FILE: 251N10.HTML/ EDIT IN 14 POINT FONT

FALL 2005

CLASS NOTES FOR ECONOMICS 251

DR. WILLIAM SHINGLETON

 

WEEK 10/ NOV 1-3

 

FINISH LAST WEEK’S MODELS

 

CHAPTERS 27-28

 

INEFFICIENCY AND PRICE SETTING FIRMS/ALL TYPES

          PRICE NEVER = MIN  ATC

          OUTPUT

          RESOURCES

          MU > MC

                   NON-PARETO OUTCOME

                   MARKET FAILURE

 

MARKET POWER

          NUMBER OF SUPPLIERS

          SIZE OF MARKET LEADERS

                   CONCENTRATION RATIO

                   MAY COME FROM INNOVATION, MERGER, OR ACQUISITION

          BARRIERS TO ENTRY

          AVAILABILITY OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS

 

 

NATURAL MONOPOLY... A SPECIAL CASE?

          RELATED TO HIGH FIXED COST/DECLINING ATC

                   ECONOMIES OF SCALE

          MONOPOLY YIELDS LOWER PRICES TO CONSUMERS

 

         

          PRICE REGULATION/WITHOUT PRICE DISCRIMINATION

                   1. MC = MR

                   2. P = MC

                   3. P = ATC

                             AVERICH-JOHNSON PRICE REGULATION

                                       BLOATED COSTS

                                      FIRMS STILL MAX PROFITS

 

 

 

          PRICE REGULATION/WITH PRICE DISCRIMINATION/W DECLINING MC

                   1. MC = MR

                   2. P = MC

 

 


COSTS OF REGULATION

          ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS

                   130,000 GOVERNMENT JOBS /WEINDENBAUM CENTER/2001

                   LAWYERS AND ACCOUNTANTS FOR THE GOVERNMENT

                   WHO PAYS THE COST?

 

          COMPLIANCE COSTS

                   HOW MANY LAWYERS AND ACCOUNTANTS FOR THE VICTIMS?

                   WHO PAYS THE COST?

 

          EFFICIENCY COSTS

                   VALUE OF SUNSET RULES/TELEPHONE TAX FOR WWI

 

 

 


ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS/EXTERNALITIES

 

          COASE THEOREM: EXPLANATION

                    VOLUNTARY EXCHANGE CAN SOLVE PROBLEMS

                   COST AND BENEFIT, NOT LAW, DETERMINE BEST OUTCOMES

                   IF DEALS ARE EASY TO MAKE, THE DISTRIBUTION OF

                   PROPERTY RIGHTS DOES NOT AFFECT THE OUTCOME

 

                   COASE THEOREM: APPLICATIONS

                             ROLE OF PROPERTY RIGHTS...RAIN FOREST FOR THE RICH

                             GAME FARMS FOR ENDANGERED SPECIES WSJ 8-31-92

                             WHO OWNS THE ELEPHANTS? WSJ 10-25-91

 

                             PAY GREENLAND FISHERMEN NOT TO FISH TO RESTORE

                                      NEW ENGLAND SALMON

                                      FISH WORTH $15 TO COMMERCIAL FISHERMEN

                                      FISH WORTH $1000 TO TOURISTS AND ASSOCIATED

                                                INDUSTRIES IF IT RETURNS TO RECREATIONAL FISHING AREA WSJ 8-25-92



ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION/NEGATIVE EXTERNALITIES

          OPTIMAL RATE OF PULLUTION

                   MC = MB

                   WHO MEASURES THE MC, MB?

          REGULATE THE PROBLEM

          TAX THE PRODUCT             

          TAX THE PROBLEM/EMISSION CHARGES

          VOUCHERS

 

 

POLICY TOOLS

          REGULATION

                   COST

                             ADMINISTRATIVE/COMPLIANCE/ECONOMIC

                   EFFECTS ON ENVIRONMENT

                   EFFICIENCY

 

          MARKETABLE PERMITS / VOUCHER MARKET

                   COST <http://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/auctions/2005/index.html >

                   $690/TON FOR SULFUR DIOXIDE

                             (EPA) allows 8.95 million tons of SO2 per year

                             COASE AGAIN

 

                   EFFECTS ON ENVIRONMENT

                   EFFICIENCY

                             MC/MB

 

                   HOW TO MEASURE MARGINAL SOCIAL BENEFIT

 

 

          SUBSIDIES FOR RENEWABLE ENERGY

                   COST

                   EFFECTS ON ENVIRONMENT

                   EFFICIENCY