BOOK REVIEW

MISDELIVERED MESSAGE

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You the People: The United Nations, Transitional Administration, and State-Building. Simon Chesterman. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2004. Pp. 296, $95.00 (hardcover).

A reader investing in *You the People* might have the reasonable belief from its title that this book is meant to talk to her, one of the everyday people, about the impact of the United Nations' democratization and state-building efforts in recent years. She will be sorely disappointed: as the flyleaf correctly notes, this book is "[a]imed at policy-makers, diplomats, and, . . . academic[s]"—everyone except everyday people.[1]

As Professor Chesterman explains it, the book attempts to highlight the tensions between "the ends of liberal democracy and the means of benevolent autocracy," that is to say, the inherent ironies and challenges of imposing a democratic government on a state's citizenry. Chesterman's central purpose is to draw attention to the failure of the United Nations and its most powerful member states to adequately involve the citizens of states under its protection in democratization efforts, as well as the structural bars to U.N. effectiveness as a transitional caretaker. But in writing *You the People*, Chesterman himself missed an opportunity to engage the very people whose problems of access he means to address. This book, like many of the flawed missions described within, talks about, around, and above everyday people. It is the ultimate insider's critique, and therefore is unlikely to become a useful tool for agents of change operating from outside the U.N. structure.

In his introduction, Chesterman describes a newly-heightened awareness of the need for nation-building, or "'peacebuilding,'" as

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1. SIMON CHESTERMAN, YOU THE PEOPLE: THE UNITED NATIONS, TRANSITIONAL ADMINISTRATION, AND STATE-BUILDING, at dust jacket (2005).

the process of "'reforming or strengthening governmental institutions' or 'the creation of structures for the institutionalization of peace'" is referred to within the United Nations.[2] When the mission is framed as "nation-building," as then-Governor George W. Bush referred to it during his 2000 presidential campaign,[3] the exercise seems inherently flawed: arrogant, interfering, and, because it is externally generated, innately suspect and doomed to failure. When the mission is framed as the stabilization of governments and regions to enhance international and regional peace and security, as President Bush described it during the 2004 U.S. presidential election debates,[4] the exercise assumes the air of a well-meaning sacrifice, aimed at empowering the local citizenry. The drastic change in the perspective of President Bush from a detractor of nation-building to a supporter of state-building is attributed by Chesterman to Bush's post-9/11 realization that stable, peaceful states are less likely to breed or harbor terrorists, and more likely to be respectful of international norms and cooperate with international efforts to maintain peace and security.[5] Accordingly, the Bush administration has become a vociferous advocate of interventions of this sort; on the list of current states for which the United States supports intervention are Afghanistan, Iraq, and Sudan.[6] No longer skeptical, President Bush has announced that state-building—or rebuilding, to be more accurate—is a tool that the United States is willing use.[7] In advocating state-building, as

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2. *Id.* at 4.

3. *Id.*

4. "This nation of ours has got a solemn duty to defeat this ideology of hate. . . . We have a duty to defeat this enemy. We have a duty to protect our children and grandchildren. The best way to defeat them is to never waver, to be strong, to use every asset at our disposal, is to constantly stay on the offensive and, at the same time, spread liberty." George W. Bush, Remarks at the Presidential Candidates' Debate (Sept. 30, 2004), http://www.debates.org/pages/trans2004a.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2005).

5. Chesterman, *supra* note 1, at 249–50.

6. For example, as a key member of the Security Council, the United States has long lobbied for the United Nations to take action in Sudan. *See, e.g.*, S.C. Res. 1574, U.N. SCOR, 59th Sess., 5082nd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1574 (2004) (expressing support for intervention by the African Union and monitoring by the United Nations and other agencies).

7. The first comprehensive statement of the President's new outlook is typically considered to be his 2002 annual report to Congress on the administration's national security strategy. *See* THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (2002), http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf (last visited Apr. 12, 2005). As one commentator of the report noted:

> On September 20, 2002, President Bush released a new national security strategy that essentially abandons concepts of deterrence—which dominated defense policies during the Cold War years—for a forward-reaching, pre-emptive strategy against hostile states and terrorist groups, while also expanding development

Chesterman notes, the United States has assumed a mandate that is broader than anything anticipated by the post-World War II vision of international society:

> [State-building] goes beyond traditional peacekeeping and peacebuilding mandates, and is directed at constructing or reconstructing institutions of governance capable of providing citizens with physical and economic security. This includes quasi-governmental activities such as electoral assistance, human rights and rule of law technical assistance, security sector reform, and certain forms of development assistance.[8]

Chesterman is right; this new mission of the Bush administration—exporting democracy[9]—will represent a huge expansion of the type of peacebuilding missions undertaken in the first sixty years of U.N. history.

