90
Village at War
When the Government military operation came, the Government soldiers be-
haved very badly, and were very cruel to the people. So people began to think
to themselves that everything they had heard about the Government being bad
was true. Maybe they supported the Communist side after that.
Others suggested that few felt anger with the Front after such Gov-
ernment retaliatory operations. There were three main reasons for that.
First, many had actually been involved in or at least knew in advance of
the Front actions. Second, Front guerrillas and local leaders conducted
themselves in a generally polite and humble fashion. And third, those
same leaders often warned and psychologically prepared people in ad-
vance of Government operations. The simple weapons of punji sticks
were thus connected to the Front's political strategy, for not only did the
tactic serve to undermine Government credibility and effectiveness, but
the harsh Government response it elicited may have actually caused sup-
port for the Front to heighten.
During the first years of Front activity, guerrillas often brought pres-
sure to bear against pro-Government villagers. A peasant recalled one
instance:
There was a man on the village council
thought was taking money for himself.
put up papers all through the area near
name, and said that he must change his
tion would kill him. The papers were a
who was very bad, and who everyone
So one night the Communists began to
that man's house. The papers gave his
bad ways, or the people of the revolu-
warning.
There were other instances of such warnings by paper, but sometimes
warnings took another form-destruction. A peasant commented on what
happened to a corrupt policeman. "One night a very large bomb exploded
in front of that man's house," he recalled. "It did not hurt anybody, but I
think it made him very afraid." After the explosion, the policeman
slightly changed his demeanor, becoming more cautious and not as bla-
tantly corrupt.
Of more immediate importance to villagers were the attacks against
some of the larger landholders. A peasant explained how Front personnel
directed warnings against them:
When the rich landowners tried to collect rent, we let them know that we did not
agree. We told the people to say, "No, we will not pay you so much. We will
give you some, but not so much."
The landlords were afraid of us, so they had to agree. The people were so
happy then, and they thanked us. We always said, "No, do not thank us. We
were just doing our duty. We work for the people."
Struggle
DEEPENING COMMITMENT
91
"There were so many people here who supported the Communists," a
tradesman recalled, "that sometimes I had the idea everybody supported
that side." He was speaking of the period 1962-1963. It was then that
Government security activities intensified and resulted in the arrest or
death of about 20 insurgents in My Thuy Phuong. And the Front met force
with force. As guerrillas grew more active, there was a deepening of
commitment to the Front in the village. Speaking of 1%2-1963, a peasant
had these words:
Others said that at least 75 percent of My Thuy Phuong's people sup-
ported the Front, about 5 percent supported the Government, and the
remaining 20 percent were uncommitted. About half the Front supporters
were actively involved in assisting Front leaders and guerrillas, and the
other half passively supported the insurgent cause. Speaking of the un-
committed, a small tradesman asserted, "They did not want to fight. They
didn't care about politics." Others indicated that, as during the Viet Minh
era, many of the uncommitted came under intense pressure from both
Government and insurgent forces. And by the mid-1960s, many shifted to
pro-Front stances-a phenomenon examined in Chapter 8.
People assisted Front guerrillas both directly and through an emerging
network of runners and lookouts, and supplied reports concerning Gov-
ernment activities, some of which proved useful in planning attacks. As
noted earlier, others helped guerrillas prepare punji traps, and still others
volunteered to work digging the tunnels which honeycombed drier sec-
tions of the village. These manpower drafts, it should be emphasized,
were entirely voluntary, though some volunteers may have helped due
more to family or peer-group pressure than devotion to the Front cause.
Drafts for the local guerrilla force are discussed below.
Finally, commitment to the Front was reflected in the willingness of
many to give contributions to Front tax collectors. As during the Viet
Minh period, there were no set "taxation schedules" for the village, nor
tax-collection agents designated as such. The collectors usually identified
themselves as members of the Finance/Economy Section of the local
Front committee. Monetary contributions varied with the wealth of the
families, and with the military activities of village guerrillas. In other
words, collectors encouraged larger contributions from more prosperous
families and during periods of heightened guerrilla attack. Many people
who could afford no monetary donations, or who only gave token
amounts of money, sometimes donated various types of food to the Front.
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