Crossing the Moselle River

The Effect of Patton’s Gasoline Shortage on the 317^th Infantry Regiment

By

Dean J. Dominique

And the veterans of 317^th Infantry Regiment

“The history books do not say a great deal about the 317th Infantry.  However, it was a regiment that accomplished rather startling results:  first bridgehead across the Moselle, cleared out La Grande Couronne de Nancy, participated in the capture of Metz -- the first time in history that the fort had ever fallen to an assault, and, of course, participated in the Battle of the Bulge as one of the first regiments to arrive in the area after the German assault had broken the line.  It suffered extremely severe casualties and contained some of the best men I have ever known.”

Colonel (Retired) James H. Hayes

317^th Infantry Regiment Veteran

September 1942 to December 1945¹

In July 1942, the 317^th Infantry Regiment was activated under the 80^th Infantry Division to join the fight in World War II. The two units fought bravely together in World War I and were again called to action. The motto “Armis et Animis”, By Arms and By Courage, is about as an accurate maxim as can be attributed to a unit. In August 1944, the unit disembarked in the European Theater of Operations after two years of extensive preparation. They followed the D-Day invasion and began the famous journey across France and Germany with General George Patton’s Third Army.

The soldiers of the 317^th fared well in the first month of combat, in part due to the maneuver training conducted in the United States prior to deploying. Less than one month after arriving in country, the 317^th fought a savage contest at Pont-a-Mousson, France which was an immediate consequence of the gasoline shortage created as the Allies dashed through France and endeavored to supply the fighting force while taking care of the French civilians. At Pont-a-Mousson, the 317^th received considerable casualties as a direct result of the gasoline shortfall.

The scarcity of supplies became obvious towards the end of August as the Allies began to break through the German defenses. On the 28^th of August, the priority of supplies was reallocated to First Army in support of British General Montgomery. It was concluded that they had more important objectives than General Patton’s Third Army. In addition, General Omar Bradley was directed to supply Paris with over three thousand tons of supplies a day. Patton wrote a letter to his son stating, “At the present time, my chief difficulty is not the Germans but gasoline. If they would give me enough gas, I could go anywhere I want…” ². He later wrote,

“It was evident at this time that there was no real threat against us…Everything seemed rosy, when suddenly it was reported to me that the 140,000 gallons of gas we were to get that day had not arrived…I later found that …the delay was due to a change of plan by the High Command, implemented, in my opinion, by General Montgomery…I presented my case for a rapid advance to the east for the purpose of cutting the Siegfried Line before it could be manned. Bradley was very sympathetic, but …the rest of SHAEFs Staff did not concur. It was my opinion then that this was the momentous error of the war…I was sure it was a terrible mistake to halt even at the Meuse”³.

By the September 3, 1944, most of the Third Army elements were stalled by the gas shortage. Major James Hayes, the 317^th regimental intelligence officer, noted, “It seemed as if the entire invasion force ran out of gasoline. We became foot infantry once more and began the slow march to the Moselle”⁴. That same day Patton assembled his corps commanders for a meeting with General Bradley. Bradley was unsettled that General Eisenhower had made Montgomery the Allied main effort, which meant Bradley received fewer supplies. Bradley made the decision to give Patton’s Third Army half of the total supplies he received. He then gave Patton four additional divisions and authorization for to cross the Moselle, cut through the Siegfried Line and travel as far as the Rhine River ⁵.

Patton in turn gave General Eddy, the XII Corps Commander, permission to move towards a crossing of the Moselle north of the town of Nancy (Cole, 1984, p. 54)⁶. Eddy’s strategy was to have the 80^th Infantry Division secure a bridgehead at Pont-a-Mousson and then have the 4^th Armored Division pass through and attack Nancy from the north (Balish, 1950, p. 17)⁷. 317^th was ordered to conduct a reconnaissance in force and establish the bridgehead for the 80^th Infantry Division (Cole, 1984, p. 60)⁸.