Chesterman is also correct that international institutions must be prepared to understand the scope of their roles in this process and adjust to this new reality. The Bush administration's mission to export democracy is under way and likely to be expansive; democratization has been described by the President as a "pillar" upon which the "peace and security of free nations now rests,"[10] and has already been advanced as a legitimate alternate justification for invading one nation—Iraq—which did not then present a threat to international peace and security.

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assistance and free trade, promoting democracy, fighting disease, and transforming the U.S. military.

COMMENTARY ON THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, GLOBAL SECURITY.ORG, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/national/nss-020920.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2005). In a recent address comparing the current global climate to the one faced by Winston Churchill during the post-World War II and Cold War eras, President Bush discussed the testing of this "strategy" in Afghanistan and Iraq, nations he described as "barbaric" and "ruled by . . . cruelty," but which are now governed by democratically-oriented regimes that the United States has helped to reshape. *See* President's Remarks at the "Churchill and the Great Republic" Exhibit, 40 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 188, 191 (Feb. 4, 2004).

8. CHESTERMAN, *supra* note 1, at 5.

9. As recently as his 2005 State of the Union address, President Bush expressed his belief that "[t]he only force powerful enough to stop the rise of tyranny and terror and replace hatred with hope is the force of human freedom." President's Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, 41 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 126, 131 (Feb. 2, 2005). Acknowledging that "[o]ur enemies know this" and have declared war on democracy, the President confirmed that the intention of his administration would be "to support democratic movements in the Middle East and beyond, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world." *Id.* He reemphasized his view of this policy as a matter of national security: "Our aim is to build and preserve a community of free and independent nations, with governments that answer to their citizens and reflect their own cultures. And because democracies respect their own people and their neighbors, the advance of freedom will lead to peace." *Id.*

10. President's Remarks at Whitehall Palace, London, 39 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOCS. 1645, 1646 (Nov. 19, 2003).

Moreover, although there is much speculation as to which countries top the Bush administration's list of states potentially subject to intervention (many people place North Korea and Iran in leading positions on the list), there is no doubt that the U.N. and other international agencies will be the first organizations asked to administer democratic transitions in these countries. In this too, the Bush administration has embraced the U.N. perspective, eschewing its previous policy of unfettered unilateralism:

> The peace and security of free nations now rests on three pillars. First, international organizations must be equal to the challenges facing our world, from lifting up failing states to opposing proliferation. . . . The second pillar of peace and security in our world is the willingness of free nations, when the last resort arrives, to [restrain] aggression and evil by force. . . . The third pillar of security is our commitment to the global expansion of democracy and the hope and progress it brings as the alternative to instability and hatred and terror.[11]

Thus the vision of state-building currently adopted by the United States anticipates assistance from the United Nations and other key international institutions.[12]

The Bush administration initially scorned U.N. involvement in post-invasion Iraq, declaring instead that the United States and its key allies would manage the transition, with the assistance of a select group of returning Iraqi exiles and local resistance leaders.[13]

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11. *Id* at 1646–47.

12. For example, the President has suggested that he, like President Clinton before him, prefers at times to operate through the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance (NATO), an institution where the United States holds greater influence than it does in the United Nations. *See, e.g.*, Jim Garamone, *Bush: NATO Is 'the' Vital U.S. Security Relationship*, AMERICAN FORCES PRESS SERVICE, Feb. 22, 2005 (reporting President Bush as referring to NATO as "'*the* vital relationship for the United States when it comes to security'"), http://www.dod.mil/news/Feb2005/n02222005_2005022206.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2005). NATO immediately lent military support to the United States in the wake of the 9/11 attacks by invoking Article 5 of the NATO treaty—the mutual defense pact. *See* NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson, Statement to the Press on the North Atlantic Council Decision on Implementation of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty following the 11 September Attacks Against the United States (Oct. 4, 2001), http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2001/s011004b.htm (last visited Apr. 12, 2005). Not even NATO's western European base, however, could be persuaded to support the U.S. invasion of Iraq; not until late 2004 did all NATO states pledge to provide support in Iraq in the form of limited military training and financial support. *See* NATO, NATO's ASSISTANCE TO IRAQ (n.d.), *at* http://www.nato.int/issues/iraq-assistance/index.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2005).

