waves: two leading waves in [the] front trench line, 3rd wave in [the] communication trench, 4th wave in [the] 2nd line trenches. Order of companies from right to left: A, B, C, D. These dispositions were completed about 3 am. We suffered 50 casualties while waiting. The opposing lines were about 400 yards apart, with a ravine some 70 yards wide with steep banks about 20 feet high, about half way. The order was for the leading wave to get within 150 yards from German lines by 7.30am to be ready to assault the instant our barrage lifted at 7.30 am. To do this the leading waves went over the parapet at 7.10 am, 2nd waves at 7.15 am, 3rd at 7.20 am and the last waves at 7.30 am. Ansor, Atkinson, Johnston C, and Brew were in command respectively and 11 other platoon officers, that was all that were allowed in the actual assault: and about 600 men. Of these Johnston was killed. Atkinson, Townsend, Hollywood, Montgomery, Seggie, Stewart are missing, believed killed. Brew, Gibson, Jackson, Shillington, Andrews, Smith, Barcroft, Capt Ensor are wounded and 516 other ranks are casualties. 57 killed 158 missing 303 wounded Total 518 The 1st wave got away without suffering badly, the 2nd wave had many casualties, and the 3rd and 4th waves were mown down by machine gun fire, frontal and enfilade, before they reached the ravine. After the machine gun fire the Germans put a barrage between us and the ravine and few of C and D companies got to the German front line, but a number of A and B companies got through the German line and reached their objective at Beaucourt Station, past the German 3rd line. Of these none have returned. Owing to the failures of Battalions on our left, they were cut off. The gallant and splendid leading of the officers and the steady advance of the men even after their officers were down, was magnificent, and makes me proud indeed to have been associated with such heroes. For four nights after, parties went out and searched for the wounded and brought in several (Ensor and three others on the 4th night), and then we were moved back 12 miles and the Border Regiment continued the search and rescued many of which we owe them deep gratitude. Cather was killed bringing in wounded in daylight, and Menaul slightly wounded. Alas, many of our best have gone and we only marched back 281 strong, including transport. The Battalion in the hour of trial was splendid as I knew it would be, but I am heartbroken. The gallant friends and comrades we shall see no more. So few have come back unwounded it is hard to get any information as to individuals. Of the 48 Lewis Gunners, only 7 are left. In 'A' Company, Sgts More, Whitsitt, Hegan, Kirkwood, McCourt are wounded and Sgt Wilson is missing believed killed. In 'B' Company, Sgt Porter is killed and Sgts Caulfield, Keith, Barr, Courtney, Johnston wounded. In 'C' Company, Sgts Hobbs and Bryans are killed and Sgts Brown, Love missing. In 'D' Company, Sgts Mullen, Gordon, Thornberry killed, Sgts Hare, Balmer, Sewell, Hughes wounded and Sgt Bunting missing. McClurg, the Primate's chauffeur wounded. We want Lewis gunners badly, the Signallers escaped well, we still have over 30 available. Your draft of 53 came last night and I saw them today, very well turned out and a good lot. What can you do further? I fear little - nearly all our bombing teams are gone. We are right back now, not more than 30 miles from Boulogne and are hoping to get drafts and trying to refit and sort things out. Fortunately the four Company Sgt Majors and four Company Quarter Master Sgts were not allowed over the parapet so the Company Staff is intact. Cather's loss is a severe one, he was quite wonderful as an Adjutant, but his was a glorious death and his name has gone in for a posthumous Victoria Cross. He brought in one wounded man from about 150 yards from German wire in daylight! and was killed going out to a wounded man who feebly waved to him on his calling out to see if there were any more near. There has [sic] been a lot of extravagant words written and published in the Press, which is a great pity. The Division behaved magnificently and the point does not want labouring. Please be careful that this epistle does not get into the Press. I am still dazed at the blow and the prospect in front of us all, but we must not be downcast; and must remember the glorious example of the gallant band who so nobly upheld the honour of the Battalion, and who have died so gloriously, leaving their example to live after them, and to inspire those who are left. " By the time Colonel Blacker wrote this letter, the Division was already on the move again. On 11 July, the demoralised remnants of the Division were removed from the Somme and Picardy region altogether and had entrained for Flanders in Belgium. The route took the Division through Auxi-le-Château, Frévent, Conteville, Berguette, Thiennes, and Steenbecque to an area north-west of St. Omer for training. Divisional Headquarters was set up in Tilques, and the 108th Brigade was positioned in Eperlecques. On 20 July, the 108th was moved forward by motorised transport to camps south of Neuve Eglise and on the southern side of Hill 63, just west of Bois de Ploegsteert, which had been nicknamed 'Plug Street Wood', while Divisional Headquarters was moved to Mont Noir, a few miles north-northwest of Bailleul. During the evening, the 108th relieved battalions of the 20th Division in the front line trenches and were the first of the Ulstermen to go back into line since the Division's extraction from Hamel. Meanwhile, back on the Somme, the Allied offensive had continued on until 12 July, but, except for a few exceptions, was successfully contained by the German Army. It soon became a battle of attrition, which continued until March 1917. The Germans continued to hold Beaumont-Hamel and Thiepval and it wasn't until 27 September 1916 that Thiepval was surrounded and captured. It is interesting to note that during September British tanks were used here on the front for the first time, but with less than desirable results. St. Pierre Divion and Beaumont-Hamel weren't conquered until 13 November, with the aide of seven divisions under cover of a thick fog, and was followed by Beaumont village next day. The 32nd Division objective, the Thiepval Plateau, even then still resisted capture but finally fell with a bounty of 7000 German prisoners on 19 November, some 4 1/2 months after the initial attack. Despite the fact the German forces had held on so long, it is estimated they suffered a massive 700,000 casualties across the entire front between 1 July and 1 December, while it is thought the British lost some 400,000. Although John Brew had survived the terrible slaughter of 1 July, and recovered from his wounds, it would be over 5 months before he was at last able to return to the command of 'D' Company. New drafts were added to the Ulster Division to replace the losses incurred on the Somme, and by late July the Division was positioned in Messines in Belgium. Here, the high water table meant the possibility of digging only shallow trenches which then had to be fortified by sandbags. The trenches were always flooded and dirty and were under the additional threat of German tunnelling and bombing. A story is told of a very good 20 foot deep trench dug by the Royal Engineers in August. By September there was a foot of water in the bottom of it, in October it rose to two feet, and by November the water had risen to the top of the stairs. Someone with a sense of humour added a sarcastic sign, "The R. E. Swimming Bath". Life in the Allied trenches carried on much as it had before and settled back into a form of routine monotony, though the Autumn of 1916 was seen as a welcome quiet time for the Ulstermen while the Germans were still concentrated on the Somme, far to their south. In an effort to alleviate the monotony often experienced in the trenches, several amateur newspapers of different levels of quality sprung up in the British Army. One of them, the "B.E.F. Times", originating in the 12th Sherwood Foresters, amused the troops by summing up trench life with it's tongue-in-cheek attitude to Winter mud and the hardships of the average soldier on the Western Front. "To the P.B.I. * An Appreciation. Gone is the summer, and gone are the flies, Gone the green hedges that gladdened our eyes; Around us the landscape is reeking with rain, Gone is the comfort - 'tis Winter again. So here's to the lads of the P.B.I., Who live in a ditch that never is dry; Who grin through discomfort and danger alike, Go 'over the top' when a chance comes to strike; Though they're living in Hell they're cheery and gay, And draw as their stipend just one bob per day. Back once more to the boots, gum, thigh, In a pulverised trench where the mud's knee-high; To the duck-board slide on a cold wet night, When you pray for a star shell to give you light; When you clothes are wet, and the rum jar's dry, Then you want all your cheeriness P.B.I. ...." (*P.B.I. = Poor bloody infantry) Back at the business of war, much time was spent improving and strengthening defences. General Plumer was encouraging the use of mining as an offensive weapon and Tunnelling Companies were busy driving long shafts under No Man's Land in the direction of the German lines at their strongest defences. However, the German Army, holding the high ground, as it always seemed to be to the average British soldier, also occupied it's time the same way, using all it's available expertise and technology. Four lines of trenches ran parallel to and west of the Wytschaete-Messines road, defended by a wide area of wire and pillboxes. Thick concrete dugouts were erected, hidden behind farm houses, bridges, and natural contours in the landscape which afforded ample protection from Allied machine gun and artillery fire. German miners were also hard at work, tunnelling their way towards British lines. It was a race against time, an attempt to discover the efforts of the opposition - and destroy them, and hope that their own tunnels would not be discovered. It was not seldom that shafts would collapse or be bombed, trapping men below ground and burying them alive. It was a dangerous job, but Tunnelling teams on both sides were known as courageous men, who were highly respected and admired by others soldiers. After recuperation from his wound and a break at home, John George Brew was sent back to the front where he rejoined the 9th Irish Fusiliers at Messines on 10 December 1916. Christmas passed quietly and then, at the end of January, John George was given the opportunity to take temporary command of the Battalion for a few days while the Commanding Officer was absent. In early 1917, the strength of British forces in France had grown to some 1,200,000 men, the strength of French forces to around 2,600,000, and that of the Belgians to about 100,000, totalling altogether around 3,900,000 Allied men opposite an estimated circa 2,500,000 Germans, but the war had nonetheless begun to stagnate. The casualty figures continued to increase while movement on the front remained meagre. At home, the civilian population was becoming unsettled. It was realised that the war needed fresh ideas and strategies and this was made felt by the replacement of the Asquith Government, on 11 December 1916, by Prime Minister David Lloyd George who won on the promise of more vigorous and effective leadership. In France, a French plan to avoid offensives on the