The Germans used the lull in the battle created by the gasoline shortage to establish a defense on the high ground east of the Moselle. The XII Corps G-2 (Intelligence) concluded there was not much resistance across the river. Cavalry patrols operating on the west side of the Moselle reported that the Germans were not capable of making a stand at the Moselle. The Germans, however, realized that the increased cavalry presence in the area of Pont-a-Mousson meant that it was a likely site for a crossing of the Moselle and the Germans dug in with an estimated division from Pagny to Dieulouard. They took advantage of the superior observation and fields of fire offered by the high ground on the east side of the Moselle. Due to the lack of information, the composition and disposition of the Germans across the Moselle was ambiguous to the Americans.

As ordered, the 317^th Infantry Regimental Commander, Colonel Cameron, dispatched the 317^th to the Moselle without a daytime reconnaissance due to time constraints. 3^rd Battalion, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Roberts, led the way preceded only by the reconnaissance platoon with the 317^th intelligence officer, Major James Hayes. Major Hayes was able to caution 3^rd Battalion that the Germans had blown the bridge and established a defense on the east side of the Moselle, but he could not determine the strength. A skirmish ensued and the Germans engaged 3^rd Battalion for most of the day while the reconnaissance platoon moved into the high ground on the west side of the Moselle and established observation posts to compile information on the German’s strength and location (Hayes, 1998, p. 103)⁹.

Major Hayes then returned to the 317^th command post to update Colonel Cameron on the situation. General Eddy visited the command post and Major Hayes updated him on the situation as well. General Eddy was doubtful that the 317^th had come under such heavy artillery and small arms fire and decided to personally visit one of the observation points. Unfortunately, a pause in the battle occurred during the command reconnaissance. Major Hayes wrote:

“In this case, the cessation of fire turned out to be a disaster for the 317^th. As General Eddy looked out from the OP, the Moselle had become as smooth as glass, birds twittered in the trees and the scene became one of idyllic calm. He clearly thought I had exaggerated the intensity of fire. He turned to Colonel Cameron and said something like, ‘there aren't any Germans out there.’ He ordered Colonel Cameron to immediately execute a hasty crossing of the Moselle River at Pont-à-Mousson. A few hours after receiving orders to cross the river, Lieutenant Colonel Roberts initiated a hasty crossing and immediately came under intense and well-directed artillery, mortar and small arms fire. Two companies managed to cross the river and immediately had to fight off a determined German counter-attack. Ultimately, the rest of the regiment could not support the force across the river and the 3^rd Battalion lost several hundred men in killed, wounded and captured. General Eddy had not heeded one of the first precepts of combat -- he underestimated the enemy and the 317^th Infantry suffered severely for that error. The General …thought that because we had been able to chase the Germans from Falaise to the Moselle that the German Army had been totally defeated. That did not occur until another nine months of hard combat had really destroyed the power of the German Army” (1998, p. 103)¹⁰.

After the initial failure to cross the river, another hasty crossing was ordered for the morning of September 5^th. This time all three battalions would attempt a crossing and whichever location was successful would be exploited. 1^st Battalion attacked at Dieulouard south of Pont-a-Mousson. 2^nd Battalion would attack to the north at Vandieres. 3^rd Battalion would again try its luck at Pont-a-Mousson. The order specified for the attacks to begin at 0600 by which time it was daylight. Intense artillery and mortar fire poured down on the crossing sites. The Germans controlled the hills overlooking the river valley and used this advantage to call for fire. Colonel Cameron along with Major Hayes accompanied 1^st Battalion. Lieutenant Colonel Norman commanded the battalion and, prior to joining the 317^th, had been an instructor on river crossings at Fort Benning. 1^st Battalion attempted to cross the wide-open Moselle River Valley and immediately came under intense artillery and small arms fire. The infantrymen with their heavy pontoon boats made excellent targets for the Germans: most were hit or killed (Hayes,1998, p. 107). The anti-tank platoon pulled their 57mm guns into a coal factory and attempted to mount their guns but was unable due to the narrow passages (Murrell, 1995, p. 12). 1^st Battalion was forced to retreat under heavy artillery fire and many remained in the coal factory. Colonel Cameron soon received word that 2^nd and 3^rd Battalion’s attack had also failed. Heavy casualties were already mounting up. Colonel Cameron visited 2^nd Battalion to ascertain why the attack failed. Heavy artillery and casualties from F Company greeted Colonel Cameron upon his arrival. Colonel Cameron returned to his command post to inform General McBride that the attack faltered and the Moselle was heavily fortified. Other units from 80^th Infantry Division met the same resistance to the south. Corps and division headquarters then agreed that the Moselle was indeed heavily fortified. The 317^th was then ordered to prepare for a full-scale river crossing: a hasty river crossing would not work against such a well-established defense (Hayes, 1998, p. 107)¹¹.

