West African Emigration to Italy and the U

Many of the authors I have read have referred to the history of migration in vague terms and it is impossible for me to summarize the issue adequately here, but an attempt based on the sparse literature will be made. While there is a lot literature on internal migration patterns in West African societies, investigations and reports on international migration are limited to not more than a few authors (Adepoju, Amin and Forde, Zachariah and VanHear). For this reason the research reviewed here is superficial and vague and many of the hypothesis that come from it are guesses from studies done of American migration.

Before colonialism there were some migration patterns in West Africa, particularly into areas of Ghana (Zachariah 31; Adepoju 60). The biggest migrations in the area occurred when the colonists came as people moved escaping forced migration, war and famine or because of labor recruitment (Zachariah 31; Adepoju 65). The colonists needed manpower and soldiers and so would force whole groups into labor (Zachariah 31). They would require taxes of the natives, forcing them to move to the city for temporary employment (sometimes for many months) in order to earn the currency necessary to pay the taxes. When Ghana developed, it became the primary country of immigration in the region, with Upper Volta providing the majority of the immigrants (idem). This continued until in 1935 the Ivory Coast experienced great growth in its developments and Ghana became the second nation of immigrant choice (idem).

When forced labor was abolished immigrant streams continued as regions such as Nigeria, Togo and Upper Volta had established migration as a means of sustenance (ibid, 32). Many of the immigrants did return to their homelands, but they would quickly return because of the bleak economic circumstances there (idem). In 1951, migrants from Upper Volta were induced to emigrate to the Ivory Coast by the establishment of an employer labor recruitment organization that had formed there. This organization was abolished with the independence of the colony and its establishment as a nation, but migrants still relied on jobs there and continued to migrate. This is indicative of the establishment of migrant streams by governments and recruitment institutions, which is of particular importance in the context of Europe as many of the migrant streams that exist today were established by labor recruitment efforts of those countries to help rebuild after the war (Borchardt 3).

Nigerians have traditionally emigrated to other parts of Africa for years to find better fishing and better crops (Ekanem, 257; Adepojou, 36, 60, 81). Ghanaians have not traditionally had general tendencies to emigrate, but that because of the economic difficulties of the early 70’s it has become more and more the norm for their society (Adepojou, 70). It is therefore my intent in pursuing this study to better understand the historical context of emigration and its place in these societies.

Samir Amin and Daryll Forde conducted a number of studies of West African migration, which they presented at the Eleventh International African Seminar in Dakar on April 1972. In this work, they cite that up to that point there had been little sociological analysis done on the effects of migration on the societies there (and I have been unable to locate any since). They then hypothesize that

Money remitted by migrants serves to enhance their positions in the ‘traditional’ status system of the village or origin: ostentatious expenses, rising marriage costs, etc., thus reinforcing the traditional structures. This is certainly neither because the Africans do not have the same conceptions (about money among other things) as the Europeans, which is thoughtlessly believed by superficial observers, nor because they are unrelenting ‘traditionalists’, but simply because there is no other alternative (103).

Amin and Forde further state that the societies that are left behind by the emigrants are subsequently impoverished, stimulating more emigration, and that these societies then revert to traditionalist structures as a coping strategy against poverty (idem). But they are vague as to what structures they are speaking of. They state that, in the context of their study (during the 1970’s), migrants were not able to contribute much to their home communities in the way of development projects and enterprises because of the severe lack of infrastructure to be provided by the government to support such projects and because the migrants lacked the managerial skills to operate them. When they are able to establish private enterprise such as shops or stores, it is difficult for the citizens to work with the returned migrants by paying cash for the products because there is a lack of wage labor for the residents and they depend on the cash provided from remittances of their relative migrants. Migration is generally responsible for the stagnation of development of the home communities, according to the paradigm of Amin and Forde. They are probably thinking of Upper Volta as an example but which would be invalid due to too many other factors contributing to poverty. This is a particularly interesting theory as it offers us a framework to compare contemporary studies and data to it to then form our own hypotheses.

