in Vietnam from 15,000 troops in 1964 to 550,000 in 1968.13 In late 1969 the
gradual withdrawal of ground forces began, inching its way to the final
U .S. pullout in January 1973. The bell curve of escalation and withdrawal
spread the commitment of men into a decade-long chain of one-year tours
of duty.
In the years of escalation, as draft calls mounted to 30,000 and 40,000 a
month, many young people believed the entire generation might be mobi-
lized for war. There were, of course, many ways to avoid the draft, and
millions of men did just that. Very few, however, felt completely confident
that they would never be ordered to fight. Perhaps the war would escalate
to such a degree or go on so long that all exemptions and deferments would
be eliminated. No one could be sure what would happen. Only in retro-
spect is it clear that the odds of serving in Vietnam were, for many people,
really quite small. The forces that fought in Vietnam were drawn from the
largest generation of young people in the nation's history. During the
years 1964 to 1973, from the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution to the final with-
drawal of American troops from Vietnam, 27 million men came of draft
age. The 2.5 million men of that generation who went to Vietnam repre-
sent less than 10 percent of America's male baby boomers. 14
The parents of the Vietnam generation had an utterly different experi-
ence of war. During World War II virtually all young, able-bodied men
entered the service-some 12 million. Personal connections to the military
permeated society regardless of class, race, or gender. Almost every
family had a close relative overseas-a husband fighting in France, a son
in the South Pacific, or at least an uncle with the Seabees, a niece in the
WAVES, or a cousin in the Air Corps. These connections continued well
into the 1950s. Throughout the Korean War years and for several years
after, roughly 70 percent of the draft-age population of men served in the
military; but from the 1950s to the 1960s, military service became less and
less universal. During the Vietnam years, the portion had dropped to 40
percent: 10 percent were in Vietnam, and 30 percent served in Germany,
South Korea, and the dozens of other duty stations in the United States
and abroad. What had been, in the 1940s, an experience shared by the vast
majority gradually became the experience of a distinct minority. 15
What kind of minority was it? In modern American culture, minority
usually serves as a code word for nonwhite races, especially African
Americans. To speak of American forces in Vietnam as a minority invites
the assumption that blacks, Hispanics, Asian Americans, and N ative
Americans fought and died in numbers grossly disproportionate to their
percentage of the total U .S. population. It is a common assumption, but
not one that has been sufficiently examined. For that matter, the whole
experience of racial minorities in Vietnam has been woefully ignored by
the media and academics. For Hispanics, Asian Americans, and N ative
Americans, even the most basic statistical information about their role in
Vietnam remains either unknown or inadequately examined.
We know how many black soldiers served and died in Vietnam, but the
important task is to interpret those figures in historical context.
that context, racial disproportions can be either exaggerated or
To simplify: At the beginning of the war blacks comprised more
20 percent of American combat deaths, about twice their portion of
U.S. population. However, the portion of black casualties declined
time so that, for the war as a whole, black casualties were only
disproportionate (12.5 percent from a civilian population of 11
The total percentage of blacks who served in Vietnam was
10 percent throughout the war. 16
faced more than their fair share of the risks in
from 1965 to 1967. That fact might well have failed to gain any
.,
Martin Luther King was probably the most effective in generat-
about the number of black casualties in Vietnam. King had
from frequent public criticism of the war until 1967 , persuaded
opposition to the war might divert energy
cause of civil rights and alienate prowar politicians whose sup-
movement sought (President Johnson, for example). By early
King believed the time had come to break his silence. As
energy and resources from domestic social reform, King
the war itself had already done as much. More importantly, he
in the face of a war he believed
critique of the war was wide ranging, based on a historical
long struggle in Vietnam for national independence,
to nonviolence, and on outrage over the violence the
inflicting on the land and people of Indochina. Always
.,
black and white. "The promises of the Great Society," he said,
battlefield of Vietnam." The expense of the
could be spent to solve problems
The war on poverty was being supplanted by the war on Viet-
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