Israel involved


After the uneasy armistices of 1949 Israel was troubled by Fedayeen raids; in 1955 alone 260 Israeli citizens were killed by Arab groups based in Gaza or Jordan. There was also a serious perceived military threat as the Egyptian Government turned to the Soviet bloc for arms. Significant quantities of Il-28 bombers and MiG-15 and MiG-17 fighters, delivered from 1955, were beginning to supplant the older Vampire and Meteor fighters, and the EAF had intruded into Israeli airspace from time to time.
On 21 July 1955 during talks in Gaza four IDF/AF jets flew over provocatively. Later, on 22 August there was a skirmish on the ground, following which EAF Vampires flew reconnaissance sorties on the 29th. The aircraft were intercepted by IDF/AF Meteors from a 117 Sqn detachment at Hatzor and one was shot down. There was a further incursion on 31 August which went unintercepted and then on 1 September there was a further clash when two Vampires (1567 and 1569) were shot down by Meteor FR9 no 36.
The Egyptians effectively blocked the Straits of Tiran which resulted in further Israeli action on the ground. By now the Egyptians had announced their orders for Soviet aircraft which resulted in the IDF/AF looking to upgrade its own air force. Most Western powers were reluctant to sell aircraft to Israel, but the French had no such qualms, especially given Egyptian support for Algerian nationalists who were fighting the French in what has been called ‘a savage war of peace’. The first type ordered was the Ouragan, 24 of which equipped 113 Sqn at Hatzor, and later 24 Mysteres equipped 101 Sqn, also at Hatzor. 103 Sqn, at Tel Nof, employed three Noratlas and had ten loaned C-47s from the Armee de l’Air.
There were further skirmishes along the frontier and on 12 April 1956 Ouragan 323 of 113 Sqn shot down Vampire 1584 of 2 Sqn detached to El Arish. At about this time a further eighteen Mysteres were delivered (of an order for 36) with six extra Ouragans.
The dilemma facing Britain and France on taking military action was to find sufficient justification for invading a sovereign state. It was decided to encourage Israel to attack the Egyptians in Sinai - which suited the former anyway - with a drive to the Canal. This would give the Anglo-French force adequate reason to send troops to intervene to maintain the integrity of the Canal.
The Israeli Chief of Staff, General Moshe Dayan, first heard of the invasion plan on 1 September 1956 when French interests suggested that Israel join in. By 12 September the plans for ‘Musketeer’ were ready, although their implementation depended on the very slow process of requisitioning, loading and sailing the large number of merchant vessels required. The Israelis flew to Paris for a further planning meeting on the 29th and on 3 October Eden told close advisers that Israel had offered to collaborate.
The die was finally cast at a series of tri-partite meetings at Sévres between 22 and 24 October; concurrently the French reached a private agreement with Israel for defensive support involving warships and fighter aircraft. The final plan was for the Israelis to invade Sinai on 29 October. When the Israelis reached the Canal the British and French governments would issue an ultimatum requiring the Israelis and Egyptians to withdraw their forces ten miles east and west respectively. It was confidently predicted that the ultimatum would be rejected by Egypt, which would give the Allies a justifiable excuse for military intervention.
That the British did not trust the Israelis was evident through the preparation of Operation ‘Cordage’, designed to neutralise the IDF/AF air bases in the event that Israel attacked Jordan. One senior RAF commander is on record as having said that he did not know whether his aircraft were to bomb Egyptian or Israeli airfields until 24 hours before the operation began.
The IDF/AF was not well-equipped for an offensive operation. By October 1956 it had about 80 fighters operational, comprising sixteen Mystere IVAs, 22 Ouragans, eleven Meteor F8/FR9s, two Meteor NF13s and 29 P-51D Mustangs. Also operational were two B-17s, fifteen Mosquitoes, seventeen Harvards, sixteen C-47s and three Noratlases.

IDF/AF October 1956

Unit Type Base

101 Sqn Mystere IVA Hatzor
113 Sqn Ouragan Hatzor
117 Sqn Meteor F8, FR9 Ramat David
119 Sqn Meteor NF13 Ramat David
105 Sqn Mustang Ramat David
116 Sqn Mustang Tel Nof
110 Sqn Mosquito FB6 Ramat David
103 Sqn C-47, Noratlas Tel Nof
100 Sqn Piper Cub Ramleh, Eilat
140 Sqn Harvard Beersheba

By comparison the EAF employed more and newer aircraft with about 115 fighters comprising 45 MiG-15s, six MiG-17s, 40 Vampire FB52s, nineteen Meteor F4/F8s and five Meteor NF13s. Perhaps even more worrying were 49 Il-28 bombers. The EAF transport force comprised about twenty each of the C-46, C-47 and Il-14.

EAF October 1956

Unit Type Base

1 Sqn MiG-15, MiG-17 Almaza
20 Sqn MiG-15 Fayid
30 Sqn MiG-15 Abu Sueir
5 Sqn Meteor F4, F8 Fayid
10 Sqn Meteor NF13 Almaza
2 Sqn Vampire FB52 Cairo West
31 Sqn Vampire FB52 Kasfareet
40 Sqn Vampire FB52 Fayid
8 Sqn Il-28 Inchas
9 Sqn Il-28 Inchas
OTU Il-28 Luxor
3 Sqn C-47 Almaza
7 Sqn C-46 Almaza
11 Sqn Il-14 Almaza
4 Sqn Various light transports Dekheila

In addition the Syrian Air Force was equipped with seven Meteor F8, two FR9 and six NF13 with the MiG-15 just coming into service. To the north the Lebanon Air Force had five Vampire FB52s while the Royal Jordanian Air Force employed ten Vampire FB9s. The Royal Iraqi Air Force had fifteen Venom FB1, fifteen Venom FB50s, twelve Vampire FB52s and about 20 Fury FB11s.
Israeli concern was that, although the IDF/AF had enough fighters to support an attack in Sinai, there were no reserves to protect Israeli cities against air attack; there was, moreover, a shortage of transports to maintain troops in the field, given the difficulty of overland routes of re-supply. The problem was solved by the French offer of fighter cover and a squadron of Noratlas transports for the duration. While the military planning went ahead the principles of collusion were finally agreed at Sévres.

