A then popular argument held that the Anglo-French
intervention was a godsend to the Soviet Union because it
provided a cover for the Soviets to brutally suppress the
Hungarian Revolution.17 No doubt Suez deflected some criticism.
Certainly the Russians used the crudely applied English and
French military action to score points in the Third World
An additional anecdote illustrates that in terms of actual
combat, Nasser was on his own. Syrian President Shukri el-
Kuwatly was in Moscow at that time and pleaded Nasser's case
to the Soviet hierarchy. When Kuwatly became almost hysterical
at Russian intransigence, Soviet Defense Minister Zukov took
a globe and graphically explained to the excited Syrian that
the distances involved made any kind of practical assistance
impossible.29

The propaganda war, though hampered by the loss of the
psyop sound plane, continued. British radio beamed loudly
into Egypt and depicted Nasser as a traitor who almost deliverd
"our country" into the hands of the Soviet Union. A major
leaflet drop into the Delta on October 31 declared:

"Remember that we have the might to attain
our objective, and we shall use all of it
if necessary. Your choice is clear. Either
accept the Allied proposals or accept the
consequences of Nasser's policy, which will
bring heavy retribution not only to the few
who are guilty, but also to you, the many
who are innocent."37

I could have titled this paper " The Soviet Miracle ". I have to explain this " little provocation ". I think that the Suez crisis is a very rare case seeing a State -- the Soviet Union -- managing a major change in the balance of power without doing almost anything but bluff and with a very limited political and military investment. More, at the same time Moscow had to face a dangerous challenge in two countries (Poland and Hungary) with a very high value to its political, military and ideological security. I would like to show how this " miracle " could result. As the role of France, Great Britain United States and Israel are now well known, I will focus on the Soviet side. Getting access to the soviet archives we could now have a more accurate and comprehensive approach1.

A New Policy
First, what was the Soviet position in the Middle Eastern balance of power before the Suez Crisis ?

Between 1949 and 1955, Moscow had almost no policy, no strategy no allies in the Middle East. After ending the strategic alliance with Israel in 1949, the Soviet policy was constrained by the internal factors during the last Stalin's years. The struggle for power at the top leadership, the different affairs and plots, especially the so-called "Zionist and cosmopolitan" one, led to the severing of diplomatic relations between Moscow and Tel Aviv in February 1953 (resumed in July 1953). On the other hand, during these years, Soviet Union was unable to formulate a strategy to prevent the creation of a " Middle Eastern NATO " by the Western powers. If this project failed, it was more because of the contradictions of the western policy as the result of the Soviet one.

The come back of Moscow in the Middle East began in 1955 with the negotiations with Egypt about an arms deal and with the formulation of a new approach for the Soviet policy based upon both geopolitical and ideological factors.

According to Mohamed Heikal, Nasser's adviser, the negotiations about an arms deal between Moscow and Cairo started in may 1955 after the Bandung conference. Getting access to soviet archives we know now that the scenario was different. I have no room in the frame of this paper to go through the details of this affair but just about the main points. In October 1953, for the first time the Egyptian ambassador in Moscow talked to the soviet diplomat Zaïtsev about the possibility for its country to receive soviet arms2. In July 1954, Moscow gave a positive answer to Nasser3. But the Egyptian leader did not follow up the soviet offer because he was negotiating a new treaty with Great Britain. Cairo came back to Moscow's offer in April 19554 before the Bandung conference, after the signature of the Baghdad Pact and after the failure of the negotiations with the United States about an American military support to Egypt.

The Egyptians asked the Soviets that the negotiations took place in Prague in order to avoid a harsh reaction of the Western powers. So after Shepilov's trip in Cairo in July 19555, the arms deal was concluded in September 1955 in Prague6. On the eve of the Suez crisis, Moscow was selling tanks and fighters to Cairo and sending there military advisors. It was a successful but limited breakthrough in the western political and military monopoly in the Middle East. The conclusion of the Baghdad Pact in February 1955 speeded up the rapprochement between the Soviet Union and Egypt7. As Nasser refused to join it, Moscow considered the Egyptian leader as a potential ally. The alliance with Nasser could divided the Western powers, the Arab world, prevent any solving of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the creation a military anti soviet bloc in the Middle East.