Somme, but instead to attack at each side of it, meant that British forces must occupy the entire French-held Somme front, from his current positions as far south as Roye. This strategy was met with great scepticism by General Haig who objected to an extension of the front and a thinning-out of the density of his troops on that line. Additionally he wanted to keep British troops available for an attack at Flanders, which he had been long planning. In the least, he felt, the French strategy should be postponed until May when simultaneous Russian and Italian attacks were planned, but he was over-ruled. To appease him, he was promised two additional divisions to complete the task. Not satisfied with this, he argued further until he received eight. Disagreement over strategies and leadership ensued and Franco-British relations began to decay. However, before any plans could be set in motion, the Germans would unwittingly disable them. Anticipating a new Allied offensive on the Somme front, the German Commander, General Erich Ludendorff, decided to consolidate his manpower and supplies by voluntarily withdrawing to his rear line defences, effectively buying himself time to strengthen his forces. Following a transformation of their rear line to a new front line, which they named 'Siegfried' (the British called it 'Hindenburg'), the German forces fell back in stages from 23 February to 16 March, when the main withdrawal took place. But in preparation for their retreat, they adopted what we would call today a 'burnt earth policy' and systematically destroyed everything between their old and new front lines. In mid-March, soon after the German retreat on the Somme, the width of the Messines Front held by the Ulster Division was reduced to just one brigade giving the remaining two the opportunity to relax and train behind lines. One brigade was kept near Flêtre, while the other trained in Lumbres, west of St. Omer. During this time, John George Brew was promoted to the rank of Major. The German withdrawal on the Somme Front had come unexpectedly and had caught both the British and French unawares. In an attempt to exploit the situation, belated, ill-prepared and costly attacks ensued by the British in their Spring Offensive at Vimy Ridge on 9 April, and by the French east and west of Riems on 16 April. But nothing was to be seen of the expected breakthrough; all chance of surprise was thrown away by fundamental Allied mistakes, and flawed by a well prepared enemy. Hence, the main Allied concentration was moved to Belgium's Ypres sector in May and June and preparations were soon underway in the Ulster Division lines for the Allies' second offensive on the Messines-Wytschaete Ridge. Despite all that was going on, there was an air of calm among the men: "Morning spent in cleaning up camp. Afternoon in training. Major Brew, the Quarter- master and five other ranks attend a demonstration in cooking at the Divisional School, Metéren." Divisional Headquarters moved forward to the area west of Dranouter on 27 May, where they came under a fatal attack by German artillery. The following day, Headquarters was moved again, to a prepared command post and signal station on the western slopes of Kemmel Hill. Three days later, the commencement of the Battle of Messines was heralded, as always, by preliminary bombardment which lasted an entire week. The 36th Division objective would be a line from Lumm Farm to a rail cutting on the Wytschaete-Oosttaverne road, involving the complete 107th and 109th Brigades with the 11th and 12th Royal Irish Rifles from the 108th in support. The two remaining battalions of the 108th, the 9th Irish Fusiliers and 13th Irish Rifles were planned for a reserve roll and would not go over the top until the evening of 7th, until which time they would be positioned at Fort Victoria. However, during the week long preliminary bombardment, it was they who would have to hold the front line. Careful preparation had been done in order to avoid previous mistakes. A model of the ridge was made behind the lines and aerial photographs were studied following artillery barrages to gauge their effectiveness. If it was deemed that a particular structure or trench had not been sufficiently shelled, it was noted and given special attention during the following day's barrage. Officers of flanking battalions and divisions attended each other's briefings in the days preceding the infantry assault to ensure that even the most trivial detail would be shared. Supplies of rations and ammunition were better organised, as were preparations for the evacuation of wounded. The light railway, or 'trench tramway' as it was called, would play an integral part in the speedy removal of casualties to waiting ambulances on a turning circle especially prepared for the purpose. The Ambulances would then bring wounded to the 108th Field Ambulance Dressing Station just east of Dranouter, from where they could be quickly and easily conveyed to Casualty Clearing Stations at Bailleul. The days leading up to the infantry attack were given letters of the alphabet as a code. The day of attack was called 'Z' day, and the five days previous 'U', 'V', 'W', 'X', and 'Y'. From 'U' day, Allied artillery intensified it's bombardment of German dugouts and bunkers, and billets further behind their lines. Barrages concentrated on their lines of communication day and night, sporadically mixed with gas shells. Whirlwind 30-minute barrages were also conducted on Messines and Wytschaete during which time every available weapon, from the largest to the smallest, was trained on German lines. Diversionary attacks and raids on enemy trenches were made by the Division to take prisoners and gain intelligence information. On 5 June, for example, under cover of artillery, the 9th Irish Fusiliers made a raid on the Spanbroek salient, taking one officer and 30 other ranks prisoner, at the cost of two killed and six wounded. Rain fell all day and all evening on 6 June, 'Y' day, but the plan proceeded on schedule, and Allied artillery laid down their barrage on the German lines. At 22:00 107 and 109 Brigades, having been camped beyond the range of German shelling to the south of Locre and south-west of Dranouter respectively, moved up to their start positions. Each man had been issued chewing gum, lime juice, oranges and Oxo cubes. Upon arrival, they were issued hot drinks and settled in to await zero hour. That night, some 80,000 Allied troops were lined up across the entire front, all forbidden to smoke or make any noise. At 03:10, zero hour was marked by the simultaneous detonation of nineteen massive mines under German lines, four of which were in front of the Ulster Division. So great were they, that dirt and debris rained down on both German and Allied trenches for several minutes afterwards. Although Allied soldiers knew of the plan in advance, the effect was far greater than expected; the absolute power of the explosions awed those who witnessed it and the thunderous roar was even heard in England. Men of the 8th Irish Rifles, who were standing at the time, were blown to the ground and the body of a German officer was found later having fallen from the sky some 200 yards behind the Division's lines. This was the signal for the artillery to open up and the infantry to advance. The Ulstermen moved forward under cover of almost every available form of weapon - mining, artillery, trench mortars, tanks, smoke and gas. The front was a mere 9 miles long, but there were some 2,340 pieces of artillery deployed along it; the Ulster front alone held 192 field guns and howitzers, and all were firing at once. The effect on the Germans was immeasurable; the tactical advantage resulted in excellent gains along the entire front, and troops were able to make their initial advance with little or no resistance whatsoever. Stunned by the quick succession of detonation, barrage and infantry assault, hundreds of dazed German prisoners were taken. Many others were found dead in their dugouts with no obvious sign of a cause of death - they had been killed by concussion from the mines' blasts. The protestant Ulstermen fought alongside the 16th Irish Division, who were Catholics taken mostly part from the ranks of the National Volunteers, the Ulster Volunteers' old arch enemy; to their right was the 25th Division of the 2nd ANZAC. Only two machine guns opened up on the 36th, more precisely on the 109th Brigade, but they were promptly put out of action. Though more repelling German troops were met the further the advance moved, by 04:50 all goals had nonetheless been reached according to schedule. A second wave of fresh troops from the 11th and 12th Irish Rifles, the two supporting battalions from the 108th Brigade, advanced at 06:50 under the cover of a raised barrage, and moved forward to extend the gains of the first wave. A few stubborn positions resisted, mainly pillboxes, but they were soon taken care of and the Division's objectives were successfully attained, despite the continuing nuisance of counter-barrages from German artillery positioned further east. Following nightfall, the two remaining battalions of the 108th, there under the 9th Irish Fusiliers, moved forward and joined the rest of their Brigade on the front, under the command of General Griffith. This enabled the relief of the 107th and 109th Brigades, who retired to the old British lines. The day had been warm and bright, according to the 9th Irish Fusiliers' War Diary, but heavy rain fell in the evening, accompanied by thunder and lightening. At 01:30, the Battalion relieved the 10th and 15th Irish Rifles on what was known as the 'Black Line', between Lumm and Ochre Farms. It was a long and sleepless night for them but the expected German counter-attack never came, despite several alarms. The darkness gave the Royal Engineers the chance to lay wire along the new front line, and by dawn it was clear the ridge was firmly in Allied hands. No casualties were reported by the 9th Fusiliers for the 24 hours up to 12:00, in spite of continued heavy shelling from German positions during the day. The new front had been established and the warm day was welcomed by the men while they busied themselves fortifying it. The 9th remained on the 'Black Line' until 15:30 in the afternoon when they were moved forward to relieve the 11th Irish Rifles on the 'Mauve Line'. German troops kept up fire on the Fusiliers until around midnight, but they were kept busy throughout the entire night strengthening the line. "Wiring and consolidation were proceeded with briskly during the darkness as present line is under enemy observation, he kept up continual shelling during the day". After dark that evening, the 9th was relieved by the 8th Duke of Wellington's Regiment and moved back with other battalions of the 108th to join the 107th and 109th already bivouacking in the rear on Kemmel Hill. Upon retirement, the 9th Fusiliers reported 3 O.R.s killed and 16 wounded. For the same period, the Division as a whole reported casualties of 61 officers and 1,058 other ranks killed and wounded, accounting for the strength of around one entire battalion. Different estimates consider losses in the original assault alone to have been around 700 men, tallying over 60% of the total figure for the four days on the front line. Other divisions, such as the Australians of 2 ANZAC, suffered much more severely, but it was universally considered that Allied troops