In Barak's acceptance speech last night, he emphasized defense, pledging to return Israel's deterrent capability and decisive military advantage. But Barak is quite simply not capable of doing so.
To begin with, last summer's war in Lebanon was, at least in part, Barak's fault to begin with. It was Ehud Barak, as prime minister in 2000, who ordered the IDF to retreat, tails between their legs in the dead of night, from southern Lebanon. That retreat allowed Hizbullah to construct all the weapons and logistical infrastructure they would need in the 20 km between the international border and the Litani river. And after six years of building, it was time to test it out last summer.
But Barak's retreat, just like Sharon's expulsion of Jewish residents from Gush Katif, Olmert's vicious expulsion of Jews from Amona and the very conduct of last Summer's war, all point to a far more ominous reason why Barak will fail to keep his pledge.
Deterrence is not a tangible commodity to be reduced, increased, destroyed or restored. Deterrence is a psychological element in relations between two sides. It is the element of fear, or the result of a cost-benefit analysis.
What the collection of policies and errors carried out by Israeli leaders in the past seven years has created is a sense among our enemies that Israel cannot prosecute a war to its successful conclusion. Our enemies do not fear attacking us because their cost-benefit analysis has not shown any down-side to such attacks.
There is nothing wrong with Israel's "decisive military advantage". The IDF is strong enough and well-enough equipped to defeat any other armed force in the region with little difficulty. But the power and equipment of Israel's military are not the only – or even the major – elements in our deterrent capability. The element that is so sorely lacking among our political and military elites, is the political will and the courage to do what is necessary to protect Israel's people. And our enemies see the lack of that element very plainly.
If Israel had the political will to use its "decisive military advantage" in fighting our enemies, Barak would have ended Israel's presence in southern Lebanon through clear and decisive military victory rather than by turning tail and running. Sharon would not only have left Israeli residents in the Gaza Strip, he would have used the IDF presence there to eradicate the terrorist infrastructure from that area. The current internecine violence going on there shows that that infrastructure is thriving in Gaza.
If Israeli leaders had the necessary political will to create deterrence, last summer's war would have been won decisively within a week, with Hizbullah destroyed in the process. And if Israeli leaders had any political will whatsoever, Kassam rockets would not now be falling on Sderot with the regularity of a Vancouver rainstorm.
Last night, Ehud Barak promised to return Israel's deterrent capability. But all of his vaunted military experience has not enabled him to see that the main element of deterrence is psychological, or that Barak himself is part of the reason that deterrence is lacking. As long as he and that other Ehud remain the leaders of this country, our enemies will understand that we do not have the political will or the courage to do what is necessary to win the war we are fighting. And as long as that understanding prevails, our very existence is in serious danger.
Copyright 2007. All rights reserved. Yehuda Poch is a journalist living in Israel. Reproduction in electronic or print format by permission of the author only.