Thus, on the eve of the Suez crisis the Soviet Union get a better position in the balance of power in the Middle East as in 1954 but the distribution of power remains in favour of the Western countries. Moscow had a new vague doctrine but not a policy to implement.

However, Nasser's intransigence during the negotiations over financing the Aswan Dam, combined with the U.S. Congress's opposition to this project and Egypt's recognition of Communist China in April 1956,10 led to the crisis. Nasser took alone the decision to nationalize the Suez Canal. The Soviet Union did not play any role.

Even if the former KGB agent in Cairo, Vadim Kirpichenko, states that this possibility had been envisaged by the Soviet intelligence services,11 Nasser's gesture would certainly seem to have surprised the Kremlin leaders, given the time they took to react officially to the nationalization of the Suez Canal. Even the Yugoslav leaders, albeit close to Nasser, were not taken into his confidence, as attested by the exchange between the Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister, Vladimir Semienov12 and the Yugoslav ambassador to Moscow.13

On August 2, France, Great Britain and the United States published a declaration proposing a conference to be held in London on August 16 in order to find a way out of the conflict. This conference was an American initiative. While Paris and London were tending towards a military solution, Washington tried to dissuade them.

The Soviet Union was invited to this conference as a signatory of the Constantinople Convention of 1888, which laid down the principles for using the Suez Canal. In all, 24 countries, including Egypt but not Israel, received invitations to London.16

First, the USSR was in favour of the proposal, presented to the Soviet ambassador by Nasser on August 3, to submit the matter to the United Nations Security Council.17 The politburo rejected this option, deciding that the USSR would attend the conference and asking Shepilov to draw up the list of delegation members and to prepare a set of draft instructions.18On August 9, the Soviet government published a declaration on the Suez issue. This text was the first official stand since the beginning of the crisis, Khrushchev's speech on July 31 having been unofficial. The USSR repeated its support for the Egyptian decision, which it called " an entirely legal act deriving from Egypt's sovereign rights ", denounced " the measures taken by the English and French governments ", calling them " completely unacceptable ", and a " challenge to the cause of peace ", and announcing that it would attend the London Conference, while criticizing the conditions and principles underlying its organization.

The instructions reflected the political goals pursued by the USSR, which can be divided into three lines:

1) To support Egypt while showing that the USSR is seeking a balanced solution to the crisis. However, the Soviet delegation should not find itself in a situation in which its " declarations and its proposals could be interpreted as if the Soviet Union unconditionally supported one party's actions and ignored the interests of the other party, in particular those of England and France. "19 Particularly since the USSR has common interests with the Western powers on the other aspect of the Suez problem: freedom of shipping in the Canal.

2) The USSR's second goal was to reinforce its position in the Near East and in the Third World. For the first time since the end of the first Israel-Arab war in 1949, the USSR had an opportunity not to let the Western powers monopolize the Middle East. The Soviet leaders wanted to take advantage of this crisis in order to weaken the Western powers and develop their policy of rapprochement with the decolonized countries. In this way, Moscow tried to strike an alliance with the three main players of the Bandung Conference: Nasser, Nehru and Sukarno.

3) However, the USSR did not wish to see the conflict with Egypt, France and Great Britain degenerate into a military collision. This concern was not just a propaganda argument designed for public opinion. This point was stressed several times in the instructions.