13. It is no secret that key members of the Bush administration are distrustful of the United Nations and view its structure as hindering the advancement of U.S. interests. In his annual addresses to the United Nations, the president has repeatedly, and at times stridently, called for reform of that organization. *See, e.g.*, President's Address to the United Nations General Assembly in New York, 38 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1529, 1532 (Sept. 12, 2002) (describing the risk that the United Nations might become "irrelevant").

The first few chapters of *You the People*, which describe international peace-building and state-building efforts throughout the twentieth century, ably demonstrate what the Bush administration failed to appreciate before taking over control of Iraq: state-building is *difficult*. Chesterman starts by tracing the roles of the League of Nations, the United Nations, and other international coalitions in stabilizing nations during times of occupation (Germany, 1945),[14] state creation (Israel and Palestine, 1947),[15] decolonization (Namibia, 1989),[16] intra-conflict resolution (Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1995),[17] post-conflict resolution (Kosovo, 1999)[18] and state failure (Somalia 1993).[19] Each of these examples of peace-building and state-building efforts yielded mixed results. Chesterman provides in the next five chapters theories about what makes a state-building enterprise less likely to succeed. He presents the challenges of state-building as a series of three tensions: between idealism and realism,[20] the inadequacy of means and the stated ends,[21] and the demand to maintain high international standards versus the need to establish institutions capable of being sustained by the local citizenry.[22] He explores these tensions as they were presented to and resolved by the United Nations in peace operations, democratization efforts, administration of justice in post-conflict territories, and humanitarian operations. The questions raised under these varying circumstances, in Chesterman's view, present evidence of the tensions he identified.

I. Idealism and Realism, or Omelets and Eggs

The old adage "you need to break eggs to make omelets" is an apt, if potentially trivializing, expression of the first tension Chesterman identifies. For example, if the reason for engaging in intervention is to provide a more secure environment for a nation's citizens, and perhaps even to stop massive human rights abuses, an intervening power might be understandably unwilling to resort to overwhelming force that would place an already victimized population at further risk of injury. That was certainly the policy of the

14. *See* Chesterman, *supra* note 1, at 25–36.
15. *Id.* at 52–54.
16. *Id.* at 58–60.
17. *Id.* at 76–79.
18. *Id.* at 79–82.
19. *Id.* at 84–86.
20. *Id.* at 1.
21. *Id.* at 3.
22. *Id.* at 5.

first peace-keeping missions undertaken by the United Nations[23] during the United Nation's mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina in the mid-1990s; the policy came to disastrous effect, as U.N. "safe areas" were overrun when U.N. peacekeepers failed to protect them.[24] The Srebrenica massacre and other U.N. failures in that mission led the United Nations to directly confront that tension. In a report issued in 1999, the Secretary-General concluded that the situation was "untenab[le]": "We tried to eschew the use of force except in self-defence, which brought us into conflict with the defenders of the safe areas, whose safety depended on our use of force."[25] In other words, the U.N. command failed to operationalize the realistic expectation that one must sometimes make war to reach the ideal of peace.

This tension is also highlighted by the chaos of the initial months following the U.S. invasion of Iraq. U.S. administrator Paul Bremer made the idealistically defensible decision to disband the Iraqi army on the basis that the army had acted to defend the Hussein regime; had participated in atrocities against Iraqi citizens, particularly the Kurdish and Shiite populations; and was anathematic to certain significant segments of the population.[26] In hindsight, a realistic understanding that safety and control depended on immediate deployment of force throughout the region and that Iraqi soldiers, who know the country and understand the language, might be more effective than U.S. combat forces, should have prevailed over the idealistic impulse because, "[w]ithout security, none of the more complex political tasks that are intended to justify the use of force in the first place can be achieved."[27]

These tensions exist on political axes, and in other contexts as well. For example, to install a sustainable democracy, an intervening power might very well need to maintain the mandate of external control in the form of occupation for an extended period of

23. *Id.* at 101–12.

24. *The Fall of Srebrenica: Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to General Assembly resolution 53/55*, at 5, U.N. Doc. A/54/549 (Nov. 15, 1999), *available at* http://www.un.org/News/ossg/srebrenica.pdf.

