quote " .......The opening on January 1 this year of British Government records for 1956 has generated the expected surge of interest amongst researchers at the Public Record Office. The Suez records were always going to be something of a test case for the working of the Public Records Act of 1967 and most of the pundits at Kew have been agreeably surprised by the volume of material released, while having some reservations about the quality of some of the material and being dismayed by the usual profusion of retained documents.  More than most years, the 1987 vintage is a rather patchy one, being studded with anomalies. In some cases the departments have released material from 1957 under the provisions of Section 5 of the Public Records Act 1958 to enable researchers to build up as broad a picture as possible. In the light of this accommodating attitude it is therefore surprising that some of the Cabinet committees' papers for 1956 have not been released because they were bound with those of 1957, the reason being that for convenience the records of the Eden premiership were placed together. The general and political correspondence of the Foreign Of fice will, as usual, be one of the major research tools, and this year has brought something of a bonus in the release of some 30 Permanent Under Secretary's Department 'Z' files; however, the 74 United States files and 69 French files do look rather sparse when compared to previous years' releases. When working in the Suez records for 1956 it is even more important than usual to be aware of the implications of the restricted circulation of documents. Not only did the military papers have the special 'Terrapin' (code for restricted) circulation but diplomatic material was also given a restricted 'Suez'  circulation both within the Foreign Of fice and for outside bodies. The most extreme example of this is of course the celebrated issue of collusion with Israel: given the tight circle of people within which this secret was held, it is scarcely surprising that there is no reference to collusion in Foreign Office records until during and after MUSKETEER. The military records also have little to say directly on the question of cooperation with Israel until the first days of the MUSKETEER operation. Researchers can therefore only echo the frustration  of the Foreign Office officials on this matter.  The records of the full Cabinet in CAB 128 and 129 are not that significant for the Suez crisis, except to establish how much the Cabinet was told of the negotiations with the French and Israelis in Paris in October 1956. Similarly the Defence Committee, whose records are not yet available at the PRO, was not directly involved in the Suez affair and its records, while containing useful background material on the importance of the Middle East for Britain's defence policy, are not essential. The most interesting paper on 'United Kingdom Requirements in the Middle East' written in July 1956 for the Policy Review Committee, a body engaged on a reassessment of Britain's strategic stance in the light of the changing nature of the Cold War (the records of which are not yet  available), is retained under Section 3(4) of the 1958 Act. As the Cabinet and Defence Committee were to all intents and purposes shortcircuited out of the decision - making process, the Suez crisis in all its aspects was handled by what has been called an 'inner cabinet' - the standing Egypt Committee.  Egypt Committee The records of this body, contained in CAB 134/1216 and 1217, are therefore the starting point for any research on the Suez crisis. This ministerial committee performed the vital coordinating and decisionmaking function in all areas of policy from the nationalisation of the Canal to the launching of MUSKETEER. These files therefore contain essential material on diplomatic, financial and military activity: unfortunately, these do peter out alarmingly in October 1956.  The Egypt Committee was serviced by a web of other committees. Its subcommittee, the Egypt (Official) Committee in CAB 134/1225, contains intriguing material on political directives and civil affairs arrangements for MUSKETEER.  The Middle East (Official) Committee, whose records have not yet been fully released except for memoranda up to August 1956 available in CAB 134/1298, seems to have dealt not only with questions relating to the Aswan Dam but also with the complex negotiations on SCUA and its forerunners. The Defence (Transition) Committee (CAB 134/&15), whose remit included the mobilisation and administration of the MUSKETEER forces, also reported to the Egypt Committee.  In addition to this cluster of committees which formed the nerve centre of the British machinery for the Suez crisis, the CAB series also contains the Miscellaneous and General series of ad hoc meetings of which the following are relevant for the Middle East:  CAB 130/111 (Middle East Affairs November 1956);  CAB 130/113 (preparations for Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Meeting June 1956);  and CAB 130/120 (Meeting of High Commissioners July 1956 and Meeting on Jordan October 1956).  Unfortunately CAB 130/122, which appears to be the first of series of damage assessment meetings held at Chequers in December 1956, is not yet available.    