had inflicted three times as many losses on their German counterparts as they had themselves suffered. For their part, the Ulster Division was proud to report having taken some 30 officers and 1200 other ranks prisoner, though they were unable to capture any guns in their sector before their withdrawal. The Germans retreated from the Oosttaverne Line on 11 June and fell back on their new line of defence, the Warneton Line, which effectively ended the battle. As a result of the German failure, their commander, General von Laffert, was relieved from his post by General Sixt von Armin for the alleged tactical error of placing his two reserve divisions too far to the rear to be of any immediate use when the British attacked. The Battle of Messines was seen as a huge success by the British and morale among the troops soared. The week long preparatory bombardment had meant there was no effect of surprise whatsoever, but it was not necessary. It had been a meticulously planned attack in strength, using military intelligence and the first real strategy seen on the battlefield since the outbreak of war. By 12 June, the new positions having been consolidated, the men of the Ulster Division could worry about other things for a while. The 9th Fusiliers remained in camp to rest and 160 men were able to enjoy a bath during the morning. The Division stayed in the area for a further month, each brigade taking their turn on the front and then in reserve again, where training was continued. "Training carried on as per programme. Major Brew J G left Railhead, Bailleul for Aldershot, there to join Senior Officers' Infantry Course. He was struck off strength today." John George was to remain there a full three months, but on 7 July, while he was on his way back to England, the rest of the Division was moved back to St. Omer where they enjoyed a well-earned 12 days rest and were able to bathe in the warmth of the Summer sun. As always, divisional sports were a highlight of breaks behind the lines, and on 23 July a gymkhana was held at Acquin. The following day, the Division was moved north to Wizernes and came under the command of 19th Corps of the 5th Army. By the end of July, they were positioned between Watou and Poperinge, in earnest preparation for their next battle, a supporting roll in the imminent Third Battle of Ypres, an attempt to win the northern half on the Ypres Salient. In France at the same time, following the failure of the French offensive at Champagne and it's horrendous losses, disgruntlement with leadership was mounting within French ranks which led to a wave of mutinies and desertions. Having emerged in the French 2nd Colonial Division in May, the contagious fervour soon affected 16 separate Corps. The barely 500 desertions of 1914 were eclipsed by over 21,000 in 1917. French troops maintained their willingness to defend their trenches but refused foolhardy attacks. They saw no sense in attacking impregnable enemy defences which in their eyes brought nothing but death and suffering. Although a change in French leadership was able to restore order, 23 soldiers were executed in its wake, and over 100 others deported to the colonies. French General Henri Pétain set about the difficult task of rebuilding confidence and strength, but by the end of the war, some 630 French soldiers had been sentenced to death for desertion. According to official French statistics, only 75 executions were actually carried out, but it is rumoured that many more were shot at and behind the front line in unofficial executions. Russia, too, had problems of her own attempting to counter the revolution which had broken out at home in March, and which was to culminate in her departure from the war in October. She had already ceased to be a major player and the situation had relieved Germany of much pressure on the Eastern Front. With the problems of disgruntlement among the French forces and bickering between French and British commanders over leadership, the Allied war effort had been severely weakened. Despite the strength of British forces - some 64 divisions - the British commanders were under heavy pressure as they realised they would have to carry the weight of the remainder of 1917's offensives. On 31 July, the opening day of the new Ypres offensive, sometimes referred to as "Passchendale", twelve divisions advanced along an 11 mile front, following almost ten days of intense artillery bombardment. Heavy rains began to fall that day and continued for many days into August. Aided by artillery barrages, the already muddy terrain was made impassable; advance against German pillboxes and wire was impossible. The Ypres Salient had already become synonymous with mud, blood and horror and this episode would be no different; many men sunk in the mire, drowned and disappeared, buried forever. Despite initial successes and land gains, hopes for a repeat of the quick success at Messines faded by the day. Infantry, tanks and artillery became bogged in the quagmire, and no substantial gains could be made. It was impossible to find justification for the extreme casualty figures. For their part, the Ulster Division went into battle in support of the 55th Lancaster Division's attack, initially carrying supplies and clearing casualties, then moving into the front line just two days later to relieve them. But their major roll was to be in a component of the Ypres campaign which has become known as the Battle of Langemark, which commenced on 16 August. Backed up the 5th Division, the 36th fought alongside the 16th Irish Division again as they had in Messines. On the Division's left flank was the 48th Division, while within Divisional lines, the 109th Brigade was on the left, the 108th on the right, and the 107th remained in reserve. The 9th Irish Fusiliers were positioned at Pommern Redoubt to the far right of the 108th Brigade lines. They advanced at 04:45 on a two company front, A and B followed by C and D, in the direction of Hill 35 with the 7th/8th Irish Fusiliers of the 16th Division on their right and the 13th Irish Rifles of their own Division on their left. Making excellent gains at first, in spite of the muddy conditions, considerable resistance was soon met. The German Artillery shortened it's range and C and D Companies suffered heavily. They struggled hard to take Hill 35 but found German wire mostly still in place and pill-boxes still operational. The advance was brought to a halt and the German guns began to concentrate on them, causing heavy casualties. Their commanding officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Sommerville, was killed in action and the battalion was driven back. Other battalions of the Division made few gains despite their efforts. Many died in the German counter-barrage, which was followed up by a counter-attack with infantry and succeeded in pushing the British back to their starting line along the entire front. That night, both the 108th and 109th Brigades were relieved by the 107th, which had remained in reserve, and withdrawn by bus to Winnizeele. The following evening, on the night of 17/18 August, the 107th was relieved by a brigade of the 61st Division and the Ulster Division was completely withdrawn from the Ypres front. The suffering was great, and once again the Division reported massive casualties. The 9th Irish Fusiliers alone reported 36 killed in action, 323 wounded, 12 cases of shell-shock, 83 missing, and 2 missing believed killed - a total of 456 men. Between 2 and 18 August, in just over two weeks, the Division as a whole had lost 144 officers and 3441 other ranks killed, wounded, gassed, and missing, about the equivalent of three whole battalions. But since the beginning of June, the Division's casualties amounted to a massive 205 officers and 4510 other ranks, accounting for approximately one in three men! Hardly surprising, the losses seriously effected the troops' morale. After four days rest in Winnizeele, seriously under strength, the demoralised Division was sent by train back to the Somme, where memories were stirred of the great battle and the terrible defeat they had suffered there just over a year before. In the closing days of August, they detrained at Bapaume, a town which was still behind the lines at the time they had left, and took up position on the Hindenburg Line facing the town of Cambrai, to the north-east. Here, reinforcements joined the Ulstermen to bring them up to strength, though many of these were from mainland England; the "Ulster" in the Division's name was destined to slowly become an anachronism. Additionally, the 107th Brigade gained the 1st Battalion Royal Irish Fusiliers, while the 8th and 9th Battalions of the Royal Irish Rifles were amalgamated. Within the 108th Brigade, the 9th Royal Irish Fusiliers were bolstered by about 300 men of the now dismounted North Irish Horse, and the 11th and 13th Battalions of the Royal Irish Rifles were amalgamated, while two external battalions, the 7th Battalion Royal Irish Rifles and the 2nd Rifle Battalion, were amalgamated and posted to the 108th. Having been on a senior officers training course for several months, John George Brew was fortunate enough to have missed the third Ypres campaign at Langemark. He returned to duty with the Ulster Division on 3 October and assumed 2nd in command of the 9th Royal Irish Fusiliers. By this time, preparations were well under way for the next offensive, at Cambrai. The Germans were still occupied on the Ypres Salient and would not be expecting any assault by the Allied forces before Winter. The strategists were gambling on this assumption to stage a surprise attack on the town. Part of the plan would be the first major tank attack in strength, which was to be followed by an immediate infantry assault. The aim was to overwhelm the enemy before he knew what was happening, with the intent of clearing the German Army from the entire Cambrai area. The 36th Division's goal would be to take the German trenches between the Bapaume-Cambrai road and the Canal du Nord. This would be the responsibility of the 109th Brigade while both 107th and 108th would remain in reserve for follow-up and mopping up in another part of the battle. However, the German trenches on this front were different to those which the Ulstermen had encountered on the Somme and in Ypres. These were a part of the Hindenburg Line, to where the German Army had voluntarily fallen back during the previous March. They had been built at their own leisure with the aide of the forced labour of thousands of Russian Prisoners of War. Consisting of two great lines of wide, deep and solidly built trenches with deep dugouts, well fortified with pillboxes and several lines of wire, they presented a formidable obstacle. Behind the front, British troops made practice attacks on dummy trenches built to resemble those which they would be assaulting, as they had done in preparation for the attack at Messines in June. Field Marshal Haig felt it was essential they knew what they were facing and, in the event their officers should fall, that his troops should know exactly what to do and how to carry on alone to achieve their objectives. Practice runs and briefings were repeated daily until all knew what was expected of them. Fortunately, the weather was good, and preparations were able to continue at high speed. Morning mists worked also to their advantage as many preparations could be undertaken in the proximity of the front