"Operation Sapphire and U.S. Proliferation Policy,"

Swords & Ploughshares Fall 1997; pp. 33-46.

The collapse of the Soviet coup in August 1991 was the opening act of one of the most important events of the 1990's - the rise of 15 independent states from the ashes of the Soviet empire. However, not all of them were ready for the burdens of independence. This was certainly the case in Kazakhstan, which was dealt a poor hand with which to play an expected rematch of the Great Game. Indeed, Kazakhstan was immediately burdened by its long border with their former colonizers. This proximity is magnified in the Kazakh mind by the fact that Kazakhs outnumber Russians in Kazakhstan by a paltry 300,000.¹ However, the biggest Soviet legacy in Kazakhstan were the hundreds of nuclear weapons and tons of highly enriched uranium (HEU) left when the Russians departed.²

The controversy over nuclear materials has dominated U.S.-Kazakh relations over the last five years. The U.S. pushed Kazakhstan to enter to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as a non-nuclear weapons state, which means that Kazakhstan was required to renounce all the weapons it inherited.³ As part of the de-nuclearization process, the U.S. and Kazakhstan executed Operation Sapphire, which removed 600 kilograms of a weapons-grade HEU-non-HEU mix from Kazakhstan in 1994.⁴ The policies of pressuring Kazakhstan to give up its weapons and helping with the disposal of HEU and weapons on Kazakh territory - were the initial keys to U.S. policy towards Kazakhstan. However, Operation Sapphire's fallout indicates that U.S. policy may be about to melt down.

The collapse of the Soviet Union left former Soviet nuclear materials and weapons in four of the Newly Independent States (NIS): the Russian Federation, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan.⁵ The relative diffusion of the materials meant that the calculus of nuclear warfare has changed. The lack of security at NIS weapons sites brings the possibility of nuclear leakage to a terrorist organization or rogue state far closer to reality.

Clearly, nuclear leakage would make it harder to detect nuclear programs. If HEU or plutonium were to leak to an unstable state, Iraq for example, it would accelerate the Iraqi weapons program while simultaneously making it harder to detect. The key problem in building a simple nuclear device is acquiring the HEU through reprocessing.⁶ Moreover, the production of HEU or plutonium which is most detectable stage in the weapons construction process. For example, the U.S. only found out about North Korea's nuclear program after a U.S. satellite discovered a camouflaged reprocessing facility.⁷

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States identified proliferation as its main concern.⁸ The U.S. response to the leakage threat has been a carrot and stick strategy. The prevention aspect of U.S. policy is based on the Nunn-Lugar program; the pressure has come through a variety of carrots and sticks in diplomatic and economic arenas.

Historically, the USSR has always been behind in protecting its nuclear materials. As far back as the Kennedy administration, the U.S. has provided assistance to the USSR to help secure materials.⁹ In light of the need to increase materials protection, control & accounting (MPC&A) in the former Soviet Union, President Bush proposed aid to improve the USSR's MPC&A and dismantle some Soviet nuclear weapons.¹⁰ This program was thought to have two potential benefits: not only would potentially loose nuclear materials be secured, but the NIS would be further integrated and westernized through the aid process.¹¹ Bush's policies were later codified and funded as the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (better known as Nunn-Lugar).

Nunn-Lugar funds soon became a mainstay of U.S. policy. By November of 1993, the Defense Department had committed $790 million for dismantlement programs in the FSU.¹² By 1996, outlays for Nunn-Lugar had risen to $1.5 billion.¹³ This money is split four ways, with the Russian Federation receiving about 50% of the funds.¹⁴ However, while substantial funds have been appropriated, there have been some problems with implementation of Nunn-Lugar.

