"Behind the Russian-Chinese 'Alliance,'" Washington Post 11 August 2001, A20



Constantine C. Menges misjudges reality in his July 29 Outlook piece, "Russia, China and What's Really at Stake." The pacts between Russia and China have more to do with their mutual weaknesses than with their opposition to the United States.

After sporadic fighting in the 1960s, the Soviet-Chinese border became the most militarized in the world. But with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the appalling performance of the Russian military in Chechnya, Moscow is pulling back its forces for military restructuring. In the past year, the Russians have abandoned an army base in Georgia and a naval base in Vietnam so that they can throw more resources into this effort. The Russian military's official doctrine now relies on nuclear weapons, not conventional forces, to protect the country. Attempts by Russia to reduce tensions on the Chinese border must be seen in this context.

Similarly, China needs its troops to suppress growing domestic opposition. China already has more than a quarter-million troops stationed in Tibet, Xinjiang Uighur and Inner Mongolia to suppress potential revolts. The "Shanghai Pact" that Mr. Menges believes is a new Warsaw Pact is nothing more than an agreement to coordinate activities against Afghanistan's Taliban. Beijing needs its forces to deal with a flood of North Koreans in northeast China and the barely contained Falun Gong movement. Freeing up troops from the Russian border allows China to achieve these aims.

There is the potential for a threat from an enhanced Russian-Chinese alliance. But hyperventilating over a "strategic alliance" designed to deal with domestic problems will do nothing to enhance American security.

WILLIAM D. SHINGLETON

Alexandria

The writer is a senior fellow at the National Defense Council Foundation.