line which might otherwise have been impossible. Roads were cleared, supply routes built, and the necessary equipment brought to the front and camouflaged. Tanks were brought forward and hidden in the forests; their tracks over open country, which would be visible to German reconnaissance aircraft under normal circumstances, were also well hidden by the fog. In the first two weeks of the month, the Division provided parties of between 200 - 600 soldiers each day for unloading ammunition from supply trains at Ytres Station. During this time, John George Brew took over temporary command of the 9th Fusiliers while the commanding officer, Lieutenant-Colonel P. E. Kelly, took two weeks leave. Nightly bombardment of German positions and supply roads was carried out to harass them and raids were made on their lines to check defences and gain intelligence information. One such raid, on the evening of 3 November, consisted of three parties from the 9th Irish Fusiliers, totalling together four officers and 67 other ranks. They made a large raid on German trenches to the south of the Hermies-Havrincourt road and east of the Canal du Nord. Passing through gaps in German wire, they stormed enemy positions and killed some 40 men, but with the loss to themselves of one killed, three missing believed killed, and 15 wounded. On 18 November, the 9th Irish Fusiliers moved from Bertincourt back to Barastre, some 8 miles behind the front line where they spent the night with the rest of the 108th Brigade and paraded for a final inspection by the Commanding Officer the following morning. That afternoon, the eve of the offensive, they moved forward again at 16:30 to their start positions in Vélu Wood. Next morning, under the cover of morning mist and without the customary artillery barrage announcing the beginning of an attack, 381 British tanks raced forward on a six mile front with supporting infantry. The surprise was complete as the Germans were quite obviously used to the habitual several days' advance warning by the artillery. "The Division (109th Brigade) moved to the attack at 6.20am, 107th and 108th Bdes. in support. Battalion "details" remain in Velu Wood under command of Major J.G. Brew." As no tanks had been allotted to the Division's sector, and as no artillery was allowed prior to the attack, the job of the 109th was actually made that much more difficult. Machine Gunners were to move up with heavy Vickers machine guns and spray fire down the wide Hindenburg trenches, allowing accompanying troops to move up unhindered. The 9th Fusiliers remained in reserve during the morning but moved forward to a position 500 yards north-east of Vélu Wood two hours after the assault began. The effect of surprise was, for all intents and purposes, a magnificent success; enemy wire, which would have stopped or slowed infantry, was flattened by the tanks. The infantry followed the tanks through and completed the 'mop-up' work, a time consuming and dangerous job as many Germans still hid in bunkers up to 30 feet below the surface. But, by the end of the first day, 5 miles had been gained, accounting for more than had been achieved in months of fighting in either the First Battle of the Somme or the Third Battle of Ypres. All three main lines of German trenches had been overrun, and the tanks were advancing into open country. Hundreds of Germans, stunned by the speed of the advance, were swiftly taken prisoner and herded back behind British lines. The 109th attack also went well. Their first objectives were taken with relative ease. Many Germans were killed by machine-gun fire and 70 prisoners of the 20th Landwehr Division were taken, along with two machine guns. The advance continued down communication trenches, and guards were left behind by advancing battalions at the entrance to underground bunkers to await supporting troops who would complete their clearing, referred to as 'mopping up'. Once cleared of enemy troops, a dugout would be posted with a large sign clearly stating "MOPPED". The Brigade's first objective was reached a few minutes behind schedule, around 09:30, and soon began on stage two. With a hard push, the Brigade drove the enemy before them, and despite some at times strong resistance, the remainder of the German troops in their sector fled across the Canal. The 11th Inniskillings crossed the Cambrai-Bapaume road at around 15:30 that afternoon, and settled down to consolidate their position, having attained their set objective. By the end of the day, the 109th had managed to take 509 prisoners and, to their great pleasure, also captured a German stores depot. The 9th Irish Fusiliers, meanwhile, had moved forward at 13:30 in the afternoon to Broken Bridge and Yorkshire Bank, where they found overnight shelter in dugouts from the heavy rain which had begun to fall. Next day, the advance continued, and the 109th managed to reach the outskirts of Moeuvres. The Irish Fusiliers followed the 109th forward with the 108th's other three battalions, all the while remaining behind the advance which was continuing north of the Cambrai-Bapaume road. The Fusiliers reached old German lines near Lock 7, where they spent the night in dugouts recently occupied by German troops. The Brigade was up early the following morning, 22 November, and set out at 06:30 for a position north of the Bapaume-Cambrai road. They arrived an hour later and prepared to relieve the 109th. At last they were to see some action. The Irish Fusiliers were planned for deployment in the attack on the village of Inchy, but it relied entirely on the success of the 12th Irish Rifles' attack on Moeuvres. The Fusiliers had to wait therefore in reserve for the order to finally begin their attack. But by late afternoon it had become clear that the attack by the 12th Rifles had failed to decisively take the village; they had fought their way into it, but had been pushed back out again by a German counter-attack shortly before 18:00. Realising the gravity of the situation, the order was given that the 9th Fusiliers should disregard their previous objective and move forward to support them. At 20:30 they counter-attacked on the retaken village but they, too, failed and were forced to retire to their start trenches where they spent a cold, wet, and uneasy night. It was soon clear the Germans had recovered from their original shock and had begun to organise counter measures. They changed their defensive position to the offensive and were counter-attacking in strength. The Allied advance was slowed and in some places stopped completely. Allied tank crews and their accompanying troops had begun to tire and the assault's fatal flaw suddenly became apparent; British strategists had failed to plan for reserves. The advantage could not capitalised upon and the new line could not be held. Now it was too late. By the time it was realised, it was impossible to bring reserves up fast enough to repel German attacks and consolidate on gains. The initiative fell to German commanders who only too happily exploited the opportunity. At 10:30 next morning, with the support of the 2nd Irish Rifles, the 9th Irish Fusiliers and 12th Irish Rifles attacked Moeuvres anew, this time succeeding in taking most of the village. The joy was, however, extremely short lived as German troops counter-attacked again just before midday from trenches east of the village, and aggressive fighting continued throughout the afternoon. Although the attack was beaten back, the men were tiring, and, receiving no relief from further reinforcements, the battalions were forced to evacuate Moeuvres, and leave it to the Germans; by 17:00, they were once again back in their start trenches to the south-west of the town. That evening, the 9th Fusiliers reported one officer killed, six officers wounded and 82 casualties in the other ranks for the previous 48 hour s. At dawn they were relieved by the 11th Inniskilling Fusiliers of the 109th Brigade, who had spent the previous day in reserve, and were withdrawn to Hermies, about four miles to the south, where they spent the following day resting. Snow had begun to fall and winds had risen making it very unpleasant to be out in, but in the evening the men were moved again a short distance, to Beaumetz-les-Cambrai, where they spent an extremely cold night in tents. The next day, they were moved six miles southwards, through Vélu and Bertincourt to Rocquigny, where they remained the next 48 hours. While there, many took the opportunity to bathe at last and take issue of a clean change of uniform, while others refitted and replaced damaged or lost equipment. Two days later, the Ulster Division was entrained at 20:30 at nearby Ytres, for Beaumetz-lés-Loges, south-west of Arras, for some rest. They arrived at 02:45 on 30 November and marched some 30 minutes to billets at Simencourt. They had barely arrived, when, later that same day, news came through of an massive German counter-attack at Cambrai. The Germans had used the same strategy as the British had just used on them and attacked without advance warning by artillery barrage, overrunning the British before they realised what had happened. The German commanders had the added advantage of having reinforcements which had literally just arrived from the now defunct Eastern Front and were sent straight to the front; the British still had none. The Ulster Division, though weary, were immediately recalled to the front. Leaving Simencourt the same day at 14:30, the Division had to march back to Cambrai, there being no trains available to carry them. On 3 December the 108th Brigade was placed under the command of the 61st Division and deployed in the Couillet valley the following day where they relieved the 88th Brigade. The following night, the 109th was moved forward and relieved 61st Division troops holding the front at Welsh Ridge. The Germans had already made enormous gains, taken thousands of British prisoners and hundreds of guns; bodies were lying everywhere along the front. Attack and repulse followed counter-attack and retreat for several days, but eventually the 109th drove the Germans off the ridge. From 9-12 December, the 9th Fusiliers remained behind the front in support of the rest of 108th Brigade, and spent much of their time carrying wire to the front. At dusk on 12 December, the Fusiliers relieved the 2nd Irish Rifles on the front line on a three company front, with 'D' Company in support. In their sector in the valley, the 108th had less difficulty holding the line than the 109th. It seemed the German troops in the area merely wished to consolidate their position and re-establish posts in the sunken road there. Early on the morning of 13 December, however, the Battalion received information that they should expect an attack on their lines at 06:30. Already at 04:30 they captured a prisoner from the German 6th Battalion Reserve Infantry Regiment, then stood to at 05:30 in advance of the expected assault, which never arrived. Within a short time, further advance on either side had failed, the battle degenerated into a war of attrition. Aggressive German shelling continued on British rear areas both day and night, and German aeroplanes often strafed British trenches, causing many casualties in the Division. Casualties of war were indeed high, but the poor weather and the effects of three weeks exposure to the elements had also taken a great toll on the men. Their physical condition had become extremely