The Shuttle Challenger Disaster

Space travel has been a dream for Americans since the beginning of the 20th century. Manned missions into space began in 1961 with a short 15 minute sprint by astronaut Alan Shephard. From that point, the goal for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) was to continue the advancement of space flight. The latter part of the century brought about the saga of the space shuttle Challenger. The 25th shuttle flight slated for January 1986 was supposed to start off the busiest year in the history of NASA where Halley’s Comet would be observed, the Hubble telescope deployed, and at least 15 shuttle missions flown. Another monumental occasion was the planned flight of the first ordinary American that would fly into space with the crew of the Challenger. More specifically, this brave, adventurous person would be selected from a pool of 11,000 schoolteachers. Christa McAuliffe was chosen, she became an overnight celebrity and was going to popularize space travel with every man, woman, and child in the U.S. Numerous shuttle flights gave Americans the idea that NASA missions were common practice and didn’t really merit much concern for safety. Many Americans began to consider space flight as routine and the year 1986 was supposed to be a progressive period for the veteran shuttle Challenger and NASA; however, extenuating circumstances, carelessness, and complacency lead to the demise of the famed shuttle. The shuttle was originally slated for take off on January 22, but it was delayed several times due to various difficulties and glitches. The delays were mainly a result from delays from the previous shuttle’s deployment, thus impacting the time schedule of the Challenger, and also weather conditions. The closest the Challenger got to a takeoff during the periods in which it was delayed was on January 27, the actual launch sequence had begun with the astronauts strapped in, but a problem with the hatch handle wasn’t able to be resolved for approximately 80 minutes. This time differential gave the winds around Kennedy Space Center the opportunity to surpass the acceptable crosswind level mandated by NASA. Once again, the Shuttle Challenger was delayed to January 28. It was late January 1986 and a rare Canadian cold front swept across the nation and reached the tropics of Florida. Unaccustomed to the elements, Kennedy Space Center was subjected to a deep frost and sub-freezing temperatures that gripped the local area. Ice clung to the space shuttle and the scaffolding which held the shuttle erect. Launch management held meetings debating the effects of the weather on the shuttle and inspectors were sent to investigate the ice accumulation. They judged that the shuttle would be ready for the scheduled launch. After the crew of Challenger ate their breakfast, they were briefed with information regarding the ice that covered parts of the launch pad; however, possible problems resulting from the ice and extreme temperatures were not discussed with the crew at all. Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) Engineers were concerned about the O-rings on the Shuttle’s propulsion system. O-rings had a simple, yet vital function; they were to provide a barrier in the SRB to prevent the highly combustible hot gasses from escaping as plumes of flame. Engineers were worried about the functionality of the O-rings because they had observed problems on prior flights. During those flights, however, the temperature on the launch pad was nowhere near as low as they were on January 28, the closest was 53 degrees. Engineers realized the definite danger and possible catastrophic failure of these simple rubber rings, for they observed severe erosion as a result of the superheated gasses in previous cases. Unfortunately, nobody stepped forward to definitively tell NASA that all shuttle flights must be aborted until the O-ring problems are solved. Nine minutes before the final ignition of the Shuttle, a final two ice inspection teams surveyed the scene and ground control decided to allow the temperature to rise to 40 degrees. Finally, Challenger was cleared for take off on that fateful day. Two O-rings on each SRB are the only barrier that keeps the fiery gasses from escaping the system. They were designed out of a specialized rubber material meant to expand and flex into any gap that may form due to the changing pressure. Even the smallest of crevices where gas would be able to escape, could spell disaster for the Shuttle. This was the very problem that arose on that frigid January morning. Regardless of the fact that mission control allowed the temperature to rise to 40 degrees, the damage to the O-rings had been done. The temperature had frozen the O-rings in such a manner that they were no longer able to expand into the gaps that formed in the SRB. This failure spelled out the demise of the Shuttle Challenger far before the rockets even fired up. Nevertheless, there was also visual proof of the failed O-ring before the Shuttle actually took off the ground. At approximately seven seconds after ignition a two and a half second black puff of smoke spewed from the vulnerable joint on the right SRB. Aluminum oxide from the propellant quickly sealed the gap before actual flames became apparent; however, the smoke was unnoticeable until detailed analysis after the disaster of the still photographs. The joints on the SRB were in a far weakened state for the Shuttle’s ascent, but this was compounded by fierce 84 miles per hour wind that physically jarred the rockets, so much so that the aluminum oxide that bound the gap was blown lose and a fire erupted, 58 seconds into the