The importance of this Seminar and its contents, urges me to publish its contents to the reader. To read more of war issues , please
refer to the source of these following lines at
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1984/RRW.htm.
QUOTE ".....
Yahia Al Shaer
Operation Musketeer is the story of the 1956 British and French attempt to seize the Suez Canal from Egypt. Britain and to a lesser extent, France, relied on the Suez Canal as the economic lifeline to the oil fields of the Middle East. For almost 75 years, the canal had been administered by a British dominated company. In July 1956, Egypt's president, Gamnel Abdel Nasser, upset this arrangement when he nationalized the canal. To British Prime Minister Anthony Eden and French Premier Guy Mollet, the act was unacceptable because Nasser, to quote Eden, now had "his thumb on our windpipe." To be sure, the nationalization of the canal was only the final straw. Both men hated Nasser and wished to be rid of him: The Briton because Nasser was a threat to British influence in the Middle East and the Frenchman because he saw Nasser as the source of all trouble in Algeria.
Neither power was prepared to respond immediately. France's amphibious capability was lacking and Britain's was hopelessly out of date. Obviously, a lengthy period of preparation was in order.
The story of the allies preparation for the invasion is also the story of their attempt to persuade international opinion, specifically that of the United States, that resort to military force was necessary. They never succeeded in this endeavor.
As the preparation or planning stage developed, a new player entered the drama. Israel had resolved to attack Egypt before the latter could flush out her rapidly growing arsenal of Soviet arms. When the British and French learned this, their rational for seizing the canal evolved from one of regaining lost property to one of safeguarding a vital waterway from hostile neighbors. The three powers subsequently agreed on a schedule of events to prosecute the war.
Musketeer, with all functioning properly, would have been extremely difficult to pull off. The British magnified their difficulties, however, by a massive failure of intelligence that had political rather than military repercussions. The British Chiefs of Service insisted that a World War II style amphibious operation was essential if Egypt were to be defeated. The French pleaded for a rapid seizure of objectives from an obviously feeble opponent. The British prevailed and their week long air offensive fueled a period during which their fragile economy undercut their ability to continue the war.
In late October, Israel attacked. Her army seized strategic objectives so rapidly, however, that the threat to the canal had ebbed before the allies were ready to act. When England and France finally did invade, tri-power collusion was transparent.
The operation once begun, went according to plan. On November 5, British and France paratroopers landed at key positions in Port Said and seized strategic objectives. Additional drops were made that afternoon. The following day, the allies conducted a surface assault. This stage witnessed the first combat ship to shore heliborne movement. These attacks also succeeded splendidly, but the war was almost over.
Britain's economy was collapsing. In order to gain American aid, the British government was forced to accept the American call for a cease fire. France had no choice but to go along. 44 hours after the first paratroopers landed, the war was over. The allies held only the northern end of the Suez Canal.
The British defeat was primarily political. At first, defeat seemed profound, but internal political effects were short-lived. Nasser's later political miscalculations had the effect of lessening long term international consequences not only for Britain, but the West as well.
The French shrugged off the entire episode. Algeria was the real issue. Egypt was a momentary and insignificant sideshow. If they chose to, the French could take comfort in the performance of their armed forces. The men proved tough, well trained and well led. Equipment was modern and tactics were effectively and efficiently applied. In every respect, the French army was the paragon of a modern fighting force.
Egypt had fought poorly. Nasser, however, did nothing to correct the obvious inadequacies of his forces. The military debacle would be repeated in 1967 but on a larger scale.
For the British, military lessons were more complex. Britain's Mediterranean system of military bases demonstrated little value. Her forces had to rely on the aircraft carrier as the principal means of combat support. Operational control was muddled and actual operations were hindered by outdated equipment. The helicopter was a welcome addition to the amphibious operation, but it mandated a modification of tactics.
British military success was severely limited by political failure, economic weakness and intelligence short sightedness. None of these failings could be attributed to the British fighting man. In the limited time permitted, he had done more than was asked. The successes that England achieved are a tribute exclusively to him and the first rate quality of his small unit leadership.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Synopsis i
Introduction 1 Chapters
I. A Focus on Nasser (The Historical and Political Setting) 3
II. The Knives Come Out (The Birth of the Crisis and the Beginning of planning) 19
III. "Out of the Frying Pan..." (Military Preparations) 27
IV. "...And Into the Fire" (Collusion with Israel) 61
V. The Policeman Arrive (The War in Sinai and the British Air Offensive) 73
IV. The World's Shortest War (The Invasion of the Suez Canal) 99
VII. After the Ball Was Over (Aftermath and Consequences) 123
Epilogue 135
Chapter Notes 139
Bibliography 161
ANNEX A Comparison of Military Aircraft A-1
MAPS AND CHARTS
The Suez Canal 6, 52
European Oil Routes 8
France and Algeria 10, 38
Israel and Egypt 15
Britain in the Mediterranean 20, 74
Lower Egypt 30, 32, 42, 44
The Northern Canal 36, 116, 120
Sinai Operations 46, 62, 66, 76, 78, 80, 86
Port Said 56, 100, 102, 104
Royal Marine Operations 108, 110, 112, 114
Operational Command Structure 40
Assault Phases 98
INTRODUCTION On November 5, 1956, Britain and France launched an invasion of the Suez Canal. This brief war, known also as "Operation Musketeer" witnessed less than 42 hours of ground combat and represented the dying gasp of history's most far- flung colonial empire.
In the United States, many have condemned this incident as typical colonialist behavior while others have cynically dismissed it as the world's shortest war. Such perfunctory analyses are extremely short-sighted as this war, however brief, marks a milestone of enormous import to our postwar world. The careful student of Musketeer can receive powerful insight into the evolution of modern warfare and a broader understanding of our current world.
Britain, in an attempt to safeguard her perceived economic well-being, joined a nascent conspiracy with France and Israel to attack Egypt. In the past, use of military force had proven a highly successful means for creation and maintenance of Britain's 19th century empire. Now, this method seemed to act as a catalyst that accelerated the dismemberment of its 20th century successor. To be sure, the allies possessed overwhelming military strength and were on the verge of delivering a crushing military embarassment to Egypt and her president, Gamel Abdel Nasser. Yet, they suffered a humiliating political defeat, the repercussions of which are felt to this day.
The allies and the United States learned that within the Arab world lives a spirit of nationalism that, given proper circumstances, can transcend military defeat. Britain learned the profound and sobering truths that her economy lacked the vitality and her political process the unity to withstand the censure that greets aggressive war in the modern age.
The student of purely military events can also reap rewards. This brief combat demonstrates clearly to him the necessity of carrier aviation and the indispensability of the good soldier. It also saw the birth of a soon to be dominant feature in modern amphibious warfare: The heliborne ship to shore movement.
Our world has clearly become more complex. Musketeer can aid one to understand some effects of this complexity. This war, like most, began as a result of failure by politicians. It marks the modern age in that it also ended through the failure of a politician. Indeed, the backdrop to Operation Musketeer and the lessons available for the professional officer are so dominated by political considerations, that they cannot be fully understood unless the story is allowed to unfold in its political context. It is from this context that the theme of this presentation emerges: The most grave peril for a modern military operation lies in the evolution and currents of the national political process.
I. A FOCUS ON NASSER "The canal is certainly an astounding work, and it is an extraordinary pity that it was not made by an English company and kept in our hands because it is our highway to India." Edward, Prince of Wales
The twenty years after World War II witnessed the beginning of the seemingly all encompassing economic, ideological, political and quasi-military competition of the United States and the Soviet Union. Even a perceptive observer can be lost in the enormity of this struggle and fail to connect the effect of other almost equally important interwoven strands in the complex tapestry of our current world. Two of these threads are the emergence of nationalism and the decline of colonialism. When combined, they give the appearance, even the actuality, that the burgeoning of the former inevitably accelerates the latter. These factors are the basis of the Suez story and create the currents that swept several disparate antagonists together.
The lingering colonial empires that existed at the close of World War II were the remnants of 19th Century European creations. To many Europeans, "empire" seemed almost an institutional imperative. To the English, Britain was not an island of the same name, but a mighty empire. The jingoism of the previous century remains a precious part of the most storied literature of a common language. La France was then more properly conceived of as Greater France. Even the Kaiser spoke unhesitatingly of "Our Place in the Sun." To be sure, these empires grew primarily through the efforts of military adventurers and economic exploiters. Still, these men were followed by humanitarians whose effect was immense. England extended her hegemony over much of the world, but she also eradicated slavery and other barbarisms wherever she found them. Underneath much of this humanitarianism lay a darker value. The average empire builder was certain that the natives lacked the wherewithall to progress without the enlightened leadership of the white man. "The White Man's Burden" may have been noble sentiment but it was clearly patronizing and no doubt as resented as the more colloquial "Guard your wallet, here come the wogs."
The desirability of colonialism from the local's viewpoint is academic. The military power and apparent superiority of European institutions had the dual effect of discouraging revolt in colonial possessions and encouraging good behavior by rulers in areas not yet actually subjugated by European powers. World Wars I and II shattered the illusion and reality of European might. Britain and France had been sorely pressed and both had been forced to dragoon colonial levies to prop themselves up. Even with this help, France had been beaten and England had only barely survived. After World War II, few of the colonials who had fought, considered a return to their former subservience appropriate.
Her own historical inadequacies notwithstanding, the United States became a self appointed conscience and pressured her European allies to divest themselves of their colonies. The world's newest menace, the Soviet Union also added to the problem. The much weakened colonial masters, flailing amid fermenting nationalist feelings must have seemed ideal targets to the opportunists in the Kremlin. Russian propaganda beat an incessant drum for world revolution. Promises of aid to movements for national liberation were routinely given; on occasion, these promises were kept.
In this larger context, the Suez War is more clearly understood with an examination of the positions of the parti- cipants. By 1956, much of the British Empire was gone or was scheduled for independence. Curiously, where England actually ruled, she was prepared, however reluctantly, to permit independence. She had steered a partition course for the jewel of her empire and sponsored the new nations of India and Pakistan.
Yet, where she did not rule in fact, she was often unready to relinquish her power.1 One such example was her sponsorship of the 1955 Baghdad Pact by which friendly, if unrepresentative regimes in the Persian Gulf area were guaranteed her presence.2 A second example is an underlying current of this paper:
The centrality of the Suez Canal to British concerns. The canal was and remains a narrow waterway gouged from the inhospitable isthmus that joined Africa to Asia. To a romantically inclined student of the British Empire, the names Port Said, Ismailia, and Suez conjure Click here to view image exotic visions that the rural surroundings of a midwest upbringing cannot equal. A midsummer traverse of that waterway, however, will introduce shattering reality.
The shabbiness, even putrid seediness of its banks aside, the Suez Canal was so strategically located that its importance at the time cannot be understated. In 1953, the following quote was issued in a presitigous journal: "As an international crossroads, Suez is so important that the great world powers must of necessity, either establish a foothold in it or at least make sure of its availability to them. If I know who was to be its master ten or twenty-five years from now, then I should know who has mastery of the whole world as well."3 Technology has reduced this statement to ludicrous hyper- bole. In 1956, few would have challenged the sagacity of its author. In the period from its completion in 1869 after ten years effort,(4) until the end of World War II, the Canal was the political lifeline if not the glue of the British Empire.
As the Empire retreated from India to Oman, the political value of the canal diminished. While this political lifeline was shrinking in importance, the value of the canal as an economic lifeline was not. In the pre-supertanker days, two thirds of the canal's tonnage was carried in small oil tankers. In 1955, northbound tankers carried 66.9 million tons of petroleum products. Of these, 20.5 million tons were bound for Britain. Additionally British exports of refined petroleum products accounted for 25 percent of southbound tanker traffic.
Britain was by far the largest user of the canal accounting Click here to view image
for 28.3 percent of all tonnage. As oil consumption in Britain increased, so did the importance of the canal to the British economy.5 In all, approximately 25 percent of British trade passed through the canal. Additionally, the British Government owned 44 per cent of the Suez Canal Company and a like share of the canal's revenue passed to the British Exchequer. England counted on receiving these revenues of approximately $45 million per year for the twelve remaining years of the Suez concession of 1866.6 The Suez Canal was also the military lifeline by which Britain could protect the Persian Gulf oil fields, her principal source of supply. Consequently, the canal wore an immense psychological impor- tance for the average Briton.
In 1956, Britain remained an enormously self reliant nation that had never shrunk from protecting herself and her interests. If military means were required, then military solutions were unhesitatingly imposed. This afterall was the principal lesson of Munich. This mindset also applied imperial solutions to post-imperial problems. Britain had not yet grasped the new notion that her best interests could be best swerved by able diplomacy.
France's position was entirely different. She was not disposed at all to granting independence to colonies. So wedded were even her socialist governments to the idea of Greater France that she was eager to use force to maintain her preeminance. Yet, this willingness was not sufficient.