There are many conflicts as to the regularization of immigration statistics, especially in Africa where accurate figures are impossible to attain (Asante, 23; Adepoju, 20; Fadloullah, 18). Ghana is probably the closest among the West African nations to approximate its migration figures as its record keeping has improved to appease the authorities at the IMF. Nigeria at this point has no way to know of its emigrant populations and even its domestic population is difficult to know for sure as the current figure of 120 million is just the best guess of NGO’s and foreign governments (Singer, 2). Nigeria has been left out of a number of studies because of the controversies regarding the accuracy of its census and the lack of data on migration in the census (Zachariah, 3, 15).

There are various methods of data collection and a lack of comprehensiveness and accuracy of figures. The methodology of data collection varies significantly. Jonathan Coppel states that

“International comparisons, notwithstanding great efforts by the United Nations to collect data based on a common approach, are even more difficult, given the diversity of sources, lack of common definitions and the different compilation methods used. In particular, some OECD countries define the immigrant population as those of foreign nationality, whereas others count the number of foreign-born persons. In the former case, the stock of migrants in the overall population tends to be lower because naturalized citizens are not considered to be immigrants. This, however, is not always the case, as some countries have nationality laws which limit the scope for foreigners, even for their children who are born in the host country, to become naturalized citizens” (6)

Some non-profit agencies have counted larger numbers of immigrants than the numbers given by the government. It is most important, especially in the context of this paper, to keep in mind that these figures reflect the numbers of registered, legal immigrants only. Because of the family unity goals of Italy and the United Kingdom, there is a tendency for most of the legal immigrants to be dependents (women or children) of visa holding immigrants. Therefore existing statistics are not necessarily relevant to the population to be studied by this endeavor (i.e. working men). As the laws for immigration become more restrictive immigrants who have temporary, economic intentions have less incentive to register themselves or enter legally, especially if there is danger of being deported in the process. Indeed, it is often to the advantage of the immigrant to remain clandestine, as they are more attractive to employers who wish to avoid paying taxes and union or state regulated wages.

Nonetheless, migrants are not always able to hide from the authorities and some find it in their best interest to apply for legal status in the host country. Hagan observes that the tendency among Mexican migrants in the United States is to seek legalization as others in their community of peers do so. As one of the migrants becomes familiar with the process and tells their friends of the advantages of legalization, others feel induced to do so also. But these statistics are still problematic in comparing different populations because some immigrants have greater tendencies to migrate illegally than others do. This could especially be the case for newer migrant streams into Italy as Italy constrains her borders in attempting to appease the EU by complying with the Schengen accords.

Ghana attracted migrants in the 1960’s because it was the first to gain independence and had a booming economy (Adepoju 43). In 1969 12.3% of the population were immigrants (65) but as the economy tightened it was decided to expel all immigrants that year (VanHear, 73). As a result there were labor shortages in Ghana and the economy continued to collapse, along with the political stability (ibid 74).

As Ghana was facing great burdens in the early 1970’s, the Nigerian economy picked up with an oil industry that was able to provide the nation with growing and expansive social services (Adepoju, 43; VanHear, 72). That decade, nine West African countries signed the ECOWAS treaty that would encourage free trade among the nations, as well as free migration (Adepoju 62, 77). Many of the migrants that ensued were undocumented, and there were huge numbers of them in Nigeria, mostly from Ghana (ibid 66, VanHear 72). Ghanaians went very quickly from having very low propensities of emigration to becoming an emigration nation (Adepoju 70). But as oil prices dove and the state overspent or extorted its resources, it was decided that it was time to expel the Ghanaians and all other West Africans who did not have permission for long-term residence (VanHear 76). In 1983, 700,000 Ghanaians were expelled from Nigeria; then again in 1985 another 100,000 were sent back to their homes (VanHear 72, 77). It was demanded that the immigrants leave within a month, which caused great chaos (ibid 76). As migration to other West African countries became increasingly problematic, more individuals migrated outside of the region, especially to Europe (VanHear, 78). But now that the economy of Ghana has picked up these last years and there has been a restoration of democratic rule, Ghana has become one of the leading countries in Africa. Therefore many migrants will be returning to their homes in Ghana and Ghanaians will be less likely to leave. But Nigerians may have been more inclined to emigrate since the late 80’s when it’s economy had become more bleak.