The allied plan

The military intervention in Egypt would initially take the form of bombing and would be followed by a period of psychological warfare during which aircraft would be used to drop leaflets, while spurious radio broadcasts would deceive and confuse.
The civilian population would also be warned of further impending bombing. RAF bombers from Malta and Cyprus would attack airfields and military installations, initially at night and from high altitude. Further targets would be attacked by carrier-based strike aircraft, which would later be used to cover the invasion proper. Once the EAF had been neutralised and the population confused, the invasion would begin with paradrops to the west of Port Said (British) and on Port Fuad to the east (French); these drops would be followed up by seaborne troops who would push south down the Canal with armoured support.

Transport and support units Operation Musketeer

Unit Type Base

RAF

30 Sqn Valetta C1 Nicosia ex Dishforth
84 Sqn Valetta C1 Nicosia
114 Sqn Valetta C1 Nicosia ex Khormaksar
70 Sqn Hastings C1 Nicosia
99 Sqn Hastings C1 Nicosia ex Lyneham
511 Sqn Hastings C1 Nicosia ex Lyneham
JHU Whirlwind HAR2, HMS Ocean
Sycamore HC14

RN

845 NAS Whirlwind HAS2 HMS Theseus

British Army

1913 Flt Auster AOP6 Akrotiri, Gamil

Armée de l’Air

ET 1/61 (61-N) Noratlas Tymbou ex Algiers
ET 3/61 (61-Q) Noratlas Tymbou ex Algiers
ET 1/62 (62-W) Noratlas Tymbou ex Reims
ET 2/63 (63-L) Noratlas, C-47 Tymbou ex Orléans
ET 2/64 (64-P) Breguet 761 Orléans
CEAM HD-32 Tymbou ex Mont de
Marsan

ALAT

GH3 Bell 47G Gamil ex Algiers

In the event the campaign opened on 29 October with the start of the Israeli operation ‘Kadesh’. As described later the Israelis dropped paratroops on the Mitla Pass in Sinai and drove into Egypt along three routes. By the late afternoon of 30 October Israeli troops had advanced a considerable way towards the Canal and at 1615hrs the Anglo-French ultimatum was issued, requiring both Israel and Egypt to retire ten miles from the Canal. The Egyptians, understandably, would not comply, but in any event the order to the RAF to prepare the first stage of the bombing campaign had already been given.
The French invasion convoy had left its assembly point, Bône in Algeria, on 27 October. At 2200hrs on the 30th the British fleet, with a shorter sailing time, left Malta heading for Suez. The whole operation had nearly suffered a mortal blow when the RAF Comet of 216 Sqn taking the Planning Group to Cyprus on 23 October lost all four engines at 45,000ft. Fortunately they relit at lower altitude.
The first phase of the intervention was to deal with the EAF. The Allies were most concerned about the strength of the EAF, the fighting capability of its aircrew and especially the preparedness of Czech and Soviet ‘advisers’ to fight. Allied intelligence was based on aerial reconnaissance, while Israeli assessments were probably the result of more direct espionage. Thus Allied estimates of EAF strength were double those of the IDF.
The British assessments almost certainly came via the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) through its U-2A unit based at Incirlik Air Base at Adana in Turkey. By the time of the invasion relations between Britain and America were bad. The CIA enjoyed a high degree of independence, and although informed had not advised President Eisenhower of the details of the Allied invasion plan. Throughout the Suez action the USAF’s Strategic Air Command (SAC) was placed on alert, including the B-47 equipped 306 Bomb Wing (BW) at Ben Guerir in Morocco; on 26 October the RB-47s of 70 Strategic reconnaissance Wing (SRW) arrived at Sidi Slimane, also in Morocco.
RAF bombing began on the night of 31 October and from 1 November the bomber attacks on EAF bases were complemented by daytime tactical strikes on a variety of targets by RAF, Royal Navy and French Navy fighters. On 5 November the paratroops were dropped and captured their objectives, being supported by carrier-borne fighters. At dawn on 6 November the seaborne landings began, supported for the first time ever by helicopters which landed 420 men in 1½ hours. Soon all objectives "The military" were achieved and the head of the Canal "in Port Said" was secured; indeed reconnaissance units had driven down the Canal to El Arish . However, the campaign was not to last much longer.
Under international pressure a cease-fire was ordered for midnight on the 6th. November GMT which means 02.00 after midnight Port Said time..

The Soviet Union had invaded Budapest on 4 November in the face of a Hungarian revolution, and had threatened to destroy London and Paris with nuclear missiles on the 5th if the Allies did not disengage from Egypt. In Britain - but not in France - the nation was divided and the Government had little choice but to pull the plug. Britain was humiliated, relations with France reached a modern low-point which has had a continuing impact on the British position within the European Union. Quite what role the United States thought it was playing - apart from improving its position in the Middle East at the expense of an ally - remains unclear.
Full details of the actions of the carrier-borne aircraft, the strike fighters and bombers and the French action in Israel will be covered in later articles.

Curtesy of Vic Flinthham Navis Magazine ... please visit at http://www.navismagazine.com/about.htm

 
 

The Agony of declination, to be former two Super Powers has begun, but the Agony for Port Said to be under Siege was more hurting......

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