92 / Village at War
Most commonly they gave small stocks of uncooked rice. Occasionally
men carried small amounts of rice and other food with them to the
ricefields, ostensibly for their own consumption. Sometimes in broad day-
light, they turned the food items over to local guerrillas-a fact which
came to the attention of the Government, and which prompted it to pro-
hibit the carrying of food to the ricefields.
A word on revolutionary organizations. In their recollections of early
Front efforts in the village, people identified only the functional organiza-
tions mentioned above. They noted that only the Finance/Economy and
Security sections were active. The functional liberation associations for
peasants and youth did virtually nothing during 1961-1963. And with few
exceptions local leaders did not use titles associated with the Front
groups. They simply called themselves "cadres" or "older brothers."
There was little perceptible People's Revolutionary Party activity in
the village during the early Front years. As noted earlier, only one or two
local Front leaders were party members. There is no evidence that party
membership gave those men special responsibilities in the village-only
enhanced prestige among village leaders, who viewed party membership
as very desirable. The party's covert organization for the province from
time to time supplied its members in the village with political pamphlets,
but during the early Front years the party formally had nothing to do with
local Front organizations or policies.
The Front organization for Thua Thien Province most likely contained
five sections, which were identified by Pike: (1) social movement organi-
zation and propaganda; (2) propaganda; (3) military proselyting; (4) train-
ing and indoctrination; and (5) Liberation Army provincial staff headquar-
ters.5 In Huong Thuy District, the Front's District Central Committee was
similarly organized, and operated from the hills of Thua Thien Province
under the close control of the Front provincial organization. The district
committee, in turn, maintained touch with village committees. Some went
so far as to suggest that local Front activities were totally controlled by
district personnel, but most people with opinions on this subject
suggested that control was loose. They said that Front district personnel
simply passed along general policy guidelines to Front leaders in My Thuy
Phuong, leaving most tactical decisions to those men.
By 1962-1963, the Front was extremely powerful throughout South
Vietnam, mounting larger operations against Government troops, and
utilizing more sophisticated weaponry. There was also considerable dis-
satisfaction with the Government and support for the Front in Thua
Thien/Hue, despite-or perhaps in part because of-extensive Govern-
ment military and police activities. And there are indications that in My
Thuy Phuong the Front began to employ new methods. First, people who
in 1962-1963 hesitated to support the Front began to feel pressure from an
informal network of neighbors. Some of the more enthusiastic Front sup-
Struggle / 93
porters did not hesitate to use ridicule and malicious rumors to persuade
uncommitted neighbors. One villager, then a prosperous large tradesman,
recalled what happened to him: 6
I hated the Viet Cong in those days, because the Viet Minh had killed my
brother, and the Viet Cong and the Viet Minh were the same. So everyone knew
that I would never join the Viet Cong. A few people came to me and told me that
I should support them, and that if I did not support them I should be quiet, and
not speak against the Viet Cong.
Later, many people began to say bad things about me-that I was corrupt, and
that I was a spy for the Government. But they knew that was not true. I was just
selling things at my store.
Others indicated that rumors occasionally circulated, most likely origi-
nated by Front followers, to discredit people who were allied with the
Government, or who were committed to neither side. The rumors against
pro-Government individuals were sometimes vicious, but there are indi-
cations that rumors concerning the noncommitted were sometimes just as
strong. There were instances when rumors spread that people hesitant to
support the Front were, in fact, active Front members. Then to add credi-
bility to the rumors, one or two local Front leaders or guerrillas some-
times made surprise nocturnal visits to the "targets." They made sure
neighbors saw their visits, or later leaked word to them. After such visits,
rumors of Front membership often became fact. Target villagers were
isolated by pro-Government neighbors, and gradually Front followers
won their friendship. Later, attendance at Front political meetings and
conversations with new friends often led to complete transformations.
Uncommitted or perhaps even hostile villagers became active, sometimes
enthusiastic Front supporters.
Others in the village, especially able-bodied men, during 1962-1963
experienced mounting pressure to join the guerrilla force. Several people
not aligned with the Government, but indifferent to the Front, were in
early 1963 "invited" to join a Front military unit. The recruitment tactic
here involved considerable pressure from family members and friends
who might have already begun to support the Front. In a few cases where
such tactics failed, Front personnel employed more direct methods. There
are indications that a few were actually taken from their homes by armed
parties of guerrillas, escorted to the hills west of the village, and told that
they had joined Front forces. Government and American authorities usu-
ally reported such individuals as "kidnap victims." However, there are
indications that many "victims" gradually overcame their initial indiffer-
ence about the insurgency. They willingly remained with the guerrillas.
A word now on the Front's attitude toward religion-and especially
toward Buddhism. As noted earlier, the An Quang Buddhist organization
carried much weight throughout Thua Thien/Hue, including My Thuy
Phuong. In the province there were many effective An Quang leaders,
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