Click here to view imageBy 1954, France had been pushed out of Vietnam and was hunkering down for a fight to the finish in Algeria. Loss of Indo- China had been a blow to French pride and a genuine loss of resources; divestiture of Algeria would be even more abhorrent. When French politicians alluded of Greater France, Algeria was precisely what they had in mind.7
France like England prior to the North Sea oil find, was forced to rely on external sources of petroleum. Algeria promised a remedy to this difficulty. Geologists had reported that within Algeria lay potentially large deposits of petroleum that if developed, could ensure energy self sufficiency for France at least for the near future. Clearly the French were prepared to expend a major effort to hold Algeria.
To this end, French politicians analyzed the political situation in Morocco and Tunisia and determined that resistance to burgeoning independence movements in those colonies would only detract from the effort needed in Algeria. The politicians concluded, albeit reluctantly, that the best course of action was to grant independence to Morocco and Tunisia and concentrate all resources in Algeria.(8)
This concern was uppermost in French minds when the Suez crisis broke.Into the affairs of these devolving empires stepped Abdel Gamel Nasser. Since the early career of Napolean, Britain had been involved in the affairs of Egypt, then a province of the Ottoman Empire. British occupation of Egypt began in 1882 ostensibly to safeguard the canal but in actuality to bolster the mordant Ottomans against expansionist imperial Russia. At about this time Britain acquired her share of the Suez Canal Company by paying the gambling debts of an Egyptian Sultan. Egypt gained nominal independence in 1922 but Britain retained effective control.(9
The British repeatedly employed highhanded and violent methods to retain their position. The last Egyptian King, the infamously corpulent and decadent Farouk, weakly acquiesced to save his throne.10 At the same time, the British participated in some of Farouk's demagoguery by permitting him to close the canal to Israeli shipping.
British violence in the 1952 canal zone riots and the British act of reneging on a 1946 agreement to withdraw militarily from Egypt were the last straws to ardent Egyptian nationalists.(11 In 1952 a group of Egyptian officers led by Colonel Nasser deposed Farouk and replaced him in the interim, with General Mohammed Naguib.
Naguib was only a figurehead and was eventually superseded by Nasser. Nasser was something that the British had not previously encountered. He was a rabid nationalist rather than a dynast and he belonged to a clique of totally unpredictable officers who were known in the language of the day as "unguided missiles."(12 He and the officers who deposed Farouk were undisguised anglophobes. They saw England as Egypt's foremost enemy, an evil to be confronted and taught a lesson.1(3 To this end, Nasser, a dark skinned man, never tired of relating his personal shame at racial slurs he claimed to have received from British officers.
Born in 1917 in upper or southern Egypt, he was a true son of the Nile who longed for the opportunity to harness the river for his country's good. But his designs did not end with internal development or nationalism. Nasser ardently pursued a state policy called pan-arabism that featured a strict devotion to Islam. Since Algerians were Muslims and brother Arabs, their national liberation became a natural mission.
Nasser immediately confronted the French government and the French Army, both of whom viewed pan-arabism as a force designed to undermine the entire position of France in the Mediterranean. French Premier Guy Mollet saw very early that rapproachement with Nasser over the question of Algeria was impossible.14 And as the situation in Algeria became more and more difficult, France began to blame Nasser for all her colonial troubles.15 Ironically, the French deluded themselves. Nasser had provided considerable moral support from Radio Cairo but his physical assistance did not become truly significant until after he had been attacked by Britain and France.16
Britain and, to a lesser extent, the United States and France attempted to pursue a policy of appeasement toward Nasser. They had hoped he would eventually cease his torrent of anticolonial harangues as well as his flirtation with the Soviet Union.17 These attempts took form in the evacuation of British troops from Egypt, a process finally completed in 1954,18 and promises of joint Anglo-American aid to finance Nasser's coveted Aswan Dam.19
These were not enough. Nasser desired modern arms. France obviously was not a logical source. President Eisenhower was unwilling to sell Nasser arms unless they were accompanied by a U.S. advisory group. Eisenhower apparantly wanted such a group to prevent American arms from being used against Israel. Nasser refused to accept any controls. Britain still hoped to outbid the Soviets for Nasser's favor. France also began to offer subtle hints of aid.20 On September 27, 1955,
Nasser dashed all expectations by announcing a massive arms deal with Czechoslovakia.21 Additionally, observers in Cairo began to report that a widespread Soviet cultural presence, especially in the cinema, was replacing previous western influences.22 Attempts to placate Nasser were ended completely when on July 19, 1956, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles announced that the United States would not finance the Aswan project. Two days later, Britain announced that they also would not support Aswan.23
The final player in this drama was Israel. Although this paper is restricted to the Anglo-French intervention, the political and military maneuvering of the antagonists make separation of that conflict from the Sinai war that immediately preceded it impossible. Click here to view image
Israel is a unique phenomenon in this century. It is a country established by immigration in response to an ideal created in another time and place. Reflection on Israel will never produce consensus. While most Israelis see their country as the result of legitimate aspirations by a persecuted people, most Arabs hold a far different appraisal. Nasser, of course, was not reticent in expressing his opinion:
"Israel is a stooge of Imperialism. They (the west) strengthen Israel so they can annihilate us and convert us into a state of refugees."(24
Nasser's aspirations and the unending round of Arab guerrilla warfare and Israeli reprisals marked Nasser in the Israeli mind as the gravest threat to Israel's survival. Selected comments by Israeli leaders show their concern about the unliklihood of any rapproachement with an Egypt under
Nasser. From Abba Eban: "His policy was one nation, one empire, one leader and there was little difficulty in determining who that leader might be."(25
From David Ben-Gurion: "Nasser has the capacity, the vision and the means to solve his people's problems. He lacked the courage, however, to solve real problems. He allowed himself to be seduced by the glitter of armaments. Now it is too late and he is caught in his own excesses."(26
From Golda Meir:
"Nasser incessently encouraged the Fedayeen. Radio Cairo trumpeted violent anti Israel propaganda. 'Weep, oh Israel, the day of extermination draws near.'"27
As 1956 progressed, the influx of Russian arms to Egypt, the increasing level of mideast violence and Nasser's propaganda left a worried circle of Israeli leaders. They shared with the leaders of Britain and France. hope for a chance to strike at Nasser while it was advantageous for them to do so. In late July, Nasser rashly granted them an opportunity.
II. THE KNIVE'S COME OUT "We can't have this swine sitting across our communications." Winston Churchill
The case has been made that the Suez incident of 1956 was the result of a collision of two men who felt only the deepest personal loathing for each other.1 To be sure the events incidental and subsequent to the nationalization of the canal intensified these feelings, but ample evidence exists that British Prime Minister Anthony Eden as early as 1955 was looking for an excuse to destroy Nasser.2 Eden had been preparing an elaborate case. He had declared that in every area of the mideast where unrest occurred, strong evidence of Egyptian involvement existed.3 Guy Mollet needed no convincing. He shared Eden's obsession with Nasser and was not at all hesitant to liken the Egyptian to Adolf Hitler.4 Mollet and the French army also anticipated a showdown as they were certain that Nasser was the root of all of France's colonial problems.5
On July 26, 1956, Nasser gave everyone an excuse. On that day while delivering an emotional address in which he decried the imperialism of the west, he announced that Egyptian officials had taken control of the Suez Canal.6 The concession to the canal company still had a full twelve years to run.
Nasser's motives for seizure are open to question. Most speculate that he saw revenues from the canal as a substitute for the Aswan funding he had lost one week prior.7 Most likely
Click here to view imagethis is the case although Nasser later related he had done this to show the western powers that Egypt could not be intimidated.8 It is important to note that his statement of defiance came long after he had survived the Suez intervention.
Eden moved promptly. That same day, he ordered all departments that would be concerned in a strike against Egypt to prepare an immediate analysis of the effort required to seize the canal.9 There is no evidence that at any time prior to the actual beginning of hostilities, Eden ever considered not using force.
On July 27, Eden met with the service chiefs to receive their assessment. What he heard did not make him overly hopeful, for the chiefs advised that England could not mount a sufficiently powerful expedition for two months.10 The reasons for this shocking delay were many.
The Navy was considered combat ready,11 but she had only two landing ships that could be pressed into an amphibious operation.12 The parachute forces had become ill-prepared as a result of numerous other duties that had precluded training in their primary role.13 The three parachute battalions in Cyprus had no training parachutes and would have to be flown to England for refresher training.14 Additionally, Britain possessed only five squadrons of troop carrying planes. These were only enough to transport one parachute battalion with its equipment.15
The eight infantry battalions in Cyprushad no landing craft. The nearest supporting artillery would have to be drawn from NATO forces in Germany and another armored division stationed in Libya was unusable as a result of a lack of tank transporters16 and the anticipated refusal of the Libyan government to permit these tanks to cross the Egyptian border to attack Egypt.17
To Nasser's credit, he and his intelligence analysts had also concluded that England could not act against them within two months. They were short sighted, however, in that they excluded the possibility of any source of attack other than England.18 There were enemy forces much nearer.
Nasser had overlooked both France and Israel. France had strong post-war ties to Israel; Britain did not. In the early stages of the operation, Britain undoubtedly wanted no help from Israel. Such an arrangement might injure her Anglo-Arab alliances.19 France on the other hand was indif- ferent to the Arabs but did not initially believe she could act independently of Britain. Mollet rationalized, and probably correctly, that France and Israel together could pull off the operation, but without England, could not withstand the combined force of U.S. and Soviet disapproval.20
As the French were anxious for action against Nasser, they opted to stick with Britain.
Unlike the British, the French were not at all displeased by the Egyptian seizure of the canal. Their analysis was more reasoned and distinctly more pragmatic. They saw nationalization as the casus belli that would finally enable them to be rid of Nasser.21
Unlike the British, the French began planning with clearly defined political objectives. These were:
1) Ensure sources and routes for imported petroleum. 2) Protect Israel. 3) Attack the source of supply for the Algerian rebels.(22
France had in all reality been at war continuously for 17 years. Consequently her state of readiness was quite high, especially when compared to Britain. Still, her liabilities tied her to Britain. Short range Mystere fighter squadrons needed bases almost within Egypt's borders. Long range fighters were available in Germany, but they would need bases in Cyprus. Eight infantry battalions in southern
France were combat ready but these lacked the necessary sea transports. French Defense Minister Maurice Bourges-Maunoury wished to act with utmost speed, but he estimated that France could not be ready for four weeks. If she had to wait on Britain, it would be six weeks.(23
Time weighed heavily on every possible plan. The politicians who governed England understood this and haggled at some length with their more methodical service chiefs for prompt military action.(24 The government realized that a fast operation in the face of Nasser's action would meet with protest but would retain the political and public support that was necessary to sustain it.(25 Someone suggested to the chiefs that they consider an immediate paratrooper drop to seize and hold the canal until follow-on supporting forces could arrive.
The chiefs estimated that such a force could not hold on longer than 10 days and as such could not be supported. They concluded their analysis with a not too subtle hint that they would resign if the cabinet insisted on immediate use of airborne troops.(26
The generals proposed a World War II type amphibious operation. It is still not clear why they opted for such an elaborate procedure in a situation where politics clearly called for utmost speed. Perhaps they remembered the success, that followed the detailed planning and methodical execution of El Alamein. Certainly they remembered Arnheim. In any event, they were insistent that if they had to attack Egypt, they would attack her their own way.27 Moshe Dayan suggests that they had clearly overestimated the capabilities of their opponents.28 Certain French circles are less charitable.
They accused the British service chiefs of adopting a deliberate approach for more petty reasons. Britain was clearly not ready. A methodical operation, using British naval transpor- tation and a preponderance of British fighting men would be commanded by British officers. A hasty action would of necessity use mostly French troops. The British, as their critics reason, were reluctant to accept an operation where the superior preparedness of the French would make them the senior partner.(29
Despite serious reservations, the French entered enthusiasti- cally into planning. Even as Britain was organizing her planning staff, the French advised that two combat ready divisions, the 10th Parachute and the 5th Light Mechanized would be provided for the operation.30
Three other domestic issues of significance were discussed during this initial series of planning conferences. All three would collectively injure the government's effort.
The Chancellor of the Exchequer reported that the treasury could endure the cost of the operation without undue strain. If, however, the oil pipelines across Syria were cut or the canal was blocked - well, Mr. MacMillan didn't know what would happen then.(31 Eden directed his planners to prevent the latter; the former was beyond his control.
The second issue was one that the Prime Minister could only tough out. During his meeting with the service chiefs, Eden was astonished to learn that all the chiefs did not support his intention to invade Egypt. The foremost dissenter was none other than First Sea Lord, Earl Mountbatton, a member of the Royal Family.32 Mountbatton's initial objection was mainly political. He was concerned that the opposition leader, Mr. Hugh Gaitskell, was not involved in initial discussions.
This was not an oversight. Eden had been alarmed at the degree of pacificism rampant in Labour ranks and surely sus- pected that some members placed devotion to socialism above love for Britain. Further, he believed Gaitskell was too weak to preserve secrecy if Labour were included in the planning.33
A last objection came from the government's experts in international law. They advised the Prime Minister that unless Nasser closed the canal, any legal brief that Britain might prepare to justify a forceful repossession would be feeble and virtually unsupportable. Eden literally shredded the opinion and threw it in his lawyers' faces.34 His contempt for their opinion would prove to be extraordinarily harmful.