On his return to Moscow, Shepilov presented a report to the presidium, and prepared a draft Central Committee resolution on the results of the London Conference. In this draft resolution, corrected by Souslov20, Shepilov emphasized that:

1. The nationalization of the Suez Canal was " a new and powerful blow to the colonialist positions which will impart momentum to the development of the fight by the peoples of the countries of the East against the unequal agreements imposed on them in the political and economic spheres. "21

2. The Suez crisis reflected the heightening of the internal contradictions of imperialism.

3. The USSR's was right to participate in this conference. " The Soviet Union had become a major world power. No problem in the Near and Middle East or no global problem in general can be settled without taking account of its opinion. "22

4. The creation of a common front in the speeches of the Soviet Union, India, Indonesia and Ceylon is an important political result of the London Conference. According to Shepilov, this unity made it possible to remove the danger of Western military intervention without, however, ruling it out it completely. Hence measures had to be taken in order to lessen international tension, unmask the antipopular plans of the aggressive circles of England, France and the United States, and strengthen the resistance of Egypt and the other Arab countries.”

While the London Conference was an unqualified success in the eyes of the Soviets, it did nothing to solve the problem triggered by the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company. As Nasser rejected the London Conference proposals, France, Great Britain and Israel considered they could prepare their military operation.

During the weeks after the London Conference, the USSR did not change the line it had laid down at the beginning of August. On September 11, Bulganin sent letters to the French and British prime ministers, highlighting the potential negative consequences of an armed intervention and pointing out that the USSR entirely recognized the rights and interests of France and Great Britain. On September 15, the Soviet government published a declaration following the French-British-American proposal to establish an association of Suez Canal users which would manage the Canal.23 Opposing this project, the USSR supported the Egyptian proposal, drawn up on September 1024 to convene a conference with the signatory states of the 1888 Convention in order to consider its revision. Moscow warned the Western powers against using force, while declaring its commitment to the freedom of shipping in the Canal and recognizing the importance of the Canal for France and Great Britain. However, above all, Moscow emphasized its Great Power status pointing out its concern about the situation and that any violation of the peace in the Near and Middle East would affect the security of the Soviet Union25 .

After the failure of the Users association's project, Paris and London took the Suez problem to the Security Council. Despite the potential Soviet veto, they thought that they would be able to prove to world public opinion how intransigent Nasser was being, thereby acquiring legitimacy for the military intervention being prepared.26 A few days before the Council session began, the MID's Information Committee analyzed the reasons behind the Franco-British request. Tugarinov envisaged three hypotheses:

1) France and Great Britain were aware that they were running the risk of the Soviet veto, but wanted to take advantage of it to show that the UN was incapable of solving the problem;

2) Resorting to the Security Council was intended to force the hand of the United States so that it would go along with the Franco-British plans. According to the author of this note, the United States could adopt a more conciliatory attitude to Egypt;

3) Paris and London wanted to reach a compromise with Egypt.27

However, Tugarinov did not indicate any preference for one of these hypotheses.

During the discussions in the Security Council, Shepilov defined the Soviet position along two sets of lines: initiating negotiations in order to discuss with Egypt the conditions for shipping in the Canal, and refusing any international control structure over the Canal. According to Mohamed Heikal, Shepilov urged the Egyptians to reject any compromise on the second point28. Moscow wanted to keep the control over the negotiations.

The discussions at the Security council resulted in a compromise. France and Great Britain presented a two-part resolution: the first part laid down the six principles which were intended both to guarantee the freedom of shipping in the Canal and to respect Egypt's sovereignty.29 The USSR voted in favour of this first part of the resolution, which was adopted unanimously by the Council. However, Moscow vetoed the second part of the resolution, which provided for Egypt to co-operate with the Canal Users Association " in order to ensure the proper functioning of the Canal ". Shepilov declared himself satisfied with the results obtained following these days of Security Council talks.30 This satisfaction was shared by Eisenhower, who stated, " It looks like here is a very great crisis that is behind us. "31

The Soviet leaders also received reassuring information from high-ranking members of the British Labour Party visiting Moscow. On August 14, the MID's Information Committee sent a note to Khrushchev reporting a conversation between Guy Burgess, the former Soviet agent-British diplomat who had fled to Moscow in 1951, and Tom Driberg, a journalist who was a member of the Labour Party's Executive Committee.34 For Driberg, the threats of England and France were nothing but bluff, and would not be implemented. This note was read by Khrushev.35