African Department  118842 - 118844  Foreign policy of Egypt  118846 - 118847 Influence and activities of the Soviet Union in Egypt 118849 - 118851 Reports from FO posts giving local reaction to the Suez crisis 118858  Developing influence of Egypt in the Middle East 118861 - 118865  Political relations between Egypt and UK 118873 - 118888 United Nations and Suez  118943 - 118950   Financial repercussions of  nationalisation 119046 - 119066 Aswan Dam 119078 119164 Nationalisation of the Suez Canal; London Conference and intervention by Britain and France 119169 - 119189 Suez dispute referred to United Nations  119191 - 119208 SCUA and CASU 12s424 - 125425  International reactions to events in Suez  119724 - 119729 Political relations between Libya and UK Eastern Department 120521  United Kingdom policy in the Middle East 120561 Egypt and the Persian Gulf  120755 - 120758 Attitude and policy of Saudi Arabia in the Middle East  120765 - 120771 Political relations between Saudi Arabia and UK  Economic Relations  120816 Financial situation in the United Kingdom afler the Suez crisis  120825 - 120840 Middle East Oil Committee; Working Parties on Oil Supplies  Levant Department  121220 Soviet Union and Ihe Middle East 121222 - 121223 Attitude of Arab and Moslem countries to possible hostilities 121233 - 121238  United Kingdom policy in the Middle East  121241 - 121243 Arab relations in the Middle East  121270 - 121274 United Kingdom and United States in the Middle East  121291 - 121292 The Soviet Union and the Middle East  121295 Arab nationalism and the Middle East  121417 - 121419 Oil the Suez Canal and the Middle East 121462 - 121470 Internal poluical situation in Jordan  121475 - 121489  Foreign policy of Jordan and relations wilh various Counlries  121491 - 121501 Political relations between Jordan and UK 121648 Foreign policy of Iraq  121650 - 121651 Political relations between Iraq and Egypt 121661 - 121662  Political relations between Iran and United Kingdom 121696 Foreign policy of Israel 121697  Polibcal relations between Israel and France  121705 - 121706  Political relations belween Israel and UK 121722 - 121731 Political relations between Israel and the Arab Stales 121732 - 121754  United Nations action: border disputes and the Suez crisis 121771 - 121804  Political relations between Israel and Arab States Northern Department  122069  Soviet penetration of the Middle East    Western Department 124430 - 124424 Foreign policy of France  124441 - 124444 Political relations between France and UK  118838 - 118841  Civil affairs  118902 - 118923  Military action of the United Kingdom and France at Suez 118981 - 118985  Pre - Suez assessments 118996 - 118987  Suez Canal military planning    One of the mainstays for research on postwar diplomatic history are normally the Cabinet Secretariat files in CAB 21 which are invaluable for tracing the evolution of decisions. However, the CAB 21 series for the Suez crisis is rather sparse. To an extent this can be remedied by the use of the PREM 11 series: by their very nature and because of the personal control exercised by Eden over all aspects of the Suez crisis, these  provide an additional insight into the highest echelons of decision making in Whitehall. These voluminous files mix the invaluable with the inconsequential. Of particular significance are the following:     PREM 11/1090 PREM 1098 - 1100 PREM 1104 PREM 1105 PREM 1121 PREM 1132 PREM 1135 PREM 1141 PREM 1142 PREM 1152 PREM1153 PRE M 1170 PREM 1174 - 1177 PREM 1324 PREM 1325 PREM 1345 PREM 1351 PREM 1440 PREM 1457 PREM 1465 PREM 1470 These selected files contain telegrams and memoranda covering such subjects as the immediate reaction to the nationalisation of the Canal, the proposed military response and continued military planning, and Anglo - French, Anglo - American and Anglo - Soviet relations.  These personal papers of the Prime Minister are parallelled by those of the Foreign Secretary, Selwyn Lloyd, contained in FO 800. Apart from containing his diary of engagements, miscellaneous correspondence and speeches, this class also contains  memoranda exchanged by Lloyd, Eden and other members of the Cabinet  (FO 800/721, 722 and 728 - 731) as well as papers from the Legal Advisers of the Foreign Office (FO 800/747 - 749). In addition the series contains two files that constitute a short cut into the intricacies of the Suez records, FO 800/725 and 727. Perhaps the single most important file is FO 800/726 which contains the correspondence between Dulles and Lloyd in the August to November period.  To some extent these files duplicate material available in FO 371 (general and political correspondence) which for any researcher will form the backbone for work on the Suez crisis: however, these files have to be treated with some care as on several key issues the Foreign Office was not kept informed.  The telegrams, minutes and memoranda, briefing documents and position papers preserved in this class form a day - to - day account of the diplomatic activity of Britain in 1956 and therefore portray the concerns of Whitehall. In a short piece such as this it is not possible to do justice to this class but the files in Table 1 are the most important, although others omitted should not be dismissed out of hand.  These FO 371 files should be supplemented where necessary with other FO classes such as FO 115 (Embassy and Consular archives Washington) to overcome the lack of material in some key areas: FO 115/4545 and 4548 - 4551 provide the only detailed files on Anglo - American relations in 1956. FO 115/4552 - 4608 also contains useful material on the Suez Canal and the United Nations.  