So ended the initial phase of the crisis. The decision had been made. Nasser - he more so than Egypt - would be attacked. Yet, the ability to respond immediately in a forceful way was almost nonexistent. A signal was needed.
To demonstrate their concern, the British announced that a task force contaning the carriers Bulwark, Theseus and Ocean would maneuver in the Eastern Mediterranean. Simultaneously, France announced the formation of a carrier battle group at Toulon consisting of the carriers Arromanch and Bois-Belleau and the battleship Jean Bart.35
Concurrently both governments took another step that did not go unnoticed. Britain suggested to her subjects in Egypt that they leave as soon as possible. France ordered her citizens to leave immediately.36 The more forceful directive of the French should have alerted Eden to the degree of resolve with which his partner had entered this adventure.
III. OUT OF THE FRYING PAN... "I must confess to the feeling that, save for the Almighty, only the British are capable of complicating affairs to such a degree."
Moshe Dayan The lack of preparedness and the resultant inability of Britain and France to hit quickly at their antagonist was undoubtedly galling to Eden and Mollet. Yet, the situation did not permit them the luxury of idleness. If they could have struck immediately when the canal was nationalized, they might have avoided the overwhelming opprobrium of inter- national opinion. As time passed, the necessity for resorting to force would obviously diminish, once the Egyptians demon- strated that they could efficiently operate the canal. The problem of the allies was obvious. They would have to sustain the image of the aggrieved party who only resorted to force after every possibility for peaceful arbitration had been exhausted.
Eden's primary obstacle to achieving a forceful solution was the American Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles. Dulles clearly despised Nasser but not to the extent that he would enthusiastically endorse any use of force against him. Eden sought to neutralize Dulles by going over his head. He immediately importuned Eisenhower by urging "a firm stand."
He claimed that "our interests and yours throughout the Middle East will, we are convinced, be irretrievably undermined." He went on to state to the American president his doubts that Nasser had any intent to manage the canal with any sense of international obligation.1 When he ascertained that the American interpretation of "a firm stand" would probably preclude support for armed intervention, he ressurrected an old bugaboo certain to gain their attention. He put a monetary value of approximately $500 million on the Soviet equipment then in Egypt.
He claimed that the presence of this equipment and Soviet advisors had emboldened the Egyptians and made them agressive and expansionist.2 As the intervention approached, he wrote to Eisenhower and defined his perception of the Soviet-Egyptian relationship:
"There is no doubt in our minds that Nasser whether he likes it or not, is now effectively in Russian hands, just as Mussolini was in Hitler's. It would be ineffective to show weakness to Nasser now in order to placate him as it was to show weakness to Mussolini. The only result was and would be to bring the two together."(3
In light of hindsight, Eden's inaccurate appraisal of Nasser's opportunistic neutralism seems grossly unfair. Nonetheless, it would be most unfair to Eden to suppose his sentiments were dishonest. Eden was a patriot of the first order. In 1915, he had left school at the age of 18the the war as a brigade major. His achievements were not without personal sorrow. His two brothers were killed in that conflict, just as his older son Simon perished in the second war.
In 1924, he was elected to Parliament and by 1931 was marked as a potential Prime Minister. In 1938 resigning as a matter of principle over Chamberlain's policy of appeasement.4 As someone so quickly proven right, he faced life with a confidence others do not possess. He had dedicated his life to opposing dictators and when he encountered a dictator, he knew how to deal with one. Even when he must have realized the failure that his policies had wrought, he could sum up his actions in one basic apology:
"A man with Colonel Nasser's record could not be allowed to have his thumb on our windpipe."5
Eden had another problem of international importance that could not blow up in his face if he were to continue with the assault on Egypt. If Egypt relied on Soviet technicians to operate her modern arsenal, these technicians could become casualties when fighting began. Warning the Soviets to stand aside would tip his hand. Saying nothing might mean the intervention of Soviet citizens with the full range of unsatisfactory ramifications. Fortunately for all concerned, the Russians solved that problem by withdrawing to Khartoum when the war began.6
French pleas to Washington were also immediate but more emotional. Foreign Minister Christian Pineau drew the parallel of Hitler occupying the Rhine land for Ambassador Douglas Dillon. After expressing alarm about the evils ahead, Pineau demanded Washington's approval within twenty-four hours for diversion from NATO of two squadrons of Mystere IV aircraft to Israel. (At this time, there is no evidence of collusion Click here to view image
with Israel, this paragraph not withstanding.) He then informed Dillon that a plan to seize the canal zone was under consideration.7
Britain and France were not maneuvering in a vacuum. Nasser was uncertain what Eden's reaction to nationalization would be, but he knew it would be violent. But, as stated earlier, he knew no feasible reaction could be forthcoming for two months. He was certain that given time, diplomacy would carry the day.8 He knew that to accomplish this he would need to do two things:
1) Ensure that the United States opposed the use of force by Britain and France.
He announced immediately that "The nationalization in no way affects Egypts international obligations. Freedom of shipping will in no way be affected. There is no one more anxious than Egypt to safeguard freedom of passage and the flourshing traffic in the canal."9 When his Foreign Office pointed out to Mr. Eden that it was in Egypt's best interest to operate the canal efficiently and not deny access for British and French shipping to ensure continuing revenues, Mr. Eden was not amused.(10
2) Operate the canal effectively.Nasser military preparations
Nasser also used his two months to make military pre- parations. Within a week of nationalization he redesignated the military administrative districts of Cairo, Alexandria, the Delta and Suez as operational commands. Click here to view image
Two days later he provided some muscle for these commands by withdrawing 30,000 troops from the Sinai. These were relocated in the approaches to Cairo in anticipation of a seaborne assault in the Nile Delta.11 Also withdrawn was the preponderance of his Sinai armor. These he put on the west bank of the Suez Canal from where they could support one of several defensive plans.12 This left Nasser with but six brigades in the Sinai.13 By October 29 1956, the date of the Israeli offensive, the number of soldiers in Sinai had dwindled to a militarily ineffective force of 30,000.(14
This realignment was in keeping with Egyptian strategy to temporarily give up Sinai and the Suez Canal if necessary, and defend in the Nile Delta and the approaches to Cairo. The presence of these forces, Nasser reasoned, would keep his government in power. This was important because Nasser assumed that as long as the government could maintain control, world opinion would continue to exert pressure on any invader and eventually force it to withdraw.15
The army
He assumed also that his army, despite the recent influx of modern arms, would be defeated.16 This assumption was based on a realistic assessment of his military preparedness. He had a standing army of 90,000 organized into five divisions of sixteen brigades. (30,000 were stationed east of the Suez Canal.) These brigades were constituted in infantry (10 brigades), coastal defense forces (1 brigade), medium machine guns (1 brigade), anti-aircraft forces (1 brigade) and armor (three brigades, one of which was a skeleton force). This army was being equipped with a superb Soviet assault rifle and with modern Russian tanks.
The change in weapons, however, would have to be accompanied by a change of tactics from a western orientation to a Soviet orientation. This could not be completed in a short time. Illustrative of this difficulty was the estimate of the UN force commander that only 50 of the 200 Soviet tanks were operational.
Nasser's air force
The situation in Nasser's air force was equally sobering.
He possessed 100 modern MiG-15 fighter planes that were equal to or better than anything the allies or Israel possessed. But only two squadrons of these MiGs or a total of 30 planes could be considered operational.
His remaining fighters were 27 obsolescent craft of British manufacture that were organized into two squadrons. His 60 transports would be of dubious value in the locally defensive conflict he anticipated. His bomber command was even more unprepared. Only 10 of his 50 Russian made Ilyushins were minimally operational.
Nasser did not believe that this situation would markedly improve because many of his pilots were training in the Soviet Union and would be unavailable once a war began.17
This assessment was shared by Moshe Dayan when he informed the French that he supported them in their insistence on rapid movement. He was certain that a plan calling for a swift advance and relying on flexible commanders would quickly crumple Egypt's organized forces.18
Nasser did not anticipate an end to the fighting after the defeat of his organized forces. He planned to set up a guerrilla or resistance headquarters at Tanta in the Nile Valley. To this end, he began to establish caches of small arms throughout the country and several small radio stations to supplant Radio Cairo.19 After fighting actually began, Nasser confided to a newspaper correspondent that he was prepared to resist the British and the French with a guerrilla compaign.20
As fighting was underway at the time of this claim, Nasser's disclosure seems curious at best and may be interpreted as an attempt to retain some western credibility. It could even be a manifestation of Nasser's egocentric personality. In any event, the emergence of a seemingly coordinated effort to reinstate Radio Cairo and the virilence of the resistance in Port Said would indicate that Nasser's claim was more than an idle boast.
Port Said
The Egyptians considered the Port Said area to be militarily worthless. The city had been built on a landfill created by Ferdinand de Lesseps when he dredged the ditch that became the Suez Canal. Access to the city from the sea was relatively unlimited. As such, it was virtually defenseless. Nasser envisioned no real effort to defend it because defenders could be bottled up and annihilated. Consequently, the city was not fortified and few anti-aircraft weapons were installed.
The only large guns were those left behind by the British. The garrison was limited to two battalions of reserve infantry. Click here to view image
If the city was a trap for the defenders, Nasser hoped to make it so for the attackers in case Port Said were an objective. He planned to marshal his force some twenty-five miles south of Port Said and counter attack from the high ground west of Qantara where the attackers would be forced to exit from the causeway bordering the canal.21 Events would force him to change these plans.
The canal, while it was not to be defended, possessed a strategic importance that could not be ignored. If the canal were operable, the invaders might possess the leverage to continue as an occupation force.
Nasser was determined to close it if an attack were made. Originally, he possessed six block ships. These were filled with cement, bottles and scrap iron and moved to Great Bitter Lake. From this location, they could be moved into position to close the canal on brief notice.22 In time more such ships were added.
The allies as attackers, carried out far more detailed planning. This planning would not be uneventful or uncomplicated. As stated earlier, the British service chiefs expected the operation would take the form of a classic World War II amphibious assault. They immediately cast about for the proper officer to plan and supervise such an event. They settled rapidly on Lieutenant General Sir Hugh Stockwell, an energetic and aggressively competent officer who was at that time commanding an army corps in Germany. Stockwell returned immediately to London and set up a planning staff in the Click here to view image
bowels of the Defense Ministry.23 As his deputy, Stockwell was given the colorful, hard fighting Frenchman, Major General Andre Beaufre. Beaufre was at that time the commander of the Algerian department that was the scene of that insur- rection's most bitter fighting.
Beaufre was a bluff, blunt-spoken man possessed of a gift to express most consisely a bitter and critical cynicism toward all that displeased him.
It was he who provided contemporary insight to the shortcomings and fatal misconceptions of British planning. Beaufre was also professionally close to Charles DeGaulle. It was to DeGaulle that Beaufre reported, immediately after receiving his assignment. DeGaulle had immediate misgivings about British resolution and advised Beaufre to set up a separate but parallel French planning staff. Beaufre took DeGaulle's advice.24
France entered planning with clearly defined political objectives. Britain did not. Or, if she did, they were not communicated to General Stockwell in such a way that he was able to argue for a plan that would provide effective military support for the realization of them. Events would show that Stockwell would not be informed of other things that would have a direct effect on his ability to forecast necessities and events. The most significant of these was the eventual inclusion of Israel in the war.25
As Stockwell and his planning group turned to, the govern- ment as well as the service chiefs took action to speed the Click here to view image
date by which the developing plan could be implemented. On August 2, the Prime Minister mobilized 30,000 reservists. An analysis of the categories recalled reveals a heavy grouping of crane drivers, heavy construction and dock workers, postal technicians and transport specialists. Mr. Antony Head, later Minister of Defense, pointedly admitted that this was the nucleus of an occupation force. The reservists harbored no illusions about their destination.26 On August 4, the Army began flying combat troops to Cyprus. By August 12, this buildup had reached 5,000 men.27
Stockwell began planning with the knowledge that he would be the landing force commander tasked with carrying out his plan and that General Beaufre would be his deputy. The commander of the Naval Task Force (a rough equivalent of the American Commander, Amphibious Task Force) was Vice Admiral Sir Leonard Durnford-Slater.
The commander of the Air Task Force, Air Marshal Denis Barnett, was also selected at that time. He also was British.28 (A command schematic is at the opposite page.)
The entire chain of command would call for British officers commanding British forces and French officers commanding French forces. But at every level including sea and air, the British officer would be senior.29 This placed the French in a bind; they could protest, but if problems could not be resolved, they were stuck.30
Planning proceeded subject to limited political guidance.