Burgess and Driberg met again two months later to discuss the Labour Party's situation. In a report addressed to Khrushchev, Bulganin and Shepilov, Burgess expressed his view that Driberg was being over-optimistic.36 On October 19, Burgess met another leading figure from the left wing of the Labour Party, Koni Zilliacus,37 who stated that the British government had no idea how to extricate itself from the Suez crisis. Under Eden, the Cabinet was undertaking a policy of threat and bluff, because it knew that there would be no war between East and West over the Middle East.38 The text of this conversation was also sent to Khrushchev, who had met Zilliacus a few days earlier. On September 11, one of the Arab leaders of the Israeli Communist Party, Tawfik Toubi, stated to the Soviet ambassador in Tel Aviv " that Israel would not itself engage in armed conflict with the Arabs. [...] Israel might join a military operation intiated by the Western powers. But currently there is no information indicating that the Western powers will undertake a war. They understand that an armed conflict would threaten to lose them the entire Near East. "39

All of these elements indicate that the Soviet leaders received information which might lead them to think that France and Great Britain would not implement their threats of military reprisals.

However, they also received information which might lead them to draw the opposite conclusion. This information came from the KGB, the MID's Information Committee and the USSR Embassy in Israel.

In his note, Tugarinov failed to reproduce the last part of Eisenhower's declaration, and misinterpreted it: he saw it as a sign that the Western powers might use military sanctions against Egypt.42 In fact, Washington opposed the use of force. The British leaders were not too thrilled by the American President's words,43 and were even more displeased by the declaration of Secretary of State Dulles two days later: " We have no intention of forcing a way through by gunfire. "44 But no word about this " interimperialist contradiction " can be found in Tugarinov's note. At the end of September Tugarinov wrote two notes on the position of the political forces in Great Britain45 and France46 concerning the Suez question. He indicated that, even if in the two countries the forces opposed to a policy of military sanctions were gaining ground, they were nevertheless still in the minority. However, he emphasized that the British government was in a difficult position, because " the influence of the forces in favour of a peaceful solution of the Suez crisis is growing ",47 while in France " opposition to the Western powers' policy on the Suez question is still weak and very inconsistent in Socialist and bourgeois circles. "48

On October 1, the KGB sent a note to the presidium about the possibility of military action against Egypt and the measures taken by the French intelligence services.49 At the same time, the presidium decided to send two KGB agents to Cairo in order to protect Nasser.50 Up to the end of October, the Soviet leaders continued to receive information from the KGB, but we do not know whether they were aware of the British-French-Israeli plan adopted in Sèvres on October 24.51.

The soviet embassy in Tel Aviv was also one of the sources which drew the attention of the Kremlin leaders to Israeli military preparations. On the eve of the launching of the tripartite operations, the Soviet leaders had at their disposal a fairly wide range of information and analyses. However, it would not seem, according to the available documentation, that they had a detailed knowledge of the preparations for the Anglo-Franco-British attack, and in particular the Sèvres protocols, as the American leaders.52 On the other hand, Washington was aware of the mobilization of the Israeli army, but until the eve of the war, the American intelligence services were unable to determine whether the IDF's target would be Jordan or Egypt.53 Furthermore, Ben-Gurion - familiar with the divisions within Eisenhower's administration about how to react in the case of a military operation against Nasser - thought that the United States would not intervene to stop it.54 As we have seen, the Israeli military manoeuvres did not escape the attention of Soviet diplomats and agents. However, the Kremlin leaders did not make any statements warning Israel or the Western powers in the days prior to the start of operations. They did not take any preventive measures to protect Soviet personnel in Cairo, who were evacuated in a panic, according to Vadim Kirpichenko's account55, confirmed by the minutes of the meeting of USSR ambassadors to the Near and Middle East which was held in Moscow a year after the Suez crisis. The Soviet diplomats posted in Cairo were blamed there for giving way to panic and asking Moscow to send warships to defend them and evacuate their families.56

Not only does the USSR appear to have been extremely passive on the eve of the war; it also took several days to react after the launching of hostilities.

