The capitalised version of the word Being denotes a noun: a name, the promise of a description - in short, a definition. In existentialism, this kind of defining is manifest as the search for metaphysical ‘essence’; specifically - Man’s essence, or nature. A rock’s essence could be described as ‘a hard unyielding lump of mineral’. A Cat’s essence might be described as ‘a four legged, small, furry domesticated carnivore’. When reaching for a description of Man’s essence, however, there seems to be a fundamental problem. To say: ‘Man is an omnivorous biped, roughly two metres high, good at solving problems and changing his environment’, would be to incite somebody, somewhere, to dispute the statement in some way. This is not an attempt to show mankind as an argumentative animal, only as a way of indicating that each human individual believes himself or herself to be greater than his or her basic human nature - if only as an ‘unrealised’ potential. When Sartre states ‘Existence precedes Essence’ he goes on to explain that:

Of course, if the mode or ‘quality’ of existence (other than physical existence) is dependant on the type of definition a person acquires of himself, then it might be said that, really, Essence precedes Existence. But this argument is an historic existential one, still unresolved, and not the thrust of this essay. However, the differentiation between Essence and Existence has been made, and I will return to Existence later. Sartre above implies that Essence is a particularly personal experience. This is not to suggest that man can choose his own essence - define himself - willy nilly. The definition seems to be automatic, that is to say, definition is the by-product of other forces - though still forces unique and internal to the individual (Heidegger’s Dasein, or Sartre’s Pour-Soi). According to Kierkegaard, Essence is slowly revealed as Dasein makes life-decisions:

He seems here to be stating that it is not the decision itself which is important in revealing Essence, but the process (a kind of soul-searching) which is involved in the choosing of it. In Dostoyevsky’s Crime and Punishment Raskolnikov chooses to become a murderer, but it appears doubtful whether this label really applies to him. Despite the deed, the manner in which he chooses his course shows a rather different character than that of murderer. The days prior to the murder, Raskolnikov probes his whole life, his whole being, in an existential manner similar to that described by Kierkegaard. He shows deep concern for his family, and for strangers. He feels guilt because he is failing them. He is saddened by the acts of inhumanity he witnesses. All these feelings are brought to the surface and made acute by his acts of self questioning, which in turn is brought about by his attempt to come to a decision about the murder. They reveal not the attributes of a cold-blooded man of action (in this case murder), which is the definition he hopes to apply to himself, but of an ordinary, warm, fallible human being. Raskolnikov fails to see this revelation however. He fails for two possible reasons: his anxiety of making the decision - which Kierkegaard describes as ‘the dizziness of freedom, which occurs when freedom looks down into its own possibility’ - blinds him to it. The second reason may be that described by Sartre:

If God is dead, then Man must act in place of God? This appears to be the philosophy of Raskolnikov. Though he contradicts himself many times in the book about his belief in a God, his main actions and drives show him to be trying to define himself as God in the Sartre sense: his inflated feelings of responsibility, and his judgement of the worth of others (particularly that of the victim, Ivanova).

This is a rather troublesome piece of text, for what is the fate that he must accept? What exactly is the thought? And what is its new guise that so terrifies him? Excluding suicide, this other fate might well be (considering his theories of the world thus far revealed in the story) his acceptance of life as a failure - not a god, not an extraordinary person, not Human. By his own yard-stick (that one used to measure Ivanova as ‘unfit to live’) he must condemn himself - if he fails his responsibilities and his challenges. As in Sartre, Raskolnikov attempts to make this self-definition as a kind of god his mode of existence but fails utterly. And then again, Raskolnikov may also be following another of the existentialist definitions when he threatens to "renounce life altogether". Here is where we meet the existential border of essence and existence. According to Heidegger only man truly exists, for only man is able to define his own essence: rocks, animals - even angels - all ‘are’, but their essence - their natures - are all fixed, therefore they do not ‘exist’ in an existential way. Therefore, if there is a god, then there is a threat that he has fixed man’s nature in some way so that he has no choice - the future has been mapped, and man is caught in a web which threatens his ‘existence’, for he becomes reduced to a machine, like an animal, following an imposed course. But if there is no god, then man must pick up his responsibility, and map his own future, define his own essence. This makes the freedom of choice very important indeed. Sartre seems to make Raskolnikov’s dilemma clearer when he states that:

Raskolnikov knows that murder is wrong, but understands that it is an ‘antecedent’ wrong. He feels the freedom, and the necessity, to make this murder right by choosing it so. Sartre modifies his previous statement by adding that the act of choosing what is right should be tempered by the knowledge that it can only be ‘right’ if it is for the good of all. And Raskolnikov tries to temper his choosing of the rightness of this murder by visualising how it can as Sartre specifies: eg. the victim is a social parasite, her daughter’s life is made a misery by her, Raskolnikov can help a lot of people’s lives with the money he steals, etc etc. However, there is still more. The existential need to exist ‘authentically’ means not to simply accept existence, but to ‘lay hold’ of it - one must exist in the full sense, or let it slip away. In the kantian sense, authentic means the rejection of an externally imposed set of codes and morals - in the Sartrean sense, rejection of ‘objective’ practical reasons for behaviour. Raskolnikov’s dilemma then, seems to be his fear of becoming less than human - a machine - if he fails to do what he has chosen is the TRUE right - that which an external code has labelled WRONG. His choice then is to be authentic, to grasp his existence by accepting the challenge to define himself, or to accept the values of an imposed order and renounce life - renounce existence, become a machine. Put another way, his choice is that of renouncing god or himself.