The air forces were to suppress or destroy Egyptian air Click here to view image
forces from Cyprus or from carriers in the Mediterranean. They were also ordered to knock out Radio Cairo at an early date and keep it off the air.31 They were constrained by the understanding that weather could in all likelihood make amphibious operations in that portion of the world impossible after November 15.32 Additionally, the majority of shipping would sally from Algeria and Malta, thereby necessitating a movement phase of at least six days. During this time, the force would be out in the open and the intentions of the allies would be obvious.33
Stockwell and his group found that many of the factors making Port Said defenseless also made it an undersiderable initial objective. In addition to limited routes of egress to Egypt proper, Port Said had a very limited port facility and could easily be deprived of fresh water. Additionally, the only airfield capable of handling the envisioned support traffic was at Abu Suwweir, fifty miles to the south. Port Said palled in comparison to Alexandria with its fine port, readily accessable larger airfield and fine roads.
It was by these roads that Stockwell imagined his force would move against the Egyptian army and eventually occupy Cairo and Suez.34 Such was the basis of the outline plan that he presented on August 10 to an unofficial and secretive inter governmental committee consisting of Eden, Mollet, Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd, Pineau, Antony Head and Defense Minister Maurice Bourges-Maunoury. The plan called for an Click here to view image
assembly of forces near Cyprus, a rehearsal at that island and an assault over the beaches of Alexandria on September 15. The army would march on Cairo, defeat the Egyptian army and occupy the canal.
The committee rapidly approved Stockwell's plan.35 This was certainly a conventional approach to a problem that Stockwell (who in all likelihood had divined Eden's purpose) attempted to resolve by a military process.
He had chosen to land his force in the area where it could most rapidly be built up. Then, he focused immediately on eliminating the principal threat to the seizure of his assigned objective. The objective could then be seized and restored to working order free from Egyptian military interference.
It knowingly or unknowingly aimed at knocking the chief prop from under Nasser, specifically his army.
Perhaps it is unfair to Eden and Stockwell given their origins in imperial Britain, to chastise them for failing to see that the world would not sit still for this and that Britain had neither the internal political strength nor the international economic wherewithall to contain the power of the storm they would unleash. In any event, the decision had been made and Eden only began to perceive his danger once he determined that it was too late to pull out.
The next day, General Sir Charles Keightly, British commander in the Middle East was named supreme commander for the operation, now code named "HAMILCAR" after the father
Click here to view imageof the legendary Hannibal. True to the British spirit of cooperation (without loss of control), the portly French Admiral Pierre Barjot was selected as deputy commander.36
The choice of military objectives was hardly settled.
The French had no problem with Alexandria but pressed the British to be more aggressive. Their boldness was based not just on their appraisal of the Egyptian army but on a greater depth of political intelligence.
They knew, for example, that they would not be the only players in this drama. The then commander of the Israeli Defense Force, General Moshe Dayan, had stressed earlier to Bourges-Maunoury that Israel could neither tolerate Nasser's support of terrorism nor his closing of the Straits of Tiran. He stressed that an attack on Egypt was inevitable.
Obviously, that attack must be made before any influx of modern Russian arms could overwhelm the Jewish state.37 Without betraying Dayan's revelation, the French argued that Egypt was in reality a weakling and that all objectives could be won by suddenness and speed.
They knew that if Israel became involved, the political situation would change. Then the positions of both Britain and France would became rapidly unsupportable.38
The British persisted in their World War II mindset.
They insisted that an aerial bombardment phase of from eight to ten days was essential. In the initial 48 hours, the Egyptian Air Force would be destroyed. Following bombardments would be directed against economic targets such as petroleum dumps, railway stations, and bridges.
A major psychological operations effort would be launched to break the will of the Egyptian people.39 This fixation is curious in light of post- war British denigration of Egyptian leadership and fighting capability. To be sure, British officers parroted Napolean's dictum that there are no bad soldiers, only bad officers.40
Yet, the majority of Egyptian officers, including Nasser and Amer, were trained by the British. Certainly, someone involved in this training process must have gained an appreciation of future performance.
Yet the British persisted that immense preparations were necessary. For their efforts, they were rewarded by the withering scorn of General Beaufre:
"Indubitably, we were now in cloud cuckoo- land. The theory was that under this pres- sure, the defense would collapse and signs of war weariness would appear."41
The General was assured that the allies would use technology to "land without opposition." One can almost perfectly imagine his gallic sneer as he continued:
"..., I could hardly believe my eyes. We were going from one extreme to the other. How could one hope to reduce resistance to nil and how could on know the result before-hand? Finally, and even more important, how could one expect world opinion to leave us free to bomb Egypt for 'eight to ten days, at least' without intervening? It all seemed to me perfectly childish and very dangerous."42
Nevertheless actual preparations continued. Britain began flying long range reconnaissance flights over Egypt with Canberra bombers.43 Strong evidence exists that U-2 flights were diverted to Egypt and the photographs were made available to the British.44
A large naval task force was assigned the mission of supporting the operation. It too was predominantly British.45
This force included seven aircraft carriers (five British, two French)46 and was supported by 80 merchant ships and hundreds of landing craft.47
This armada was augmented by a stream of air transports. By September 10, the force was in position at Malta, Cyprus and Algeria and consisted of 50,000 British and 30,000 French Troops.48 The force was supported by an estimated 20,000 vehicles.49
Landing this force would be a formidable task. The Royal Navy had maintained a creditable state of readiness in many areas, but her amphibious capability had eroded shockingly.
There was an absolute dearth of landing vehicles. This problem was only solved when World War II vintage DUKWs were temporarily appropriated from British amusement parks.50 Additionally, there was a pronounced shortage of tropical clothing.51 This problem was never solved in its entirety.
French problems were similar but also included availability of their overextended forces. The French persuaded the Americans to let them "borrow" new anti-tank weapons to combat Nasser's Soviet armor.52 All land vehicles were to be painted desert yellow During the past year, however, all of French industry combined had not produced enough of this yellow paint to meet such a requirement.
Once again, the French scrounged and borrowed.53 One final problem had potentially moreserious ramifications. In late August 1956, three long range fighter squadrons on duty with NATO in Germany simply "disappeared." NATO commanders were unable to locate them or explain their loss.54
To be sure, some problems were not corrected or properly solved. When the centurian tanks from England were put aboard ship, they were administratively loaded. Aircraft for the paratrooper drop were obsolete.55 Neither deficiency proved an obstacle.
Other problems peculiar to combined operations had to be surmounted. Language was a problem at all levels; equipment was not interchangeable; the British used Fahrenheit and the French Centigrade.56 Illustrative of this problem was the very name of the operation.
The British began to code vehicles for operation Hamilcar with a capital "H." In French, Hamilcar is Amilcar. The problem was obvious if petty. The endeavor was rechristianed "MUSKETEER."57
At Cyprus and Malta, training and detailed planning went on. So detailed was this planning that the Naval disembarkation orders became as thick as a London telephone directory.58 Still progress was made. So rapidly, in fact, did the allies proceed that on September 4, Stockwell returned to London from a visit to Cyprus to pronounce that preparations were a full week ahead of schedule.59 Then real trouble stuck.
Eden was embroiled in a fast changing political situation. In the six weeks since Nasser had seized the canal, the world had not come to an end. Public support for Eden's belligerent stance had steadily eroded. He was also certain that he would never gain bipartisan support from the political opposition. A vote of confidence in late September sustained
him by a vote of 319 to 248, but it was an almost straight party line vote. Eden struggled to hold the support that remained. He perceived that a rash of military and civilian casualties would cause further erosion. Consequently, he ordered the military objective changed from Alexandria to Port Said.60
One observer, Mr. Kennett Love argues that from September 1, Isreal was aware of Operation Musketeer. He concludes that Eden's shift had the additional motive of supporting a collusive effort by three countries.61 Available evidence does not support this thesis. At that time, Eden and his government had not warmed to the idea of cooperation with Israel. This would only emerge in October. In any event the operation was first delayed until September 19 and once again until September 26 to compensate for the change of objectives.62
Other factors intervened to slow Eden and Mollet's momentum. One was of their own making. Eden and Mollet had contrived to force the now virtually defunct Suez Canal company to have its European pilots go on strike. The scheduled day Click here to view image
for the strike was September 15, the original D-Day. If Nasser was unable to accommodate shipping with his local force, then he might have to close the canal and in so doing give the allies cause to intervene.63 The magic date came and went.
Nasser's Egyptian pilots supported by 15 Russians proved what most sea-faring men had already known: Navigating the canal was a piece of cake. In reality it was a straight ditch that required minimal attention by pilots. In the first day, 40 ships traveled the canal. Within a week, 254 steamed through. Both figures exceeded the average.64 The odds on Nasser's gamble had clearly improved.
Another problem was lack of enthusiasm if not outright opposition to the venture in the United States. President Eisenhower recognized the danger immediately and sought to calm his allies. Like Mr. Eden's legal advisors, Eisenhower saw the seizure as perfectly legal. He realized that to permit Lesser to keep his prize would be to allow the prestige of a man he so clearly hated to soar. Yet, the alternative was far worse. Miliary occupation would be easy, but a permanent instability with deep hostility to the west would almost certainly result.65 In short, this was a no-win situation that could only deteriorate through use of force.
Almost immediately, Eisenhower dispatched his Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, to London to try and cool the situation. Dulles's task was to persuade the unpersuadable. It is not unlikely that he realized this.66 He was forced to adopt a strategy of causing the allies to delay their plans until a recourse to arms would lack even the flimsiest support. He hoped, apparently, that by that time, Eden and Mollet would both see the futility of their scheme. Dulles was neither so aloof nor so altruistic as this discussion might suggest. In his private conversations with British and French officials, he acknowledged that an invasion of Egypt would be worth the risk if Nasser could be desposed. Dulles, however, did not think this likely. He bluntly told the allies so.67
Dulles worried that United Nations talks might dissolve in acrimony and present a justification for Britain and France to act. So, he stalled these talks until he could try a few schemes guaranteed to delay. The first was an international authority to operate the canal complete with an inaugural conference on August 15, 1956. This failed because Nasser was unwilling to be a party to it.68
Dulles was not easily discouraged. As the oldest child in an influential and highly respected family with roots to the Mayflower, he had been trained from his earliest years to persevere. His flinty, humorless personality, in obvious contrast to the effervescence of his younger brother Allen, the Director of Eisenhower's CIA, marked him as a man aquainted with but hardly defeated by disappointment.
He was an early public advocate of the League of Nations and after World War II had been appointed to a vacancy in the U.S. Senate only to lose his seat in the next election. He left Wall Street to become Secretary of State with the knowledge that he was never Eisenhower's first choice. His performance in the handling of State, however, provided inference that he approached his duties as if born to them.
He presented for the allies approval an incredible concoction called the Suez Canal User's Association. The delight provided by the various possible acronyms for this organization aside, the allies and other nations were in light of Dulles's prestige, forced to seriously consider the matter. Talks and organi- zational meetings droned on until October but finally collapsed when it became apparent that the association would have no American military muscle to back-up any legitimate rights the users might decide they had. Clearly Eisenhower and Dulles regarded the association only as a means of staving off war until after the November presidential election.69
Dulles succeeded in delaying UN talks until early October.
By then, Britain and France were faced with a new problem. It would certainly look improper to attack another country while talks were being conducted, ostensibly for the purpose of eliminating the need for force. Consequently, the invasion was pushed back to October 15. As the talks at the UN dragged on, D-Day was postponed again, this time indefinitely.70 Dulles had not succeeded in persuading the allies to call off their war but, from their point of view, he had accomplished something worse. He had by means of his tactics so clearly Click here to view image
undermined their position of legality and necessity that they would be unable to attack in any guise other than brazen agression.71
Units on Cyprus and Malta used these otherwise wasted weeks to increase readiness and fine tune planning. The French pressed for a paratroop drop along the length of the canal72 arguing that the entire operation could be wrapped up in four days. The British held firm with their projection that a minimum of ten days was required. Their plan was far more systematic and cautious.
The assault portion of the plan dubbed "Operation OMELETTE" called for British paratroop drops at Gamil airport, French drops at Port Fouad, and a British heliborne assault on the Raswa Bridges. This would be in concert with surface landings. Other paratrooper landings would take place farther down the canal when they could be supported by tanks and infantry breaking out from consolidated positions.73 Then, presumably, a march on Cairo would follow.
On Cyprus, British airborne troops had been preparing since August. They were under the command of Brigadier Mervyn Butler, a wiry Irishman incongruously called Tubby.
The men were generally ready although the operation would depend primarily on the individual capacity of the paratroopers themselves. All artillery vehicles over three tons had been left in England as a result of the shortage of shipping.
The guns did not arrive in Cyprus until late September, so little shooting was done.74 All units, despite being present at Cyprus, were not thoroughly rehearsed. One paratrooper battalion had been on duty in the mountains pursuing Greek Cypriot terrorists until ten days prior to the actual jump.
Members admitted that transition to Musketeer was "sketchy."75 At Malta, 3 Commando Brigade under Brigadier R. W. Madoc prepared for the surface and heliborne assaults. Planning remained flexible as a result of political shifts. Four separate plans were developed. All participants stayed current with the exception of one destroyer that showed up on D-Day firing at plan one's targets.
40 and 42 Commando were selected for the surface assault and were given ample opportunity to train with their supporting tank force (6th Royal Tank Regiment). The two commando units were assigned 16 LVT's of which 15 worked.