poor. Not surprisingly, many had fallen ill and required extensive medical treatment. They were cold, wet, dirty and tired. General Nugent expressed his concerns to his Commanders, aided by a strongly worded medical report from the RAMC demanding some much needed rest for the Division. Finally, from 14-16 December, during heavy snowfall, the utterly exhausted men withdrew in stages, relieved by battalions and brigades of other divisions. As they retired on 16 October, the 9th Irish Fusiliers spited the Germans with a last quick kick in the shins. At 17:00 they stormed a machine-gun post of the German 6th Reserve Infantry Regiment with mills bombs, bayoneted the gunner, drove the others into retreat, and captured the machine gun. At 21:00 they were finally able to retire when they were relived by the 7th Royal Fusiliers, and marched to Metz-le-Coutre in the rear. Despite the final loss of the campaign, through one main flaw - lack of follow-up, the Allied Generals had gained valuable experience and learnt important lessons for future assaults. Assault without artillery had found new approval, and, snubbing sceptics, the tank had at last proved it's worthiness. After a night in Metz, the Fusiliers were moved to Etricourt, where they were billeted in tents. On 18 December they were entrained at Etricourt for Mondicourt, but owing to heavy snow, the train did not arrive until midnight. Detraining was followed by a march through deep snow to billets in the village of Coullemont. Several days were spent in the area, and the men were kept busy clearing roads of snow, cleaning up, bathing and parading for inspections. Staunch Protestants, the spiritual well-being of the Ulstermen was as important to them as their physical well-being, and on Sunday morning, 23 December, they attended a church service held in the village of Humbercourt. Two days later, Christmas Day 1917, the men attended a divine service at 10:30, followed by company Christmas dinners that afternoon, each of which was visited by the Commanding Officer to say a few words. For many of the men, this was their third Christmas in France, and, although they were able to enjoy a peaceful Christmas away from the front, all hoped and prayed they would be home for the next one. After the short pause for Christmas, the men were moved by rail from Coullemont to Boves, south-east of Amiens, and spent the final days of the year hard at work clearing snow, sandbagging, route-marching and parading, an agenda which also included kit inspections and musketry instruction and practice. The high hopes which began the year had bogged down in the mud of Belgium and France, additionally complicated by Russian and French internal problems. The problems in Russia were not to be underestimated; they undermined Allied morale and almost led them to the brink of defeat. Germany used Russia's weakness on the Eastern Front to her advantage and surged forward, driving Russian troops from their strongholds. Following a further putsch by the Bolsheviks in October 1917, when Lenin took power, Russia sued for peace and pulled out of the war, thus freeing German troops to strengthen their Western Front. The second half of the year had seen limited gains by the French at Verdun and Chemin des Dames, and besides the success of Messines and the initial blow against the Germans in the ill-prepared Cambrai tank attack, there was not much to speak of in the way of Allied accomplishment or clear-cut victory in Europe that year to justify the excessive casualty figures; the 1917 Arras, Ypres and Cambrai campaigns alone had cost the British some 420,000 casualties. The war was at a stalemate and no-one knew how much longer it would continue. Britain had now been at war for over 3 years. The troops were tired. They were sick of the mud and wet feet, and fed up with the monotony of rations and life in the trenches. But in typical British fashion, soldiers poked fun at the things which irked them. One man wrote a rhyme for the "B.E.F. Times", "Sing a song of Christmas! Pockets full of slush, Four and twenty P.B.I. A dixey full of "mush", When that dixey opened The Tommie's said "Oh my! It's beef today by way of change" And they began to cry." Everyone held out hopes that the new year would finally see the end of it all. But for Allied commanders and strategists at this time, there was still a major and very serious reason for concern. Since October 1917, the number of Allied infantry divisions on the Western Front had not increased. On the contrary, it had fallen by seven, while the existing Divisions were on average 2000 men under normal strength. All the while, German troop numbers had steadily increased, nourished by train-loads arriving from the now defunct Russian front. Allied commanders were justifiably becoming increasingly worried as they realised the Allied advantage in numbers was dwindling by the day. Between the end of October and the end of December, the number of German divisions on the front had risen by over 20 and more were on their way. For the Allies, large numbers of American troops were still months off, and by early 1918, it had become quite apparent that the Germans now held the upper hand. The first six days of the new year were spent by the 9th Irish Fusiliers in Boves undergoing training, but on 7 January they were on the move again. A 14km march that day, along a snow-covered route to Marcelcave, was followed on ensuing days by an 11km march to Rosières, north-west of Roye, and a 15km march to Carrépuis, east of Roye, where they arrived on 11 January. Two days later they marched a further 20km to Villeselve, south-west of St. Quentin, where the Division's 107th and 109th Brigades immediately moved forward to relieve the French 6th Division, while the 108th remained in reserve. During these movements, Divisional Headquarters was established in Nesle, but was promptly relocated to Ollézy on 14 January. A final move of 13km northwards from Villeselve to Seraucourt-le-Grand (Grand Seraucourt) on 17 January positioned the 9th Irish Fusiliers just a short distance from the front. The length of the British front line had just been extended further south, and troops of the 107th and 109th Brigades were now occupying trenches recently held by French troops around the southern side of St. Quentin. The trenches in the Division's responsibility ran the length of some 6000 yards, between Sphinx Wood and the St. Quentin-Roisel railway line. Meanwhile, troops of the 108th Brigade were billeted in villages along the St. Quentin-Ham road, and Brigade Headquarters were set up just east of Ham in Dury. The 9th Irish Fusiliers' strength in the third week of January is recorded as being 39 officers, 866 other ranks, 39 horses and 16 mules. The Germans realised the French and been relieved and soon sent several raiding parties into the Division's lines to find out by whom. They succeeded in taking several prisoners of the 107th and 109th Brigades during the night of 22 January and obtained the answer. However, besides these small incidents, life seemed very quiet in the sector, one of the most easterly reaches of the Allied Somme front. Besides their main occupation during the latter half of January of digging trenches and improving existing ones, there was also time left for more enjoyable pastimes. The 9th Irish Fusiliers' War Diary gives us a clue: "2 p.m. Beat 16 R.Ir.R. at football, 5 goals to 1." The Ulster Division also took the opportunity to reorganise and bring in reinforcements to replace the devastating losses which Cambrai had inflicted. The 107th Brigade now consisted of the 1st, 2nd, and 15th Royal Irish Rifles, the 108th consisted of the 12th Royal Irish Rifles and 1st and 9th Royal Irish Fusiliers, and the 109th became the 1st, 2nd, and 9th Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers. With it's usual touch of tongue-in-cheek sarcasm, the editorial of the January 1918 edition of the "B.E.F. Times" gives us an impression of the sentiments of the average British soldier as the new year dawned. For the first time, it offered the encouraging expectation that 1918 would, at last, be the final year of the war - actually quite a pretentious prognosis for the situation the British Armies were now in. 1918 'Seconds out of the Ring. Last round coming up.' ....Up to now the luck has generally been with the Huns, but it looks as if we are going to leave them in the New Year. Anyway, we strongly advise Mr. Lloyd George and Sir Douglas Haig to get up and walk round their chairs three times. The sight of Winter's mantle always makes us feel poetic, but the thought of the future when the damned stuff melts restrains any rhapsodies on the subject. We have heard so many tales from the Hun about what he's going to do to us now that he has fixed Russia, that it makes us think he is trying to forget what WE are going to do to HIM. It is still our firm opinion that any Hun could be bought for a tin of bully and a slice of bread. Anyway, we feel inclined to get mixed up with the prophets Elijah, John the Baptist and Horatio Bottomly, and prophecy the general bust up of the Hun and no very remote date, say September next, provided all pull their weight. This proviso is necessary, and does not apply only to those not in khaki. So, here's to 1918, a speedy finish and a job well done. Here's the best of luck to you all in the New Year, and a quiet thought and salutation to the memory of those stout lads who left us in the old." Quite prophetic indeed, but far too early to start celebrating; much was to occur between the new year and the end, when it finally came. By the end of January, the 9th Irish Fusiliers had taken up position on the right sector of the Division's front line, where they had relieved the 14th Irish Rifles, and found the trenches in a poor state, having fallen in, in some places. Their War Diary notes that wire was plentiful and that the average distance between their trench and the German front line averaged 1000 yards. There was no lack of activity during their spell in the line; the men were sometimes bombed by enemy aircraft during the night, or came under artillery fire during the day. "5.30 a.m. German shot about 50 yds. in front of "A" Coy. He belongs to 5th Grenadier Regt. 36th Div. 2 - 4 p.m. Bn. and Coy. Headquarters. were fired on with 105mms." Maj. John George Brew once again took temporary command of the Battalion during the latter half of January, while Lieut.-Colonel Kelly took leave. John George took responsibility for the Battalion War Diary for January, and undersigned it at the end of the month. But this time, the mood among British troops had begun to become unsettled, as, like during the still before a storm, they were wary that something was brewing. During the first 10 days of February there was a marked increase of German artillery activity. British lines were suffering regular barrages and, on 11 February, John George Brew moved Battalion Headquarters to a new position. All too soon it would become apparent that their concerns were not unwarranted. On the British side of the front line, it was clear to the troops that they were now on a defensive footing. New reports of fresh German troops arriving on the Western Front were circulated almost daily and troops uneasily awaited the inevitable German offensive which they knew must arrive soon. From the 9th Irish Fusiliers' War Diary, it is clear that enemy activity of all types had massively increased. Artillery barrages of various sorts of ammunition soon became a daily occurrence, as was sniping and bombing from German aircraft. Following the disbanding of the 7th/8th Irish Rifles, the 9th Irish Fusiliers received a draft of 9 officers and 213 other ranks on 16 February to bolster their numbers. Battalion strength now stood at 46 officers and 1066 other ranks. Upon Lieut.