Ghanaian migrants have started to return home and emigrate less because of the economic and political development in their country. Nigerians have started to emigrate more since the economic disturbances of the mid-80’s.

At this point it is impossible to test this effectively from the United States over the Internet and through correspondence. Specific statistics on immigrant flows of Ghanaians and Nigerians into the U.K. are not published. It is hoped that this information will be available at the statistical offices or that the data was kept by Ghanaian and Nigerian offices and can be had there.

In 1985, the Italian Prime Minister Craxi was able to identify a source of terrorist attacks at the University of Perugia among foreigners there (Veugelers, 37). During this time there were a number of terrorist bombs and attacks, such as the bombs at the airport in Rome and at the train station in Bologna, each killing hundreds of people. This period is commonly known in Italy as “gli anni di piombo” or the years of lead (referring to lead shrapnel and bullets). The public associated terrorism and therefore crime with all immigrants, especially those “musilmanacci” (evil muslims). Notwithstanding these sentiments, pro-immigrant associations such as labor unions and Christian volunteer organizations were able to launch a huge campaign to explain that immigrants are good for the economy and that they do not steal jobs (ibid, 38). This marketing helped to pass Italy’s first important immigration legislation, the Martelli law. The Martelli law gave amnesty to hundreds of thousands of illegal immigrants that arrived before 1989. The amnesty enraged some of the public, as in Florence, where there were street riots and violence against immigrants forcing the mayor and the whole city council to resign. The rioters associated the immigrants with criminals and claimed that the amnesty of the Martelli law had triggered waves of immigrants into La Patria (Wolman, 5). There has also been a tremendous rise in the popularity of the fascist right wing Lega Nord and Alleanze Nazionale parties in the elections of the past few years, both of which run a very anti-immigrant platform.

At the turn of the century in the U.K., many of the working class were against immigration (Garrard, 71). Because of the anti-immigrant rhetoric of the previous election, in 1911 there were riots that destroyed more than 30 laundries of a Chinese community in Cardiff (May, 111). Later, in 1958, racial tension arose again when a fight started in a bar because a white woman was talking to a black man. The resulting rioting lasted over a week (The Times (London) “Renewed Racial Disturbances in London” 09/02/58. The Times (London) ‘“Keep Britain White’ call in Notting Hill Area” 09/10/58). In 1981 in Brixton there was what was described as one of the most substantial riots of the century in the U.K. It started when the police decided to stop all black young men in response to the rise in crime in the area. One evening as a police office was trying to help a stab victim who was a black man, he was accosted by bottles, etc. The next day rioting started when another black man was taken away for suspicion of possession of drugs. In the end hundred of people were injured, many cars destroyed and businesses burned (BBC Online, London Live).

When there was an overflow of asylum applicants from Sri Lanka because of the civil war, many claimed that they were bogus applicants just looking for a better job. There were statements made that “colored people will stop at nothing” and that they are subversive (Miles, 25).

It is assumed that the kind of experience that the migrant has overseas will affect their influence on their home communities when they return. Their experience overseas is not just a product of the conditions the receiving society puts the migrant communities into, but the choices and structures of the migrants themselves.

MacDonald and Portes in their extensive research of immigrants in the United States have constructed models and completed research on ethnic, immigrant communities in host nations (45-67; 102-124). They describe tight societies where the individuals gain access to the resources in the host community (the United States) through heavy reliance on friends who arrived there before them (referred to as padroni). Enclaves form in specific localities in the host country. They are started as a member or few members of an emigrating source community travel to the host country and establish themselves with the means for securing the resources they had traveled to the host to procure. It is these niches that establish the anchor for the proliferation of networks between the two nations that facilitate and precipitate migration. This link establishes where immigrant communities will form. Since enclave localities form over strong personal ties between the old immigrants and the new, and family ties are stronger than most other personal ties, these niches tend to form not necessarily according to the origin of the immigrants, as family ties can sometimes span different home communities, but according to the composition of the community and who the immigrant knows in it (MacDonald 34). These communities provide for them their jobs, a home as well as a psychological support system. The community often serves as a surrogate family. Many enclaves attempt to reproduce the social conditions or traditions of their hometowns. The more marginalized the immigrants are by the host country, the more localized and segregated these communities are (Boyd 67). When these communities are very homogeneous or dense and large, there are extremely strong social ties that allow for effective sanctions on members’ behaviors (Portes 105). This can regulate behavior such as crime, cheating the community of resources, not helping others in the community or diverging from the social norms of the traditional society. When these enclaves are in a dense and populous stage, they tend to seek to preserve their identity to such a degree that they can become more fundamentalist than their home communities (Massey 44, Alba 82).

