146 I Village at War
the deceased leaders. All had been close to them, often sitting in on
important meetings and in some cases helping organize leafletings and
other small local actions. In general, the 1968-1972 leaders, like the
movement they represented, had ties to the village and a revolutionary
past. Camp Eagle did not break the ties, only strained them.
Despite military and leadership changes on the insurgent side, weaken-
ing of the cell structure, and less involvement of people in Front activities,
revolutionary messages continued to reach My Thuy Phuong. During
1968-1972, there was some Front use of the old tactics of spreading
rumors and periodically distributing leaflets. And Front messages con-
tinued to reach people by word of mouth and clandestine radio broad-
casts. Throughout that period the messages remained timely and to the
point. For example, a 1970 broadcast included a message from the Tri
Thien Hue Liberation Front Committee, part of which reads: 46
Our people and people throughout the world continue to condemn the U.S.
imperialists for their war acts against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.
Upon hearing that the U.S. aggressors have again bombed the north and have
committed towering crimes against our people, the Tri Thien Hue Liberation
Front Committee sent a message to the sworn brotherhood Quang Binh- Vinh
Linh Fatherland Front Committee exposing the Nixon clique's bellicosity and
stubbornness. ...
Other Front messages accused the American military of damaging fruit
trees through defoliation. This was actually a valid charge, since defolia-
tion damage in Huong Thuy District was "widespread," according to a
U.S. Government report.47 People indicated that they were "very much
interested" in this message, which came in leaflets, conversations, and
broadcasts. And then there was a Front leaflet directed at children. It
urged them to befriend American and Government soldiers and assist the
Front by gathering information on military activities, by overcharging for
soft drinks and turning profits over to the Front, and by stealing weapons
and military supplies.48 This message also came from some local insur-
gents. However, there is no evidence that children actually heeded it.
Front messages calling for noncooperation began to focus on Camp
Eagle. According to a peasant, "The Viet Cong warned everyone not to
work there. They said to work there would help the Americans and hurt
the revolution." Many confirmed this assertion and indicated that mainly
due to Front pressure, relatively few from the village worked at Eagle.
And some who did were actually Front agents, assigned to gather infor-
mation on the Americans. The IOlst was thus partly correct in regarding
My Thuy Phuong residents as security risks!
Finally, there was continued Front emphasis on heroes, the most im-
portant of whom remained Ho Chi Minh. Several recalled that when Ho
died in 1969, Liberation Radio carried a message from the provincial
Front organization, including this passage: 49
Fighting the Eagle 147
With respect to the Tri Thien Hue people, President Ho had closely followed
and guided us in every phase of struggle, and advised and encouraged us in our
victories as well as in our difficulties. In the most recent letter addressed to
cadres, people, and armed forces ofTri Thien Hue, he asked us not to be proud
of our victories, not to be discouraged faced with difficulties, and to firmly hold
to the class standpoint. He advised us to constantly resort to criticism and to
continuously improve our revolutionary virtues.
To his soul, the cadres, combatants, and compatriots ofTri Thien Hue pledge to
develop their victories, to overcome all difficulties, to correct shortcomings, to
develop strong points, to unite closely to dash forward to fulfill their task, and to
strictly carry out his advice.
In summary, Camp Eagle brought a dramatic shift for the Front in My
Thuy Phuong. Through the camp's entire range of disruptive and often
destructive activities, it forced Front leaders and guerrillas into retreat,
killed some of them, and caused some Front followers to drift away. As
noted earlier, Front support fell from over 80 to about 50 percent of the
populace. But the insurgents made tactical changes, kept up their military
pressure, and continued to circulate word of their struggle. In effect, the
Front adjusted to the Eagle.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
NOTES
The arrival date was provided by Command Sergeant Major Michael Collins,
a 101st Airborne soldier who served at Camp Eagle. [Interviewed at Fort
Campbell, Ky., September 26, 1975.]
For data on unit deployment in Thua Thien/Hue, see Commander in Chief,
Pacific, Report On War In Viet-Nam (Washington, D.C.: Government Print-
ing Office, 1968).
Screaming Eagle. March-April, 1972, p. 21; a publication of the 101st Air-
borne Division Association, Greenville, Texas, available at the Public Affairs
Office, Ft. Campbell, Ky.
See note 12, Chapter 9.
See Vietnam Veterans Against the War, The Winter Soldier Investigation:
An Inquiry Into American War Crimes (Boston: Beacon Press, 1972), p. 79.
See note I.
The sign appears in a photograph provided by the Public Affairs Office, 101st
Airborne Division, Ft. Campbell, Ky.
101st Airborne Press Release, no.10-58-71, Camp Eagle; all press releases
cited are available in the 101st Airborne Museum, Fort Campbell, Ky.
Hereafter they are cited as "Press Release."
Screaming Eagle. September-October, 1970, p. 21.
Press Release, no.10-3-71.
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