-Colonel Kelly's return from leave on 19 February, Major Brew went to a 3 day conference hosted by the Corps Commander, General Sir Ivor Maxse. Though having her own problems of war-weariness at home, German morale had steadily grown with the unexpected Russian collapse and confidence took on new heights as troop strength increased in France. By March 1918, the number of German divisions on the Western Front had swelled to around 190, some 60 more than a year before, and continued to grow. The Allied armies were now becoming dangerously outnumbered and buoyed by this fact, General Ludendorff began to promise victory, but knew he would have to act fast with his new-found strength before the arrival of great numbers of American troops. Indeed, some 184,000 American troops were already in France by the end of January, and more were on there way. It was a great risk, certainly a race against time, and Ludendorff's strategists were planning an offensive of immense proportions. Optimising Allied weaknesses, Ludendorff opted for a section of the front between Arras and St. Quentin, with the intention of dividing the Allied armies and forcing the British back to the Channel coast. His first and main strike, on the Somme, was code-named 'Michael', for which 74 Divisions, 6600 artillery pieces, 3500 mortars and 326 fighter aircraft would be deployed. Subsequent diversionary attacks, planned to confuse his enemy, were called 'St. George I' and 'St. George II' , against the British at Lys at Ypres respectively, and 'Blücher' against the French at Champagne. This far reaching plan was much greater than Allied commanders ever envisaged. In the St. Quentin sector, the German 18th Army, under General Oskar von Hutier, fresh from the Eastern Front, planned it's attack on each side of St. Quentin, aiming to sever British lines and divide the British and French armies. Von Hutier's Army, headquartered at Guise, boasted 27 Divisions. To gain an impression of what this means, it is necessary to know that the average strength of a German Division in 1918 stood at 12,300 men, 3000 horses, 48 artillery pieces, 120 mortars, 78 heavy machine guns, 144 light machine guns, and 6-12 trucks. The British Fifth Army commander, General Sir Hubert Gough, on the other hand, had at his disposal 12 Divisions, 1650 guns, and 119 tanks, and 357 aircraft. An average British division in 1918 consisted of 11,800 men, 3670 horses and mules, 48 artillery pieces, 36 mortars, 64 Vickers heavy machine guns, 144 Lewis light machine guns, 770 carts and wagons, 360 motorcycles and bicycles, 14 trucks and cars, and 21 motorised ambulances. From 22 February onwards, the Ulster Division changed strategy and maintained a three brigade front, with the 108th on the right, the 107th in the centre, and 109th on the left. Each brigade kept one battalion on the front line in the forward zone, the second in support in the battle zone, some 6000 yards behind the front and protected by wired redoubts, and the third in reserve in the rear zone. According to records in the 9th Irish Fusiliers War Diary, this system was continued until the onset of the German offensive. At 17:30 on 1 March 1918, for the purpose of illustration, the 9th Irish Fusiliers moved out of Essigny Station to relieve their colleagues of the 1st Irish Fusiliers, and spent the next several days working on defences in the battle zone. Their effective strength at the time was reported as 46 Officers, 1083 O.R.s, 36 horses, and 16 mules. After a number of days at the front, they moved back into reserve again, relieved by the 1st Fusiliers. At 18:00 on 7 March, the battalion relieved the 1st Irish Fusiliers on the front line once again, and found themselves positioned with the 2nd Royal Irish Rifles of the 107th Brigade to their left, and the 8th King's Royal Rifles to their right. The main work of the Division throughout this period was improving defences, though some raiding was carried out to gauge the situation on the other side of No Man's Land. At 15:00 on 9 March, for example, 2nd Lieutenant W.G. Greenaway and 3 other ranks captured an enemy machine gun without opposition. Over the following days, the activities of the 9th Fusiliers were described as being, "Patrolling and mining nightly. Our artillery lively cutting enemy wire and sweeping likely places of assembly for enemy attack. Enemy artillery unusually quiet. Great aerial activity owing to fine weather and visibility. One E.A. [Enemy Aeroplane] brought down on enemy line opposite left battalion front." On the evening of 15 March, after 18:30, the 9th Fusiliers were relieved on the line by the 12th Irish Rifles, and moved back to Grand Seraucourt again, in reserve. Still concerned about discipline and orderliness, the Battalion commander's orders for the change-over demanded, "All dugouts will be left in a clean and sanitary condition and certificates to this effect will be obtained and forwarded to Battalion H.Q. by 12 noon, 16th. inst." By now, it had become clear the expected enemy offensive was imminent; Allied aircraft had successfully photographed German preparations behind their lines. New supply roads had been constructed and shell craters had been turned into concealed trench mortar batteries. Heavily laden motorised and horse-drawn transports had been seen heading into St. Quentin from the east, and in the distance German officers were observed studying British lines. The British answer was increased nightly bombardment of the German front lines, rear areas, and possible areas of troop assembly. On Sunday, 17 March, the Division celebrated St. Patrick's Day with a Church Parade in the morning and sports in the evening. The 9th Fusiliers' effective strength was recorded that day as 45 Officers, 1058 O.R.s, 37 horses and 18 mules. From that evening on, noise of traffic from behind German lines was heard quite clearly by British troops in the forward trenches. The following evening, two German deserters from Alsace, belonging to the 414th 'Minenwerfer' Company, came over No Man's Land to give themselves up to troops of the 107th Brigade, declaring their motive as wanting to avoid the coming offensive. The two confirmed Allied assumptions that the offensive was nigh; troops were massing on their front as were batteries of artillery and trench mortars. They reported 100 mortars directly in front of 36th Division lines for the purpose of cutting their wire. It would be accompanied by an artillery bombardment, lasting several hours, as a preliminary to an infantry assault. A number of German prisoners had already been taken which had provided valuable information to this effect, but the two Alsatians' reports were considered the most reliable yet. The information was passed on to Corps Headquarters and the Division scaled up their preparations for the offensive. The 9th Irish Fusiliers' War Diary describes their activities from 18 to 20 March as being intensive training during daylight hours with specialist training in the evening. Just a few nights later, during the night of 20 March, troops of the 61st Division launched a raid on German positions and took more prisoners who gave up the vital fact that their offensive would be launched the following morning : The preparations for Ludendorff's Spring Offensive were by now in their final hours. The German Army had spread itself along a 43 mile front between Arras, St. Quentin and La Fère. The XVIII Corps under Generalleutnant von Werern, confronted the 36th Division and the left of the 14th Division, to the north-west of their positions, on the southern side of St. Quentin. Two reserve infantry divisions were deployed on the German 3rd and rear trench line, an additional two divisions on the 2nd line and three divisions on the front line, consisting of the following troops : 1st Bavarian Division 36th Division 238th Division 1st Bavarian Regt. (Munich) 2nd Bavarian Regt. (Munich) 24th Bavarian Regiment 5th East Prussia Regiment 128th Danzig Regiment 175th Prussia Regiment 463rd Hansa Towns Regt. 464th Schleswig Regiment 465th Hanover Regiment It is believed it was troops of the 238th Division's 463rd Hansa Towns Regiment which were facing the 108th Brigade trenches. The 238th Division was one of the youngest German Divisions having been raised and trained at Lockstedt, north of Hamburg, in early 1917. It was mostly made up of young men with birth years in 1898 and 1899, and some recovered wounded. The 238th had seen action already in a defensive roll in the Third Battle of Ypres, but the coming assault at St. Quentin would be their first offensive roll of the war. In his book, "The Kaiser's Battle", Martin Middlebrook quotes many German soldiers' accounts and feelings during the lead-up to the battle. Despite overwhelming odds in their favour, it shows they still had reservations which were perhaps because of their lack of experience. One Leutnant Rudolf Hoffmann of the 463rd Hansa Towns Regiment, for example, commenting on the eve of the offensive, explained, "Most of the men were very quiet, some made a few jokes. One, I remember, took out a letter and a photograph of his wife and looked at it. He didn't say anything; they were all thinking of home. Possibly half of the men went to a quiet part of the trench and said their prayers. I too." The British reacted upon the information gained from the 61st's prisoners as soon as they could, but one could be forgiven for believing commanders had completely under-estimated what was awaiting them; their answer was merely to bombard German lines and likely areas of assembly for attack between 02:30 and 03:00. Before they could react, however, the Germans had already begun their own barrage. "02:00, Intensive enemy barrage opened on our positions for a depth of from 4-6 Kilometres." The great offensive had arrived. The organisation of the Division along the front line had remained the same since the 22 February : The 108th Brigade on the right, the 107th in the centre, and the 109th on the left. The attack found the 12th Irish Rifles holding the 108th Brigade front line, followed by the 1st Irish Fusiliers in the trenches of the battle zone, and finally the 9th Irish Fusiliers in reserve. In the 107th's sector, the front was held by the 15th Irish Rifles, with the 1st Irish Rifles in the battle zone, and the 2nd Irish Rifles in reserve. In the 109th's sector, the front was held by the 2nd Inniskillings, the battle zone by the 1st Inniskillings in, and the 9th Inniskillings stayed in reserve. At 04:35, a heavy German barrage opened up simultaneously on British front and rear positions with every weapon available to them. Trench mortars, mustard gas, chlorine gas, tear gas and smoke canisters were concentrated on the forward trenches, while heavy artillery bombarded rear areas and attempted to dispose of Allied artillery pieces and destroy supply lines. Troops, horses, transport and guns suffered heavily. It has been said that this was "one of the most furious and concentrated bombardments" of the entire war; few have matched it since. Dawn broke to reveal a heavy morning mist. It has been recorded that by 05:00 visibility was barely 10 yards, and was extremely slow to dissipate throughout the morning. British communications were soon in shambles; telephone wires had been cut by artillery, and runners had a difficult time finding their way through the dense fog and heavy shelling. Their was much pandemonium and confusion. Forward positions could not relay or receive information to Battalion and Divisional Headquarters and communication with the artillery was cut. "At 6:00am enemy attacked. Bn. moved to Bde. H.Q. just east of village. 