The first problem with Nunn-Lugar is that we don't know exactly how much nuclear material exists. Senior Russian and Ukrainian officials have admitted that there is no way to know how much nuclear fuel, HEU and plutonium are in their countries. Materials accounting was done by ruble value, not weight, and plant managers often stockpiled undocumented reserves of material in case they ever had a problem meeting their production quotas.¹⁵ As a result, materials accounting from research reactors and HEU and Plutonium production plants has been a nightmare. Importantly, most major smuggling incidents have involved research fuel, not weapons material.¹⁶

The second problem has been the NIS personnel. U.S. and international inspectors are having problems gaining access to NIS sites because U.S. disclosures of inadequacies would prove damaging. As late as 1995, some Russian officials were denying that any problem existed.¹⁷ Moreover, the people working at nuclear facilities in the NIS are often poorly paid, making the temptation to steal and sell nuclear materials even greater.¹⁸

The second element of U.S. strategy is pressure. While the U.S. is providing funds for the safe dismantlement of nuclear weapons in the NIS, it also has to keep pressure on Minsk, Almaty, Kiev, and Moscow to meet U.S. expectations. Without the cooperation of these states, Nunn-Lugar would be meaningless.

In 1994, the United States and the Russian Federation agreed to exchange information on the amount of HEU and plutonium in their countries.¹⁹ However, there is considerable bureaucratic pressure from the ministries involved which is hindering the accounting effort. It is because of special efforts at pressuring the Russians (for instance, by using foreign aid sticks and carrots) that much of the progress that has been made has come to pass.²⁰

The republics posed a different problem. While difficulties in the Russian Federation were mostly due to entrenched bureaucratic interests, the remaining new nuclear states are also upset with what they perceive as a Russo-centric U.S. policy. NIS mistrust of the former Russian colonizers is unsurprising. In turn, mistrust of Russian intentions made it hard to give up the potential deterrent which nuclear weapons represent. Thus, it took a variety of sticks and carrots to get Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan to sign the NPT as non-weapon states. Formal U.S. recognition of Ukraine was held up because the U.S. wanted the nuclear question decided first.²¹ It is only a continuation of that pressure which keeps U.S. counter-proliferation efforts in the NIS running.

It was against the backdrop of prevention and pressure that the government of Kazakhstan discovered that it had a problem. On a visit to the Ulba Metallurgy Plant in 1992, newly appointed Kazakh Atomic Energy Director Vladimir Shkolnik discovered over 600 kilograms of what was thought to be HEU.²² If the HEU were relatively pure, 600 kilograms would yield 20-50 atomic weapons.²³ This discovery left the Kazakhs with several options.

First, the Kazakhs could have declared the HEU and kept it for themselves. The Kazakhs have several hundred tons of weapons-grade material which is stored according to IAEA regulations.²⁴ Thus, it is conceivable that the Kazakhs could keep both their treaty obligations and the HEU. Indeed, some in the Kazakh government who advocated keeping the HEU to deter against future Russian expansionism.²⁵ Moreover, some in Kazakhstan feel that Kazakhstan is boxed in by four nuclear powers: Russia, China, India and Pakistan. They argue that the Kazakhs need to have control over the weapons as a multilateral deterrent.²⁶

However, keeping the material also posed some problems. First, the Kazakhs would have had difficulty securing the material from a terrorist or mafia attack.²⁷ Had the been stolen, it would have been a public relations nightmare for the Kazakhs. Furthermore, the threat of an attack to steal the HEU was real due to the possibility of interest on the part of several rogue states, including Iran.²⁸ Moreover, IAEA requirements would have required the Kazakhs to undergo a twelvefold increase in inspections at Ulba had the HEU been declared. The Kazakhs apparently decided that this process was too great a burden.²⁹

The second possibility was for Kazakhstan to sell the material to the Russians. Indeed, the Kazakhs reportedly first approached the Russians to dispose of the material.³⁰ However, the Russians showed no interest in taking over the burdens which the HEU entailed. Given the fairly sedate reactions of the Russians when the U.S. told them about Operation Sapphire, it seems that the Russians were unconcerned about Ulba.³¹ (However, accounting errors may have meant that the Russians believed that the threat of the HEU at Ulba was far less than it actually was.³²)