The sixteenth was cannibalized for spare parts. The units were able to effectively waterproof the tanks but experienced more difficulty with anti-tank weapons. Eventualy, Madoc decided that the106MM Recoiless Rifles would be transported by helicopter and LVT.
45 Commando drew the heliborne assault. This was a momentous choice as ship to shore heliborne operations in the face of a hostile enemy had never previously been tried. They received an experimental squadron comprised of 14 whirlwinds and 6 Sycamore helicopters from the Royal Army and the Fleet Air Arm. Secrecy precluded rehearsal in Malta, but air control, fire control and forward observation officers proved to be well trained.76
As D-Day approached, part of the psychological warfare plan had to be scrapped. Only one properly equipped plane existed and that was in Kenya. Before it could be flown to Cyprus, someone stole the broadcasting equipment. British plans for radio propaganda also were hurt when all the Egyptian broadcasters quit. On such short notice, only Palestinians could be recruited and they spoke in a dialect not easily understood by the Egyptians.77
As the invasion drew near, British forces managed a major success. Despite the hostile environment of Cyprus, they were able to keep Nasser's spies from gaining any insight into the paratroopers' activities.78
October dragged on and all was as ready as it would get. As they waited, however, the unsuspecting British officers saw their timetable upset by another factor for which they were completely unprepared.
IV. ...AND INTO THE FIRE
"Very interesting, but how do we actually start this war?" - Walter Monckton
When planning first began, General Beaufre sought guidance from his mentor Charles DeGaulle. DeGaulle's suspicion of British irresolution may have been excessive, but French officers at the highest level were very worried that the deliberate British approach to invading Egypt would paint the allies into a corner. The French it seems, were determined to be rid of Nasser and were committed by this time to act, with or without their British allies. They also knew of Israel's intent to launch a preemptive strike. It is not unnatural then that someone, perhaps Admiral Barjot as Dayan reports, would suggest seeking out Israel as an alternate partner.1
Israel enjoyed a warm relationship with the socialist governments of the Fourth Republic. This good feeling had been fostered in the Socialist International and also by the men who led France's Socialist Party. No Frenchman loved Israel more than Premier Guy Mollet. Mollet was then 51 and had experienced much. He had started his professional life as a teacher of English and his personal appearance seemed perfect for the part. He was shy, mild mannered, softspoken to the point of timidity and much affected by things English.
After France fell to Germany, he rejected pacifism and joined Click here to view image
the resistance. It was here that he witnessed the barbarity of the German campaign against French Jews.2 Mollet never quite fit the current image of a socialist. This was because, socialism aside, he was first, last and always a Frenchman who shared with his countrymen:
"An image of France, a kind of collective conscience, born of the political paralysis of the thirties, the humiliation of the occupation, the stern prophesies of DeGaulle, the fear of domestic communism, and the initial expectations and ensuing disap- pointments of the Resistance."
He feared that the obvious decline of France might not be an historical inevitability but the failure of a people.3
Mollet lauded Israel us the socialist state to which France should aspire and pledged his complete aid to the infant nation. He was good to his word. Even prior to the canal crisis, he had begun the flow of modern weaponry to Israel.4
In a specific tactical sense, Israel was a more natural ally for France than was Britain. Unlike England, both saw speedy operations as most important to political imperatives. Both realized that the longer the war, the more intense the pressure from the United States to stop fighting.5
Like the French, the Israelis found the notion of life without Nasser appealing. Unlike the French, however, their objectives could be realized without a change in Egyptian leadership. This is because both objectives were local to the Sinai region. One called for elimination of Egyptian miliary power in the Sinai; the other required opening the straits of Tiran6
Throughout August and September, France and Israel reached no clear agreement to attack in concert. Nevertheless, the French were providing Israel with Mystere IV aircraft and were shipping on to Israel American equipment intended for NATO use.7
On September 26, Eden and Lloyd flew to Paris for consultations with French leaders. They found the French extremely bellicose but inexplicably at ease. The French did not disclose Israeli plans but exuded certainty that talks planned for the United Nations were now necessary only as window dressing for attacking Nasser. They hinted that Israel would soon give them a pretext for intervention.8
At about this time the Israelis began to plan their own strike in detail. French aid was substantial. The French provided in addition to Mystere IV aircraft, 200 half tracks, 100 super Sherman tanks, 20 tank transporters and 300 6 x 6 trucks.9
Israel's Premier, David Ben-Gurion welcomed the support of France. But he worried about Nasser's fleet of Soviet bombers and feared for Israel's cities if the planes were not destroyed. He believed that only Britain with her land based bombers could effectively neutralize or destroy the Egyptian Air Force. He began, therefore, to urge the French through his emmissaries to ensure that Britain was included in any operation.10
By early October, the British began to learn of the extent of French and Israeli cooperation. Eden no longer wanted to rule out collusion with Israel, but he was more insistent than his old and new partners that any collusion remain a secret. Britain needed the continued friendship of Iraq and Jordan and could only suffer if she were found to have entreated with the Jewish state. The Israeli attack promised the best of both worlds. Britain and France could pose as policemen and separate the combatants. In so doing, they would depose Nasser and possibly regain the canal.11
The Israelis assumed that since the plan so perfectly suited Britain's interests, Eden had devised it. This attitude was shared by the CIA12 and had certain validity as Eden had insisted on an ultimatum to preserve his moral position. In all likelihood, the French, who worked hardest to put the consortium together, were the genuine fathers of this brainchild. French Air Chief of Staff General Maurice Challe related that he had given the idea to Eden in a briefing and that the Prime Minister was "thrilled."13
Now it was Ben-Gurion who was disatisfied. He was gravely concerned that his forces might attack and then be left in peril if Musketeer never got off the ground. He did not fully trust the resolution of the English or the capacity of his own air force to defend Israel's cities. Before he would go through with the attack, he wanted a French air umbrella
and a formal agreement of the colluders.14 He got both. Click here to view image
Text of the ultimatum addressed to Egypt
(b) to withdraw all Egyptian military forces to a distance of ten miles from the Canal; and
(c) in order to guarantee freedom of transit through the Canal by the ships of all nations and in order to separate the belligerents, to accept the temporary occupation by the Anglo-French forces of key positions at Port Said, Ismailiya and Suez.
The United Kingdom and French Government request an answer to this communication within twelve hours. If at the expiration of that time one or both Governments have not undertaken to comply with the above requirements, United Kingdom and French forces will intervene in whatever strength may be necessary to secure compliance.
A similar communication has been sent to the Government of Israel Figure 4-1
1) Israel would attack Egypt in the Sinai. An Israeli papatroop drop near the Mitla Pass would be interpreted by Britain and France as a threat to the Suez Canal.
Text
of the ultimatum addressed to Israel
(a) to stop all warlike action on land, sea and air forthwith;
(b) to withdraw all Israel military forces to a distance of ten miles east of the Canal;
A communication has been addressed to the Government of Egypt requesting them to cease hostilites and to withdraw their forces from the neighborhood of the Canal, and to accept the temporary occupation by Anglo-French forces of key positions at Port Said, Ismailiya and Suez.
The United Kingdom and French Government request an answer to this communication within twelve hours. If at the expiration of that time one or both governments have not undertaken to comply with the above requirements, United Kingdom and French forces will intervene in whatever strength may be necessary to secure compliance. Figure 4-2
c) A temporary British and French occupation of the Suez Canal. In Egypt's case, this temporary occupation would be independent of any acceptance or rejection of the ultimatum.
3) When Egypt refused the ultimatum, Britain and France would unleash Operation Musketer. Several other pledges were made. Israel would not com- plicate Britain's involvement by attacking Jordan. France would provide 65 fighters and pilots in addition to the 45 Mysteres already in Israel's air force.
These would fly cover until the Royal Air Force, operating from Cyprus, could join the fray. Eden insisted on one final provision: No copies of the accord would ever be made public.15
V. THE POLICEMEN ARRIVE
"We are naot Burglars" - Anthony Eden
"The Prime Minister is perfectly right. What we did was to go in to help the burglar and shoot the householder" Hugh Gaitskell
One can easily imagine the shock with which Stockwell received the news of collusion with Israel. Equally imaginable is the scorn, anger and contempt he no doubt directed at his civilian leaders. To his credit he began working to ensure that the operation, now set for November 6, would be as successful as possible.
Eden, however, stymied him again. The Prime Minister, now obsessed with proper appearances, had demanded that no loading take place until the ultimatum had expired.1 This left Stockwell with a problem best described as a mathematical impossibility. Loading required four days. This interval when added to the six days steaming from Malta to Egypt meant that if the fleet were to arrive off Port Said on November 6, loading must begin no later than the very next day. If Israel attacked on October 29, it was safe to assume the ultimatum could not expire before O 31.
What to do? The urgency of the situation was obvious.
Yet, he had been told to
do nothing until such time as action was impossible. Stockwell conferred
with Beaufre. One of them remembered an embarkation training exercise called
Click
here to view image Operation
"Boathook" that could possibly be used as a ruse to begin loading. Stockwell
rushed to Malta and conferred with the Commander in Chief of the Mediterranean
Fleet, Admiral Sir Guy Grantham. Grantham ordered loading to begin immediately.
He then went one better and ordered the carrier task force to sail on October
26.2
The Marines loaded rapidly.
In 16 hours, they embarked all 150 officers, 2000 men and 550 vehicles.3
By October 30, in advance of the ultimatum, the entire force was loaded.4
Also in advance of the ultimatum
and contrary to Eden's instructions, Grantham had taken other actions to
ensure British Forces would be in position to strike. On October 29, he
dispatched 20 squadrons of Canberra and Valiant bombers to Cyprus.5 On
October 29, the advance force of destroyers sortied from Malta.6 The French
in Algeria and Toulon kept pace.
As dusk approached on October
29, 1956, Israeli forces struck in the Sinai. That night, French pilots
flying from Cyprus made supply drops in support of Israeli forces. This
support included jeeps, guns, food, ammunition, water and petroleum products.7
And as previously stated, French planes flew cover for Israeli cities.
The Israeli advance was
not the rapid, all-out assault that occured in 1967 for two reasons.
In the afternoon of October
29 a paratrooper drop was made just east of the Mitla Pass. This would
permit Britain and France to infer that a threat to the Suez Canal had
occurred,9 especially when an armored column moved into Sinai to rein-
force the paratroopers. Again, this was a safe move as Dayan reasoned that
if the international reaction were unduly harsh, the Brigade could withdraw
and Israel could claim retaliation for some earlier wrong.10
Dayan stressed to the brigade
commander that possession of the pass was unnecessary and that his mission
was to sit still and by presence only, create the impression of a threat
to the canal. In this regard, the brigade's orders of October 31, reiterated
that no advance would be made to seize the pass. Sharm el-Sheikh, the fortress
controlling the Straits of Tiran was the principal objective.11 These orders
should have meant the end of combat in this sector.
To the northeast of the
Mitla, things did not go according to plan. On October 30, the Israelis
had captured Kusseima Click
here to view image on
schedule. But the Commander of the 7th Armored Brigade, Colonel Arsaf Simhoni,
despite an order from Dayan to hold his position, launched an attack in
that sector a full 24 hours early.12 This apparently was an example of
the "Haganah ethos" that Israeli commanders seize the initiative when opportunity
is presented.(13 To his credit, Simhoni had
correctly interpreted the military situation. He rapidly smashed his opposition
and began to move toward the canal on the Ismailia highway.
Dayan was furious. He could see that the rout was on and that the entire rationale for the British and French intervention might soon unravel. He set out by jeep to find Simhoni and remove him from command.(14
As he drove, his anger subsided. He rationalized that he had picked the commander precisely for his initiative and his ability to size up the situation. Besides, he had not told Simhoni the basis for any delay. He could not expect the commander to divine that Britain and France were also in on the action. When he found Simhoni, he took no disciplinary action. Rather, he congratulated him and revised Operation Kadesh to take advantage of the army's newest successes.15
Dayan was too circumspect to admit that while Egyptian air power might still cause trouble, it was now obvious that his objectives could be rapidly realized without any help from Britain.16 As a former prisoner of the British, he probably had no interest in providing any assistance that would not prove mutually beneficial. Click here to view image
If it was immediately apparent
to Dayan that the Egyptian Army was being routed, what happened next gave
that clear impression to everyone. Ariel Sharon, commanding the brigade
at the Mitla, was chafing in a stationary posture. He requested permission
to conduct a reconnaissance of the pass. His request was approved. What
Sharon implemented, however, was a full-scale reconniassance-in-force that
rapidly evolved to a seven hour pitched battle.
After sustaining 38 fatalities
and 120 wounded the Israelies held the pass and the road to Suez stood
open.17 Sharon's interpretation of orders is not an issue to this thesis.
The importance of his actions is the fact they revealed the clear possibility
of an Egyptian military diaster that might end the war well before the
allies could intervene to stop it.