2Lt. Prenter and 4 ORs killed. 2Lt. Perkins and 16 Platoon missing. Part of 2 Platoons of A. Coy. missing." German troops advanced en-mass in gas masks behind a creeping barrage, using the fog as cover, and led by divisional 'storm troops' with heavy machine guns. Later reports place the time of infantry attack at 08:30, and the main thrust to the west of the Ulster Division, but confusion is hardly surprising under the circumstances. The Division was overwhelmed by the onslaught of German Infantry and recoiled under the might of the massive push. Along with all other British troops on the front, they were driven back faster than they believed possible. As the day progressed, breakthroughs of successive lines of British trenches were reported continuously. The push was gaining momentum and German troops were moving faster than British Artillery could reel in their range. Many barrages landed uselessly behind the unremitting advance. Around midday, a major breakthrough in the 14th Division's lines, to the right of the 36th's sector, meant that German troops were already in the battle zone. This became an immediate and dangerous threat to the 36th. Before long, German troops were in Essigny, and beating on the 108th Brigade's right flank. The 1st Irish Fusiliers turned to meet them and the 9th Irish Fusiliers were sent in to defend the exposed flank but by 14:30, German troops were already 1½ miles south of Essigny. The entire forward zone had by now been captured and the enormity of the German attack began to become quite clear. General Gough, however, was still having problems convincing his own commanders of the gravity of the situation. Meanwhile, the 108th's 12th Irish Rifles, despite all that was thrown against it, put up stubborn resistance and held on longer than almost any other British unit, despite several direct attacks on their trenches, which at times involved bitter hand-to-hand fighting and attacks with flame throwers. Each time, the Germans were ejected from the 12th Rifles' trenches. But then, soon after midday, the fog lifted and revealed to their horror the extent of the breakthrough - German soldiers could be seen a mile behind them! By this time the Rifles were being attacked from the front and both flanks; they were virtually surrounded, and quite clearly outnumbered. They decided the best course of action was to retreat, but by 16:00, the situation had become so hopeless that they realised their only option was surrender. Some 100 men, many of whom were wounded, destroyed their rifles and gave themselves up to avoid senseless slaughter. In the confusion of the battle, no-one was aware of their gallant stand, and it is difficult to gauge the effectiveness of their delaying action, but, following the war, the unit was awarded two DCMs, one MC, and four MMs for the episode. Meanwhile, the rest of the 108th Brigade was ordered to form a defensive flank half way between Essigny and Lizerolles, and the 9th Inniskillings of the 109th formed up behind the 9th Irish Fusiliers' positions in support, where the front remained steady until dusk. The oncoming darkness gave the Germans the opportunity to bring up reinforcements, which began assembling for the next onslaught. During this, the fighting continued elsewhere; 17:30 the positions held by the remnants of the 15th Rifles' (107th Brigade) and 2nd Inniskillings' (109th Brigade) were surrendered and captured, following the earlier fall of the 108th's 12th Rifles around 16:00. That evening, both the 9th and 1st Irish Fusiliers fell back to between Artemps and Tugny-et-Pont, until they were ordered to withdraw further around 22:30. They moved a short distance north-west to Happencourt, while General Nugent moved Divisional Headquarters to Estouilly, just north-east of Ham. As they retreated across bridges over the Canal de la Somme, they were blown up by the Division's Engineers and the Ulstermen spent the night behind the fragile interim barrier. "Serious losses had been sustained. In addition to losing three battalions of the Forward Zone, the three battalions in the Battle Zone were reduced to 250 men each; only the three reserve battalions were at reasonable strength. The fighting strength of the division now numbered less than 3000 men." In post war analysis, it has been calculated that 2392 men of the Ulster Division had been taken prisoner alone on the first day of battle. As for the roll of the Royal Flying Corps, the morning fog had delayed the effective use of aircraft but, by the end of the day, 36 squadrons had been in action and reported losing 16 aircraft and crew, while having shot down 14 enemy. The Germans for their part reported respectively 19 and 8. The following day was spent in aggressive fighting across the Canal. The Germans brought heavy artillery into Artemps under the cover of morning mist which duly forced the remaining battalions of the 109th to retreat to join the 108th at Happencourt. General Nugent's commanders decided to form a new line of defence on the south of the Canal de St. Quentin, requiring the Division to withdraw to Sommette, which it did by escaping over the Canal at Dury. It has been said, however, that the decision to withdraw during daylight over a distance of almost 9 miles, requiring severe fighting and losses, was actually the result of a misunderstanding between Generals Gough and Maxse. It would be later seen in analysis as a foolhardy and unnecessary surrender of a vital position. The 107th took up new positions in Eucourt and Cugny, the 109th behind them in support in Brouchy, while the 1st and 9th Irish Fusiliers of the 108th took up positions on the Division's left flank on the Canal's bank. The move was completed by 23:00 and the 36th, with newly attached remnants of other divisions, held a line of about 5 miles length between 1 mile west of Sommette and 1½ miles north-west of Jussy, where they were rejoined by their Divisional Artillery which had been in action with the 20th Division during the day. Divisional Headquarters was also relocated to Fréniches, several miles to the south-west. The Engineers arrived in late, having been busy blowing all the bridges across the Canal between Ham and Ollézy, although it would soon be revealed that the railway bridge at Pithon had failed to be destroyed; the minor damage done by French Railway Troops was hastily repaired by troops of the German No.3 Foot Guard Regiment, and the Germans were soon crossing in great numbers. Early next morning, Saturday 23 March, German troops succeeded in forcing a breakthrough of the line in the 14th Division's sector on the Canal at Jussy, opening the way south, and the leak could not be plugged. German troops surged south, having crossed the Canal at many points already by 11:15, and the British were soon in full retreat again. All lines of defence had now been overcome. There was nothing left to stop the German advance and bitter fighting over open country ensued. There was little rest for British troops; those who were not fighting were beating a retreat. The 16th Irish Rifles were put under the command of the 9th Irish Fusiliers and spent the entire day in action. In the evening, they retreated from a German push on the left flank and spent a relatively quiet night at a farm house outside Villeselve. During that day, along the Division's front, Aubigny, Brouchy, Cugny and Eaucourt had been lost. In the early hours of 24 March, before dawn, German troops entered Golancourt, just north-west of Villeselve, foiling a planned counter-offensive by the 109th before it was launched. The Brigade's attack was cancelled and the troops remained in their defensive positions. The front at this time ran roughly between Cugny and the south of Golancourt. Fierce fighting continued through the morning along the entire front and at 11:00 the remnants of the Division were ordered to withdraw further south to the town of Guiscard. Gaps in the front created by the staggered withdrawal were utilised by advancing Germans and the Division's sector of the line collapsed. Being attacked now from both the north-east and north-west, they fell back into Villeselve, but were heavily bombed by German Artillery from around 12:00. British troops, backed up by French infantry attempted to hold the line here, but when the French received their own orders to retreat, the British had no choice but to go with them, and fell back through Berlancourt to Guiscard. During the move, German Artillery levelled barrages on both of these towns. At 23:00, the Division's remaining troops were placed under the command of the French 62nd Division, and ordered to retreat, filtering back through their lines. The remains of the 9th Irish Fusiliers were left as rearguard on the ridge between Berlancourt and Guiscard during the night where Captain Partridge was killed and Captain Vasey wounded, while the rest of the Division retired to Sermaize and Frétoy-le-Château to get some rest. The movements of the 25 March were extremely confused and reports from different battalions and divisions contradict one another often. The remaining troops of the Ulster Division were ordered to withdraw and reorganise, maintaining a support for French troops now holding the front, and commenced a 15 mile march west. Around midday, they halted for a few hours rest near Avricourt. While there they received orders to head for a new line which would be formed between Bouchoir and Guerbigny. That day, the German Army picked up the pace of their advance and pressed forward at an alarming pace, covered many miles. Allied troops and civilians with laden carts and wagons filled the roads streaming south and west. The Germans passed through Libermont, and over the Canal du Nord. Further north, the town of Nesle was captured, while to the south west of Libermont German troops soon faced the French along the Noyon-Roye road. Most of the Ulster Division had arrived in their new lines around 02:00 on 26 March, and were able to sleep around six hours, the longest continuous sleep they had had since the beginning of the offensive began, some six days before. Within a few short hours, while they slept, German troops entered and occupied Roye. Meanwhile, the 9th Irish Fusiliers were a long way behind the rest of the Division, delayed by their action north of Guiscard the night before. Their retreat was a 30 mile continuous night march from Guiscard to Erches, their designated position at the centre of the new line, along the Guerbigny-Bouchoir road. They route-marched through Bussy to Avricourt, then on to Tilloloy, Popincourt, Grivillers, Marquivillers, and finally via Guerbigny to Erches, where they arrived, completely exhausted, around 11:00 on 26 March. German troops were never far behind. Having taken Roye during the early hours of the morning, they continued to advance on the Bouchoir-Guerbigny line. By