25. Chesterman, *supra* note 1, at 108.

26. In a *Wall Street Journal* op-ed in January 2005, Bremer defended his decision by noting that the army and intelligence services had long been used to "to inflict misery, torture and death on Iraqis and their neighbors. The Baath Party was another important instrument of Saddam's tyranny," and that only by dissolving the army would Iraqi people be reassured that these forces "would no longer be used as instruments of repression." L. Paul Bremer III, Editorial, *The Right Call*, WALL ST. J., Jan. 12, 2005, at A10.

27. CHESTERMAN, *supra* note 1, at 101.

time; in those circumstances, the external influence may be viewed as a necessary precursor to the ideal of self-determination. Or, to create an atmosphere that recognizes human rights, the governing authority might choose to curtail citizens' rights to freedom of movement, or free expression in the short run. No matter how ironic one might find the spectacle of U.S. officials pressuring Arab states to rein in Al Jazeera, the first independent Arab-controlled news media,[28] is it wise to dismiss all such curtailments as inconsistent with the ideals of nation-building and therefore inappropriate? On the other hand, when a group of states or an international institution is acting in the name of furthering international human rights norms, should the international community tolerate violations of those norms?

Chesterman understandably can offer no clear resolution of the intractable problem he highlights, nor can he help bridge the gap between idealism and realism. The difficulty of the task is best understood by examining a concrete example, such as the U.S. actions in Iraq, as it might be measured against relevant human rights documents. Accordingly, one might accept, for a limited time, the brief detention of Iraqi men from a certain neighborhood, because under the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the right to liberty and to be free from arbitrary arrest or detention[29] may be suspended, for a limited period, in response to a public emergency.[30] On the other hand, the prohibition on torture is not subject to derogation under the Covenant, and thus must be respected at all times.[31] Applying that rubric, detaining suspects without charge in the Abu Ghraib detention facility would be permitted for some period, while the mistreatment of detainees would not be tolerated. Yet the resolution of the competing pressures of idealism and realism cannot be as simple as merely requir-

28. *See, e.g.*, Steven R. Weisman, *Qatar's quest: Finding a buyer for Al Jazeera*, INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, Jan. 31, 2005 (reporting a move by the Qatari government to sell the network in response to "intense" pressure by U.S. officials, who view the broadcasts as inflammatory and inaccurate), http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/01/30/news/qatar.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2005).

29. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art. 9, para. 1, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.

30. *Id.* art. 4, para. 1. This analysis speaks to the *character* of the right but does not purport to consider the technical operational questions of applying the treaty—including whether intermittent violence by insurgents represents a circumstance where the public emergency threatens the life of the nation, nor the more intriguing question of whether the leaders of an occupying state may invoke that provision where the state threatened is not their own.

31. *Id.* art. 4, para. 2.

ing transitional authorities to "follow the law"; while identifying the extremes may be easy, the grey areas remain: What about evacuating a town? Confiscating weapons? Requiring identity cards? Achieving a principled balance between extremes requires careful thought, and one hopes that the international community will work harder to develop appropriate operational principles.

II. Inadequacy of Means and Stated Ends, or the Chosen Ones

The lofty goal of state-building as a means of spreading democracy raises a series of questions inherent to the complexity—and idealism—of the mission. The question of how legitimate it is to impose a democratic structure crafted by external actors is necessarily complicated by the fact that, in a country unaccustomed to democratic practices, there is less likely to be a cadre of experienced and capable individuals to lead the transition. Instead, the only means, however inadequate, of effectuating the stated goal of establishing a democratic government might be to install an interim government to be ratified by referendum at some later date; but this approach necessitates a recognition that, as was the case in Afghanistan and will likely be the case in Iraq, the government initially installed will benefit from incumbency and so greatly disadvantage any challengers in the subsequent voting process. In short, the choices imposed by a transitional authority through these preliminary non-democratic processes will likely have a lasting impact. If so, can the ultimate result fairly be considered a consultative democracy? If not, is the transitional effort irredeemably flawed? Whether and how much to consult the public in the various stages of creating governmental institutions is an issue that has challenged the United Nations in Afghanistan, East Timor, and Iraq—arguably its most ambitious transitional projects to date.