Understanding Nigerian and Ghanaian enclaves in Europe can add to our understanding of the effects of the migrants’ experiences on their home communities. It can clarify why we find large populations of Ghanaians and Nigerians in seemingly hostile environments and allow us to perceive the contexts of their migrant experience.

Enclave communities are strong and a key characteristic for the success of Ghanaians and Nigerians in Europe and these enclaves heavily regulate the immigrants’ behavior.

Because of the lack of social support provided by the state migrants have come to increasingly rely on enclaves and those networks for support (Adepoju 42). Familial and personal ties have taken the place of the state in providing the structure necessary for subsistence. Ekeh’s essay on patrimonialism in African politics has described a society in which one’s personal obligations to the community and financially supporting one’s relatives and friends are of the utmost importance and of priority in African societies (96). As defined by Bratton, patramonialism is when

Relationships of loyalty and dependence pervade a formal political and administrative system and leaders occupy bureaucratic offices less to perform public service than to acquire personal wealth and status. The distinction between private and public interests is purposely blurred. The essence of neopatrimonialism is the award by public officials of personal favors, both within the state (notably public sector jobs) and in society (for instance, licenses, contacts, and projects). In return for material rewards, clients mobilize political support and refer all decisions upward as a mark of deference to patrons (458).

When an individual gains access to a public service job and therefore has access to public goods or resources, it is expected that he will share these resources with his family and friends in order to support them. Even when the job pays very poorly many expectations and financial burdens of his family and friends in the village are placed upon him. These social norms may also exist very strongly in enclave communities as the padrone or big man is expected to go to great lengths to share his success with his family and friends who follow him to the host country. If the enclave community sanctions are effective and Massey and Alba’s generalization of such communities is correct, then the community will be more fundamentalist than at home and there may be even greater demands on the big man in these niches than there are in the source country.

When groups are marginalized in society and excluded in any way from full participation in the labor force it is more likely that these immigrants will resort to informal means to attain their financial goals (Portes). If many of the members resort to this strategy, and the community is tightly knit with strong sanction potentials of the enclave, then there can be much regulation of the activity by the community (Portes 119). Since it is assumed that there is a large amount of informal migration to Europe (as described by Samura’s documentary) and much informal employment then the activities of the immigrants must be effectively regulated by strong enclave sanctions. There is an invested interest for the enclave to keep a strong regulation of these activities, as their discovery by the host authorities can have damaging effects on the whole community. This provides the venue for the strong enclave ties to operate and manifest as well as the impetus for them to be effective and enforced.

In the context of migration between Ghana and Nigeria there were strong chain and group migrations as family and friends (mostly males) moved together and encouraged each other’s migration (Adepoju 42, 72). Once in the host country, they established new communities that were “extensions of home” and that provided strong support for their work (idem, VanHear 76). Ghanaians and Nigerians both maintained their own separate communities when they were immigrants and preserved their cultural habits (Adepoju 72). Personal kinship obligations dominated the nature of the migrants’ remittances and strategies and everything they did was to help their friends and family (Fadloullah 42).