In the above I have crossed over from essence (Being) into existence (being). Or to be more truthful, I have bridged the definitions. In order to exist, it is seen that one must first define their essence. But to choose - the method of definition - one must first exist (a rock has essence - it has a nature, but because it cannot choose, it does not exist!) This is a difficult concept. What is existence?

this question is firstly best approached from the idea of essence. A rock has essence, and we judge a rock (as it cannot judge itself), by how well it adears to the concept of ‘rockiness’ - eg: hard, cold, inanimate and mineral - these characteristics make up its essence. A tiger is judged to be a good one (by its potential mate, perhaps), by the colour and pattern of its fur, its size, its smell, and its ability to survive (to name just a few), so in order for a tiger to be successful and propagate its genes, it needs to demonstrate these characteristics of tigerness as effectively as possible. In the case of the tiger (a rock being too inanimate), it continually strives to be a ‘good’ tiger. On the other hand, existentialists state that man is different to every other animate or inanimate object in the way he is continually striving to ‘break-out’ or change himself or his environment. Where the essence of all other things is static, man’s essence is primarily ec-static - he is a dynamic being, resisting all attempts of classification. This is to imply that the essence of man is to have ‘no’ fixed essence. Thus comes the link between ‘Being’ and ‘being’: noun = fixed, constant, stable; and verb = action, doing, movement, dynamism. As McQuarrie argues, existence comes from the Greek ex-sistence, or ‘standing out’. Man stands out from his surroundings. Though all things - rocks, tigers, the world, and god(?) stand-out from nothing, man stands out even from these by the way he is able to be self-aware, and take control of his destiny - be aware of what he is, and what he may become. Heidegger’s existenz, translated from the german as meaning: potential being. Only man exists, for only man asks the question: "who am I", before setting-out on a quest in order to answer his own question. There is no conception of being a ‘good human’ like there is for being a good rock, for all judgements are based on rules defined purely by humans. So, in the act of transcending himself and his surroundings in order to define himself, man achieves existence. In this way we understand how all other things in the world lack existence, as they are all in unity with each other by having static essences (even god’s essence is - by definition - omni-fixed), and these combine to make up ‘the world’.

With this basic premise of existence made clear, it is possible to move on to the two main modes of existing: being-in-the-world, and being-with-others. What Buber refers to as the I-Thou, I-It states. ‘being’ -in-the-world is perhaps better described as being in-relation to the world, or even being standing-out from the world - and the description of this (I-It state) is as already described above. The being-with-others, or perhaps being standing-out from others (I-Thou state), is fairly similar in concept. Sartre’s concept of each person wanting to be god is (as he admits) doomed to frustration while other people are around, for there can only be one god. In the I-It state, man stands out from the world. Logically, if there is no world, there can be nothing to stand-out from - thus existence is dependent upon there being ‘a world’. Similarly, in the I-Thou state, if there is no-one to stand-out from, existence is threatened also. This is a paradox: if the ideal state for being a god is a world with no other people, then it is a state that itself frustrates the god-head - for without other people, the existent ceases to be anything, least of all, a god. In Crime and punishment, Raskolnikov tries to define himself as this god by abandoning society’s codes for his own, but fails by suffering guilt. He thinks this failure is due to his inability to abandon the external system, but is this a correct assumption on his part. Raskolnikov’s retreat into himself shortly before and after his crime, seems to bear witness to this god-drive as it can be explained as renouncing the existence of others in order to claim the divine status. Thus his shocking treatment of his friends and family, (let alone the murder itself), can be accounted for in a person ordinarily (and even simultaneously) quite strongly attached to these sort of human relationships. However, the reason for his failure to avoid guilt can be found by examining the existentialist definition of the I-Thou state of existence. Raskolnikov believed that to make his existence authentic, he had to abandon the established moral code and commit murder, by doing this he set himself up as a god. However, it is seen that being a god produces alienation. This itself results in an in-authentic existence of the I-thou state, for social isolation breaks the link solicitude. In order to be an individual requires that there is someone other to be individual from. As Buber specifies:

So, if man is nothing without others, to be god is to be nothing. Conversely, Heidegger suggests that ‘everyone is the other, and nobody is himself’. But if everybody is ‘the other’, then ‘I’ am the other too - but this can only lead logically to the conclusion that every other is an ‘I’, so that ‘I’ and ‘thou’ become one. Is this the ideal society - and the ultimate authentic existence? is god discovered by turning away from the other to seek infinity, or by embracing the other and finding god in the finite? An answer seems to be suggested by Dostoyevsky. For by turning away from others to find god, he gains I-It authenticity but loses I-Thou authenticity. However, by choosing to accept his punishment, though it accepts external values, it is the choice which keeps the act an I-It authentic one, while simultaneously authenticating the I-Thou existence by his giving-up the god-head and embracing the existence of others. It is implied then that the reason Raskolnikov felt guilt was not because he could not step-over external moral values, but that he could not step-over his own moral values. For if everyone is the other, and everyone is ‘I’, what is wrong in the eyes of others is also wrong in the individual ones. It was his own guilt that Raskolnikov experienced, not a foreign one - and the crime was against himself.