Two types of system had been under consideration – a laser-based system, and a missile-based system produced by the Rafael corporation. Olmert and Peretz approved the missile system, based partly on the higher cost of development of the laser system.
In an interview with Ha’aretz after the announcement, former Rafael CEO Dr. Ze'ev Bonen tried to pour cold water on the enthusiasm the missile-based system has received from decision-makers. "The active defense against rockets is limited in its nature, and in the future as well it will not be possible to defend a front that is kilometers-wide like in Sderot and Kiryat Shmona," warned Bonen. "The most effective means of preventing firing is diplomatic. If a military means is necessary, the most effective means is offensive, the occupation of the launching strip. The system that will be developed will, years from now, give good, not absolute, protection to the inner part of the country but not to the front strip, which is the focus of the launches and which the enemy seeks to exhaust so as to send its inhabitants fleeing."
Reading Ze'ev Bonen's words reminds me of the main strategic argument that was made for withdrawal from Gaza and is still being made for withdrawal from Judea and Samaria. That argument posits that we can't hope to defend such a long and porous border, so it is better for us to withdraw and concentrate our defenses on a more secure boundary. If we pull the Jewish communities out of Gaza, we will not need to spread our defenses so thin in that area, and we will more properly be able to defend places like Sderot.
Now, we have the former CEO of a major defense contractor saying that after such a withdrawal, we cannot hope to defend such a broad area as a complete city from primitive, low-range, low-yield missiles. So the Palestinians will continue focusing their attacks on Sderot in the hope of convincing its residents to flee.
The problem with this approach is that its logical conclusion is to have all the Jews leave Israel. Last year it was Gaza. Now it's Sderot. In two years, as Kassam ranges improve, it will be Kiryat Gat, and after a withdrawal from Judea and Samaria it will be Jerusalem, Netanya and Tel Aviv.
But what is even more problematic is that the decision this week to develop and deploy a missile system against incoming low-range missiles cannot successfully defend Israel. The Kassams currently being fired from Gaza have a range of about 8-10 km. There is about 30 seconds from the time it is fired until the time it hits. Any missile defense will need at least that long to operate, and if the interception is successful, the missile will be intercepted while it is already over Israeli territory, likely already over a target town like Sderot. So instead of the missile hitting, its debris will hit, with much the same effect.
Lasers, which are considerably cheaper on a per-shot basis (news reports have it at $1000 a shot, instead of $35,000 per missile fired), take far less time to deploy and to intercept. Light travels faster than a missile.
In today's situation, choosing a missile-based system over a laser-based system was a wrong decision. In two-and-a-half years, when the system is actually deployed, it will be even worse, since the Palestinians, with help from Hizbullah and Iran, are constantly upgrading the range and capabilities of their missiles. In two-and-a-half years, Israel will be defending 2009-version missiles with a 2005-era solution.
The biggest problem presented by the situation in Sderot, like the situation in the north, is that such defensive measures were not considered years ago. When Ehud Barak pulled Israeli forces out of southern Lebanon in 2000, he knew that Hizbullah forces would now be able to attack northern Israel with far greater ease. He had far too much military knowledge about the situation in the north not to be aware of this. And in case that wasn’t sufficient, he was told very loudly by every right-wing protestor in the country that this would happen. Yet he pulled out without first reinforcing Israel’s defenses in the north, and last summer’s war was the result.
When Ariel Sharon expelled Jewish communities from the Gaza Strip, he knew that he was bringing Sderot more within range of Kassam rockets. He knew that he was exposing strategically sensitive installations in southern Ashkelon, that had previously been out of Kassam range to attack. He knew that both Hizbullah and Iran were heavily involved in supplying more advanced weapons to the Palestinians. He had far too much military and intelligence knowledge not to be aware of these things. And in case that was not enough, he too was told by every right-wing protestor in the country what would happen. Yet he too abandoned the Gaza Strip without first ensuring the security of places like Sderot.
It has long been apparent to me that leaders such as Barak and Sharon, for all their heroic and historic military exploits, did not have Israel’s security as their primary concern. The same can be said of many other Israeli “leaders” of recent years. The result has been either poor or non-existent planning by political and military leaders, failure after failure on both diplomatic and military battlefields, and the emergence of a critical structural weakness in Israel’s state mechanisms.
Under these circumstances, the diplomatic and military means for defending Israel against Kassam or Katyusha rockets will also not succeed, which makes the approval of the best anti-missile defense system of the utmost importance.
But the choice made by Olmert and Peretz is instead yet another example of their complete blindness, their complete inability to manage strategic affairs properly, and their utter lack of foresight. It shows how Olmert and Peretz, without the credentials and background of a Barak or a Sharon, continue to make the same mistakes. And it is yet another reason for them to resign.
Copyright 2007. All rights reserved. Yehuda Poch is a journalist living in Israel. Reproduction in electronic or print format by permission of the author only.