mid-morning, they were in Andechy, just 3½ miles away, although advance parties were already making their first contact with the new defences and meeting resistance. The Ulstermen had established themselves along the line in Brigade order, from left to right, the 107th, the 108th and the 109th, having occupied the remains of old French trenches from 1916. With additional support from the 30th Division in Bouchoir and the 122nd Field Company, the 36th's Lewis Guns formed a formidable barrier which succeeded in holding back repeated German attacks. Gradually, German troops began to reach the line in greater strength and by 13:00, a great battle was in progress. In the 9th Irish Fusiliers' lines, "Major BREW & details went into line in front of ERCHES. Remainder of Bn. under Capt. Despard (M.C.) formed reserves W. of ERCHES." The Division put up excellent resistance and fought off many direct attacks. However, the Germans soon realised the Division had no artillery to support them, and it was only a matter of time before they brought forward their own; around dusk they commenced bombardment of Erches. It was followed by a concentrated infantry attack and by 20:00, German troops had forced their way into the town, severing the Ulster Division's line. Then, during the evening, a sudden and rash series of events brought John George Brew's war to an unexpected end. One account records the incident as follows: "During the action, a serious loss occurred when a motor car with the GSO1 of the divisional staff drove into a German patrol and its occupants were captured. They included Col. Place, the CO of the 1st Irish Fusiliers, Lt. Col. Furnell, and A/CO of 9th Irish Fusiliers Major Brew, all of whom were returning from a conference." While returning to his lines with other Officers after obtaining permission for a further retreat, he was driven directly into advancing German soldiers. A German bullet stopped the car's engine and the officers jumped out ready for a fight, but the Germans were upon them before they could react. A couple of them were wounded and the little group had no choice but to surrender. So it was to be here in Erches, on 26 March 1918, that Major John George Brew was to fight his final battle. The details surrounding the incident remained vague until a few years after the war, though several days later, the Battalion Casualty Report noted dryly, "Major BREW, J.G...Missing (Believed wounded) 26.3.18". It had been a costly retreat to Erches, both in land and lives. The haste of the withdrawal and the ferocity of the German attack had cost the 9th Irish Fusiliers officers ranks 2 killed in action, 6 wounded, 1missing believed wounded, accounting for John George Brew, and 14 missing. John George would appear to be the highest ranking casualty of the 9th Irish Fusiliers for the period. Of the Other Ranks, 15 were killed in action, 75 wounded, 1 wounded and missing, and 406 missing. How many of the Battalion's 420 missing were actually wounded or killed was at that time anyone's guess. For the remaining troops, it was to be a long night in the trenches under heavy bombardment by the German artillery. British lines of supply were broken and no ammunition, food or water reached the front. At dawn, the Germans attacked again. To the right of their section of the front, the French retreated. To save being trapped, the 109th Brigade moved back with them. The result was the immediate capture of Guerbigny, which posed an instant threat to the 108th Brigade isolated at Erches. The remnants of the 108th then bore the full brunt of the German attack, having failed to receive an order to withdraw. They battled on under incredulous odds until shortly after 11:00 by which time they were virtually annihilated and finally overrun. It has been said that only one officer and nineteen other ranks came away alive. The remainder of the 107th and 109th Brigades continued to fall back, but the last troops of the 15th Irish Rifles still held on until around midday, before withdrawing towards Arvillers, and meeting what was left of the 1st and 2nd Irish Rifles on the way. The three Battalions together numbered not more than half a company, and in Arvillers, these three officers and 60 men held the line until they were finally relieved by the French on the morning of 28 March. They were the last of the 36th Division to be removed from what was to become known as the "Battle of St. Quentin". "The exhausted remnants entrained for Europe via Gamache on the Channel coast. The Ulster Division, on arrival in France needed a fleet of trains to move them to the Somme area; now, only one was required to take them away. I doubt if the whole Division could produce more than the equivalent of a full battalion..." The 108th's ranks barely numbered 300 men following the battle, and the Division's casualties for the ten days following the offensive's opening day on 21 March stood at 7252, of which 185 officers and 5659 other ranks were reported as missing. Among the officers ranks, 127 were reported killed or wounded. By this time, despite less than satisfying results on his other fronts, Ludendorff's troops, advancing from the original front at St. Quentin, had penetrated some 40 miles deep into British lines and had reached Montdidier. Ludendorff claimed 80,000 Allied prisoners and the capture of 975 guns. Total British casualties in those few days stood at a staggering 300,000. He bathed in his success, but his over-optimism led him to miscalculate his and his enemy's next moves; he failed to adequately follow up and the Allied forces, bolstered by the arrival of 12 divisions of American troops, repelled his march to the Channel coast and brought it to a grinding halt. Although they did not fully realise it at the time, this was, at last, the turn of tide which the Allied armies had so long awaited. It was the beginning of the end; something for which they had prayed, but closer than they dared dream. Back in Portadown, late that month, John George's wife Annie's worst fears were realised when a telegram from the War Office arrived stating, "To Mrs. Brew Rathlin Portadown Regret inform you Major JG Brew Irish Fusiliers reported missing believed wounded twenty-six March no details". It would be another month before Annie would hear from the War Office again when she received a second telegram informing her, "Major J.G. Brew, Royal Irish Rifles, is now reported missing believed prisoner of war on March 26th". She tried to console herself with the fact that as a prisoner, John had probably survived the war. But on 25 May 1918, an unexpected letter shattered Annie's hopes; it brought crushing news. "The Military Secretary presents his compliments to Mrs. Brew and deeply regrets to inform her that in a casualty list sent from the Front by the German Military Authorities to the Frankfurt Red Cross, and which has been forwarded to the War Office, it is stated that Major J.G. Brew, 9/R. Irish Fusiliers, who was reported missing on the 26th March, 1918, died at 4.p.m. on 6/4/18 from shot wound lung. Buried at the southern outskirts of Hattencourt [sic] in a separate Grave No.64". John George's Army Service Record shows the report which was received from the German Red Cross in German. It was correctly and fully translated without error. The War Office followed up their May letter with another on 6 June confirming, "In view of this report the Army Council are regretfully constrained to conclude that Major Brew Died of Wounds received in action, as a Prisoner of War in German hands, on 6th April 1918. I am to express their sympathy to you in your bereavement". Comforting, it was not. The circumstances surrounding John George's capture and death were, however, to remain a mystery for several years and Annie Brew's grief was only deepened by the unknown. Though she had attempted to find out what had occurred, it was not until a full three years after his death that she would obtain the answer, when she received a letter dated 6 April 1921 - ironically three years to the day - from Colonel M. J. Furnell. It read, "Col. Fitzgerald was speaking to me yesterday and asked me to write to you what I knew about your husband's death in 1918, as I was with him at the time. As you probably know your husband and I were commanding the 9th and 1st Bn's of the Regiment and on the evening of the 27th I think it was [it was actually the evening of the 26th], our two Battalions were holding a position in some old trenches where we had been heavily attacked all day and we had decided to withdraw both our Battalions at dark. We went to tell the General who was on our right what our intentions were, when the General Staff Officer No 1, Col Green of the Ulster Division, arrived and said he would take your husband and myself to see our own Brigadier in his motor; we went and saw the Brigadier but upon returning in the motor, drove into an advance party of the Germans who opened fire and bombed the car. Col Green was wounded and we were all captured. After being searched we were being marched back to the German Headquarters by an escort, when some Germans who evidently mistook us for British troops opened fire on us; your husband was walking alongside me and was hit. I ran over towards the men who were firing thinking they were our own troops as things were rather mixed up and it was dark. However, I discovered they were Bosche as they fired at me when I was a few yards from them. I then went back to your husband who was lying on the road. I found he had been hit through the lung and as Col Green and the motor driver were already wounded it was impossible to move him without help from the Bosche which they refused to give and only beat us with the butts of their rifles when we asked them to move your husband. We moved him to the side of the road and made him as comfortable as possible, he couldn't speak much, the Bosche were trying to hurry us on all the time so [I] didn't have much chance of doing anything and said goodbye to your husband and he was able to shake hands with me. When we reached German Headquarters Col Green who spoke German told the German Commanding Officer about your husband and they told him they would send out for him but one can never believe a Bosche. There was one of our doctors also a prisoner and I asked him about your husband. He said the best thing that could happen was for him to remain where he was as it was a frosty night and that might stop the bleeding. I never heard what happened to your husband afterwards and I didn't meet anyone who had met him in a German hospital but heard when I was released that he had died. I had met your husband many times in 1917-18 and was very sorry indeed when I heard he had died. I was afraid at the time it was a bad wound." John George left his widow, Annie, and 2 children, 9 year old John Kenneth and 7 year old Marion, in Portadown, County Armagh, Northern Ireland. His death is recorded in the "Army Officers War Records of Deaths 1914-1921", and reads simply, "Name and Rank - John George Brew Temp. Maj., Unit - 9th Bn. R. Ir. Fus., Died of Wounds 6.4.1918 Outskirts of Hatton Court ." He is buried in Roye New British Cemetery, outside the town of Roye, 40km south-east of Amiens, in Picardy, France. New British Cemetery contains some 417 graves of Allied soldiers gathered from temporary graves in surrounding areas, most of whom were either German prisoners of war or died during the retreat of March 19.