Traditionally in the modern relations among nations in West Africa, there has been a tendency for countries with a French colonial legacy and countries of an Anglo legacy to unite and have relations among themselves (Aryeetey) as can be seen by the economic unions and multi-national organizations that have formed among Mali, Côte d’Ivoire, Senegal, etc. (32). Adepoju states that much of the migration between West African countries has been between countries that share the same colonial legacy (62). From data collected from the statistical office of Italy, it seems that most Ghanaians and Nigerians can be found in the same cities and are nearly absent in others (www.istat.it). Where these niches exist, there is a low population of immigrants of Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire, both with franco legacies.

Relations among enclaves are according to national and cultural relationships of sending countries.

It would probably not be possible to extend this so far as to say that there are multi-national, culturally similar enclaves, because (in viewing Chart 4 of “Data and Charts of Immigrants in Italy”) we see that where there are high populations of Ghanaians, there are also less Nigerians, et vice versa. The only place where this is not the case is in Mantova, where Senegalese dominate the African population and from where many Nigerians and Ghanaians commute to Brescia and Verona for employment (from personal experience). There may also be some lingering resentment and distrust between Nigerians and Ghanaians as a result of the mutual expulsion orders of the respective others populations (see VanHear and Adepoju). It may be interesting to explore the relationships between populations that are particularly targeted for hate by some Italians (the Albanians because of the great number of illegal immigrants and refugees and North Africans because of the numerous terrorist attacks during the 70’s and 80’s) and the black Africans (see Chart 2 of “Data and Charts of Immigrants in Italy”a), as there may be resentment of the former for the latter, the black Africans being the minority of the minorities and looked down upon by many of those immigrants in their home countries (particularly Moroccan, who have difficulties with clandestine immigration from West Africa to Europe through their borders). The relationship between different black communities will also be interesting to note in London, where there is a great increase of African migrants (Charts 4-6 in “Data and Charts of Immigrants in the United Kingdom”).

Even though there is a greater number of West African immigrants in Rome (Chart 4 of “Data and Charts of Immigrants in Italy”), I have chosen to study the niches of Verona because I want to observe how immigrant enclaves behave where there is a high level of stress against them and potential marginalization, as there is in the north with the domination of extreme right anti-immigrant political parties in those regions. In these conditions the enclave communities are more important and are probably the strongest. Though it may depend on the context and character of the immigrants. It may be that upon first arrival to Europe, many new immigrants choose to go to Rome where there are more migrants and where there is more English spoken. If my hypothesis about the waves of migrants is correct and that most new migrants are Nigerian, then it can be seen that Rome has more new migrants by virtue of the fact that there are considerably more Nigerians there. It could be that this is a city of transition where the migrants learn the language and the culture until they can better compete for better jobs in the north. The economy is much healthier in the north. And if it is migrant jobs and wages that are hurt the most with the higher number of immigrants (Coppel, 16; Borjas 20), then it makes sense that migrants would want to eventually move on to the more lucrative regions in the north. These cities in the north may also be just another step in the migrants’ travels to more lucrative jobs and extensive enclaves in the United Kingdom.

West African migrants intend to stay for relatively short periods of time in European countries.

Professor Waldinger in his work on immigrants in Los Angeles states that most migrants come to a host country with a financial goal in mind and have the intentions of staying until that goal is reached (25). Most migrants have temporary intentions in their stay, but this stay will often extend beyond the intended time (Borjas). With the development of enclaves, immigration can become more established and permanent. Migrants are predominantly male, even in African societies (Zachariah, 45). After they have established themselves in the host communities, they will send for their wives and family to join them. If the migrant has a visa for stay, Italian immigration law puts a high priority on family unity policies that allow for easy and quick visa attainment for immediate relatives of legal visa holders or refugees (with the passage of the Martelli laws in 1991) (Jenks, 4). This is probably difficult for most Africans because of the costs of flying the family to the country but if my guess that Ghanaians dominated the first wave of migration and that Nigerians a contemporary second then we should see more Ghanaian women then Nigerian women in Italy. But this is not the case (see Chart 1 of “Data and Charts of Immigrants in Italy”). This could be because of alleged high levels of Nigerian prostitution. Zachariah states that Ghanaians have traditionally stayed in other West African host countries for a shorter period of time than Nigerians (36) but it would be surprising to see Nigerian having established permanent communities that exceed those of Ghanaians in Italy in such a short time.