In London and Paris, nobody really took seriously the Soviet nuclear threat. Eden considered his country to be protected by its possession of nuclear weapons. Mollet tried to find out from the American ambassador to Paris, Douglas Dillon, what the United States would do if France, which was not yet a nuclear power, were attacked by Soviet missiles. Dillon replied that he was convinced that Washington would stand by France, but he added that the White House would not make any official declaration to this effect just a few hours away from the American presidential election.62 In fact, Paris and London were more concerned by the American attitude than the Soviet threats.

Bulganin also sent President Eisenhower a letter in which he suggested to the United States that there should be military co-operation between the " two great powers having the hydrogen bomb " in order to stop the aggression against Egypt.63 Eisenhower rejected the Soviet proposal and did not appear to really believe in Moscow's threats, despite the concerns of the American ambassador to Moscow, Charles Bohlen, who thought that the USSR would not be able to refrain from acting if fighting continued in Egypt. However, the U-2 flights over Syria did not reveal any Soviet military presence which could be sent to the Egypt theatre of war.64

Why did the USSR suggest joint action to the United States? This was an initiative that clearly surprised all players. Through Soviet diplomatic action, combining threats - against France, Great Britain and Israel - with conciliation - in its proposal to act jointly with the United States, the USSR tried to avoid the contradiction between its regional and international constraints.

On the regional level, the threats were designed to show Egypt and the Arab world that the USSR was a reliable ally which was taking action to help a partner in difficulty. This demonstration was all the more necessary since the United States, having dissociated itself from France, Great Britain and Israel, might in the eyes of the Arab world appear to be a better potential ally than the USSR. It is in this light that Moscow's nuclear intimidation can be read.

On the international level, Moscow had to deal with two requirements: on the one hand, it had to affirm its great power status as the United States, in particular in the Near East, and on the other hand it had to adhere to the line of peaceful coexistence which meant ensuring that the conflict did not degenerate into an open confrontation with the United States. Hence threats against Paris, London and Tel Aviv, combined with the proposal to Washington for joint action, offered the best possible combination in the light of all these constraints affecting it.

Were the Soviet threats serious? This is a question which has been constantly asked since the end of the Suez crisis. A number of elements would seem to indicate that they were symbolic rather than real, and improvised rather than planned. Dmitri Shepilov stated that the threats were a bluff and that he himself, during his conversations with the French and British ambassadors outside the Security Council sessions, used Khrushchev's unpredictable character in order to back them up.65 From the Soviet passiveness up to November 5 and the evidence provided by the Syrian president, Kuwatly, it would appear that Moscow did not have a clear idea about how to behave. At that time the USSR did not have any military resources for rapid intervention in the Near East, and the threat of sending Soviet volunteers to fight side by side with the Egyptians was made on November 10,66 in other words after France and Great Britain had agreed to the cease-fire, i.e. at a point when fighting had stopped and the volunteers would, in any case, have been useless. After the crisis, the Egyptian ambassador to Moscow asked the Soviet Deputy-Minister of Foreign Affairs, Zorin, why the USSR had issued this declaration after the fighting had stopped. " It seemed to us, " replied Zorin, " that in the prevailing situation it was very important to undertake this step in order, on the one hand, to put additional moral pressure to bear on the aggressors and, on the other hand, to show that the Soviet Union and the other peace-loving countries were not interested to the international situation worsening. "67 Thus Zorin acknowledged that this threat of sending Soviet volunteers in Egypt was purely symbolic.

Similarly, the Soviet leaders stated that their action had forced France and Great Britain to put a stop to their undertaking, but in fact, this factor was far less significant than the United States' political and economic pressures on their allies.68 On December 3, France and Great Britain announced the withdrawal of their troops, which concluded on December 22, while Israel kept its armed forces in Gaza and Sharm el Sheikh until March 1957.