At any rate, the Kazakhs approached U.S. Ambassador to Kazakhstan William H. Courtney in mid-1993.³³ After Ambassador Courtney passed this information on to the State Department (DOS), he was ordered to try to get more information about the material from the Kazakhs.³⁴ This led to a February 1994 visit by a Department of Energy (DOE) specialist to Ulba. Elwood Gift, the DOE selection to examine the HEU, determined at least part of the 600 kilograms to be enriched to above 90% - weapons-grade material.³⁵

After receiving Gift's preliminary report, the National Security Council (NSC) determined that the threat warranted a major U.S. response. The NSC authorized a Defense Department (DOD) - led working group to secure the material.³⁶ This group included officials from DOS, DOE, and DOD and was nicknamed the "tiger team".³⁷ The team momentarily considered simply beefing up security at Ulba, but this plan was rejected because the U.S. would have had to foot the entire bill for security upgrades.³⁸ The full NSC agreed, and it was decided to withdraw the material from Kazakhstan.

At this point, internecine war broke out on the U.S. side over two issues. The first was funding. While the Tiger Team's plan called for DOE to send material specialists, DOS to handle negotiations, and DOD to handle transportation and security, who paid for what was left unclear.³⁹ As the U.S. negotiated the Kazakhs down from their reported request of $50 million in compensation, it was unclear from where the compensation would come.⁴⁰ It was finally agreed to partially fund Sapphire through Nunn-Lugar.⁴¹

The second debate was over whether or not to ask the consent of (or even inform) the Russians about the removal of the HEU from Ulba. It was fortunate for the U.S. that the Russians were unclear about what exactly was at Ulba (Russia's Ministry of Atomic Energy may not have known the material was even there).⁴² After initial contacts revealed confusion on the Russian side, Vice President Gore brought the matter up in a summit meeting with Russian Primer Chernomyrdin in June 1994.⁴³ Varying reports state that either Yeltsin gave the final go-ahead to Kazakh President Nursultan Nazaerbayev⁴⁴ or Chernomyrdin gave the final go-ahead to Gore.⁴⁵

The next stage of the operation involved the actual removal of the material from Kazakhstan. In August, a DOD team went to Ulba to determine if the airstrip could support the C-5 Galaxys which would ferry the DOE team and the HEU.⁴⁶ At the same time, Alex Riedy, who would head the team for DOE, was working on the problem of transporting over half a ton of uranium. He eventually came up with a collapsible processing facility which would easily fit on the Galaxy.⁴⁷

While the technical aspects of the mission were being resolved, the Tiger Team also had to deal with the issue of security. Obviously, moving a large U.S. team to Ulba was going to attract attention. The first key to preventing leaks was compartmentalizing information. It was only at the highest levels that anyone knew the extent of Operation Sapphire.⁴⁸ The official cover for the mission was that the Riedy team was there for technical assistance to help the Kazakhs meet IAEA safeguards.⁴⁹ Moreover, it was decided that all negotiations would be handled via embassies to avoid the prospect of high-level delegations travelling from capital to capital.⁵⁰

After a summer of preparation, the presidential order authorizing the airlift was written in September, though delays for consultations kept it from being signed until early October.⁵¹ The delay in signing the order caused another problem - the potential for ice on the runways. While the initial plan called for a final departure on November 1, the aforementioned delays eventually pushed it back to November 23.⁵² Since the airstrip was not in good shape, further delays could have delayed a pull-out until spring.⁵³

On the ground, the Riedy team transferred the HEU into 1,300 small IAEA approved containers, which were then placed inside larger drums. This process, which made the material far safer to transport, went smoothly and was complete after about six weeks of 12-to-14 hour a day work.⁵⁴ However, there was a slight problem when it was discovered that the Ulba plant had 104% of the HEU the Kazakhs thought was there. This excess was at least partly due to the fact that almost all accounting and record-keeping at Ulba was done on paper.⁵⁵