That night, the 317^th underwent violent artillery barrages and the command post lost all communications. Colonel Cameron was concerned because he had not received any reports from 1^st Battalion. Colonel Cameron sent Major Hayes to Dieulouard to find the location of the battalion and their circumstances. Upon arriving at 1^st Battalion, both Major Hayes and the battalion executive officer, Major “Curly” Burnett, agreed that Lieutenant Colonel Norman was suffering from exhaustion and had lost control of his companies. Major Hayes returned to the 317^th command post to notify Colonel Cameron of the situation. Colonel Cameron insisted on traveling to 1^st Battalion despite the extremely heavy interdictory fire. When he arrived at the coal factory in which the battalion was located, he quickly determined that Lieutenant Colonel Norman was exhausted and not in control of the situation. He was relieved of command and replaced with Major “Curly” Burnett. He was nicknamed “Curly” due to his baldness (Hayes, 1998, p. 108)¹².

At 0225 the next morning, soldiers from 3^rd Battalion attempted another crossing under the cover of darkness. Again, they were met with heavy opposition. The Germans counterattacked and pushed 3^rd Battalion back across the Moselle. L Company was hit especially hard and Auzie Johnston was one of those taken prisoner along “with quite a large number of men” (Bredbenner, 1999, p. 140)¹³. In the morning all three battalions pulled back and established defensive positions. 1^st Battalion dug in on the high ground of Jezainville. 2^nd Battalion pulled back to Vandieres. 3^rd Battalion stayed in the high ground west of Pont-a-Mousson (Bredbenner, 1999, p. 26). 317^th then began its preparation for a deliberate crossing of the Moselle River.

As the 317^th moved into its defensive positions west of the Moselle, strategies were being considered on how and where to cross. General McBride called for a meeting of battalion commanders at the regimental headquarters and asked for suggestions on how to cross the river, which was out of character. It was rumored that General McBride was given an ultimatum by Patton to cross the river or face being relieved. Lieutenant Colonel Murray, the 2^nd Battalion Commander, stated that he believed they had tried to cross on too broad of a front without proper planning and support. He proposed the attack occur on a narrow front with concentrated support. General McBride agreed (Murrell, 2001, p. 87).

Colonel Cameron wanted to search out fords across the river to make the crossing easier. He assigned the task to Major Hayes. Major Hayes went to the town of Limey, located to the west of Pont-a-Mousson, and got in contact with some French resistance fighters. They informed him of a local priest who was very knowledgeable on the history of the Romans and their trek into Gaul. The priest informed Major Hayes that the Romans used a ford located north of the Isle de Scarpone in the Moselle near Dieulouard. Major Hayes found the ford exactly where the priest described it. In addition, he located another crossing that was located between two German units. The Germans had failed to coordinate, which meant that there were no outposts or Germans at the site. Major Hayes reported the potential crossing sites to Colonel Cameron who immediately approved them. Due to limited daylight, further examination of the sites was not done until the next day. For the next two days, the 317^th continued to recon the two crossing sites of the Moselle. 1^st and 2^nd Battalions moved into the Le Pretre forest to prepare for the attack while B and K Companies maintained patrols along the river (Bredbenner, 1999, p. 28).