First, during a presidium meeting on October 28, before military operations were launched, Khrushchev argued for a swift resolution of the Budapest crisis, basing himself on the Western powers situation in Suez: " The English and the French are in a real mess in Egypt. We should not get caught in the same company. "69

Subsequently, on October 31, in other words after the begining of the Israeli military offensive in Sinai and the first bombings of Egypt by Franco-British aviation, Khrushchev declared that the attack on Nasser's regime was the first stage in an offensive where Budapest would be the second stage if Moscow did not react: " We must re-examine our declaration and not withdraw our troops from Hungary and Budapest. We must take the initiative by re-establishing order in Hungary. If we leave Hungary, this will give a boost to the Americans, the English and the French - the imperialists. They will take this for weakness on our part, and they will launch a major offensive. In that way we would be laying bare the weakness of our positions. If we do that, our party won't accept it. The imperialists will then add Hungary to Egypt. We have no alternative. "70 From these comments it can be seen that the war in Egypt probably speeded up the decision to intervene in Budapest, even if it was highly likely that the decision would have been taken in any case. The comments also provide us with two vital pieces of information. At that point, Khrushchev thought that France, Great Britain and the United States were waging a concerted operation against Egypt - it should be noted that he does not mention Israel - and he thought that his Egyptian ally had lost, that Cairo's defeat was inevitable. This element could in part explain the Soviet passivity until November 5. Moscow did not want to mobilize for a lost cause while its interests which were essential in another way - Hungary - were at stake. The seeming Soviet passivity can also be explained by the mobilization of the Kremlin leaders over the situation in Budapest.

Lastly, the hypothesis that the crushing of the Hungarian revolution allowed the USSR to recapture the initiative in the Near East is confirmed here by Malin's notes. On November 4, after the beginning of the Soviet intervention in Hungary, the presidium decided " to play a more active role in helping Egypt. Think of measures (maybe a demonstration outside the Embassy of Great Britain). More newspaper coverage. "71 This does not indicate that the presidium discussed or took a decision on sending Bulganin's letters of November 5, nor on their contents, merely that the situation was, in the Soviet leaders' eyes, being resolved in Budapest, so that the latter could from now on focus on their Egyptian ally.

1) Its main enemies, France and Great Britain, emerged from the crisis much weakened. Their failure at Suez marked the irreversible decline of their colonial empires. The Soviet Union made a major breakthrough in the Middle East;

2) The crisis highlighted the contradictions of interests - what was known in Soviet language as inter-imperialist contradictions - within the Atlantic alliance in an area which might well be considered as essential to Western security;

3) While the pressure which the United States brought to bear on their allies constituted the decisive factor in resolving the crisis, the USSR did manage, as a result of its diplomatic signals, to derive major political benefit, acquiring prestige and power in the Third World, even if its standing in the West was seriously damaged by the repression in Hungary which, coming after the revelations of the 20th Congress, unleashed a profound crisis in the Communist movement. In addition, the Suez crisis was a decisive stage in the " globalization of the Soviet power "73 which would enable it to impose itself as a " superpower " as the United States. It was a major turning point of the Cold War.

But throughout this crisis, Soviet policy was improvised. On each occasion it was forced into responding late. This policy was the result of Khrushchev's initiatives, and to a large extent it has not yet been decided whether they were discussed prior to their implementation or whether they were the outcome of Khrushchev's actions only. Anyway, the " Soviet miracle " is far more the outcome of circumstances, the inconsistencies of Western policy and a military operation based on an unlikely scenario. But it changed the balance of power in the Middle East for the next 15 years.

The abovementioned assesment, was published by "Institut d'études politiques de Paris"... Laurent Rucker, the author of Staline, Israel et les Juifs, Paris, Presses universitaires de France, 2001.. has proven a good and sharp sense for an in depth analysis of the strategy and attitude of the former USSR. His other publications are worth reading..