flight. The final barrier of defense for the Shuttle gave way, thus allowing the final destruction of Challenger to take place. Nearly fifteen seconds later, the Shuttle Challenger was no more. A huge fireball lit up the cloudless blue sky over Florida that day. The final words that were heard from the Shuttle before the communication system failed were uttered by pilot Mike Smith, “Uh-Oh!” The huge flash of fire that blinded him from the front windows made it clear to him that they were doomed. Red hot debris rained down as millions of people across the nation stared in utter disbelief. The investigation into the disaster began nearly immediately when President Reagan established a Presidential Commission of Inquiry. It was found over the course of the next year that “no other element of the Space Shuttle system (aside from the destruction of the O-rings) contributed to this failure.” The billion dollar spacecraft met its end because of a faulty $900 synthetic rubber band that was repeatedly warned to be vulnerable, especially at low temperatures. Families of the lost astronauts were outraged by the complacency of NASA and the maker of the O-rings, Morton Thiokol. It was discovered that the cabin was still intact and basically shielded from the flames after the explosion; it was designed to withstand several “Gs” of atmospheric pressure. Horrifically, after examination of the cabin and bodies of the crew, it was made clear that they didn’t immediately die after the explosion; in fact some of the emergency oxygen was activated. Although, some argue that the crew may have been mercifully unconscious during the plummet downward, many experts support that astronauts of the caliber of those who piloted the Shuttle Challenger were well trained to withstand high amounts of pressure on their body. Sadly, this may mean that the helpless crew was aware of their imminent fate during the two minutes and forty-five second freefall at nearly 2000 miles per hour before smashing into the ocean below. The explosion of the Shuttle Challenger resulted primarily from NASA’s glossing over a multitude of risk factors, especially possible failure of the SRB O-rings resulting from extremely low temperatures. The O-ring is a seemingly simple aspect of the complex, technological feat of the modern space shuttle; however, even the simplest component is vital to the overall functionality of the space craft. Engineers did discover that the O-ring could easily be at risk for failure when operating under low temperature conditions. In addition, continued reuse of these rings also increases the likelihood of catastrophic failure. Therefore, it should have been obvious to NASA officials that O-rings should often be replaced and the shuttle itself should only operate in a set range of temperatures. Twenty-four successful shuttle flights occurred before the launch of the Challenger, none of which had major problems. NASA and the general population of the United States began to feel that manned space flight was “routine,” nobody ever thought it was plausible for the shuttle to literally explode miles above the earth. On January 28, officials should have immediately rescheduled the flight for a later date, just like they did the several times before this date. For NASA, however, this was not a favorable option because they had to maintain a strict timetable to optimize shuttle launches in 1986. Engineer, Roger Boisjoly, was later deemed to be a whistleblower; he protested the launch of the Challenger on January 28 because his O-ring research discovered that extremely low temperatures could lead directly to a disastrous failure of the Space Shuttle. After the Challenger explosion, Boisjoly presented his findings regarding the O-rings to the Presidential Commission investigating the matter. During the debates regarding launching Challenger on the scheduled date, NASA went against Boisjoly’s recommendation to delay until temperatures were in a suitable range for the O-rings to remain fully functional. Many Americans began to consider space flight routine and the year 1986 was supposed to be a progressive period for the veteran shuttle Challenger and NASA; however, extenuating circumstances, carelessness, and complacency lead to the demise of the famed shuttle. The unusually frigid temperatures around Kennedy Space Center in late January essentially froze the O-rings of the Challenger’s SRB rocket boosters. O-rings are meant to expand to fill in the gaps that form during launch and act as a barrier to these superheated gasses. At abnormally low temperatures, however, the O-rings were unable to do so on January 28, 1986. The hot gasses caught on fire, and the weakened joints on the SRB could no longer withstand the pressure, especially with unusually high winds miles above the earth. The Challenger exploded, eventually ending the lives of the crew members when they hit the ocean over two minutes later. It was discovered by the Presidential Commission investigating the incident that the catastrophe could have been averted if the advice of engineers was followed. The busy year of spaceflight that NASA originally planned for 1986 was abruptly ended and wouldn’t resume for another three years. Nevertheless, President Reagan vowed that “we’ll continue our quest in space, there will be more shuttle flights and more shuttle crews and, yes, more volunteers, more civilians, more teachers in space.”

Shuttle Challenger moments after the explosion.

Seven members of the crew who perished aboard the Shuttle Challenger.

Smoke can be seen prior to llaunch coming from the right SRB.

Mangled section of the cabin which was recovered after the disaster.