Six weeks later (about a week before Thanksgiving, 1994) the HEU was ready for transport. As the HEU was loaded into trucks for transit to the landing strips, the C-5s were in the air. The convoy of trucks had to be heavily guarded because the HEU was now far easier to transport and to steal.⁵⁶ Under the protection of a Kazakh Special Forces unit, the convoy set off as soon as the first plane landed around 4:00 AM on November 20.⁵⁷ The C-5s had their problems as well. The plane to land was one of three which were supposed to fly to Kazakhstan. However, snowstorms prevented two planes from flying in to Kazakhstan on the second attempt.⁵⁸ A second plane arrived later in the day to take the remainder of the HEU.⁵⁹

From the early days of Sapphire, there had been a controversy over the final resting place of the HEU. The administration clearly knew that the transfer of the HEU to the United States would be a political bombshell. In the press conference after Sapphire, the administration did its best to make it clear that the HEU was not nuclear waste.⁶⁰ Indeed, Vice President Gore, who had represented Tennessee in the Senate, was delegated to smooth the way after it was decided to move the HEU to the Y-12 plant in Oak Ridge.⁶¹ There was good cause to be worried. Shortly after Operation Sapphire was announced, the environmental lobbyist Oak Ridge Environmental Peace Alliance charged that Sapphire's secrecy was designed to suppress domestic dissent, not to protect the material.⁶²

A second problem soon arose with respect to the payment methods the U.S. used for the HEU. While U.S. officials thought that the compensation issue had been resolved in the negotiations leading up to Sapphire, the Kazakhs made requests to change the agreement even after the airlift was complete.⁶³ The compensation package which was finally agreed to is still a sore spot for the Kazakhs.⁶⁴

The case of Operation Sapphire points up some potential problems with U.S. policy. The Kazakhs are, at some levels of the government, unhappy with how they have been treated. If the U.S. runs similar missions in the future, the axis of cooperation which made Sapphire a success may break.

Of course, the first critical question is whether or not similar stores of unsecured HEU exist in the FSU. While the general feeling is that finding a cache of HEU this large is a one-time event, it is probable that there are further undeclared stores of HEU throughout all four republics.⁶⁵ Furthermore, the Kazakhs are considering DPRK-type reactors to provide energy; since these yield HEU, there will still be a possibility of HEU leakage.⁶⁶

The second question is whether or not the Kazakhs would approach the U.S. if a similar situation were to occur today. The evidence on this point is not clear. Certainly, the carrots of U.S. aid and sticks of U.S. reprisal could mean continued Kazakh cooperation. However, the possibility that the Kazakhs would hold on to the material is becoming a more genuine reality. It has been a poorly kept secret that the Kazakhs thought that U.S. security guarantees would follow Kazakhstan's accession to the NPT and subsequent cooperation in Operation Sapphire.⁶⁷ Those guarantees would not materialize.

Indeed, even the aid promised by the U.S. turned out to be less than expected. While the Kazakhs thought they would wind up with high-tech equipment, the U.S. offered only routine medical supplies, which were easier to acquire.⁶⁸ While there was supplemental aid in the form of 40,000 pounds of relief supplies for Kazakh orphanages volunteered by the families of the Riedy team,⁶⁹ the Kazakhs were in general not happy about the U.S. compensation package, all of which had to be spent in the United States for specific equipment.⁷⁰

Moreover, the Kazakhs have been making statements recently which indicate that they think that they can handle the HEU in their country. While initial comments by Kazakh officials indicated that they would continue to cooperate in similar situations in the future,⁷¹ they are now saying something different. Officials are implying that they have the technical capacity to secure uranium stores in the future.⁷² In addition, the Kazakhs are now claiming that none of the recently captured smuggled HEU came from Kazakhstan.⁷³

Against the backdrop of the Kazakhs claiming they can handle the HEU has been a deterioration of Kazakh-Russian relations, as symbolized by the Kazakhs requiring air travelers from the CIS to go through customs.⁷⁴ This may all point to the Kazakhs using the HEU as a deterrent against the Russians. Even without the threat of HEU sales, Kazakhstan still has leverage when it thinks it is slighted. Indeed, Kazakhstan's recent decision to sell Iran hand-held anti-aircraft misses over American objections indicates that it may be punishing the U.S. for its treatment of Kazakhstan during Sapphire.⁷⁵ Statements by American troops participating in a recent exercise in Kazakhstan that indicate that Kazakhstan is now in America's sphere of influence will certainly not help matters.⁷⁶

The third question is whether the U.S. would do a Sapphire-style operation again. The tendency of the administration and some others has been to portray Sapphire as a perfect mission.⁷⁷ However, there is a minority school of thought which believes that the costs of Sapphire outweighed the benefits.