By the time Sharon had seized
the Mitla Pass, the British and French ultimatum had been delivered. The
deadline expired without Egyptian acceptance. Nasser realized immediately
what was in store for him and issued an order to his army commander Amer
to withdraw as many tanks and troops as possible from Sinai so that they
could be used to defend Egypt proper.18
That Amer was intrusted
with the Army is indicitive of the fact that Nasser's Egypt was in some
ways similar to the Egypt of Farouk. Abdel Hakim Amer, like his close friend
Nasser, was born in upper Egypt. He had attended Military School in Egypt
and at Sandhurst and was an early conspirator with Nasser. He had assumed
control of the armed forces when Nasser became president.
Amer knew little of unit
dispositions and proved a very casual and ineffectual administrator possibly
as a result of addiction to hasheesh. His stupidity and weak character
were the butt of many army jokes. Nevertheless, he was designated Nasser's
official successor.19
Amer was far from eager
to withdraw. He wanted to fight the Israelis and was confident that he
could beat them. He issued communiques that detailed enormously successful
- if totally fictitious - operations against the invaders. These communiques
of the type all too familiar from more recent middle east wars, apparantly
confused Nasser who had little else to assist him in gauging progress of
the battle. Con- sequently he was too slow to pressure Amer to remove his
forces from Sinai, thereby increasing his losses and failing to strengthen
his inner defenses.20
On October 31, Britain and
France commenced air and naval operations against Egypt but not until they
had experienced a brief delay to avoid interfering with the evacuation
of American citizens.21 In fact, the British government went to great lengths
to avoid civilian casualties of any kind and duly patted themselves on
the back for their efforts. At 1645, the Voice of Britain broadcast the
following message:
"In order to protect their
lives, all residents of Egypt are requested to stay away from all civil
airports in Egypt from this moment until the Egyptian government accepts
the demand of the United Kingdom and France which was delivered on October
30." (22) In the days to come, the concern for civilian safety would devolve
to new extremes of silliness as Eden groped for moral ground.
Civilian traffic continued
unimpeded by the air offense. Eden congratulated himself for that while
claiming military traffic had been effectively halted.23 Other sources
are less charitable and note that Egyptian armor and other army vehicles
took cover in civilian locales where most survived the war.(24
This is not to say that the air strikes against Egypt were unsuccessful. Moshe Dayan, the commander initially concerned with the distruction of Egypt's aerial capabilities was openly appreciative of their success. He pronounced the Egyptian Air Force completely neutralized and unable to interfere with his ground operations.25 Indeed, it appeared all too easy. Debriefed British pilots, after a seemingly obligatory denial that they had attacked any civilian targets, described bombing runs little affected by ground fire or airborne intercepters.26
One would think that this should not have been the case. His readiness problems aside, Nasser possessed enough hot fighter planes to make life difficult for the British as the airplane comparison figures in Annex A demonstrate. Yet, they did not challenge the allies. Egyptian journalist Mohamed Heikal states that the reason for the absence of aerial activity was that Nasser had given the order not to fight back so that he might save his forces.27 This must be questioned.
A more likely explanation
is that the Soviet Union was unwilling to become involved.
The paucity of trained Egyptian
pilots leads one to infer that a functional Egyptain air force would rely
quite probably on Soviet pilots and certainly on Soviet technicians. Given
Soviet problems at the time in Hungary, it is highly probable that the
Soviets, rather than Nasser, decided that Egypt's Air Force should remain
idle. The Russian withdrawal of 48 Ilyushin strike bombers to Southern
Egypt and Khartoum shortly before the British attack tends to support this
premise.28
An additional anecdote illustrates
that in terms of actual combat, Nasser was on his own. Syrian President
Shukri el- Kuwatly was in Moscow at that time and pleaded Nasser's case
to the Soviet hierarchy. When Kuwatly became almost hysterical at Russian
intransigence, Soviet Defense Minister Zukov took a globe and graphically
explained to the excited Syrian that the distances involved made any kind
of practical assistance impossible.29
As a further triumph, the
British were able to silence the powerful transmitters of Radio Cairo with,
again "few civilian casualties."30
On the first day of the bombing, something much more important was put out of commission - the Suez Canal. As the bombing began, Nasser ordered the canal closed. By this time he had put together a force, if that is a proper term, of 40 ships that had been positioned for precisely that purpose. These ships were towed out and sunk along the entire length of the canal effectively closing it and trapping 14 ships that had been in transit.
All operational machinery was smashed as well.31 One of the avowed objectives of the proposed intervention had now become unattainable. The canal could no longer be protected. The British government now could only warn ominously of a possible oil shortage and future gasoline rationing.32
Naval combat was equally one sided. On October 30, the antiquated Egyptian Frigate, Ibrahim al-Awwal was on station off the coast of Israel. At sundown, her Captain received orders to bombard the Israeli port of Haifa, an action that he commenced at 0335 on the 31st. Although a full three hours remained until the Anglo-French ultimatum was to expire, the French Destroyer Keisaint, also on station, engaged the Ibrahim with her guns.
The Ibrahim was unhit but broke off at full speed and ran for Egypt. Before she could make good her escape, the Ibrahim was run down and captured by Israeli patrol boats and destroyers. She had inflicted no casualties and little damage.33
Later on the 31st, the French cruiser Georges Leygues provided shore bombardment for Israeli ground forces assaulting the Rafah strong point. The assistance was noisy but not particularly significant.34
On the evening of October 31, the British cruiser, H.M.S. Newfoundland, on patrol in the Gulf of Suez, came upon the Click here to view image Egyptain frigates Rasheed and Damietta. The latter was lying still in the water and was picked up by the Newfoundland's spotlight. The Damietta started her engines and after ignoring an order from the British Captain to halt, opened fire at the spotlight. She was promptly blown apart by the cruiser's six-inch guns. As the British picked up survivers, the Rasheed fled to the Saudi port of Wejh. The naval war south of Suez was over.35
For all practical purposes, a northern naval war had never begun. One small incident, however, is instructive. In the dusk of November 4, two small Egyptian coastal patrol boats set out from their station in the delta to attack the British and French fleets and were promptly sunk by carrier aircraft. Within days the Arab world had been told that the two small craft had sunk the Jean Bart before succumbing. This like most Egyptian communiques, was patently false. In all, the Egyptians claimed one battleship, one crusier and two destroyers sunk and three destroyers damaged. The allies reported no ships hit.36
The engagements of the naval war were insignificant. As part of the larger picture, however, they were enormously important. They underline the utter weakness of the Egyptians and further illustrate the magnitude of British miscalculations of enemy strength.
The propaganda war, though
hampered by the loss of the psyop sound plane, continued. British radio
beamed loudly into Egypt and depicted Nasser as a traitor who almost deliverd
"our country" into the hands of the Soviet Union. A major leaflet drop
into the Delta on October 31 declared:
"Remember that we have
the might to attain our objective, and we shall use all of it if necessary.
Your choice is clear. Either accept the Allied proposals or accept the
consequences of Nasser's policy, which will bring heavy retribution not
only to the few who are guilty, but also to you, the many who are innocent."37
This was all very imposing except when one considers the gross illiteracy of the population and the tendency of leaf- leted populations throughout the world to employ the literature for day to day concerns of a more immediately pressing nature.38
Egyptian claims of battle success were the invention of commanders in the field and not a coordinated propaganda campaign by the government. The claims did not deceive the allies and had only limited positive effect on the civilian population. Aside from comic relief, the only effect of this fiction was to deepen the fog descending on Egypt's leadership.
By November 2, the Israeli advance was accelerating and the extent of Egypt's humiliating defeat was clear. This posed two advantages for the British and French:
The French pushed for the fourth and got an Israeli promise to protect the French and British flank by occupying Qantara.40 Eden immediately vetoed this approach. It would be too difficult to deny collusion.(41
But Israel also needed time.
Sharm el-Sheikh was not captured. Something else was needed. On November
3, the Israeli Ambassador to the U.S., Abba Eban, was notified by his government
that an immediate cease fire was unaceptable.42 He then set out to frame
a set of conditions that would delay a cease fire and make it possible
to blame Egypt. This was in the form of five questions asked formally of
the Egyptian Ambassador to the U.N. These questions had to be satisfactorily
answered before Israel could consider it "safe" to quit fighting.
The questions were:
Nasser was faced with a different problem: How to survive until the fighting stopped. He had initially believed that the major allied effort would come in the Delta or at least his intelligence service had prepared him for this. To this end, he tried to delay the American evacuation hoping that Britain might receive some bad publicity.(44
He was, by October 31, however, convinced that the main effort would come at Port Said and that the garrison should be reinforced. He initially sent two companies of regular infantry to the city. They were to fight as civilian irre- gulars and disrupt allied supply efforts. One day later, he ordered three national guard battalions consisting of 600 men and four tank chassis mounted 100 MM ZU-100 guns added to the force. He also dispatched an ammunition train that reached Port Said on the evening of November 4. (45
He knew that any resistance put up by this force would be insufficient to deny the allies but he believed that any commotion at the UN and in the House of Commons resulting from this extra violence would work to his good. He also believed it might stiffen civilian morale for the anticipated guerrilla struggle. (46
By November 4, Nasser had concluded that Amer was unable to manage the deteriorating situation. Consequently, he left Interior Minister Zakaria Mohieddin in charge of the central government and set out for port Said to personally supervise preparations. By evening, he had reached Ismailia but was prevented from going farther by an insistent guard commander.( 47
Nasser's luck had held again because the British and French paratrooper drop occurred the following morning.
The effect of Nasser's possible capture makes for one of the most interesting speculations of the entire campaign.
If Nasser thought he would eventually prevail, he must have realized that the situation was sufficiently bad that he ought to hedge his bets. He knew that 74 years prior, England had used the safety of British subjects as a pretext for invading Egypt. He was not about to give them another such excuse. He countered any possibility of that by decreeing the death penalty for anyone who harmed a British or French citizen. (48
An English reporter noted that British citizens were treated with civility and not denied access to any public accommodations. (49 Similarly, the British Ambassador was allowed free movement about Cairo in his Rolls Royce. (50
If the events of the past week had compounded the planning of the Egyptians and the Israelis, they were absolutely exasperating the British and French.
It was obvious that Musketeer Revise (the new plan calling for a November 6 landing), would be too late to accomplish everything that the politicans desired. Something would have to change. Beaufre had hid staff frenzidly preparing plans for every imaginable contingency: With Israel; without Israel; France alone; different concepts of seizure. In the end, Eden rejected all these plans but did on November 2, approve a one day step up in the parachute landings. (51
In his memoirs, the English Prime Minister defers to the judgment of General Keightly that organized resistance would now last for five days.52 Keightly never divorced himself of this notion nor is it likely he could.
Sir Charles had been born in 1901 and educated at Sandhurst. During World War II, he commanded an armored division in Tunisia and later a corps in the famed 8th Army. He had won some reknown as a commander for a daring envelopment whereby his tanks splashed through the surf onto the German flank.
Yet, people who knew him, including some Americans whom he had commanded, suggested that this episode was out of character. He was considered rather, a very solid, dependable type who was very good at planning and very relaxed in that type of environment. At this time, the most newsworthy thing about the general was that he had directed the British military withdrawal from Egypt in 1954.( 53
This irony aside, General
Keightly was having his problems. Eden had authorized a one day step up
of the operation and that meant revision of the sequence of events.
The British drop into Gamil
was retained but now the French would drop at Raswa instead. This would
put a relatively small number of paratroopers - as a result of the limited
aircraft parking space at Cyprus - on the ground in Egypt for 24 hours
without any support, other than carrier aviation. Clearly this was a new
risk. (54
The risk was primarily in Keightly's mind. He had cautiously interpreted the earlier Egyptian withdrawal as a movement to contact against his forces. He now saw the rout as a con- tinuation of that movement. To him, this meant that a step up in the timetable was not only unwarranted, but very dangerous.
He had been overruled by Eden but he was not about to jeopardize the operation by engaging in any further risky attacks.55 No doubt he saw proposed changes to the plan as opportunities for disaster rather than chances for success.
French worries were not confined to changes in military timetables. They now had cause to question Mr. Eden's resolve.56 Indeed, Eden was wavering. And no wonder, he was catching it from every side. Labour was shouting for his resignation; Eisenhower was opposed to force; he had a pending economic crisis.
The French accurately gauged Eden's mood and sent Foreign Minister Pineau to London to buck him up. The French also let the world know that they and the British were unwilling to accept any truce at this time and hinted broadly that the expedition would be pursued until Nasser gas toppled. (57
In fairness to Eden, he was sick. He suffered from a bile duct malfunction that despite three operations, was never properly repaired. This malady often left him in a weakened condition and led to an emotional state that was both irritated and irrascible. (58
His health problems were compounded by a personal tragedy in October 1956 when his second wife Clarisa, twenty-three years his junior, suffered a miscarriage.59 Perhaps it is not unwarranted to assume that Eden's health and his personal tragedy adversely affected his judgment. In turn, errors in judgment increased the pressure on him and accelerated the deterioration of his physical condition and the erosion of his operational resolve.
The events of the days immediately
prior to the assault reveal the full extent of his slipping resolve. On
November 1, Earl
Mountbatton wrote a personal note to Eden urging him once again to consider
the damage that would result to Britain's diplomatic and economic situation.