It will be interesting to test this hypothesis by seeking the census data in Ghana to see how long most migrants are gone and what percentages of them are permanent migrants. Hopefully they will have specific data for European migrations, though this will probably be very difficult to address as there is probably much informal and undocumented movement.

The enclave conditions can have important implications for the migrant experience. If the enclaves are effective, then the amount of remittances sent back home can be greater and the tendency for long-term migration will also increase. The relationships fostered in these communities may also be transferred to the home communities and therefore may extend traditional ties to outside the bounds of locality or family.

Studies have shown that the majority of remittances sent by migrants are used by the receiving communities for consumer products instead of being invested (the key to development) (Boyd 23). This leads to the receiving countries having high reliance on the remittances for their subsistence. But Asch points out that even though this money is used for normal goods in daily life, this helps to alleviate poverty, satisfy their basic needs and allow them to be healthier and more productive in the labor they perform in their own economies (14). Evidence of these benefits may be inferred from south American studies that show that families that receive remittances have a higher percentage of children that attend school then those who do not (35). These remittances also help the economy because it allows part of the foreign exchange to benefit the people who need it the most, and not just sustain the political elites who sometimes manipulate the markets for their own personal benefits in attaining luxury goods (idem). There is much benefit from these funds for the nation as a whole (Adepoju 76). When the funds are transferred through formal means, financial institutions may benefit because it provides them funds to lend to investors (205), even though it may be that much of the funds and goods arrive to the home community through informal means outside of banking. A study in Pakistan estimates that 50% of all remittances arrive informally (35), but this may be different for West Africans due to the long distances between Africa and Europe and therefore the rarity of personal visits that would allow handheld gifts and packages that include clothing and money. Individuals in the community can also benefit as they can do personal services for the receiving family, such as childcare, and have another source of income (idem). These funds can be very important for families and they may use emigration as a diversification of income resources strategy in order to maintain subsistence stability (Stark 10; Asch 13). Because better-educated migrants have more potential of sending higher remittances, families will invest in a child’s education so that they can then send their remittances home as a form of payback (36). Though it is difficult for the emigrants to justify their leaving a society that helped to contribute to their education and causing a social loss (or brain drain). The financial loss is compensated for with remittances, but the social loss is not (12).

It is difficult to determine for a fact the amount of remittances a country receives both because of the high rate of informal transfers and because of the differing manners in which data is collected. Asch states that “Some countries include remittances as a separate line item in the balance of payments, others combine them with cash transfers, and still others combine them with transfers in cash and kind” (35). Therefore conclusive, quantitative analysis would take too much original research to explore with this project.

The way in which Amin and Forde state that remittances cause the societies to be more traditional is very interesting, though it is merely a hypothesis and not empirically based. But exploring some of the effects that remittances can have on the emigrant sending society can be very useful, especially in terms of economic development.

Borchardt agrees with Amin and Forde that emigrants can impoverish the sending community (3), but he also shows that emigrants upon their return can have a wonderful influence on development projects.

In addition to the effects of remittances, migrants have a tremendous positive effect on their home communities by initiating development projects and initiatives that accelerate economic growth in their home communities.

In the context of migration from Morocco, Borchardt observes that these projects can be more effective then project started by NGO’s or the government (5). Part of this reason is because of the degree of cooperation and community participation that is required (idem). Adepoju also states that such projects were also started by migrants in West Africa (75). Amin and Forde posit that private endeavors in West Africa are useless because of the lack of infrastructure available to sustain such projects by the migrants and many become frustrated and never complete them (104), but this was in the context of migration in the early 1970’s, and much of the fundamental infrastructure such as roads and electricity may now be available to such a degree that these projects can be successful (especially in the more developed Ghana). Asch recognizes this and states that “the migrant is aware of the lack of infrastructure for their business ventures, but remittances and earnings from overseas still contribute to projects and they are started anyways” (196). These projects don’t have to be just for the direct public good, but also private endeavors can be helpful as they provide employment in the home community, as was observed by Asch’s study of the effects of emigration (172).