Unfortunately, material for other embassies, such as Paris, Jedda and Cairo, are not available; some were destroyed in the 1956 evacuation and others later because of duplication with the main FO 371 sequence. For any researcher interested in the significant area of British information, cultural and propaganda work in the Middle East, FO 953 (records of the Information Policy Department) looks potentially fruitful.  Other civil departments such as the Colonial Of fice and the Commonwealth Office had less influence on the handling of the Suez crisis and these records are therefore not very helpful.  The exception is a series of files in DO 35 which chronicle the response of the Commonwealth to the evolving Suez crisis; 6334 and 6337 - 6341 provide material on all the Commonwealth countries with the exception of Australia. DO 35/6314 - 6322 contains material relating to interdepartmental cooperation during the summer and autumn of 1956.  Of the financial and supply departments the most important is the Treasury, by virtue of its position and Macmillan's membership of the inner cabinet. The most important files dealing with the financial aspect of the dispute are T 236/4188 - 4190, which concern the run on sterling, and T236/4614 and 4635 which concern  financial pressure brought to bear on the Nasser regime as a preliminary to the military option.  The evolution of MUSKETEER, the deployment of forces, the launching of the_operation and its military consequences can to some degree be found in the files of the civilian departments and committees. The Egypt Committee, as the overseeing body, contains some useful material, while the following FO 371 files are also concerned with military planning and the military action:  In addition there are various files in the Africa and Levant Departments concerned with the supply of arms to the Middle East and the possible application of the Tripartite Declaration of 1950 in 1956.  However, for a comprehensive picture of the military aspects of the Suez affair it is necessary to go to the Ministry of Defence and the Service Department files. Taken together these form a coherent body of material that rivals FO 371 as a source for any study of the events of 1956. It would be a great mistake to ignore the   AIR, ADM and WO classes in the mistaken belief that these deal with 'pay and rations' alone. Several classes are essential for any study of the operational side of MUSKETEER  ADM 116  Admiralty Secretariat and Cases contains some 100 files on the Suez Canal dispute and MUSKETEER: 6097 - 6101 Covers plans 6103 - 6106 preparations 6133 - 6135  Covers reports 6209 proceedings 6112 - 6127 Covers signals AIR 20  Unregistered Papers contains some 100 files, including Air Task Force HQ and Allied Forces HQ COS(Air) papers:  9593 - 9594 Covers plans and preparations 9673 - 9678 Covers situation reports 9957 - 9974  Covers post - action assessments  10100 - 10219 Covers various operational 10363 - 10371  reports    WO 288 Suez Campaign Headquarters papers and War Diaries contains some 155 files these consist of situation reports, signal logs, war diaries and post - action reports Higher - level strategic issues Moreover, the Air Ministry, Admiralty and War Office classes also deal with higher - level strategic issues in conjunction with the Ministry of Defence and the Chiefs of Staff machinery. The DEFE file sequences are rather disappointing; DEFE 7, DEFE 11 and DEFE 13 contain little that is of any use for MUSKETEER.  However, the Chiefs of Staff and Joint Planning Staff machinery is of central importance: DEFE 4 (COS meetings), DEFE 5 (COS papers) and DEFE 6 (JPS papers) provide the records for the most important military body that held an overseeing role for the MUSKETEER operation and its likely consequences. These should as far as possible be read together; although papers are often attached to the COS meetings, it is worth cross - checking with the papers in DEFE 5 and DEFE 6 to be able to trace the evolution of a particular paper. As usual what is lacking are the Secretarial minutes, which are occasionally very important documents and do not seem to be preserved, and the minutes of the Staff Conferences with the Minister of Defence......    The DEFE history records In addition, Anthony Gorst, a modern historian working in London, has listed the following records which - like the previous records -  should be supplemented with the Service Department files. ADM 205  First Sea Lord Papers - Suez Records some 50 files 117 - 119  Suez Main Papers 120  Suez Briefs for the First Sea Lord 127  Repercussions in the Persian Gulf and Middle East  132 - 133 Early drafts of MUSKETEER plan 138 MUSKETEER III Plan 139 - 142 MUSKETEER Plans and Signals  149 Miscellaneous Egypt Papers 150 Short account of Suez Operation AIR 8 Chief of Air Staff Papers - some 30 files 1940  MUSKETEER General papers 1948 Planning for MUSKETEER  1951  MUSKETEER: situation following cease-fire  2076 - 2078  Implications of Suez crisis: Jordan  2081 - 2100 Various MUSKETEER subject files WO 106  Directorate of Military Operations and Intelligence 5986 MUSKETEER planning WO 216  Chief of the Imperial General Staff papers 907 MUSKETEER planning  909  CIGS Appreciation of Suez Operation

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