Eden, on the third, thanked the First Sea Lord but stressed that the operation
would continue.60
This steadfastness was a
charade. Eden was already looking for a way out. During a televised speech
on the evening of November 3, he referred to the pending clash as a "police
action" to separate the combatants.
He continued that Britain
and France would be willing to step aside as soon as the United Nations
could assume that function. Even as he prepared his speech, he had taken
steps to further limit the scope of the invasion to the establishment of
a bridgehead on the Suez Canal. Under no condition was there to be march
on Cairo.61 He then dispatched Head, now the Minister of Defense, to Cyprus
to give Keightly the bad news.
Here the concern for civilian
casualties really got out of hand. Head, presumably on Eden's orders, limited
the calibre of naval gunfire support to 4.5 inches, effectively restricting
many of the support ships such as the massive Jean Bart to troop transport
duties.
This was followed by perhaps
the government's most negligent act. Actual landing sites were disclosed
when British radio warned Egyptian civilians to stay away from Port Said
beaches.62 One can only imagine the reaction in Paris.
Eden was now picking at
the detailed planning and execution of the operation. He told Keightly
to try and shift the entire attack to the east side of the canal. Keightly
then showed that his inflexibility possessed a positive side. he stated
that this was impossible.63 Eden then wanted a last minute at which he
could delay the paratroop drop for 24 hours. Keightly strongly advised
against any further alternation.64 Eden demurred.
The invasion was on. Only
Eden could stop it now and even that would not be easy. The momentum that
propelled the assault had been building daily and almost irresistibly.
As Eden vacilated, the occupation force sailed from Southhampton.65
Click here to view image
Shortly after 0400 on Monday, November 5, 1956, Phase II of Operation Musketeer began. This phase was the paratrooper assault into Port Said and Port Fouad and was code named Operation Omelette.1 These small paratrooper forces would be dropped into an enemy metropolitan area and were expected to hold their objectives unsupported for twenty-four hours. British readiness had unwittingly conspired to make the test even more risky.
The Royal Air Force did not have sufficient planes of the type needed to transport the paratroopers' artillery. Consequently, the guns had to go by ship and would not be present until the 6th, if then.2
The paratroopers were organized into groups smaller than their commanders preferred. The men compensated for this, however, by their toughness and elite qualities. The British unit was 3d Parachute Battalion, the so-called "Red Devils."
They numbered 600 men and
drew Gamil Airfield as their princi- pal objective.3 They were on the whole
a youngish group of regulars but with a 10 to 15% mixture of combat veterans.
They were fit, tough and
much admired by their officers.4 But, if they were combat ready, they were
not exactly pro- ficient military parachutists. They were scheduled to
drop from 600 feet into a rectangle one mile deep by one half
Click
here to view image mile
wide. They were too poorly trained to jump with weapons and planned to
retrieve their arms from drop boxes.5
In contrast, the Frenchmen,
500 members of the 10th Parachute Division were a hardened lot. They were
well trained, well armed, and almost exclusively veterans of Algeria and
Vietnam.
They were highly motivated
and demonstrated an elan that few troops anywhere could match. They had
drawn the Raswa bridges as an objective and would jump from 400 feet but
into a drop zone one half mile deep and 150 yards wide.6 This smaller zone
was possible in part because the French planes had dual exit ports. 7
The drops were scheduled
for 0608 to 0630 with the French dropping 15 minutes behind the British.8
The British were fortunate
in that the Egyptians had littered the runway at Gamil with obstacles.
The paratroopers gratefully used these as cover until they could arm, organize
and move out. By shortly after 0700, the British had chased off the company
of reservists defending Gamil and seized the air field. They consoldiated
their gains and moved out toward Port Said against increasing Egyptain
resistance.9 They had suffered one killed.10
The French did even better.
Where the British were successful, their gaullic allies were wreaking havoc.
They had landed on a defended position but had thoroughly routed and destroyed
the defenders. The Egyptians had managed to blow the lesser pontoon bridges,
but the French rapidly seized
Click here to
view image the
major span.11 The French then captured the Port Said waterworks
and turned off the machinery. All this was accomplished by 0900.12
The French were aided immensely by the utility of their aerial transport planes. One of these Nordatlas stayed behind and circled the city at 1,000 feet. Aboard was French Brigadier General Jean Gilles who directed the battle below. The British were less fortuante. Their equipment was ancient and every radio set was damaged on landing.13 Eventually, they were able to repair some equipment and make radio contract with Gilles.
Both forces began to expand
their sectors. The French instituted vigorous patroling out to six miles
from the Bridge.14 As the British moved east toward Port Said, they met
increasing resistance emanating from the Port Said Coast Guard Station.
Air strikes from British carriers reduced this to rubble and the advance
continued - albeit slowly.15
Although Keightly probably
would not admit it just then, the French had been proven right in the sense
that the enemy were a pushover. So smoothly had the operation gone that
all troops were in place and initial objectives had been captured ahead
of schedule. Additionally, only seven planes had been hit. None of these
were lost. By noon it was clear that follow-up drops should be made. The
British dropped 100 men and heavy equipment at Gamil shortly after 1400.
Simultaneously, the French dropped another 400 men on the golf course at
the
Click here to view image
southeastern edge of Port Fouad.
This latter group met heavy resistance but was undeterred as they occupied
the town. In fact, they brutalized Port Fouad so thoroughly that all resis-
tance quickly ended and the French landing the following day was strictly
administrative.16
Nasser's plan was to fight
a guerilla action in the city and if we are to believe Heikal, attack the
allies once they spilled off the causeway south of Port Said.17 This is
a point rendered moot by the allied acceptance on November 6 of the cease
fire. The developing situation, however, clearly indicated that defenses
in the city were all Nasser could then rely on. And there, things were
not going well.
By later afternoon, the
British and French had still not linked up. Yet, Egyptian forces in the
city were hard pressed. The plight of the civilian inhabitants was even
worse. Nasser had expected the civilian population to bear the brunt of
the fighting and had armed them for this purpose, a curious act by one
considered ripe for a civil uprising.18 Indeed, the civilians bore the
brunt.
The French literally pulled
no punches. They blasted their way from street to street leaving a trail
of death and destruction. Numerous fires had been started and the inoperative
water works insured that fire fighting was impossible.19
The Egyptian military commander,
Brigadier General Salahedeen Moguy summed up the situation and no doubt
concluded that things would only get worse and probably very quickly. He
sounded out the allies for a cease fire. Talks with Butler eventually led
to multually agreeable terms of sur- render.20
This agreement soon foundered.
The British and French had a clumsy command and control arrangement and
it took time to involve all the principles. Illustrative of these difficulties
were the locations of Generals Stockwell and Beaufre on separate ships.
Communications were abysmal. Terms could not be approved until almost 2200.21
In the meantime, something else happended. Nasser finally got back to Cairo. There, he found Amer in a state of emotional collapse. Now, he completely superseded his general and made all former decrees from Amer subject to his own control. One such decree was the measure of authority granted Moguy as commander in Port Said. When Nasser learned of the pending surrender, he overruled it and announced his actions over Radio Cairo, now back on the air. When the dissappointed Moguy met again with Butler at 10:30 p.m., he could only announce that there would be no surrender and that hostilities would begin anew.22
Eden attributes the stiffening of Egyptian resolve to the presence of Russian officers and aid. He cites the presence of sound trucks assuring the civilian population that Russian help was on the way as definitive proof.23 This is probably not the case. Little evidence exists to confirm the presence of any Russian other than the Soviet consul. Additionally Moguy has admitted that the announcement of pending Russian aid was a lie conceived by him and broadcast on his order.24 So ended the first day of the assault. The inaction of the final hours guaranteed more fighting would follow.
The second day brought Phase
III, the ship to shore movement. This called for the seaborne forces to
come ashore, link up with the paratroopers, and prepare for the total seizure
of the canal. To the west of the canal would be the Royal Marines, backed
by the 6th Royal Tank Regiment; east of the canal would be a battalion
of the Legion supported by French marine commandos and tanks.25
The Marines and the French
had been at sea for almost a week. On November 5, they married up with
a French convoy of gunfire ships and minisweepers. The convoy then turned
south for Post Said.26
Shortly before dawn on the
6th, the invasion began from a line approximately five miles off-shore.
It was supported by almost one hour of naval gunfire preassault bombardment,
none larger than 4.5 inches.27
The British landing at 4:50
a.m. preceeded that of the French by almost two hours.28 The focal point
of the assault was the Casino Pier with 40 Commando landing to the east
and 42 commando to the west. 6th Royal Tank Regiment (RTR) was in trace
of 40 Commando. Each commando landed its first wave in LVT's with succeeding
waves in landing craft.29 On neither beach did the commandos encounter
any mines.30 Click
here to view image
The most important task,
that of seizing the basins along the west bank of the canal, fell to 40
Commando.31 These were assigned because the Royal Navy hoped to avoid the
complication of landing masses of troops and equipment over the crowded
beaches. The Egyptian block ships, however, had made this plan extremely
difficult to implement, thereby lessening the significance of 40 Commando's
objectives.32
For many of the men of 40
Commando, the landing was a "dry" one. For the others it was not uncomfortable.33
The commandos captured their early intermediate objectives with ease and
after tanks were landed, began to move out. This process lasted almost
90 minutes.34 They quickly overcame sporadic resistance and overran the
port police station. As they continued their push toward the Suez Canal
Company offices, they received some good fortune when an officer looking
for a vantage point captured General Moguy and 20 members of his staff.35
40 eventually captured the
canal offices and then made their last attack of the day, securing the
Navy House.36
The 6th RTR had by this
time broken through in an armored column. By noon RTR had linked up with
the French paratroopers at Raswa. Some of the Frenchmen then became mounted
infantry as the column struck out to the south and seized El Tina where
it went into the defensive.37
42 Commando landed to the
west of 40 and had drawn the power station as their main objective. Like
40, they rapidly Click
here to view image secured
their intermediate objectives.38 Their principal line of advance was the
Rue Mohamed Ali, a main north-south thoroughfare. They lacked manpower
to occupy the area, so they traversed it as rapidly as they could on their
LVT's.
In rapid course, they captured
the power station and the cold storage plant and linked up with 40 commando,
thereby protecting that unit's flank.39
The seaborne landing had
gone splendidly. All the objectives had been rapidly seized and the link-up
with the French paratroopers had taken place. But the two commandos were
too small to effectively control the area they had crossed. They settled
instead for rapid movement to achieve their objectives.40 The thankless
task of clearing remaining enemy resistance from Port Said, therefore,
fell to the Brigade's floating reserve, 45 Commando.
The original mission of
45 Commando was to conduct a heliborne assault and seize a defended objective
in the Basin area. This was amended for numerous reasons not the least
of which was the absence of any known precedent for a ship to shore heliborne
assault. Additional factors were a lack of sufficient helicopters and the
change in plans that had moved the French paratroopers into the Raswa Bridges
the previous day.41
45 Commando's mission was
modified to reflect the changed situation. They intended to land in a soccer
stadium, occupy the town, silence snipers, deal with bypassed resistance,
Click here to view image
collect discarded enemy weapons
and equipment and link up with the 3d Parachute Battalion advancing from
Gamil Airfield.42
This seems an enormous set of objectives for a force numbering only 415 men. The commando were well trained, however, and had the unusual advantage of having many men who had previously served in the canal area. Consequently, the Marines knew Port Said better than their Egyptian army adversaries.43
At H + 55 minutes, the floating reserve was called in. 45 loaded immediately and was soon enroute to the furiously burning city. Lieutenant Colonel Tailyour, the commanding officer of the commando, decided that he would conduct his own reconnaissance of the landing site. He immediately found much about it that was unsatisfactory: The approaches were fouled by overhead wire; smoke obscured vision, the landing zone was under enemy fire; enemy troops were maneuvering in the area. He and his party scrambled back on their heli- copter and set out to find another site.44
The new site was just west of the de Lesseps statue in an area already secured by 40 Commando. If the Royal Marines had forfeited the honor of a completed landing against hostile objectives, they did gain some important advantages. The plan of the day called for an assault of 415 men in four waves. This landing over the course of 2 1/2 hours would permit a buildup of 23 1/2 tons of supply. The plan estimated a casualty factor of ten percent per wave. The slightly more sheltered landing site enabled the commando to land all 415 Click here to view image
men and 23 tons of supply
in one hour and twenty-three minutes.