An aspect of West African migration that may be particularly interesting is the social effect that migration has on the sending community. Borchardt discussed the effects of “cultural transfers” and changes to social structures and norms with a “new significance of time and money” (5). Such perspectives were vehemently protested by Amin and Forde, but with no empirical support (103). With the expulsions of Nigerians from Ghana, immigrants returned and brought new crops and contributed to a “breakdown of social rigidities that hinder economic change” (Adepoju, 75). Asch discusses in her research summaries that migrants are affected by the experience of migration in that they become more cosmopolitan and open in their way of perceiving the world (173). The migrant becomes more sophisticated.

One of the reasons which Amin and Forde give for the failure of migrant projects is their lack of managerial training due to the fact that in receiving countries they are the ultimate proletariat and receive no experience that expands their skills (104). But according to Asch evidence suggests that while away emigrants do upgrade their skills and have better jobs and make more contributions with these skills on return (210). In this way, the migrant becomes more educated while abroad. The perceptions or horizons of the migrant are expanded because of their experience living in a more developed country.

While it is true that the returnees may be perceived as outsiders because they have taken on new western characteristics in their experience abroad, this may not have too much of a large effect as usually this society wants to be more like the west in its success (177). If it were possible to measure such a thing with this project, it would be interesting to study the social effects from a migrant who has been in a socially segregated, racist receiving country. But because higher exclusion of the receiving country gives rise to tighter enclave communities, and these enclave communities tend to be more traditionalist than the home societies, it could be that the effect is that traditional values and norms are reinforced by the importance placed on them by the returning migrant.

Another interesting effect addressed by Asch in the context of Philippinos is the changes that migration can have on the stability of familial relationships (208). In comparing this to the situation in the Dominican Republic it seems that the effects on the family are mixed: in Philippino societies, family relationships stay the same, but in the Dominican Republic, they are worsened (207).

The proposed hypotheses, if true, will all influence social change in the home communities. Strong enclave communities will contribute to the solidarity and national identity of Nigerians and Ghanaians while development projects will stimulate growth in these communities. While in Ghana, concentration of the study will be on a few specific towns at which point the research question itself will be changed to specify Ghana. From contacts made in Italy and London, these towns will serve as a case study for the effects that migration has on these communities. It is expected that through more developed study of Ghanaian society and during the course of data collection that the hypotheses will change, possibly dramatically as some will fall out into the periphery of the study, while new observations and subsequent ideas and investigations will yield new insight to this study.

All sources not listed here can be found in the annotated bibliography. These sources have not been annotated because of their exhaustive coverage in previous coursework.

Bratton, Michael and Nicolas Van de Walle. “Neopatrimonial Regimes and Political Transitions in Africa.” World Politics. 46.4. (1994).

Peter Ekeh. “Colonialism and the Two Publics in Africa: A Theoretical Statement.” Comparative Studies in Society and History. 17. Jan 1975.

Massey, Douglas, et al. Return to Aztlan. Berkeley: University of California Press. 1987. Ch 6.

J.S. MacDonald and L. MacDonald. “Chain Migration, Ethnic Neighborhood Formation, and Social Networks.” An Urban World. ed. C. Tilly. Boston: Little, Brown. 1974.

Alehandro Portes. “Economic Sociology and the Sociology of Immigration.” The Economic Sociology of Immigration. 1995.

Jaqualine Maria Hagan. “Social Networks, Gender and Immigrant Settlement: Resource and Constraint.” American Sociological Review. 63(1). 1998.

Monica Boyd. “Family and Personal Networks in International Migration: Recent Developments and New Agendas.” International Migration Review. v. 23, 1989.

Richard Alba and Victor Nee. “Rethinking assimilation theory for a new era of immigration.” International Migration Review. v31, n4. 1997.

George Borjas. “The Economics of Immigration.” Journal of Economic Literature. December 1994.

a in this graph, “Black” is defined as perceived as unassimilatable by Italian society. Their levels of popularity in Italy are so low as to obstruct the possibility of assimilation. African populations have been distinguished from the rest.

West African Emigration to Italy and the U.K.