The costs of Sapphire are twofold. First are the obvious mission costs - roughly $20 million in compensation for the Kazakhs and $5 million in operational costs for the airlift.⁷⁸ On top of those costs are the implied costs - the fact that the U.S. has declared a de facto price at which it will buy uranium. At $20-25 million/600 kg., the price the U.S. has to pay for future caches and for Russian HEU and Plutonium will almost certainly be similar.⁷⁹ Moreover, the controversy over the ultimate fate of the Kazakh HEU has exacted a political price from the administration.

While the costs were fairly high, the benefits reaped by the administration were less than first anticipated. The first goal the administration wanted to accomplish was to pick up the security and political benefits inherent with reducing the "loose nukes" threat. However, subsequent analysis of the Kazakh HEU indicates that a large percentage of it may not be suitable for immediate use in weapons.⁸⁰ Thus, the security threat may have been overblown.

The second potential benefit outlined by the administration was to bring Kazakhstan closer into the community of nations.⁸¹ However, the subsequent statements by the Kazakhs about keeping future materials at home, not to mention the relative lack of democracy in Kazakhstan, indicate that this goal remains unfulfilled.⁸²

The fourth question is whether the Russians would be as acquiescent in the future about another Operation Sapphire. As stated earlier, it seems that Russia's relative placidity on the Kazakh HEU stemmed from Russia's lack of knowledge about conditions and equipment at Ulba. Moreover, the Russians were not as assertive in the FSU two years ago as they are now.⁸³ Thus, the Russians are more likely to block an Operation Sapphire in the future. Compounding the situation is the level of mafia infestation of the Russian government, which could affect mission secrecy.⁸⁴

To date, the U.S. counterproliferation regime has been fairly effective in the sense that there have been no major disasters. However, problems with the regime that surfaced during Operation Sapphire indicate that it could be close to failure. Indeed, the prospects for another Sapphire in the future look fairly glum.

Thus, the U.S. must reform its strategy on a number of levels. First, there must be a clear body to deal with proliferation missions. Part of the problem with Sapphire was the administrative confusion and turf wars which resulted as the Tiger Team tried to figure out how to handle Kazakhstan's HEU. Having a written set of guidelines and, more importantly, a standing working group for loose HEU situations could help improve the U.S. effort.

Second, the U.S. must try to keep the interests of the state housing the HEU in mind. Having the U.S. take Kazakh support for granted is certainly no way to ensure their support in the future. Furthermore, while the Kazakh desire for security guarantees is clearly out of the question, helping Kazakhstan's security forces through joint training exercises and technical assistance may at the same time improve their view of the U.S.

Third, the long-range security of HEU relies on the pursuit of two goals. Not only must the U.S. keep up its effort to improve MPC&A in the FSU, it must also work towards economic and political development of the regions. There is little doubt that an economically strong, democratic Kazakhstan would be more responsible and more reliable that the economically chaotic and authoritarian Kazakhstan we see today.

It is impossible to say that following these recommendations will prevent a catastrophic nuclear leak, or that failure to follow them guarantees disaster. However, if the U.S. does not take appropriate action, it may spend decades after a disaster wondering just what it had consumed with its poor policy.

Bill Shingleton is currently a Senior in SIS double majoring in Russian Studies and International Relations. In the fall of 1996, Shingleton participated in the World Capitals Program in Moscow. Another of Shingleton's articles, "China's Consolidation Isn't Solid," was published in the Christian Science Monitor.