Only three helicopters,
including the reconnaissance bird were lost. As the commando prepared to
move out, they found themselves ahead of schedule with a larger and better
organized force. The men were also grateful for dry feet.45
45 ran into trouble almost immediately. Resistance was disorganized, but the high buildings and the fires from the previous day made any systematic advance difficult. As if this were not enough, a "friendly" air strike inflicted 18 causalties on the Marines.46
The main route of advance
was the Rue El Mahrousa. By 1100 the Marines, as yet unsupported by tanks,
had cleared the length of the street to the point where it becomes Rue
Mohamed Ali. The commando then turned westward and advanced toward the
paratroopers. At 1320, they were joined by tanks and progress improved
as snipers' nests were blasted by the rumbling machines. By 1600, they
had reached Rue El Ghali Moukhtar. By 1730, fighting had practically ceased,
but contact with the paratroopers was not made until the next day.47
In the meantime, the Royal
Navy was unloading the 16th Parachute Brigade. These were the last of the
assault troops to be engaged.48
On the east bank of the canal,
the French found no resistance at all. The landing force came ashore to
widespread damage and almost total quiet.49 The only armed men in the
Click
here to view image brutalized town were French paratroopers,
many of them drunk, who had landed the day before.50 This quiet remained
throughout the occupation, so thoroughly had any possibility for resistance
been stamped out.51
Everything was on schedule.
Given the paucity of resistance, it would have taken a poor commander to
be anything but on schedule. General Butler had by this time relocated
in El Tina to take control of the next day's operations. At 1600 local
time, he received his orders. The British were to break out to the south
and seize the airfield at Abu Suwweir; the French were also to move south
and capture Ismailia; the Royal Marines were to mop up in Port Said.52
Other things were happening
that would negate these orders. The strength of the allies on the battlefield
was unquestioned. On the international field, however, a situation beyond
their control was forcing them to come to grips with their weaknesses.
Chancellor of the Exchequer
MacMillan had earlier predicted Britain's ability to pay the bill for military
operations. He had declined, however, to project the effect of international
opposition to the invasion. When that opposition hit, it hit hard. For
two months there had been a mini-run on the Pound Sterling brought about
by crises-related speculation in currency. When the British and French
attacked, this run accelerated.
The Chinese withdrew their
balance and the Indians reduced theirs. In the first six days of November,
British reserves plummeted sharply. By the end of the month, they would
fall $279 million or roughly 15%. A continuation of this trend would mean
that England would soon be unable to guarantee her debts.
Eden professed later that
the decline would have become serious if it had continued.53 This is understatement
carried to absurdity. If he could see that kind of trouble pending, the
situation was already serious. MacMillan bluntly admitted that the Pound
had collapsed and could only be saved by an American loan to resolve the
technical impediments to stability.
Her Majesty's Government
understood quite clearly that this loan was impossible until a cease-fire
had been agreed upon.54 The same pertained to alleviation of expected petroleum
shortfalls.
The issue of what caused
the allied acceptance of the cease fire was clouded by a sudden thrust
of the Soviet leadership to propel themselves into the crisis. On the evening
of November 5, 1956, Soviet Premier Nikolai Bulganin sent a dispatch to
his counterparts in Great Britain, France and Israel. The messages to Britain
and France were blunt; the note to Israel was more so. The attackers must
immediately desist or face the consequences. Bulganin was not subtle in
explaining what there consequences were. The gist of his threat was as
follows:
"In what position would
Britain have found herself if she herself had been attacked by more powerful
states possessing every kind of modern destructive weapon? And there are
countries now which need not have sent a Navy or Air Force to the coasts
of Britain, but could have used other means such as a rocket technique.
We are filled with determination to use force to crush the aggressors and
to restore peace in the East. We hope you will show the necessary prudence
and will draw from this the appropriate conclusions."55
Few, if any, took this for
anything but a hypocritical sham to divert attention from the brutal rape
of Hungary. Labour's hierarchy saw if that way.56 Eden on this occasion
correctly analyzed his intelligence. He noted the "uncommon infrequency"
of Soviet wireless transmissions and their distinctly restrained nature.
He believed that Soviet pro- paganda was stepped up only when it was obvious
that American pressure had forced the allies to quit. 57
Eisenhower, apparently believing
it was a bluff, called it.58 The French and Israelis ignored it.59 Sadat
also made light of it.60
In retrospect, things were
going so well diplomatically for Nasser that it is unlikely he would have
accepted any aid. In this regard, he told U.S. Ambassador Hare in his typically
tactless manner, "Don't worry about these Soviet moves. I don't trust any
big power."61
In any event, it was all
academic. The decision to quit had already been made. The only question
was when. From 0200 until noon on the sixth, Eden, Mollet and representatives
of the ailing Dulles were in constant contact. Finally, a decision was
made to accept the cease fire effective, 2400
London time, November 6,
or 0200 Suez time, November 7, 1956.62 Click
here to view image
After consultations the
order to cease firing was finally relayed to Butler who received it at
2030 Suez time. His orders were modified so that he should seize as much
of the canal as he could before time ran out.63
Although fighting was still
going on to their rear in Port Said, weary British and French paratroopers
climbed on tanks and raced south unimpeded.64 The Royal Artillery had now
rejoined the paratroopers but they were moving so fast that they were unable
to fire their guns in support. Nor was any needed.65
As midnight approached,
British patrols reached Lake Timsah and the main body rolled into positions
at El Cap, twenty-five miles to the north.66 Butler described the final
hours as "damned silly" and "not a military exercise." His men raced as
fast as transport would allow. In the end, they were forced to ignore defensible
or key terrain and occupy only vulnerable ground next to the canal.67
Not unlike Cinderella, the
allies found themselves dashing futilely as the evening played itself out.
When the clock struck twelve, the music stopped.
History was not so kind to
Mollet and Eden. There was no cry for Mollet's resignation, but the large
majority of Frenchmen who continued to support his policies in Algeria
and the Middle East, balked at the expense. In May 1957, he lost a parlementary
vote of confidence on a tax bill and resigned.7 Less than one year later,
the entire Fourth Republic was swept away in the wake of Charles DeGaulle.
Mollet remained a force in French politics but mainly in opposition to
Gaullism. He lived until 1975 but had the misfortune to witness first independence
for Alergia and then the end of that special Franco-Israeli relationship
he had cherished.8
Immediately after the cease-fire,
it was obvious that some- one in Britain would pay. Eden declared an intention
to remain in office but was unable to do so.9 On January 10, 1957 he resigned.10
He maintained to the end that he had followed a proper course. In his apologia
for Suez, he whimsically mused that no one knows what might have happened
had he con- tinued the attack. He followed with two feeble nonsequiturs:
"Militant dictators have more enemies at home than the foreigner ever dreams"
and "This will be for history to determine."11
History had determined.
Eden lived out the remainder of his years as Lord Avon. He was politely
treated but generally ignored in counsels of state. When he died in 1977,
The Times of London cast his epitaph: "He was the last prime minister to
believe Britain was a great power and the first to confront a crisis which
proved she was not."12
Ben-Gurion, David, Memoirs, The World Publishing Company, Cleveland, Ohio, 1970.
Ben-Zohar, Michael, Ben-Gurion, The Armed Prophet, Prentice- Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1968. Translated from the French by Len Ortzen.
Dayan, Moshe, Moshe Dayan: Story of My Life, William Morrow and Company, Inc., New York, New York, 1976.
Eban, Abba, Abba Eban, An Autobiography, Random House, New York, New York, 1977.
Eden, Anthony, Full Circle, The Memoirs of Anthony Eden, Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, Massachusetts, 1960.
Eisenhower, Dwight David, Waging Peace, Doubleday & Company, Inc., Garden City, New York, 1965.
Heikal, Mohamed Hassanein, The Cairo Documents, Doubleday & Company, Inc., Garden City, New York, 1973.
Hoopes, Townsend, The Devil and John Foster Dulles, Little, Brown and Company, Boston, Massachusetts, 1973.
MacMillan, Harold, Riding the Storm, Harper and Row, Publishers New York, New York, 1971.
Meir, Golda, My Life, G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York, New York, 1975.
Nutting, Anthony, Nasser, E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., New York, New York, 1972.
Sadat, Anwar el-, In Search of Identity, Harper and Row, Publishers, New York, New York, 1978.
Terraine, John, The Life and Times of Lord Mountbatton, Arrow Books, Ltd, London, 1970.
Teveth, Shabtai, Moshe Dayan,
Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston Massachusetts, 1973. Translated from the
Hebrew by Leah and David Zinder.
Barnett, Correlli, Britain and Her Army, 1509-1970, William Morrow Company, New York, New York, 1970.
Bell, J. Bowyer, The Lon War: Israel and the Arabs Since 1946, Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1969.
Carver, Michael, War Since 1945, G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York, New York, 1981.
Cooper, Chester L., The Lion's Last Roar: Suez, 1956, Harper and Row, Publishers, New York, New York, 1978.
Furniss, Edgar, S. Jr., DeGaulle and the French Army, The Twentieth Century Fund, New York, New York, 1964.
Johnson, Paul, The Suez War, Greenberg Press, New York, New York, 1957.
Kelly, George Armstrong, Lost Soldiers, The French Army and Empire in Crisis, 1947-1962, The M.I.T. Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1965.
Ladd, James D., The Royal Marines, 1919-1980, Jane's Publishing Company, Limited, London 1980.
LaGorce, Paul Marie de, The French Army, A Military-Political History, George Braziller, Inc., New York, New York, 1963. Translated from the French by Kenneth Douglas.
Little, Tom, Modern Egypt, Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, New York, New York, 1967.
Longgood, William F., Suez Story, Greenberg: Publishers, New York, New York, 1957.
Love, Kennett, Suez, The Twice Fought War, McGraw-Hill Book Company, New York, New York, 1969.
Marwick, Arthur, Britain in the Century of Total War, Little, Brown and Company, Boston, Massachusetts, 1968.
Morse, Edward L., Foreign Policy and Interdependence in Gaullist France, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1973.
Neff, Donald, Warriors at Suez, Linden Press/Simon and Schuster, New York, New York, 1981.
Nutting, Anthony, No End of A Lesson, Clarkson N. Potter, Inc. Publisher, New York, New York, 1967.
Robertson, Terrence, Crisis, Atheneum, New York, New York, 1965.
Smith, Tony, The French Stake in Algeria, 1945-1966, Cornell University Press, London, 1978.
Stoessinger, John, Why Nations Go to War, St. Martin's Press, New York, New York, 1974.
Thomas, Hugh, Suez, Harper and Row, Publishers, New York, New York, 1967.
Wheelock, Keith, Nasser's New Egypt, Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, New York, New York, 1960.
Genet, Janet Flanner, Paris Journal, 1944-1965, Edited by William Shaum, Atheneum, New York, New York, 1965.
The Globe and Laurel, "Operations by 3 Commando," Portsmouth, United Kingdom, Vol. LXIV, December 1956.
The Globe and Laurel, "3 Commando Brigade," Portsmouth, United Kingdom, Vol. LXV, February 1957.
Siegfried, Andre, "The Suez, International Roadway," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 31, July 1953.
Callender, Harold, "Paris Acts to Bar Cease Fire Now," New York Times, November 3, 1956.
Callender, Harold, "The Cease-Fire In Suez," New York Times, November 8, 1956.
Callender, Harold, "Paradoxes in Paris," New York Times, May 23, 1957.
Caruthers, Osgood, "Egypt Declares War Goes On," New York Times, November 3, 1956.
Doty, Robert I, "French Landing a Quiet One," New York Times, November 8, 1956.
Middleton, Drew, "British
and French Forces Push Toward Landing," New York Times,
November 3, 1956.
Middleton, Drew, "MacMillan Party a Slight Favorite in Voting Today," New York Times, October 8, 1956.
New York Times News Special, "A Model British General," November 1, 1956.
New York Times News Special, "British Say Egypt Sank 7 Ships In Suez Canal In Blockade Bid," November 3, 1956.
New York Times News Special, "Chutists Cheery at Take-Off time," November 6, 1956.
New York Times News Special, "Text of British Admiralty Statement," November 7, 1956.
Ronan, Thomas P., "Britain Cuts Use of Oil, Gasoline," New York Times, November 8, 1956.
I owe sincere appreciation and gratitude to many students and staff at the Education Center who assisted me with insight and willingness to listen as I formulated the ideas of this paper. In particular, I owe a debt of thanks to Lieutenant Colonel Tim Kline, U.S. Air Force, who edited the paper and got me to express my insights more succinctly.
I also need to thank Mr. Dave Brown of the Education Center Library and his marvelously professional staff who patiently showed me how to use the research facilites and permitted me to retain numerous overdrawn books. Also thanks to Mrs. Cheryl Kull who uncomplainingly prepared new copies as I changed happy to glad and back to happy again.
Finally I wish to thank my family for putting up with me during the five months I "took off" to prepare this paper.
The premise behind the assignment
of this topic is that study of a post-World War II amphibious operation
will provide insight to officer students who could someday be assigned
the mission of conducting an amphibious operation. This premise is not
invalid. Another premise has emerged, however, that is every bit as important:
Specifically, modern warfare is intensely political. Political overtones
in turn, can be so predominant that they overshadow actual results on the
battlefield. This is precisely what happened during Operation Musketeer.
------------------------- The source of this website is
------------------------- see YSH-DUELL-2.htm for completion -------------------------------------------------------
Operation Musketeer: A Military, Success Ends in Political Failure,
by Major R. W. Rathbun, 2 April 1984. For additional reading,
try: The Road to Suez, by Erskine Childers; Suez, by Keith Kyle; Suez,
by Kenneth Love; and Suez, by Hugh Thomas.
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