III. High Standards and Local Capacity, or "Just Good Enough for Government Work"

The first two tensions arguably arise from the need by the intervening force to establish immediate and effective control, provide a safe and secure environment, and, at the same time, cede some level of control to local actors as soon as possible. In other words, these tensions highlight the challenges of being a "benevolent occupying force." In a state where there is an absence of meaningful democratic participation, the occupying force must turn over control to local actors who may lack the capacity to implement the

kind of complicated governmental design that best meets the ideals of democratic principles. The newly transformed state may also lack the resources or infrastructure to deliver to its citizens the services typically associated with democratic governments, such as free access to education on a non-discriminatory basis, access to health care, and the means and security to meaningfully participate in civil society. The tension can only be resolved by privileging certain characteristics of government, setting minimum goals based on that modeling, and recognizing that some needs will simply be unmet by the transitional government.[32]

In addition to providing interesting examples and analysis of these tensions at work, Chesterman also emphasizes the untenable position in which the United Nations is placed by yet another tension: that between the circumstances of state-building and fundamental U.N. principles. State-building represents intervention at its most extreme: the remaking of a state from the ground up. Such a complicated exercise benefits from as much planning and preparation as possible. The U.N. Charter, on the other hand, identifies as key principles the peaceful resolution of disputes, the sovereign equality of all states, and the right of all states to political independence.[33] Moreover, the Charter expressly states that, absent authorization under Chapter VII,[34] "[n]othing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state."[35] Absent a Security Council decision that the United Nations must take action, is it proper for the Secretariat to undertake planning to remake the government of a member state? Whatever course it takes, the United Nations is open to legitimate criticism: either it has anticipated and therefore facilitated intervention, or it has failed to undertake necessary planning and consequently is less effective in the transitional process. This philosophical conundrum is only exacerbated in situations where a powerful member state like the United States announces its intent to undertake regime-change, with or without the authorization of

32. For example, a state might privilege women's access to government and impose a gender quota on the make-up of the representative body. At the same time, the public might recognize that schooling for girls is not socially or financially possible, and excuse the government from providing that resource, even as it acknowledges that girls will have a difficult time effectively using their vote in future elections without a proper education.

33. U.N. CHARTER art. 2.

34. Chapter VII provides for the Security Council to order action in response to a threat to or breach of international peace and security. *Id.* arts. 39–42.

35. *Id.* art. 2, para. 7.

the United Nations, as the United States did in the case of Iraq;[36] While planning to assist in the post-intervention transition would have been a prudent move on the part of the U.N, it would have sent a mixed message of approval or acceptance of the inevitability of the U.S. invasion plan.

IV. Conclusion

As was noted earlier in this Review, Chesterman successfully demonstrates not only that state-building is a difficult undertaking, but also that the ideal of democratic transformation must inevitably be compromised in light of the realities and challenges of implanting democracy in a society with no tradition of participatory government. Chesterman also succeeds in describing the continuing self-education process at the United Nations; as it struggles to cope with transitional duties in a wide variety of circumstances, it tries to learn how to do the job better. In Chesterman's view, however, change is unlikely to come from within, because "[l]earning from such lessons has not . . . been one of the strengths of the United Nations."[37]

Chesterman is perhaps too hard on the United Nations. Many of the lessons he wishes its members and leaders would learn remain unclear. For example, the United Nations has yet to determine how best to deal with the national self-interest of its member states, which controls its ability to act. This limitation means that U.N. planning may be rendered an exercise in frustration if member states choose not to participate in the transitional process by providing security forces, necessary technical expertise, diplomatic support, or monetary or other resources. Similarly ambiguous is the lesson of how to approach the United Nations' relationship with the United States, currently the most dominant state actor. This raises a different set of even more troubling issues, not the least of which is the U.S. tendency, at least in the recent past and likely in the foreseeable future, to view the United Nations as an agent of U.S. policy, which can be called on to implement its goals. Thus, while the United Nations "may never again be called upon to

36. *See, e.g.*, President's Address to the United Nations General Assembly in New York, *supra* note 13, at 1533 (noting that the United States "must stand up for [its] security" and inviting the other U.N. member states to "make that stand, as well"); *see also* Toby Harden, *US will attack Iraq without UN backing*, Telegraph, Jan. 10, 2003 (quoting a U.S. official as saying that failure to reach consensus at the United Nations was not a bar to U.S. military action), *available at* http://news.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/News/2003/01/10/wirq110.xml.

37. Chesterman, *supra* note 1, at 256.

repeat operations comparable to Kosovo and East Timor, where it exercised sovereign powers on a temporary basis,"[38] the result is both good news and bad news for future U.N. transition efforts, because less responsibility for the failures of occupation necessarily means diminished ability to control the United States and effect positive outcomes.