1. Nichol, Jim. CRS Report for Congress: Kazakh Republic: Basic Facts. Washington, DC: CRS, 16 October 1991; 1.

2. Clark, Susan. "The Central Asian States: Defining Security Priorities and Developing Military Forces," in Central Asia and the World, ed. Michael Mandlebaum (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1994), 178.

3. Laumulin, Murat. "Kazakhstan's Nuclear Policy and the Control of Nuclear Weapons." in The Nuclear Challenge in Russia and the New States of Eurasia, ed. George Quester (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1995), 181.

4. Interview of former non-Proliferation Officer of the Government of Kazakhstan with author, 3 April 1997.

5. "Fact Sheet: Safe and Secure Dismantlement of Nuclear Weapons in the New Independent States." U.S. Department of State Dispatch 5 (3 January 1994): 6.

6. Allison, Graham, et al. Avoiding Nuclear Anarchy. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1996; 58.

7. Albright, David, and O'Neill, Kevin. "Jury-Rigged, But Working." The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 51 (January/February 1995): 25.

8. "On the Nuclear Prowl". The Washington Post 6 July 1997: C6.

9. Powers, John R, and Muckerman, Joseph E. "Rethink the Nuclear Threat." Orbis 38 (Winter 1994): 104.

10. Ellis, Jason. "Nunn-Lugar's Mid-Life Crisis". Survival 39 (Spring 1997): 86.

11. Nacht, Michael. "U.S. Nuclear Arms Control Policies Toward Russia and the Former Soviet Union." in The Nuclear Challenge in Russia and the New States of Eurasia, ed. George Quester (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1995), 240.

12. "Fact Sheet" 6.

13. Ellis, "Nunn-Lugar's" 103.

14. Ibid 104.

15. Sopko, John F. "The Changing Proliferation Threat." Foreign Policy 105 (Winter 1996-7): 10.

 16. Potter, William C. "Before the Deluge? Assessing the Threat Of Nuclear Leakage From the Post-Soviet States." Arms Control Today 25 (October 1995): 10.

17. Allison, Avoiding Nuclear Anarchy, 75.

18. Albright, "Jury-Rigged..." 25.

19. Gibbons, John H. Lecture. "Managing Nuclear Materials in the Post Cold-War Era." Keynote Address: Second International Policy Forum. 22 March 1995.

20. Miller, Stephen E. "Russia and Nuclear Weapons." in The Nuclear Challenge in Russia and the New States of Eurasia, ed. George Quester (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1995), 91.

21. Garnett, Sherman W. "Ukrainian Nuclear Policy." in The Nuclear Challenge in Russia and the New States of Eurasia, ed. George Quester (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1995), 135.

22. Potter, William C. "The Challenges of International Nonproliferation Cooperation." Transition 1 (17 November 1995): 2. In: http://www.omri.cz:80/publications/transition/Features/Feature.V01N21.html

23. Tirpak, John A. "Project Sapphire." Air Force Magazine 78 (August 1995): 51.

24. Potter, William C., et al. "Nuclear Security in Kazakhstan and Ukraine: An Interview with Vladimir Shkolnik and Nicolai Steinberg." The Nonproliferation Review 2 (Fall 1994): 10. In: http://cns.miis.edu/npr/Nskzk21.html.

25. Interview of former non-Proliferation Officer of the Government of Kazakhstan with author, 3 April 1997.

26. Moltz, James Clay. "CIS Proliferation Problems and Issues for the NPT Conference." The Nonproliferation Review 2 (Winter 1995): 2. In: http://cns.miis.edu/npr/Moltz22.html.