On September 11^th the 80^th Infantry Division received the XII Corps order to cross the Moselle on September 12^th (Bredbenner, 1999, p. 74). That afternoon, fighter bombers from the XIX Tactical Air Command bombed Mousson Hill, which was the dominant terrain feature on the east side of the Moselle from which the Germans observed the 317th (Bredbenner, 1999, p. 87). Soldiers prepared for the crossing by conducting maintenance on their weapons and studying maps of the bridgehead. Under the cover of darkness, 317^th soldiers were moved into position. At 0400, on September 12, the attack began with the 610^th Tank Destroyer Battalion and the 702^nd Tank Battalion providing smoke cover. 3^rd Battalion crossed the ford located on the northern end of the Isle de Scarpone. The 1^st Battalion crossed at the site located between the German units. 2^nd Battalion followed 1^st Battalion with orders to pass through and attack Landremont. Unlike the preceding attempts, no casualties were taken during the crossing. It was not until they began to assault the high ground east of the Moselle that they received any casualties. The crossing at the fords especially surprised the Germans because they did not know of its existence (Hayes, 1998, p.109). By 0830 on the morning of the 12^th, the 317^th became the first unit to cross the Moselle and then seized all their objectives at Bezaumont, Saint Genvieve, and La Falaise. Construction immediately began on the pontoon and footbridges. A bright, sunny day was about to emerge (Bredbenner, 1998, p. 87).

The Germans recognized the consequence of this bridgehead and tried in vain over following days to destroy it and push the Americans back. Action at the Moselle bridgehead continued through the end of the month. During the month of September, the 317^th Infantry Regiment suffered over 3000 casualties, which is almost an entire regiment. According to Major Hayes, “The 80^th Division suffered about 15,000 casualties during its entire period in combat so during one month, the 317^th incurred about 20% of the total division casualties. For this unswerving devotion to duty and mission the 317^th Infantry received the Presidential Citation for Distinguished Unit” (1998, p. 110).

Many veterans who fought at the battle at Pont-a-Mousson recall it as one of the worst battles of the war. It was a hard fought battle which, except only for the gasoline shortage, may not have been fought. Nonetheless, it was a ferocious confrontation which, in the end, was won by the hard fighting soldiers of the 317^th Infantry Regiment, “By Arms and By Courage.”

Bibliography

Balish, Harry LTC. (1950, January) The Battle of Nancy, A Double Envelopment. Military Review, 16-23.

Blumenson, Martin (1996). The Patton Papers, 1940-1945. New York: Da Capo Press.

Bredbenner, Edgar E. Jr. 80^th “Blue Ridge” Infantry Division. Paducah, Kentucky: Turner Publishing.

Cole, Hugh M. (1984). The Lorraine Campaign. Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History.

Hayes, James Colonel (Retired) (1998). The Valient Die Once. Personal memoirs.

Hayes, James Colonel (Retired) (2002). E-mail to Dean J. Dominique

Murell, Robert (2001). Stories of the Men of the 80^th Infantry Division in World War II. Oakmont, PA: Self published.

Murrell, Robert (1995). Operational History of the 317^th Infantry Regiment in World War II. Oakmont, PA: Self published.

Patton, George S. General (1947). War As I Knew It. New York: Houghton Mifflin.

Notes

¹ Hayes e-mail. Hayes, James Colonel (Retired) (2002). E-mail to Dean J. Dominique

² Blum p 530. Blumenson, Martin (1996). The Patton Papers, 1940-1945. New York: Da Capo Press.

³ Patton 120. Patton, George S. General (1947). War As I Knew It. New York: Houghton Mifflin.

⁴ Hayes 103. Hayes, James Colonel (Retired) (1998). The Valient Die Once. Personal memoirs.

⁵ Blum 539

⁶ Cole 54. Cole, Hugh M. (1984). The Lorraine Campaign. Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History.

⁷ Balish 17. Balish, Harry LTC. (1950, January) The Battle of Nancy, A Double Envelopment. Military Review, 16-23.

⁸ Cole 60

⁹ Hayes 103

¹⁰ Hayes 103

¹¹ Hayes 107

¹² Murrell 12. Murrell, Robert (1995). Operational History of the 317^th Infantry Regiment in World War II. Oakmont, PA: Self published.

¹³ Hayes 107

¹⁴ Hayes 108

¹⁵ Bred 140. Bredbenner, Edgar E. Jr. 80^th “Blue Ridge” Infantry Division. Paducah, Kentucky: Turner Publishing.

¹⁶ Bred 26

¹⁷ Mur 2001 87. Murell, Robert (2001). Stories of the Men of the 80^th Infantry Division in World War II. Oakmont, PA: Self published.

¹⁸ Bred 74

¹⁹ Bred 74

²⁰ Bred 87

²¹ Hayes 109

²² Bred 87

²³ Hayes 110