Chesterman also suggests that the United Nations has failed to learn the lesson that "in those rare situations in which the United Nations and other international actors are called upon to exercise state-like functions, they must not lose sight of their limited mandate to hold that sovereign power in trust for the population that will ultimately claim it."[39] Chesterman has not, however, adequately made the case that this lesson has not been learned. In fact, throughout the book, he acknowledges adjustments to U.N. transitional planning efforts that reflect a desire on the part of mission planners to implement changes based on past experiences. Further, he is very convincing in his arguments that the circumstances of each state-building exercise requires new and unique adaptations to respond to local conditions; if that is true, it is not certain what lessons the United Nations could learn that would equip it to respond optimally in all situations. He also persuades his reader that the very structure of responsibilities of the United Nations means those who are charged with planning and managing the transition may not have at their disposal basic information, such as which states will participate in the nation-building operation and what resources will be provided. Chesterman also successfully argues that the philosophical barriers to planning for a likely but as yet unauthorized intervention are significant; while U.N. missions planners might know, for example, the local leaders who would naturally be expected to participate in a transitional government, it would be unseemly to consult them in the planning process before authorization, and there might well be insufficient time to consult them afterwards. It should be expected that plans developed under less than ideal circumstances will be flawed and it should be accepted that without the ability to plan appropriately, U.N. mission planners will discharge their trust imperfectly. Mission planners know their mandate is limited, but their ability to discharge their obligations more effectively is limited as well. Chesterman offers no suggestions as to changes in structure that could

38. *Id.*

39. *Id.* at 257.

be implemented by the United Nations to overcome these inherent structural and philosophical barriers.

My biggest disappointment with *You the People* is not, however, Chesterman's failure to provide suggestions on how to overcome such limitations. Instead, my disappointment is with the manner in which he presents his insights. As Chesterman suggests throughout the book, the structural and other challenges, as well as the prevailing attitudes of U.N. technocrats, place the United Nations, and in more recent examples, the United States, in the role of "benevolent autocra[t],"[40] doling out nuggets of democracy to the long-suffering masses while at the same time excluding them from full engagement in the transitional process. That the exercise of state-building is unavoidably tainted by overtones of benevolent colonialism does not, however, excuse U.N. transition team members from trying to devise creative means of effectively integrating the local populace into the transition process. Chesterman and I agree on this point. I do, however, fault him for falling into the very same trap; he also, in effect, assumes the same mantle of benevolence as he speaks above and about, but not to, "the people." Thus, instead of writing a book that is addressed directly to the subjects or potential subjects of a state-building effort, Chesterman has written a book for the very people he accuses of not recognizing the needs of the targeted community and of being incapable of learning from past mistakes.

Indeed, an insider tone permeates the entire book: descriptions of historical figures and of previous examples of peace-keeping, peace-making, and state-building are described in snippets, meaningful only to someone intimately familiar with the history of the United Nations. Although a survey of this sort requires brief treatment of background material, I wish that Chesterman had spoken in greater detail about a smaller number of examples in order to make them more meaningful to "the people" who might read his book with the hope of understanding and perhaps influencing a state-building transition in their country. Similarly, Chesterman's ultimate exhortation is for the United Nations and the United States to change their manner of operation; he neither anticipates nor empowers change from outside of the elite, benevolent ranks.

Yet history has demonstrated that change is rarely sparked from within; an outside catalyst is often required to ignite meaningful transformation. Indeed, the very theory that underlies and serves

40. *Id.*

as justification for the extreme measure of state-building is that the situation in a particular country is irredeemable, requiring outside action to force change. It is ironic, therefore, that Chesterman does not recognize and exploit the potential for change to occur through the efforts of outside forces, particularly given the structural and philosophical barriers that prevent U.N. mission planners from consulting with local democratic leaders at key moments in the planning process. Although there may well be barriers of another type, these specific limitations will not hamper the efforts of "the people" to develop their own plans for the transition; thus, why not empower them by providing them with the means to understand and influence the benevolent autocratic process? Chesterman offers no strategies for those external to the process; in effect, he delivers the directive to change to the audience least likely to be inclined to change or able to effectuate that change. In the end, however, Chesterman should be applauded for his very useful exposition on the United Nations' ever-changing role as an agent of transition. Chesterman needs to take the next step and deliver his message to the community most interested in the process and perhaps most willing and able to address its limitations—the everyday people.