27. Tirpak, "Project Sapphire," 51.

28. Potter, "The Challenges..." 2.

29. Interview of former non-Proliferation Officer of the Government of Kazakhstan with author, 3 April 1997.

30. Potter, "The Challenges..." 3.

31. Ibid 5.

32. Laumulin, Murat. "Political Aspects of Kazakhstan's Nuclear Policies." The Nonproliferation Review 3 (Fall 1995): 85

33. Potter, "The Challenges..." 3.

34. Ibid 3.

35. Ibid 3-4.

36. Tirpak, "Project Sapphire," 52.

37. United States Department of Energy Office of Declassification. "Operation Sapphire." Index of Communique Issues 7 (February 1995): 3. In: http://128.164.25.200:80/dprc/doe/Communique/communique_feb95.html

38. Tirpak, "Project Sapphire," 52.

39. United States Department of Energy, "Operation Sapphire," 4

40. Anderson, Jack, and Binstein, Michael. "Uranium: Buy It or Else?" The Washington Post 4 December 1994: C7.

41. Potter, "The Challenges..." 4.

42. Hibbs, Mark. "Report Suggests Minatom Doesn't Know How Much HEU It Has, Officials Say." NuclearFuel 5 December 1994: 12.

43. Potter, "The Challenges..." 5.

44. Tirpak, "Project Sapphire," 52.

45. Potter, "The Challenges..." 5.

46. Tirpak, "Project Sapphire," 52.

47. Ibid. 52.

48. Laumulin, "Political Aspects..." 85.

49. Potter, "The Challenges..." 5.

50. Tirpak, "Project Sapphire," 52.

51. Ibid. 53.

52. The White House: Office of the Press Secretary. "The United States and Kazakhstan Announce the Transfer of Vulnerable Nuclear Materials to Safe Storage." Washington, DC: 23 November 1994.

53. Tirpak, "Project Sapphire," 53.

54. "Aerospace Laureates 94" Aviation Week and Space Technology 142 (23 January 1995): 17.

55. Potter, "Before the Deluge..." 12.

56. Tirpak, "Project Sapphire," 53.

57. Ibid 53.

58. Ibid 53.

59. Potter, "The Challenges..." 7.

60. The White House: Office of the Press Secretary. "The United States and Kazakhstan Announce the Transfer of Vulnerable Nuclear Materials to Safe Storage." Washington, DC: 23 November 1994.

61. Potter, "The Challenges..." 8.

62. Kramer, David. "DOE Disputes Reports Questioning Threat Posed by Kazakhstan Uranium." Inside Energy/with Federal Lands 5 December 1994: 9.

63. Ibid. 7.

64. Interview of former non-Proliferation Officer of the Government of Kazakhstan with author, 3 April 1997.

65. Ibid.

66. Potter, "Nuclear Security..." 11.

67. Laumulin, Murat. "Nuclear Politics and the Future Security of Kazakhstan." The Nonproliferation Review 1 (Winter 1994): 3. In: http://cns.miis.edu/npr/Laumul12.html.

68. Potter, "The Challenges..." 7.

69. Tirpak, "Project Sapphire," 53.

70. Interview of former non-Proliferation Officer of the Government of Kazakhstan with author, 3 April 1997.

71. Laumulin, "Political Aspects..." 85.

72. Laumulin, "Nuclear Politics..." 2.

73. Potter, "Nuclear Security..." 9.

74. American Embassy, Almaty. "Kazakhstan: Economic Update." 1 April 1997; 1. In: http://www.itaiep.doc.gov/bisnis/cables/970401kz.html.

75. Gertz, Bill. "U.S. Protests Kazakhs' Plans to Sell Iran Advanced Missiles." The Washington Times 4 June 1997.

76. Pope, Hugh. "U.S. Plays High-Stakes War Games in Kazakhstan." The Wall Street Journal 16 September 1997: A16.

77. Allison, Avoiding Nuclear Anarchy, 102.

78. Potter, The Challenges..." 7.

79. Anderson, "Uranium..." C7.

80. Dizard, Wilson. "Operation Sapphire Said Not to Get High-Grade Weapons Uranium." Nucleonics Week 35 (1 December 1994): 11.

81. The White House: Office of the Press Secretary. "The United States and Kazakhstan Announce the Transfer of Vulnerable Nuclear Materials to Safe Storage." Washington, DC: 23 November 1994.

82. Olcott, Martha Brill. Central Asia's New States. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996.

83. Ibid. 70.

84. Tirpak, "Project Sapphire," 52.